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Between January 1973 and February 1975 five major constitutional courts in 
the Western world ruled on the abortion issue. The constitutional decisions 
issued by the United States Supreme Court, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court, the French Constitutional Council, the German Federal Consti­
tutional Court, and the Italian Constitutional Court are the point of depar­
ture of this study. In all five cases the question under review was if, and on 
what conditions, a pregnant woman is allowed under the Constitution to 
have an abortion. The answers given to jh is. question by the respective con­
stitutional courts differ on many basic points. Whereas the US Supreme 
Court declared the woman’s fundamental right to have an abortion during the 
fust three months of pregnancy and struck down almost all state abortion 
laws which prohibited abortion in some way, the German Constitutional 
Court, on the contrary, stated that the unbom’s right to life is protected un- 
d$r the Constitution as from the N th  day after conception and declared the 
recently passed abortion reform unconstitutional. The Austrian, French and 
Italian Courts took a less radical position. The Austrian Constitutional 
Court upheld a liberal and the French Constitutional Council a moderate 
abortion reform. The Italian Constitutional Court struck down an old, re­
strictive abortion law, however inm oderate terms.
In the light of these five constitutional decisions on abortion read in con­
junction with the legislative acts in which they resulted, the focus of this 
study is on the fundamental rights-aspecl of the abortion issue by means of a 
comparative approach to abortion adjudication. The central question is: can 
the abortion issue be phrased in constitutional terms, and if so, how? There 
has been a growing tendency in the abortion debate to phrase the abortion is­
sue in constitutional terms. On the one extreme it is claimed that the fetus 
has a right to life and that therefore abortion should not be allowed. On the 
other extreme there is the conviction that the woman’s right to self- deter­
mination gives her the right to abortion on demand throughout pregnancy. 
This tendency to ‘«institutionalize’ the abortion debate has led to a polariza­
tion in views on abortion and has paralyzed the discussion to a great extent, 
because of the impossibility to reconcile these two opposite views based on 
conflicting moral and social values.
What will be done in this study is to analyze closely the constitutional 
validity of the various arguments used in the abortion debate in the light of 
both constitutional theory and constitutional practice.
Whether a pregnant woman can claim a right to interrupt her pregnancy 
will depend on whether the fetus has a fundamental right to life, and if so, 
on how the balance is struck between the right to life o f the fetus and the 
pregnant woman’s right to self-determination in the context of abortion.
Once the right to abortion (in certain circumstances) is recognized, further 
questions arise as to the fundamental rights of others affected by the abortion 
decision of the pregnant woman. Can the husband or partner of the pregnant 
woman, or the parents of a pregnant minor, claim the right to have a say in 
the abortion decision on the basis of their right to family life? Can the doc­
tor who is called to perform or assist at an abortion refuse collaboration or, 
in the opposite case, require freedom from government interference in the 
field of abortion, on the basis of his right to freedom of profession? And, fi­
nally, can the pregnant woman herself claim, on the basis of her right to 
equality, that she be treated in the same way, in terms of public funding, as 
pregnant women giving birth?
Any solution to the abortion issue requires an interpretation and balanc­
ing of these fundamental values.
The enquiry into the constitutional aspects of the abortion issue will pro­
ceed along the following lines:
-  The first step will be to place the constitutional debate in its historical set­
ting. An examination of the history of abortion reform -  i.e. the social, 
religious and political factors which were significant in the evolving of the 
abortion issue -  will enable us to find out what has been the role of the 
(concern with) the fundamental rights just mentioned in this historical pro­
cess, and will therefore help us place the constitutional debate in a broader 
context.
-  Next, the questions just raised as to the fundamental rights involved in the 
abortion decision will be dealt with at a theoretical level. Any analysis of 
the constitutional decisions on abortion requires first of all a clarification of 
the underlying concepts in abstraclo, i.e. a definition of the content and lim­
its of the relevant fundamental rights.
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-  The third step is to analyze the constitutional practice in the light of the 
preceding theoretical discussion. This means to ‘test’ the interpretation given 
to the relevant fundamental values by the five constitutional courts and 
legislators against the preceding theoretical analysis of these values. The 
theoretical framework together with the comparative method will allow a 
critical evaluation of the various constitutional solutions given to the ques­
tion of abortion, an evaluation which is necessary for testing the constitu­
tional soundness of the various national solutions adopted.
-  The last step of this enquiry will be an attempt to formulate explanations 
for the national differences in the constitutional approach to the abortion is­
sue, i.e. for the fact that the question of abortion which presented itself in 
very similar terms in these five countries was nevertheless dealt with in dif­
ferent ways. Explanations will be sought within the constitutional frame­
work of each country, in the national features of constitutional thought and 
of constitutional decision making. The question of abortion is a transna­
tional issue, transcending the borders of individual states (testified, for ex­
ample, by the fact that women go abroad for obtaining an abortion). 
Constitutional law has a kind of ‘unifying force’ with respect to such a 
transnational issue, as it ‘dictates, as a minimum, some common and rela­
tively permanent standards binding for and superior to all the laws of the par­
ticular country involved’.1
The comparative approach seems therefore useful in two respects. The 
comparative method highlights, first of all, the trends or phenomena in the 
various countries, it shows the divergences and convergences in the constitu­
tional approach to abortion -  an issue which presented itself in very similar 
constitutional terms in these five countries belonging to the same Western 
libcral-democratic tradition. This close analysis of the different constitutional 
interpretations is indispensable in that it provides a ‘basis of concrete data' 
upon which to found any possible solution.2 Given the highly emotive con­
tent of the abortion issue and the ideologically opposing views involved, 
only a firm basis, i.e. a rigid comparative analysis of the constitutional deci­
sions involved, can be convincing in dealing with this issue.
Furthermore, the comparative method enables us to shed light on the cen­
tral question: is there a constitutional solution to the abortion issue? The 
‘daLa1 provided by the comparative method can be ‘evaluated’ and can there­
1 Cippelleiu, M., Seccombe, M., Weiler, J. (Eds), Integration through Law, Vol.I.
Book I, de Gmyter, Berlin, 1986, Foreword, XVID.
^ ibid. Introduction, p. 5.
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fore contribute to the solution o f the problems posed.3 In this case, the 
analysis of the constitutional decisions on abortion allows us to evaluate the 
various positions on abortion and to formulate a possible constitutional 
solution.
Comparative analysis contains by its very nature a dialectic tension..Qn 
the one hand, the subjects of comparison must have a point of identityjjr 
similarity so as to render analysis meaningful. On the other hand, conditions 
of total identity, or of total dissimilarity, render comparative analysis mean­
ingless. It is the interplay between similarity and diversity, between conver­
gence and divergence, which gives substance to a comparative analysis.^ In
the case of abortion, the common denominator of these five countries is the 
Western liberal-democratic tradition reflected in their constitutions. The dis­
similarity is presented by the differences in constitutional interpretation of 
the abortion issue. An attempt has been made in this study to spell out these 
differences and similarities, and to point, through this process of unravelling 
the reasons for these dissimilarities, at the core or substance of the abortion 
issue.
There is no need to say that there exists an immense literature on the 
question of abortion. Extensive research has been done on the historical, re­
ligious, social, sociological, psychological, political and medical aspects of 
abortion. Legal writings have concentrated either on the philosophi­
cal/theoretical (i.e. abstract) aspects of the issue or on the national abortion 
reforms and/or constitutional decisions (i.e. the positivist aspects). What 
seems to be original about this study is that it links the theoretical debate to 
the legal/constitutional outcome. This approach enables us to test the theo­
retical analysis against the constitutional practice and, therefore, to weigh 
the validity of the latter. Another distinguishing feature of this study is that 
it is a comparative study of constitutional adjudication of abortion covering 
more than two or three countries in a comprehensive way. It does not merely 
describe the various national solutions but also tries to give explanations for 
the differences in outcome by going into the national background of consti­
tutional decision making.
The purpose of this study is not to defend a certain viewpoint on abor­
tion. The first and principal aim of this study is to raise questions and point 
at the incoherences in the solutions offered by legislatures and courts in order
3 Ibid.
* Ibid, p. 9.
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to show the complexity of the issue. Many o f the points raised in this study 
arFunHer discussion as well in the present debate on test-tube babies and sur­
rogate motherhood, although obviously seen from a different angle. Pomting 
at the weaknesses of the various constitutional decisions only makes sense, 
however,'iF also a possible solution or a possible ‘way out' is formulated. 
An attempt has therefore been made to ‘extract' from these various conver­
gent and divergent trends a possible constitutional solution to the abortion 
question.
It seems impossible to be ‘neutral’ on such a controversial issue as abor­
tion. I have no intention of hiding my own personal l iberal ̂ pragmatist 
views on abortion. Nevertheless, because (he objective of this study is to 
show the complexityjrf the issue, the .problems involved in weighing con­
flicting values, the inconsistencies which easily arise, and ultim atelythe 
impossibility »  come op-wiilHrclcar-cuL principled, solution, I have at­
tempted throughout this study to be unbiased and present the various argu­
ments in the most objective possible way.
The discussion will evolve in the following way.
Chapter /  sketches the general background against which the abortion issue 
emerged. The historical, religious, socio- political and medical reasons 
which led to the prohibitions existing up the the beginning of the 1970’s, 
and subsequently to a demand for a relaxation of these restrictions, are briefly 
described. The purpose of this chapter is to place the constitutional debate in 
a broader perspective, i.e. to highlight all the factors which played a role in 
the emergence of the abortion issue, not only the concern with the protec­
tion of unborn life or the woman’s claim to self-determination. This chapter 
does not add any new elements to the discussion on abortion; it is merely in­
tended to clarify the significance of the present constitutional debate on abor­
tion within the general historical evolution of abortion legislation.
Chapter II provides the theoretical basis for the constitutional debate follow­
ing in chapter III. Before looking at how constitutional courts and legislators 
interpreted the fundamental rights involved in the abortion decision, it is 
necessary to clarify what these constitutional rights really mean, i.e. to dis­
cuss their content and limits. This means discussing the reasons for recog­
nizing the absolute or relative right to life of the fetus or for not recognizing 
a fetus’ right to life. It also entails a discussion of the reasons for granting 
the pregnant woman an absolute, relative or no right to decide on abortion, 
and for recognizing contingent rights of the father of the fetus, the parents of
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a pregnant minor, and the doctor who is called to assist at an abortion. This 
discussion will show the underlying conflicting social and cultural values 
which render the abortion issue so complex. The purpose of this chapter is 
not to propose a new solution to the abortion issue, but on the contrary to 
show the difficulties in finding a solution and to allow a more profound un­
derstanding of the constitutional debate.
In the light of this theoretical discussion, chapter III will analyze the consti­
tutional interpretation of the fundamental values involved in the abortion de­
cision by constitutional courts and legislators. The questions to be answered 
are: what do these courts and legislators really say about the content of the 
various fundamental rights involved? What are the implications o f their rul­
ings in constitutional terms? What does the comparative analysis teach us 
about the substance of the abortion issue? And finally, is there a constitu­
tional solution to the abortion question? An answer to these questions will 
require first of all an analysis of the interpretation given to the relevant fun­
damental rights (i.e. right to life of the fetus, woman’s right to self-determi­
nation, the father’s and parents’ right to family life, the doctor’s right to pro­
fessional freedom etc.) by the respective courts and legislators. Such a com­
parative analysis will enable us to set out the convergences and divergences 
in the interpretation of these values, and to ‘test’ the constitutional sound­
ness of the various arguments in the light of the theoretical discussion. 
Finally, this discussion will lead us to what could be a constitutional solu­
tion to the question o f abortion.
Chapter IV  will suggest some explanations for the different approaches taken 
by the various constitutional courts. Explanations are sought in the sphere 
of the general legal culture of each country (the jurisprudential tradition, the 
role of the respective courts in society), and in the specific context o f abor­
tion (the constitutional and legal history of abortion prohibitions, the pre­
vailing social philosophy, the political and jurisdictional context). This 
comparative analysis will be limited to the legal sphere, thus excluding 
purely sociological and political considerations.
Recent developments
This study deals with the constitutional events up to April 1985. Two de­
velopments should be taken into consideration in order to complete the pic-
6
turc: the recent jurisprudence o f the French Constitutional Council and the 
1986 abortion decision of the American Supreme Court
During the last few years, the French Constitutional Council has been at 
the center of attention. First of all, there has been an extensive debate among 
French scholars on the advantages and disadvantages and/or opportunity of 
the introduction of diffused constitutional review in France, following the 
American example5. Secondly, the Council has gained importance because 
of the increasing number of decisions issued, which go beyond the mere dec­
laration of constitutionality or non-constitutionality of a law. Following in 
a way the example of the German Federal Constitutional Court and of the 
Italian Constitutional Court, the French Constitutional Council has made 
‘déclarations de non-contrariété sous réserve’ and has given ‘directives’, thus 
forcing the legislature to respond to its rulings. Because practically all new 
laws are submitted to the Council for adjudication, the Council’s decisions 
have a greater impact and are gaining wider acceptance.6
The most recent abortion decision not discussed in this study -  issued by 
the American Supreme Court is Thornburgh v. American college o f  
Obstetricians?  in which the Supreme Court struck down another state regu­
lation as unconstitutional, the 1982 Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act.
The Pennsylvania Act required doctors to give every woman seeking abor­
tion a list of information at least 24 hours before she gave her ‘voluntary 
and informed consent’, and to sign reports prepared by the abortion clinic or 
hospital giving detailed information about the patient. The Supreme Court 
struck down all these provisions of the Act holding that they intruded into 
the privacy of the physician-patient consultation by ‘officially structuring... 
the dialogue between the woman and her physician’, and that they went well 
beyond the state’s legitimate interest in maternal health and failed to respect 
the ‘patient’s confidentiality and privacy’.8 Finally, the Court invalidated 
provisions relating to the degree of care and choice of procedure for post-via­
bility abortions and provisions requiring that a second physician be con­
sulted before abortion of a viable fetus. The regulations struck down in this 
decision are very similar to the ones struck down in the Akron decision of
^ See C om m entaire, 35, Autumn 1986, p. 413 ff., and Comm entaire, 36. Winter 
1986/87, p. 682IT.
® C. Philip, Revue du Droit Public, 1987, pp. 198-214.
^ Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrician», 106 J  O .  2169 (1986); to be
found as well in The United States Law Week, 34^.1^4618 (1986).
8 106 S.Ct. 2180.
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1983, even though it could be sustained that the Akron  regulations were 
more coercive o f a woman’s abortion decision than the ones invalidated in 
Thornburgh.9
The significance of this decision docs not seem to lie as much in its con­
tent as in the voting pattern. The four dissenters (Chief Justice Burger, 
Justices O 'Connor, Rchnquist and While) expressed very outspokenly their 
dissatisfaction with the framework of Roe v. Wade (1973).10 Given the nar­
row majority (5-4) and this growing discontent with the Roe-decision, an­
other ‘conservative’ nomination might change the Court’s jurisprudence on 
abortion altogether. There is no doubt that if B ork’s nomination by 
President Reagan in Octobcr 1987 had been accepted by the Senate, this 
could have turned the dissenting minority in a majority.
These two developments just described -  the more incisive role of the 
Frcnch Constitutional Council and the most recent abortion decision issued 
by the US Supreme Court -  have not altered, however, the constitutional de­
bate on abortion as reported in this study. The abortion issue continues to be 
a subject of public debate, especially in the United States where a change in 
the Supreme Court could, in fact, change the law on abortion. There are, 
however, no new positions; the constitutional debate evolves still around the 
positions presented in this study. Whereas the abortion issue is loosing 
emotional force -  especially in Europe, not that much in the US for the rea­
sons mentioned -  the public attention is presently drawn to the question of 
artificial insemination, in-vitro fertilization and surrogate motherhood. 
Although these issue raise questions which are, on the one hand, the exact 
opposite of the question o f  abortions (i.e. ‘how to have children' versus 
‘how to avoid having children'), the constitutional problems involved, on 
the other hand, are very similar to the ones emerging from the abortion is­
sue. The dilemmas of how to define a person, of how to judge the value of 
human life, of how to set the limits of the union between mother and fetus, 
are equally at the core of this more recent issue.11
‘The Supreme Court -  heading Cases', Harvard Law Review, 100. 1986. pp. 206-208.
54Z.1V4627 ff.; See aljo Harvard Law Review, op. a t. note 9. p 209.
See A.E. Stumpf, 'Redefining mother: a legal matrix for new reproductive 
technologic«’. The Yale Law Journal, 96, 1986, pp. 187ff., for a discussion of the 
legal aspecu of surrogate motherhood, which shows -  from the ‘opposite side' -  the 
legal problems posed by the ‘nght to procreative freedom'.
Chapter I 
The Emergence of the Abortion Issue
Introduction
This chapter traces very briefly the origins of the abortion restrictions as 
they existed in the US and in Europe up to the end o f ihe 1960s, and, subse­
quently describes the social and political developments which led to a liberal­
ization of abortion in the 1970s. This chapter will try to provide a rough 
outline of the historical, social and political background of the constitutional 
debate on abortion at the time abortion reforms were passed. Those elements 
will be indicated which led to the emergence o f the abortion issue. W hat 
matters here is the choice of the various elements because of their relevance 
for the theoretical and constitutional debate dealt with in chapter II and chap­
ter III o f this study. The description of the various elements or aspects is cer­
tainly not complete, and is amplified by the footnotes.
Section A  describes the teachings o f  the Roman Catholic Church on abor­
tion. Section B  deals with the legal history o f abortion legislation in the 
common law world (US and Grcal Britain) and on the European continent, 
and analyzes the motives for the old abortion restrictions. The social changes 
which led to the emergence o f the abortion issue will be discussed in section 
C. Section D  will deal with the various elements which set in motion the 
public debate on abortion and, hence, turned abortion into a political issue. 
The process of legalization o f abortion will be discussed in section E.
Section A The Teachings of the Roman Catholic 
Church
The purpose of this section is to give a brief summary of the most salient 
aspects of (he Catholic doctrine on abortion. The reason why Protestant and 
Jewish teachings are not specifically dealt with is not because they are less
important. The Protestant condemnation of abortion was certainly as strong 
and based on similar arguments as the Catholic position up to the beginning 
of this century. The Catholic arguments against abortion, however, are the 
most developed, the most specific and the most unanimous.1 The emphasis 
in this section is on the history o f  Catholic teachings. The present Catholic 
position is definitely more nuanccd, less unanimous and in many ways 
much closer to contemporary Protestant views on abortion. The purpose of 
this section is to show, through a historical analysis of Catholic thought on 
abortion, that the Catholic condemnation of abortion was not merely based 
on a condemnation of the killing of human life. And that is what perhaps 
most distinguishes the Catholic view on abortion from the Protestant one. 
Another important reason why Catholic doctrine is dealt with exclusively is 
that the Catholic Church has had the strongest voice in the abortion debate.
In the Mediterranean world in which Christianity evolved, abortion was a 
normal practice. Abortion, contraception and infanticide were treated in the 
same manner during the Roman Empire. Abortion was proposed as a solu­
tion to prevent excess population, but given the considerable health risks 
involved, it was probably practised less than infanticide or abandonment of 
children. Although the law of the Roman Empire punished abortion in cer­
tain circumstances (as in the case where the father had not given his con­
sent), the objective o f the law was not to protect the embryo as a human 
person, for it was regarded as part of the mother. The parents' freedom to 
dispose of their young offspring was taken for granted. On the whole, 
Roman culture was marked by indifference to fetal and early life.2
It is in this climate that the Christian teaching on the sanctity o f life de­
veloped. The historical source of the Catholic teaching on abortion was the 
conviction of the early Christian community that abortion was incompatible 
with the fundamental Christian norm of love, a norm which forbade the tak­
ing of life. Even in very early and authoritative sources of Christian law (80 
A.D.), abortion was treated as a grievous sin and ranked in importance with
* Noon»n, J.T., 'An almost absolute value in hutory', in Noonan, J.T. ed.. The moral­
ity o f  abortion, legal and historical perspectives. Harvard Un. P ré« , Cambridge 
Mass., 1990. p. 101.
2 Noonan, J.T., op cit. note 1, p. 3-6. Williams, G., The sanctity o f life and criminal 
law, Faber and Faber. London, 1958, p. 148. Veyne, P., 'L'avortemenl i  Rom e'. 
I'H istoire, 1979, p. 30-32. Connery. Abortion: the development o f  the Honan  
Catholic perspectives, Loyola Un. Press, Chicago, 1977, p. 26.
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those acts forbidden by the Ten Commandments.3 As the Church emerged as 
a legal religion and a social force in the 4ih ccniury, these sentiments on 
abortion took the form of legislation. In the course of this century the dis­
tinction between the formed and the unformed fetus became a focus for anal­
ysis. This goes back to an ancient speculation as to the time when life 
commences, based on the belief that the fetus did not begin to live until 
some time after conception. Aristotle held that the male fetus became ani­
mate at about 40 days, and the female at about 90 days after conception. 
This ancient distinction received renewed attention by the theologians of the 
Eastern Church. Augustine took pan in this discussion but confessed that he 
was unable to make up his mind on the issue and he refused to participate in 
the moral disapprobation of homicide and abortion. Augustine condemned 
three kinds of acts: contraception, the killing o f the fetus before it is formed 
or 'lives ', and the killing o f a live fetus. Each of these acts was treated as a 
sin against marriage. Although a number of Church councils condemned 
abortion in all circumstances between the Sth and the 12th centuries, the 
Aristotelian distinction between ‘formed’ and ’unformed' fetus had left its 
mark.4
Gratian in his D ecreium  (1140), the first fully systematic attempt to 
com pile ecclesiastical legislation, accepted the distinction between the 
‘form ed' and the ‘unformed’ fetus. Gratian announced that abortion is defi­
nitely not murder if the soul has not been infused into the fetus. The 
Decretals o f Pope Gregory IX (1234) which were valid for the whole 
Church, sustained this distinction, although they are ambiguous on the 
point o f abortion. The Dccrctals included Gratian’s distinction, but also an­
other canon in which all efforts to prevent conception or offspring are classi­
fied as homicide. This led to considerable controversy regarding the classifi­
cation of abortion as homicide. Later commentaries on the Decretals main­
tained that all abortion is murder and thus gravely sinful, but that the canon­
ical penalties should vary according to the stage of fetal life.5
Between 1200 and 1500 there began to appear broader based works called 
Sem entiae  in addition to the strictly legal collections. The most important 
of these Sentences, the one by Peter Lombard, repeated the distinction made
3 Callahan, D., Abortion: taw, choice ami morality, Macmillan, London, 1970, p. 410.
4 Noonan, op. cit. note 1, p. 16.
® William«, op. cit. noie 2. p. 151. Connery, op. cit. note 2, p. J9-I04. Noonan, op.
cit. noie 1, p. 20-22. Callahan, op cit. note 3. p. 411-412.
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by Graiian. In his commentary on the Sentences, Thomas Aquinas (1227- 
1274) accepted the theory of delayed animation and the Aristotelian distinc­
tion regarding the time of male and female animation.6
The commentators of the 15th century did not advance the debate in any 
noticeable way, except for the theological discussion in the work of 
Antoninus, a Dominican and archbishop of Florence. He brought into the 
main line of moral theology an opinion of another Dominican and follower 
of St. Thomas, who lived in the 14th century. Talking about the duty of the 
doctor, he stated that if a doctor gives medicine to cause an abortion to save 
the pregnant woman’s life, he sinned when the fetus was ensouled, but when 
the fetus was not ensouled it was his duty to do so. In this way the concept 
of therapeutic abortion was introduced, which was going to be the center of 
discussion between 1500 and 1600. The idea of the abortion of the unani­
mated fetus to save the life of the mother won considerable support from 
theologians. The Spanish Jesuit Tomas Sanchez (1550-1610) added another 
element to the discussion, namely the distinction between ‘d irect’ and 
‘indirect’ killing, based on Thomas Aquinas’ earlier efforts to distinguish 
between the lawful and the unlawful killing of man. He proposed that the 
killing of an uncnsoulcd fetus was lawful as long as there was no ‘direct in­
tention' to kill. The justification he gave was that the intention of the 
woman was to save her own life, an act which had the double effect of tak­
ing the life o f the fetus and preserving the life of the woman. Hence the dis­
tinction was not based on the physical acts which were done, but on the 
dominant purpose of the mother.7
Whereas the tendency of moral theologians had been to question the abso­
lute prohibition of abortion, an opposite trend can be discerned in the leg­
islative activity of the papacy. Pope Sixtus V stated in his bull Effraenatam  
(1588) that the same penalties of both canon and secular law should apply to 
abortion as to homicide, regardless of the age of the fetus. No exception was 
made for therapeutic abortion. This penalty was, however, soon limited 
(1591) to abortion of the formed fetus.8
A stream of thought distinct from papal teachings began in the 17th cen­
tury, without immediate effect but with a long term impact on the views on
6 Noonan, op. cit. note 1, p. 22-26. Connery, op. cit. note 2, p. 105-113.
•t
Noonan, op. cit. note 1. p. 26-31. Connery, op. cil. note 2, p. 114-165. Callahan, 
op cit. note 3, p. 412.
a
Callahan, op. cit. note 3, p. 413. Connery, op. cit. note 2, p. 166-167. Noonan, op. 
cit. note 1, p. 32-34.
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abortion. A Roman physician, Paolo Zacchia, attacked the prevailing inter­
pretation o f Aristotle that the fetus progresses by stages from vegetal en- 
soulmcnt to animal cnsoulmcnt to rational ensoulment. In his view the 
Thomistic view of the unity of man required that there be a single human 
soul from the beginning o f the existence of the new fetus. According to 
Zacchia this meant that the rational soul was infused in the first moment of 
conception. Zacchia’s thesis was well received although it had no immediate 
impact on the theological discussion.9
From the middle of the 18th ccntury up to the middle o f the 20th century, 
the teaching o f the Church developed to an almost absolute prohibition of 
abortion. The central authority of the Church, which was far more presti­
gious in moral matters in the period 1880-1950 than ever before in its his­
tory, dominated the development. The concern of the Church to protect un­
born life was particularly animated by the spread o f abortion in Western 
Europe. Many Frcnchmcn practised birth control during the last quarter of 
the 18th century, and the general impression was that abortion often sup­
plemented ineffective contraception. At the same time the Aristotelian anal­
ysis o f gestation was gradually rejected by the scientific world. In 1827 Karl 
Ernest von Baer had discovered the ovum in the human female, and soon the 
joint action of spermatozoon and ovum was understood. In 1869, Pope Pius 
IX dropped the reference to the ‘ensouled fetus’ in the excommunication for 
abortion. Excommunication now seemed to be the penalty for the abortion 
of any embryo. The new Code of Canon Law of 1917 made a further exten­
sion. It had been affirmed that the excommunication did not extend to the 
woman herself, but only to the doctors or others assisting at the abortion. 
The new Code of Canon Law specifically included ‘m others’ in those ex- 
communicaicd for procuring abort ion.10
From the beginning o f the 19ih century, the practice o f performing such 
procedures as craniotomy or embryotomy on viable fetuses during the deliv­
ery in order to save the life of the mother became more and more frequent In 
1884 the Holy Office stated that this operation was morally wrong. In 1889 
this condemnation was extended to any surgical procedure which was directly 
lethal to the fetus. Strong, uncompromising papal statements continued in 
the 20th century. The encyclical Casti Connubii (1930) issued by pope Pius 
XI contained a sharp condemnation of abortion. It denied that even extreme
9 Noonin, op cit. noie 1, p. 34-35.
Ib id ., p. 36-40. C illih in , op. cit. noie 3. p. 413-414. Connery, op. cit. noie 2, p.
225-291.
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necessity could provide sufficient grounds for abortion, and it condemned 
abortion on social and cugcnic grounds. The encyclical also showed consid­
erable concern with the actions o f public authority, i.e., legislation permit­
ting abortion in some cases. The pope observed that public authority could 
not confer a right to dispose o f innoccnt life.11
A few exceptional cases of therapeutic abortion were not fully settled, 
however, by Casti Connubii. Leading moral theologians contended that the 
encyclical had not condemned certain abortions necessary to save the mother 
from serious danger, if the direct intention of the doctor was to remove the 
pathological condition, and not to kill the fetus. Two cases were presented, 
namely the situation of an ectopic pregnancy and of a cancerous uterus. In 
both cases the physical intervention had the good effect of removing the 
pathological tube or the cancerous uterus, and the bad effect of killing the fe­
tus. Neither effect considered in itself was more ‘direct’ than the other, but 
the intention of the doctor was said to be directed only to the good end, and 
was therefore justified. Pope Pius XII implicitly approved the rationale for 
these exceptions in 1951.12
The Second Vatican Council led by Pope John XXIII considered abortion 
specifically in relation to family planning. The Council made several doctri­
nal advances. The most important one was that for the first time contracep­
tion was treated differently from abortion, and it was considered that contra­
ception might be allowed in some cases. Abortion, however, was condemned 
with the statement, ‘life from its conception is to be guarded with the great­
est care. Abortion and infanticide are horrible crim es'.13 These views on 
abortion were repeated by Pope Paul VI in his encyclical Humanae Vitae. He 
declared that ‘the direct interruption of the generative process already begun, 
and, above all, directly willed and procured abortion, even if for therapeutic 
reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as licit means of regulating birth’.14
It is essential to analyze the Roman Catholic doctrine on abortion for a 
full understanding of the abortion debate which took place in the second half 
of the 20th century. All Christian countries affected by these teachings in­
troduced laws forbidding abortion. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic doc-
11 Connery, op cil. note 2, p. 291-294. Callahan, op. cil. note 3, p. 414, Noonan, op  
cil. note 1, p. 40-44.
12 Noonan, op. cil. note 1, p. 47-49. Callahan, op cil. note 3, p. 415. Connery op  
cil.. p. 295-302.
I*}
Noonan, op. cil. note I, p. 45.
14 Callahan, op. cil. note 3, p. 415.
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trine is the source of the most influential and rigorously developed argu­
ments against abortion.15
The Catholic condemnation of abortion, however, is complex in that it 
has two sources. It is not only based on an ethic of killing, but also on an 
ethic of sex and distinguishes itself in this from Protestant teaching.16 The 
C atholic teachings on contraception are illum inating in this respect. 
Traditionally Catholic doctrine condemned abortion and contraception in 
equal measure, as it sought to maintain a link between sexual activity and 
procreation. It forbade the separation of the unitive, i.e. love-fostering, 
aspect of sexuality from the procreative aspect. This principle dates back to 
the Augustinian view that the only fully lawful sexual act was intercourse 
performed solely with procreative intent. In this view, both the obstruction 
o f procreation, i.e. contraception, and abortion violated the requirement of a 
procreative intent in intercourse. Both contraception and abortion were thus 
regarded as sexual sins.17
Only in the latter part o f the 19th century was a relationship between love 
and sexual pleasure rccognizcd and the expression and fostering of marital 
love as a legitimate purpose of intercourse accepted by Catholic theologians. 
This concept was developed in a substantial way after World War I, but was 
not officially rccognizcd by the Church until the 1950s. Casti Connubii in 
1930 still referred to contraception as the 'cruel lust o f couples to avoid pro­
crea tion ’.18 It was only in 1951 that Pope Pius XII accepted the rhythm 
method of contraception as an alternative to procreation open to all couples 
if there were serious reasons for avoiding procreation.19 During the Second 
Vatican Council the separation between the unitive and the procreative 
aspect of sexuality was for the first lime officially accepted. Although 
Scheme 13 ‘The Church and the modem world' declared that matrimony is 
essentially linked to procreation, it was recognized that ‘the good o f the off­
spring requires that the spouses truly love each other’ and that conjugal love
15 Nicholson, S.T., Abortion and the Roman Catholic Church, Religious ethics, 
Knoxville, 1978, p. 4-12.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid .. p 4-12-
18 Noonan, J.T.. Contraception -  a history o f its treatment by the Catholic theologians 
and canonists. Harvard Un. Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, p. 427.
19 Ibid., p. 445-446
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was ‘perfected’ in conjugal intercourse.20 It was acccptcd that there might 
well be a conflict between the expression of love and responsible parent­
hood. In procreation the spouses were not to be bound by blind instinct, but 
to act with 'full and conscious responsibility'.2* This did not imply, how­
ever, that all methods of contraception were acceptcd. On the contrary, the 
only method officially accepted up to the present day is the rhythm 
method.22
The fact that up to the second half of the 20th century abortion .like con­
traception, was linked to sins of a sexual nature, has deeply conditioned the 
abortion debate. As the Catholic condemnation of abortion is not merely 
based on the principle of the sanctity of human life, it might be argued that 
part of the appeal of the Catholic case against abortion is anchored in a re­
strictive attitude towards sexual pleasure.23 It is therefore misleading in the 
context of the present debate on abortion to maintain that the Catholic 
Church has always condemned abortion only on the basis of the killing of 
human life. Abortion as a sexual sin is constant in the history of the Roman 
Catholic Church. It is essential in the public debate over abortion to distin­
guish clearly between abortion as a sin of sex and abortion as a sin of 
killing. Abortion as a frustration o f procreation is no longer considered as a 
legitimate subject of legislative concern, whereas abortion as the killing of a 
human being certainly is.24
Section B The Legal History
1. T he P eriod  up to  1900
The legal history of abortion prohibitions in the common law world is dif­
ferent from that in the civil law countries. The influence of Catholic teach­
ings on abortion has been much stronger on the European continent than in 
the United Kingdom or in the US.
20 Ibid., p. 503.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 508-509.
23 Nicholson, op. cil. note 15, p. 3-4.
24 Ibid., p. 12.
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UK. The rule o f the common law, dating from the time of Bracton (13th 
century) adopted the distinction between the formed and the unformed fetus, 
as accepted by Cratian and later by the canonists. English common law also 
made a distinction between early and late abortion, drawing the dividing line 
at quickcning.25 According to Blackstone, ‘life begins in contemplation of 
law as soon as the infant is able to stir in the mother’s womb’ 26 W hereas 
Bracton considered abortion to be homicide after animation, the great Eliza­
bethan lawyer Coke believed abortion after quickening was a ‘great m is­
prision’ or ‘misdemeanor’, not a murder.27
The law remained this way in England until 1803, when the first statute 
on abortion was passed. For the first time abortion before quickening be­
came a crime, but not punishable so severely as abortion after quickening. 
Both were felonies that qualified for the death penalty.28 Further recodifica­
tion look place in 1837. The penalties for abortion became milder. Abortion 
was one of the several crimcs that ccascd to be a capital offence. The distinc­
tion between abortion before and after quickening was lost, however. 
Prosecutions were relatively few and acquittals occurred frequently.29
The Offcnccs against the Person Act o f  1861 established a maximum 
punishment o f imprisonment for life for abortion or attempted abortion. The 
Act passed without debate in the chamber o f the M other o f Parliaments. 
Abortion was stilt a sufficiently dangerous medical intervention and was 
consequently lim ited to very urgent cases. There was a very im perfect 
knowledge of human reproduction at the time. Furthermore, the act was 
passed before the upsurge in abortion numbers registered in the 1870s. 
Public attention was engaged by other, more immediate problems.30
US. In the absence o f any legislation on the subject of abortion in the US
in 1800, the legal status of the practice was governed by the traditional
British common law as interpreted by the local courts o f the new American 
states. Hence, the termination of early pregnancy, i.e. before quickening,
25 Quickening refen io ihe moment at which feu l movements »re felt by the pregnant
woman. See chapter II, section A, par. S.
^  Williams, op cit. note 2. p. 152. note 7.
27 Pocu, M.. Diggory, P., Peel, J., Abortion, Cambridge l>n. Press, New York, 1977, p.
277. Williams, op cu. note 2, p. 151
28 Poos, op cu. note 27. p. 278-279. Williams, op a t. note 2. p. 152.
29 Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 279-280.
30 Ibid.. p. 282.
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was not considered criminal under the common law in effect in the US. One 
practical argument for the quickening doctrine was that no reliable tests for 
pregnancy existed in the early 19th century. Quickening alone could confirm 
with absolute certainty that a woman was really pregnant. The practice of 
aborting unwanted pregnancies was almost certainly not rare in the US dur­
ing the first decades o f the 19th century. Abortion was resorted to mostly by 
unmarried women who wanted to avoid the disgrace of becoming unwed 
mothers. It was not yet thought to be a means of birth control, however. 
Writers on abortion regarded the health risks involved in abortion as not 
much worse than childbirth itself.31
In the period between 1821 and 1841, ten states cnacted legislation which 
for the first time made ccrtain kinds of abortion explicit statute offences. 
This first wave of abortion legislation emerged from the efforts of both leg­
islators and doctors to control medical practice rather than from public pres­
sure to deal with abortion per se. In the early part of the 19th century abor­
tion was a dangerous operation. Legislative reform, like for example the re­
vision of the New York criminal code, was more concerned with the protec­
tion of women against dangerous mcdical treatments than with outlawing 
the abortion practice itself.32 Another reason why doctors pressed for abor­
tion legislation was a desire to professionalize medicine. By pointing at the 
dangers and abuses conncctcd with the abortion practice, the regular physi­
cians could encourage the slate to employ sanctions against the unqualified 
practitioners who became increasingly involved in the abortion practice. It 
was, in short, an attempt to upgrade the standards of the medical profes­
sion.33 A clear indication that these early laws intended to control medical 
practice is the fact that they only punished the person who administered the 
abortifacient or performed the operation. None of them punished the woman 
herself in any way. On the whole, the US (in 1841) remained still commit­
ted to the common law tradition which was in effect in 16 o f the 26 slates.
The early 1840s constitute a turning point in the practice of abortion in 
the US. Firstly, abortion came out into the public view. Abortion services 
were advertized, many home medical manuals made allusions to abortifacient 
techniques, a flourishing business in abortifacient medicines developed, and
i i
Mohr. J.C.. Abortion in America -  the origins and evolution o f national policy 
]800-1900, Oxford Un. Pre«i, New Yortt. 1979. p. 3-19.
32 Ibid.. p, 28-29.
Ibid., p. 31-37. Francome, C., Abortion freedom  — a worldwide movement, George 
Allen A Unwin. London, 1984, p. 31.
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sexual matters were more openly discussed.34 Secondly, the overall incidence 
o f abortion began to rise sharply in the 1840s and remained at high levels 
through the 1870s. This was observed by doctors and confirmed by the 
nation’s falling birth rates from the 1830s onwards. Abortion was no longer 
a marginal practice, but rather a widespread social phenomenon whose 
incidence probably approximated that of illegitimacy.35 Thirdly, the social 
character of abortion changed. Whereas it used to be a recourse o f the desper­
ate and socially marginal, it was now increasingly used by white, married, 
Protestant, native-born women of the middle and upper classes who used it 
as a birth control device.36
Between 1840 and 1860 lawmakers in several states began to react to this 
increase in the use of abortion, but their response as a whole was limited and 
cautious. Only three states struck the immunities traditionally enjoyed by 
American women in cases of abortion. Only a few anti-advertizing laws were 
passed. The quickening doctrine remained an important principle in Amer­
ican courts, and 13 of the 33 states had yet to pass any statutes on the sub­
ject o f abortion by I860.37
Although regular physicians had been a major force in the creation of 
anti-abortion legislation since the 1820s, their support for such legislation 
had been largely ad hoc. The founding of the American Medical Association 
in 1847 provided the organizational framework for a concerted campaign 
against abortion. The anti-abortion campaign which was launched by the 
medical profession in the late 1850s was in part a manifestation of the al­
ready mentioned fact that many physicians wanted to promote a sense of pro­
fessionalism. As any healer who wanted to practise medicine could do so. 
the only way to distinguish professional-minded physicians from the rest 
was through public sanctions imposed by anti-abortion laws. Apart from 
these professional motives, most physicians sincerely believed that abortion 
was morally wrong. Doctors knew that quickening had no special signifi­
cance as a stage in gestation. The physicians’ crusade had two primary objec­
tives: to influence public opinion and to determine the passage of legisla­
tion.38
34 Mohr, op eit. noie 31. p. 46-85.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 86-118.
37 Ibid., p. 19-146.
38 Ibid., p. 147-170.
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Many articles appeared in the press between 1860 and 1880 which re­
ported the dangerous results of abortion interventions. By 1870, however, 
the press had bccomc indifferent towards the practice of abortion. The anti- 
abortion campaign did not rcccive cither the support it had hoped for from 
the spokesmen of organized religion. The campaign won limited support 
from a few denominations, but it never bccame an alliance, not even with 
the Catholics. A major succcss was obtained, on the contrary, among the 
anti-obscenity crusaders. Anthony Cromstock, the leader o f the New York 
Society for the Suppression of Vice, included abortion in the definition of 
obscenity and persuaded Congress to pass ‘an Act for the suppression of 
Trade in and Circulation of. Obscene Literature and Articles of Immoral 
U se’.39 Under this law, Cromstock became the country’s best-known pur­
suer of abortionists between 1873 and 1877, usually through their adver­
tisements. By the middle of the 1870s the commercial visibility of abortion 
practices was over.40
The campaign of the regular physicians against abortion produced the 
most important burst o f legislation between 1860 and 1880. At least 40 
anti-abortion statutes were passed, and most of them established that abor­
tion at any stage of pregnancy was a crime. One of the reasons why doctors 
had a more effective influence on public policy was the scientific progress 
made in medicine which gave the profession more credibility. The insight 
gained in the nature of sepsis in 1863 and an increasing emphasis on bacte­
riology in checking disease provided the medical profession with the means 
to dominate and outdistance most of their rivals. Under the pressure of regu­
lar medical societies and of the the shifts in public opinion that were 
brought about, legislatures tied up the abortion restrictions. Quickening 
rules were dropped, immunities for women were revoked, advertizing and the 
definition o f what was obsccne was strictly controlled. The legislation that 
was brought about between 1860 and 1880 established the official abortion 
policies which would be valid up to the 1960s.41
In the period between 1880 and 1900 the transition to legal proscription 
of abortion was completed. The states that had not yet acted during the pre­
vious years passed unambiguous anti-abortion laws. The courts abandoned 
their historic tolerance towards those accused of performing abortions. The
39 Ibid.. p. 196.
40 Ibid.. p. 171-199.
41 Ibid., p. 200-225.
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physicians finally controlled the standards of medical practice which resulted 
in a reduccd availability of abortion services to the general public. The 
women who had recourse to abortion were no longer middle-class Protes­
tants, but the lower class and immigrants. In short, by 1900 abortion was 
prohibited all over the country and the law was enforced.42
Europe. The main difference between the European continent and the 
common law world is that the continent followed the teachings of the 
Roman Catholic Church much more closely. Abortion was never legal on 
the European mainland, whereas abortion prohibitions in the UK, and even 
more so in the US, are, as we have seen dating back to the beginning and 
the end of the 19th century respectively.43 There were, of course, variations 
in the penal sanctions imposed and in the enforcement of the abortion prohi­
bitions over time and in the individual countries. By the end o f the I9lh cen­
tury capital punishment was replaced by im prisonm ent in the German 
states.44 In France, England and Austria abortion laws were enforced quite 
marginally, in contrast to the German states, between 1870 and 1900.4^
By (he second half of the 19th century abortion was practised increasingly 
frequently. An important indication of the widescale use of abortion was the 
dccline in the birth rate. This decline was primarily due to the use o f contra­
ceptives. However, while the public learned o f the possibility of contracep­
tion they also discovered in their private lives about the defects o f the avail­
able methods.46 The result was a high rate of ‘m istakes’, or unwanted con­
ceptions, and a consequent turning to abortion to erase them. That is what 
seemed to have happened in the late 19th century.47
42 Ibid., p  226-245.
43 National law* prohibiting abortion were pasted in 1810 in France, in 1871 in the 
German Reich (based on the Prussian Penal Code of 1851), and in 1768 in Austria. See 
Francome, op. a t. note 33, p. 29; and Edltnger, G., Dokumentation der politischen 
Geschichte n r  Reform des par 144 STG, Ludwig Boltzmann -  Insuiui für Kroninal- 
soaologie, Vienna, 1981. p. 3.
44 Soulas de Russel, D., ‘L'interruption de grossesse en Republique Fédérale d'A llem ­
agne', Revue de Droit Pénal el de Criminologie, 1976/77, p. 541.
4^ Jochirmen. L  ‘par. 218 (1871-1971), Hundert Jahre Elend mit einer tausendjährigen
Tradition', m Jochimsen, L. ed.. Sektion 218 -  Dokumentation eines 100-jährigen 
Elends, Konkret Buch Verlag. Hamburg, 1971, p. 15. Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 380.
46 The available methods were 'coitus intem iptus', douching, spermicides, and poor- 
quality sheaths. See Potts, op cit. note 27, p. 161.
47 Pous, op cd. note 27, p. 161. Mohr, op a t.  note 31, p. 83-84.
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The upsurge of abortion resulting in a dccline in the birth rate started in 
the US in the 1840s, in the UK and on the European continent in the 1870s. 
The British mcdical profession organized several campaigns against abortion 
in the period up to the First World War.48 As early as 1868 it was claimed 
that abortion in France had grown ‘into a veritable industry’, and by the end 
of the century several writers commented upon the explosive rise in hospital 
admissions for abortion.49 There is also evidence of a considerable abortion 
practice in Italy before World War I. In a large trial in 1904 eight licensed 
midwives were convicted.50
In short, by the end of the 19th century the practice of induced abortion 
existed on a measurable scale and it was a social problem.51
2. T he P erio d  1900-1970
World War I produced profound social changes. Women entered employment 
in unprecedented numbers, and in some countries they obtained the right to 
vote. The post-war liberalization of attitudes facilitated the spread of contra­
ceptive knowledge. In 1918 Marie Slopes published her book Married love 
and in 1921 she opened the first birth control clinic in Britain and began her 
‘Campaign for constructive birth control’. In France Victor Margueritte 
wrote La gargonne telling women that ‘their body was theirs’. Acceptance of 
abortion was unthinkable, but there was a growing awareness of the inade­
quacies of many existing abortion laws.52
The recognition of the fact that the old law was unworkable led to a de­
crease in the sentences of fines and imprisonment in France in 1923. The 
scarce enforcement of abortion legislation was a general trend in the devel­
oped countries, although not everywhere. In Italy several desperate efforts 
were made between the wars to make restrictive legislation work. Illegal 
abortions continued nevertheless. In 1926 Germany modified her 19th cen­
tury abortion legislation into a simpler and less harsh law. The Reichs- 
gericht recognized in its decision of 1927 that an abortion on a medical
48 Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 32.
49 Potts, op. cil. note 27, p. 47,
50 Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 34.
51 Potts gives qualitative evidence, see p. 162-169, op. cil. note 27.
52 Potts, op. cil. note 27, p. 380. Francome, op. cil. note 33, p. 56.
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indication could be performed legally.53 This change was the result of left- 
wing political pressure and the support of the medical profession which 
thought limited modification of the law desirable, as in Britain.54
After the Nazis and the Fascists came to power existing legislation was 
enforced more strictly. The Nazi penal code of 1936 made all propaganda in 
favor of birth control and abortion a criminal offense. In the ideology of 
promoting the ‘master race’, the criminal code was not applied to Jews, 
however. In 1943 the law was extended as to include the death penalty, as 
those guilty of.abortion ‘continually impaired the vitality of the German 
people by such deeds’.55 In France, too, there was a trend of increasing re­
strictiveness prior to World War II which was continued and entrenched under 
the German domination. In 1939, the Code de ¡a famille was enacted which 
imposed heavier penalties for abortionists. The Vichy government of France 
made the abortion law even more stringent, ranking abortion with treason 
and sabotage. Under this regime there was the last-known occasion in world 
history of an individual being executed for a crime relating to abortion.56
Whereas many European countries enacted more restrictive abortion poli­
cies in the 1930s, in Britain preparations were made for the setting up of an 
organization to fight the abortion law. The first person to call for a change 
o f the British abortion provisions was Stella Browne in 1915. Although the 
Malthusians57 were not prepared to endorse abortions, they were sympathetic 
to the writings of Stella Browne. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the 
Malthusian League was the only organization providing information on 
abortion on a regular basis. The women's groups, especially in the Labour
53 Wolff, U. Schwangerschaftsabbruch aus medizinischer Sicht, de Gruyter, Berlin,
1973, p. 115.
54 Pom, op. cil. note 27, p. 380-381. Fnncome, op cil. note 33, p. 56.
55 Pentì, op cil. note 27, p. 382. Verordnung zur Durchführung der Verordnung zum
Schutz von Ehe, Familie und Mutterschaft, 18-1943 (RGBU at 1169). See Quaas, M., 
‘Abortion, law and public policy’. Comparative Law Yearbook. 1983, p. 42. See for 
the Italian case, Bartole, S., 'Scelte di valore più o  meno implicite in una laconica 
sentenza sull'aborto'. Giurisprudenza Costituzionale. 1975, p. 2102 ff.
56 Ibid., p. 381-383. Francome, op cil. note 33. p. 59-60.
5^ Malthus introduced his doctrine in the wake of the French Revolution. He believed
that there was a natural ten den cy for population size to outstrip food supply and hoped 
that the poorer groups would engage m self-restraint in order to control their family 
size. Malthusianism received renewed attention after World War II, as there was a 
growing concern with the size of the population. The neo-Malthusian movement 
promoted the use of contraccption to further their aims. See Francome, op. cit. note 
33, p. 2-4.
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Party, were the most forthright in the matter of birth control and were also 
prime movers in the pressure group for the reform of the abortion law. In 
1936, the Abortion Law Reform Association (ALRA) was set up, which 
united all the activists working for a reform. Stella Browne was the most 
militant of the three principal organizers. By 1938 ALRA had 274 members, 
a reasonable size for the kind of organization it was.58
In the 1930s a liberalization of the 1861 British law was obtained through 
court actions. Justice McCardie publicly attacked the law and refused to ap­
ply the penal sanctions imposed by it in a number of cases of abortion. His 
attacks on the law were widely publicized and were influential in changing 
attitudes. At the same time the 1861 law was tested in the courts by the ac­
tions o f Mr. Aleck Bourne. Bourne was a gynaecologist of great integrity 
who performed an abortion in 1938 on a 14 year old girl pregnant after rape. 
Bourne went for trial but was acquitted by the jury. Due to this trial the 
scope of the 1861 law was limited in such a way as to exclude rape and other 
factors related to the health of the woman from punishment.59
A similar liberalization of abortion as in Britain occurred in Sweden and 
Denmark. Abortion on medical grounds was in practice allowed (in Sweden) 
as from 1921. In 1938 an abortion law was passed which allowed for abor­
tion on limited grounds. The abortion law reforms of 1946 and 1963 ex­
tended the grounds for abortion to include a socio-medical, an ethical and a 
fetal indication and laid down the condition that the abortion be approved by 
a special committee. The first abortion law in Denmark dates back to 1937, 
which had as its most important objective the suppression o f the illegal 
abortion practice and the protection of women’s health. This law was quite 
liberal for that time. It allowed for abortion on ethical grounds, and took 
into account the health of both the mother and the fetus. After 1945 a com­
mittee was set up to research the problem of the increasing number of illegal 
abortions. In response to this phenomenon abortion committees were set up, 
like in Sweden, to decide on the abortion requests o f women. A further liber­
alization of the law took place in 1956 and then again in 1970. 
Nevertheless, the number of women that went abroad (to Poland, and after
5® Francome, op. cit. note 33. p. 68.
59 Ibid., p. 65-70. Poeti, op. cit. note 27, p. 286-289.
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1968 to the United Kingdom) in order to obtain an abortion increased over 
the years.60
The first systematic proponent of the legalization of abortion in the US 
was William Robinson. In his book ‘Sex, Love and M orality’ (1928) he 
made a forthright call for legislation which would liberalize abortion during 
the first three months of pregnancy. Other doctors supported his call and 
there was also some pressure for reform from a women’s group. This group, 
however, was not very strong, nothing in comparison to the British ALRA. 
William Robinson remained a lone organizer, and when he died in 1936 his 
efforts were not continued. One of the most important reasons for his failure 
was that the birth control movement had not yet succecded in breaking down 
the Cromstock laws by 1936. Adoption of abortion as an issue before con­
traception was accepted would frustrate the main aim of the dissemination of 
contraceptive information. Such was the opinion of Planned Parenthood, the 
organization fighting for birth control in the US. Robinsons’s efforts turned 
out to be premature.61
The campaign for the reform of the British law was a long one. ALRA 
met again after the Sccond World War but was fairly inactive for a long pe­
riod before being invigorated by a dramatic change of leadership in 1963. In 
1952, 1961 and 1963 bills were introduced in Parliament to extend the 
grounds for abortion, but without success. By the mid-1960s public opinion 
began to polarize and independent ballots established that there was already 
widespread support for liberalization o f  the law, not only among the lay 
public but also among general practitioners. The abortion campaign was 
dominated by ALRA and the passage of the law followed nearly two years of 
intense parliamentary and public debate. In 1967 the British Abortion Act 
establishing an indications solution was finally passed by both Houses of 
the British Parliament.62 The English debate had wide repercussions abroad, 
especially in the US.63
A further liberalization of the already quite liberal abortion practice took 
place in the Scandinavian countries. Both Sweden and Denmark were faced 
with a situation in which an increasing number of women went abroad
60 KetUng, E., vm  P rug , P., Abortus provocatiu wet tn  praktijk, Zeut, NISSO.1983, p.
18ff.
6 * Francome, op. cil. noli 33, p. 74-77.
62 Ibid., p. 82-91.
Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 290-292.
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(Poland, UK) for an abortion. This pressed the respective governments to re­
view their laws based on an indications solution and approval by an abortion 
committee. In Denmark the abortion practice had liberalized much more than 
intended by the law. The need was felt to adjust the law to the changed views 
on abortion. One of the main arguments in support o f a general liberaliza­
tion of abortion was that the privacy of pregnant women, intruded upon by 
the complicated procedure required by the law, should be protected. This led 
to the abortion reform of 1973 which established an unconditioned right to 
abortion for the first trimester of pregnancy (i.e. a time-phase rule). A simi­
lar development took place in Sweden. In 1971 a committee was set up to 
review the situation. Here too the result was a new law in 1975 which estab­
lished abortion on request for the first 18 weeks of pregnancy. Thus both 
Sweden and Denmark abandoned at the beginning of the 1970s their indica­
tions solution combined with extensive procedural requirements (such as the 
approval by an abortion committee), and adopted a time-phase rule under 
which the woman's right to have an abortion during the early stage of preg­
nancy without having to give any reasons for her request was established.64
Rapid changes took place in the US in the 1960s and the 1970s. In the 
1960s the Association for the Study of Abortion assumed national leader­
ship. In 1962 the American Law Institute suggested a model penal code to 
legalize abortion on the basis of an indications solution.65 1967 was a turn­
ing point in the US as it was in the UK. Colorado passed a reform bill based 
on the ALI recommendations. While the ALI model code was receiving sup­
port, more radical arguments were put forward. The American Civil Liberties 
Union proposed the repeal of abortion legislation, that is, abortions (up to a 
certain time limit) should be performed by doctors and be governed by the 
same considerations as other medical practices.66 Between 1967 and 1971, 
17 states either reformed or repealed their laws, most of them based on the 
ALI recommendations. The influence of British legislation was also appar­
ent, both in the timing of the state reforms and in the wording of the new 
laws.67
Reform laws were passed in California and North Carolina (1967), 
Georgia and Maryland (1968), Arkansas, Kansas, Delaware, Oregon and New
^  Ketting, op. cit. note 60, p. 18ff.
65 See ch»pter [II, foowoie 2.
66 Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 332-337.
67 ib id ., p. 337.
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Mexico (1969). At the same time repeal laws were introduced in other states. 
Hawaii was the first state to repeal its law in February 1970, followed by 
Alaska and Maryland. The most spectacular events took place in New York. 
Under the strong pressure of Governor Rockefeller and after intense debate, a 
repeal bill was passed in 1970 by one vote in the State Assembly.68
The role of the courts in the liberalization of abortion has been crucial in 
the US. In 1969 two important court decisions were issued on abortion by 
state Supreme Courts. In the case Belous v. California, the California 
Supreme Court declared the state law unconstitutional, ruling that the 
woman has rights over her own procreation.69 This was the first state 
Supreme Court decision in American history to declare an abortion statute 
unconstitutional. In U.S. v. Vuitch, in late 1969, the abortion law of 
Washington DC was declared unconstitutional.70 Between 1970 and 1971 an 
avalanche of eases camc before all levels of courts, some attempting to cre­
ate a more liberal situation and others attempting to halt or reverse changes 
taking place. In Michigan, South Dakota, Georgia, Wisconsin and Texas, 
abortion laws were struck down by at least one level of jurisdiction. In 
Wisconsin the law was also found to infringe the right to privacy granted 
under the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution. By 1971, 17 cases relating 
to abortion had been referred to the Supreme C ourt71
There is no doubt that the developments just described in the UK, 
Denmark, Sweden and the US have had an impact on the debate which pre­
ceded abortion legalization on the European Continent. The legal changes in 
these countries had gone through three phases. First, an indications solution 
was adopted (like in the Scandinavian countries), which allowed for abortion 
on a limited number o f grounds and often required approval by a special 
committee. The next step was a liberalization of these indications solutions 
which now included not only a medical, ethical and fetal but also a socio- 
medical indication. The 1967 British Abortion Act is the best example of 
this trend. Practice showed, however, that this liberalized indications solu­
tion could easily be interpreted very widely, depending on the attitude of the 
doctor who had to decide on the abortion requests. Furthermore, the illegal 
abortion practice was not completely suppressed. This led some countries
68 Ibid., p. 332-342.
69 People V Belous, 458 P. 2d. 1941, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
70 U.S. ». Vuitch, 305 F.Supp. 1032 (D.C. D C. Nov. 10. 1969).
71 Ibid., p. 343-344. Francome, op. cit. noie 33, p. 106- 107.
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(Sweden, Denmark, some states in the US) to introduce a total liberalization 
of abortion. The third phase of abortion legalization was therefore the adop­
tion of the time-phase rule, i.e. the recognition of the woman’s rights to 
abortion up to a certain stage of pregnancy.
These various legal changes had an impact on the discussion that took 
place on the European Continent in the 1970s. This is not to say that this 
led to a greater consensus on how to deal with the abortion issue. On the 
contrary, the result of this liberalization of abortion in the UK, US, and in 
Scandinavia was definitely not considered in a positive way by all the parties 
taking part in the political debate. However, these developments abroad pro­
vided useful empirical information which played an important role in the 
abortion debate.72
In conclusion, we can learn several things from the history of legal abor­
tion prohibitions. Although the concern with the protection of unborn life 
was an important reason for proscribing abortion, it was definitely not the 
only one. A very important motive for prohibiting abortion in the early 
19th century was the medical risk involved in what was, at the time, a dan­
gerous intervention. The American development illustrates this very well. 
Restrictive views on sexual morality have also led to a condemnation of 
abortion, in the same way as contraception was condemned. Campaigns for 
the liberalization of contraception were in many ways similar to the move­
ments claiming freedom of abortion. This aspcct is also illustrated in 
American legal history, where abortion was one of the major concerns of the 
Society for the Suppression of Vice, under Cromstock’s leadership. A final 
aspect underlying abortion prohibitions in some countries was the preoccu­
pation with underpopulation. The 1920 French abortion provisions, for ex­
ample, were seen as a remedy against the population problem caused by 
World War I.73 The same seems to have happened during the German empire 
after the Franco-German War.74
It is important to keep in mind these various motives for abortion restric­
tions, because this enables a deeper understanding not only of the old abor­
72 Potts, op. cit. noie 27, p. 391. A spécial committee was formed in Germany before
the parliamentary debates which travelled to London and New York to gather infor­
mation on the experience of other nations with reform legislation. See Quaas, op cit. 
noie 55, p. 44.
73 Pm gaud, B., L'avortement -  histoire d 'un débal, France. Flammanon, 1975, p. 34.
74 Jochimsen, op. cit. note 45, p. 15-16.
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tion laws but also of the changes that led to more liberal abortion legisla­
tion, as will be shown in the next scction.
Section C The Social Changes Leading up to the 
Abortion Debate
Several social changes occurred in the 1950s and 1960s which questioned the 
reasons for abortion prohibitions as set out in the previous section. Firstly, 
views on sexual morality changed, which led to a call for sexual freedom and 
for birth control. A second profound change regarded the position of women 
in society. The claim for equal treatment o f men and women necessarily in­
cluded women's demand for reproductive freedom. A third reason for relaxing 
abortion prohibitions was the problem of overpopulation as perceived in the 
1960s. Fourthly, advances in mcdical technology rendered abortion a safe 
procedure. A fifth reason, connected to the previous one, was that doctors 
wanted to be left free to practise their profession and therefore be unhampered 
by abortion laws. These five factors led to a growing public awareness that 
the existing abortion laws needed reform. This in turn resulted in a public 
demand for abortion reforms as will be discussed in the next section.
The focus on birth control in the 1960s was due to a change in sexual 
morality whereby traditional ideas on marriage and sex only directed towards 
reproduction, lost ground. Birth control was primarily aimed at the planning 
of the size of the family. A second reason for and at the same time a conse­
quence of the couple’s demand for birth control was the separation of sexual 
freedom and procreation. This twofold development -  family planning and 
sexuality independent of procreation -  resulted in a new vision of family 
life. The values of the ‘quality of life’ and the ‘wanted child’ partially re­
placed the value of the ‘sanctity o f life'.75 Couples and individuals claimed 
the right to effective planning of their future and, hence, effective methods of 
birth control. Originally, the birth control movement disapproved o f abor­
tion, and even regarded the quest for abortion as a threat to the credibility of 
the birth control cause.76 There is no doubt, however, that within the ideol­
ogy of family planning abortion would be demanded in those cases where the
75 Sam s, B., Rodman, II., The abortion controversy, Columbia Un. P ré« , New York,
1974, p. 50 IT. See chapter 0 , section A, 3 and 4, for a discussion of the values of the 
'sanctity of life’ and of the 'quality of life’.
76 Sarvu, op. cit. note 75, p. 133 ff.
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traditional methods of birth control had failed. So although the birth control 
movement initially disapproved of abortion as a method of family planning, 
it was the values on which the birth control movement was based -  such as 
the ‘quality of life’ and the ‘warned child’ -  which resulted in the demand for 
abortion as a ‘safety valve’ in those cases where other methods of birth 
control failed. In this view, abortion was a complementary method of birth 
control.
Empirical data suggest that reduction in birth rates, providing that the 
motivation for fertility regulation exists, is most likely to occur when both 
contraccptivc methods and abortion are widely available. Nations and social 
classes appear to pass through three stages in their demographic transition 
from high to low rates of fertility. In the first stage there is no birth preven­
tion resulting in high birth rates. During the second stage there is a reduc­
tion in the birth rates accomplished primarily by abortion. The third stage is 
marked by low birth rates which arc achieved mainly by effective contracep­
tion with some residual abortions to meet contraceptive failure.77
Some policymakers had hoped to alter the pattern. By promoting contra­
ceptive methods as the sole means of controlling human fertility, it was 
thought that illegal abortions would be eliminated and the intervening period 
of increased abortions could be avoided. Accumulating evidence suggests, 
however, that this interim stage cannot easily be bypassed, but that timely 
liberalization and broad availability of abortion together with the provision 
of all methods of contraception can hasten the entry of developing countries 
into the third stage of the model.78 The experience with legal abortion in the 
US and Europe has shown the validity of these findings.
Whereas abortion as a means of effective birth control is demanded by in­
dividuals and couples in general, it is claimed by the women’s liberation 
movements in particular in the context of their demand for an equal position 
in society. Reproductive freedom is a necessary condition for the liberation 
o f women from their traditional, maternal, and socially subordinate posi­
tion.79 If women really want to achieve the same social and economic posi­
tion in society as men, their right to reproductive freedom including abortion 
must be guaranteed. In this view, restrictive abortion laws are the product of
77 Van der Tak, J., 'Impact of changing abortion legislation and practice on fertility 
trends’, in David, H.P. cd.. Abortion research, international experience, Lexington, 
Massachusetts, 1974, p. 39 ff.
78 Ibid., p. 40.
79 Noonan, op. a t. note 1, Introduction, p. xv-xvi.
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a male dominated society, and abortion on demand or the woman’s right to 
self-determination are a necessary condition for the liberation of women. 
These arguments arc well-known and therefore need no further explanation.
A third group interested in fertility control were policymakers in the field 
of the population problem. Whereas the demand for freedom of abortion 
from couples and women emphasized the individual freedom in matters of 
family planning, policymakers viewed abortion liberalization as a device to 
control the growth of the population ‘from above’. The reason why gov­
ernments were conccrned with the size of the population in the 1960s was 
not only the absolute increase of the population after World War II, but also 
the economic implications of a relatively high increase in poor and underde­
veloped areas. Fertility control was seen as a way of reducing the number of 
the poor in socicty and, hcnce, of solving the problem of poverty. The advo­
cates of the extension of fertility control did not necessarily support the in­
dividual’s right to choose.80 There was a particular interest in the US in fer­
tility control, which was probably due to the high birth rates among minor­
ity groups.81 It soon became apparent that in order to achieve a reduction of 
population growth the known means of contraception were unsatisfactory 
and insufficient. Japan 's spectacular success in this field was obtained 
through the massive spread o f abortion in addition to contraceptive 
methods.82
The awareness of the social and economic consequences of population 
growth gradually led the United Nations member countries to agree on the 
desirability of greater involvement of the UN system in population matters. 
The Declaration on Population of December 1966, issued on Human Rights 
Day, state in its preamble that ‘the size of the family should be the free
^  Francome, op. cit. noie 33. p. 3-4. See for a general discussion of population policy 
Weintraub, P., 'Population and law: legal control of démographie' processes', 
European Demographic Information Bulletin, 1974, p. 129 ff; Gould, K.H.. ‘Family 
planning and abortion policy in the United Slates', Social Service Review, 1979, p. 
452 ff.
8* Noonan, op. cil. note 1, p. xiii. It has been argued that the American Supreme Court 
rulings on contraception and abortion (see chapter III) have nothing to do with sexual 
liberation, but that they aie family planning cases in the sense that they seek to 
reestablish social stability which is threatened by excessive population growth. See 
Grey, T.C., 'Eros, civilization and the Burger Court', Law and Contemporary 
Problems, 43. 1980. p. 83 ff.
82 Ibid., p. xiv.
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choice of each individual family’.83 This view was repeated in 1976 during 
the UN Confcrcncc on Human Rights. Although the UN system is provid­
ing increasing support for family planning services, training and research, it 
has refrained from adopting a formal position on abortion or any other 
method of fertility regulation. The work program of the UN Population 
Commission, however, made provisions from 1970 onwards for studies of 
social, demographic, and other aspects of abortion. National statistics on 
abortion have been included in the UN Demographic Yearbook since the
1971 edition.84
In July 1969, President Nixon appointed the Commission on Population 
Growth and the American Future, set up to further the national goal of pro­
viding adequate family planning services within the next Five years ‘to all 
those who want them but cannot afford them’.85 In 1971 the Commission 
on Population Growth not only recommended that abortion laws should be 
liberalized, but held up the very liberal New York statute as the model legis­
lation. President Nixon, however, replied to this suggestion in a public let­
ter that he considered abortion as an unacceptable form of population control 
and that the Commission’s recommendations were unacceptable.86
Although concern with problems of overpopulation did not necessarily 
lead to the acceptance of abortion as a remedy, as these two examples show, 
it is nevertheless important to take this debate into account as it did touch 
on the abortion issue and may have had a psychological impact
A fourth element leading up to a call for abortion liberalization was the 
advances made in medical technology. Even in the early 1970s, the mortality 
rate associated with legal abortions performed in hospitals at an early stage 
of gestation was lower than the maternal mortality associated with preg­
nancy and childbirth. Furthermore, new abortion techniques, like the suction 
method, rendered abortion in the first months of pregnancy a quite simple in­
tervention.87
83 David, H.P., ‘Abortion research in transnational perspective: an overview', in David, 
op. cii. note 77, p. 7.
84 Ibid., p. 8.
8^ Sam s, op. cit. note 75, p. 135-139.
86 Ibid.
87 Ttetze, C., ‘Mortality with contraception and induced abortion', in David, op. cit. 
note 77, p. 103 ff. See Tieux, C.. Induced Abortion, a worldreview, 4th ed.. The 
Population Council, New York, 1981, p. 71, for a description of thi« method.
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A fifth factor to take into account, closely connected to the advances made 
in medical technology, is the altitude of the medical profession. Whereas the 
medical community used to be strongly opposed to abortion, this changed in 
the 1960s. The most marked change took place in the US where a survey 
done in 1969 showed that 51% of the US physicians wanted abortion to be 
available to any woman upon her request to a competent physician.88 In the 
European countries, liberalization did not receive such massive support by 
the medical profession as in the US. but a considerable number pronounced 
in favor of abortion.89 What all doctors had in common was their concern 
with the preservation of their freedom of profession. The British Royal 
College of Gynecologists produced a report in 1966 which it suggested a 
partial liberalization of the law, but it warned that legislators should be rea­
sonably sure of their cooperation before changing the law.90
There is no doubt, in short, that given the technical possibilities to per­
form abortions safely, the medical profession had an interest in securing its 
freedom of action. And although important sectors of the medical profession 
were opposed to abortion, others supported abortion liberalization and would 
thus gain by freedom from government interference in the practice of abor­
tion.
In conclusion, in the 1960s and early 1970s there was a growing demand 
for a lifting of the existing abortion prohibitions from various sectors of so­
ciety. The traditional views on sexuality and family life began to break down 
and this led to a demand for effective birth control including abortion, both 
from couples and from the women’s movements. A growing concern with 
population growth made governments consider a population policy. At the 
same time advances in medical technology rendered abortion a safe procedure 
during the initial stage of pregnancy, and part of the mcdical profession was 
willing to be involved in the abortion practice, provided they were unham­
pered by abortion restrictions.
88 Francome, op. cti. note 33, p. 107.
89 See for France. Francome, op. cil. note 33, p. 139; for Austria, Edlinger, op cil. note 
43. p. 108-109; and for Germany, Sou las de Russel, op. cil. note 44, p. 544.
Francome, op. cil. note 33, p. 95.
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Section D Abortion as a Political Issue
Various factors can be indicated which turned abortion from a social into a 
political issue, that is, rendered a change of the law necessary to policy­
makers.
The events which had a crucial impact on public opinion and set off the 
public debate on abortion were the Thalidomide affair and the German 
measles epidemic. Between 1961 and 1963, doctors discovered that the new 
drug Thalidomide, widely used by pregnant women for morning sickness, 
could cause fetal abnormalities. In 1962, Mrs. Sherri Finkbine, an American 
television announccr, focused attention on the drug when she was refused 
termination of her pregnancy in the US and had to fly to Sweden for an abor­
tion. This became front-page news and received international publicity.91
Another Thalidomide affair took place in Belgium. In May 1962, a 
Belgian woman gave birth to a seriously deformed child and killed it soon 
after it was bom. She had been taking the drug Softenon containing 
Thalidomide. Her trial received wide publicity. Whereas the public prosecu­
tor had requested her condem nation, the jury acquitted her o f all the 
charges.92 The same dilemma came up in 1964, when a German measles 
epidcmic hit the United Slates. This event, oncc again, provided an excellent 
opportunity to focus the attention of a mass audience on the problem of 
abortion.93 The Thalidomide affair and the German measles epidemic were 
the first occasions on which wide publicity was given to, and people were 
made aware of, the insufficiencies of the existing abortion laws.94
The liberalization of abortion became the unifying issue o f the feminist 
movement in Europe in the early 1970s, especially in countries with a 
strong Catholic tradition like Italy, France and Germany. In March 1971, 
100 well known Frenchmen signed a declaration against the restrictive 
Abortion Act proposed by Peyret. A month later 343 women, among whom 
were famous personalities like Simone de Beauvoir, Jeanne Moreau and 
Margueritte Duras, signed a manifesto published in the left-wing magazine 
Le Nouvel Observateur. slating that they had had abortions and calling for
91 Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 81. Sarvis, op. cil. note 75. p. 5-7.
92 De Bruyn, J., Geschiedenis van de abortus in Nederland: een analyst van opvallingen
tn  discusstes, 1600-1979, Van Gennep, 1979, Amsterdam, p. 178.
93 Sarvis, op. cit. note 75, p. 6.
94 Francome, op. cit. note 33. p. 81.
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repeal of ihc law. Two months later, in June 1971, the German weekly 
Stern published a similar declaration by 374 German women, and the weekly 
Spiegel published a declaration signed by 329 doctors. At the same time the 
actress Romy Schneider was denounced, as having had an abortion, and this 
caused a national scandal. In Italy, hundreds of women’s confessions were 
collected and published by feminists in order to provoke judicial action. In 
November 1972, a trial took place at Bobigny near Paris, against a girl aged 
17 who had had an abortion after having been raped. She was acquitted, her 
mother received a fine, and the abortionist a suspended sentence.95 A similar 
trial took place in Padova, Italy, in June 1973, against a 16 year old girl.96 
Owing to the women’s mobilization and the interventions o f well-known 
personalities, the abortion debate was speeded up within the feminist move­
ment and gained greater public attention.
One of the tactics used by the feminist movement was the challenging of 
the existing abortion laws by referring women for illegal abortions. The 
Italian ‘Centro Informazione Sterilizzazione e Aborto’(CISA) introduced 
suction abortion in Italy and accompanied women to cheap doctors in 
London. The inevitable arrest of the leader of this organization, in front of 
the press, television, and hundreds of supporters, gained the maximum pub­
licity.97 In a sccond incident an Italian gynaecologist, a member o f the 
Radical Party, was imprisoned for two months without trial for performing 
abortions. Three MP’s exercising their rights to visit any prison in Italy saw 
him and then refused to leave, saying they wished to be charged as 
‘accomplices’ of the gynaecologist This type of incident kept the issue in 
the news and challenged the legitimacy of the law.98
In this wave of judicial contcst, clandestine abortions were performed on a 
large scale wherever a repressive law was in force. Abortion centers and clin­
ics were opened and organizations founded which fought for the liberalization 
of abortion and which publicly advocated illegal abortions. Although some 
people involved in this practice were arrested (like in the Italian case), on the
95 Ibid., p. 138.
96 Teodori, M., Storia delle nuove sinistre in Europa (1956-1976), D Mulino, Bologn»,
1976, p. 585.
97 Francome, op eit. noie 33, p. 144.
98 ibid., p. 144.
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whole, bolh in the US and in Europe, prosecutors enforced the laws haphaz­
ardly and courts were lenient."
The split between law and practice became a salient feature of the abortion 
controversy in all the countries discusscd here. On the one hand, the number 
of illegal abortions was very high, on the other hand, the number of prose­
cutions and condemnations was minimal. Although the estimate o f the 
number of illegal abortions performed yearly varied widely according to the 
various sources, policymakers were convinced that this situation was intol­
erable.100 Furthermore, the situation discriminated against poor women. 
Wealthy women had long obtained safe abortions in more liberal minded 
countries. By the beginning of the 1970s, many French, German and Italian 
women went to Britain or to Holland in order to have an abortion. The 
number of German women going to Britain for an abortion rose from 3.621 
in 1970 to 17.531 in 1972. Even more women went to Holland, about 
61.000 in 1975.101 The number of French women obtaining an abortion in 
the UK went up from 2.300 in 1970 to 36.400 in 1974.102 This phe­
nomenon together with the fact that doctors performing illegal abortions 
were often making large profits was felt as a gross injustice, also by poli­
cymakers.103
A last, very important factor leading up to the political debate on abortion 
was the change in public opinion and the role of the press. Surveys show 
that there was a gradual increase of public support for abortion in the US 
during the 1960s with a more rapid increase between 1969 and 1972.104 In 
1968 a Gallup survey showed that 15% of the public approved of liberalized
"  Souloul, J.H., Conséquences une loi -  avortement, AU II, La Table Ronde. Paris,
1977, p. 21-31. Pingaud, op cit. note 73, p. 38-39. Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 
138. Gerstein, H., LOW RY, D., 'Abortion, abstract nom s, and social control: the de­
cision of the West German Federal Constitutional Court', Emory Law Journal, 25, 
1976, p. 850-853. Edlinger, op. cit. note 43, p. 19-23. Sarvu, op. cit. note 75, p. 
27-40.
100 Edlinger, op. cit. note 43, p. 17-21 and 131-135. Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 115, 
138 and 144. Soulas de Russel, op cit. note 44, p. 543.
Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 141.
102 Tietze, C., Induced abortion, a world review, 1981, The Population Council, New 
York. 1981, p. 37, table 3.
103 Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 395. Gerstein, op. cit. note 99, p. 853.
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abortion laws. In November 1969 this had gone up to 40%, and in June
1972 64% of a 1574 sample of Americans over 18 years of age and drawn 
from 400 localities believed that the decision to have an abortion should be 
made solely by the women and her doctor.105 The mosi dramatic increase in 
public support for liberal abortion policies took place in the West and North 
East of the US, and among white, non-Catholic, college educated m en.106
On the European continent the percentage of supporters of abortion liber­
alization grew steadily in the period between 1970 and 1975. As in the US, 
there were differences of opinion according to sex, religion, age and educa­
tion. More non-Catholics than Catholics, more men than women, more 
young people than old people supported the liberalization of abortion.107 By 
the mid-1970s the abortion movements on the European Continent could 
point to the support they had from public opinion. The report of one poll in 
France taken in 1974 said that 60% of the population was in favor of abor­
tion. In Germany, a poll (in 1975) showed that 59% of Germans had been in 
favor of the repeal law.108 A survey of the Italian magazine Panorama sur­
prised politicians in 1974 by showing that 75% of Italians favored legal 
abortion .109 Also in Austria a majority of the population was in favor of 
liberalization of abortion in 1971.'10
A key factor in the change of public opinion in the US and in Europe was 
the role of the press. First o f all, the press reported the changes that were 
taking place by publishing the results o f opinion polls. It is well-known 
that statistics can be used and interpreted in many ways according to one’s 
personal purposes. Whether the interpretation given to the data obtained in 
opinion polls was always sound is questionable. There are clear indications, 
for example, that in some cases the press in the U.S. gave a more ‘liberal’ 
picture of public opinion than justified. The important aspect of these polls 
is, however, that whatever their scientific value, they did influence policy­
m ak ers .111 Furthermore, the press also openly supported the abortion 
movement in many cases, which also had an impact on public opinion and
105 Potts, op. cit. note 27, p. 361. Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 123.
106 Uslaner e.o., op. cit. note 104, p. 1778 ff.
*07 De Boer, C., ‘The polls: abortion'. Public Opinion Quarterly, 1977/78. p. 553-564.
108 Francome, op. cil. note 33, p. 138-144.
109 Potti, op cit. note 27, p. 401.
110 Edlmger, op. cil. note 43, p. 36.
1 * * Sarvii, op. cit. note 75. p. 9
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policymakers. In Italy the weekly Espresso played an active role in the abor­
tion campaign.112 The initiatives taken by the press in France and Germany 
have already been mentioned. There is no doubt that the press had a strong 
influence on policymakers.
The intensity of the abortion debate was not uniform in all countries. The 
women’s movement in the US urged for very radical changes in a society 
where there was strong opposition to abortion.113 In Italy too, the pro- and 
anti-abortion groups were particularly far apart and the debate went on much 
longer and was more intense than in France, Germany and A ustria.114 In 
spite of these differences, the debates on abortion followed the same lines in 
the US and on the European continent. The pressure exercised by the abor­
tion movement, the massive number of illegal abortions, the judicial contes­
tation, the change of public opinion and the role of the press were common 
features of the abortion debates in all these countries. These debates were not 
limited to the national level but had an international audience.
As the abortion movement gained momentum, anti-abortion forces were 
generated. Pro-life movements were set up which fought against the liberal­
ization of abortion in the name of the protection of unborn life. This oppo­
sition to abortion was often largely supported by the Catholic Church and 
by conservative parties, in the US also by Fundamentalist groups.115 
Doctors, lawyers, scientists,and the various religious denominations were 
often split on the abortion issue. Some of them joined pro-life movements, 
others declared their sympathy with the abortion movement.116 The pro-life 
forces focused the attention on the ‘inhuman’ aspects o f abortion liberaliza­
tion. Pictures were shown of fetuses and references were made to 'crying fe­
tuses’ in order to stress the human features of the unborn. They claimed the 
right to life of the fetus against the women’s claim for self-determination. 
The clash between the two groups gave a strongly emotive-symbolic content 
to the abortion issue.
112 Teodori, M.. /  nuovi radicali, Mondadori. Milano. 1977, p. 158 ff.
113 Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 100-114.
114 Potts, op. cil. note 27, p. 401-402. Francome, op. cil. note 33, p. 143-148.
1 Potts, op cil. note 27, p. 362-363. Francome, op. cit. note 33. p. 111-113. See for a 
report of lhe position of the German religious denominations Jochimsen, op cil. 
note 45, p. 75-169; Europäische Äraeaktiofi (ed), Alarm um die Abtreibung, Hamster 
Verlag, Neuhausen-Stuttgart, 1980, p. 14-204.
116 Pingaud, op. cil. note 73, p. 46-138. Edlinger, op. cil. note 43. p. 95-123. Soulas de 
Russel, op cit. note 44, p. 544-546.
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There is no doubt that by the mid-1970s the public pressure for abortion 
reforms forced governments to act. The nature of the issue, however, made a 
political solution very difficult. It has been pointed out in the literature that 
the emotive-symbolic content of the issue leads to feelings of competence 
among the public, that is to say, people have clear opinions on abortion and 
it is difficult for politicians to depoliticize the issue. Furthermore, the di­
rectly opposing ‘fundamental’ values involved in the abortion decision 
makes bargaining or compromising extremely difficult. Views on abortion 
often cut across party lines. In particular in countries with religiously based 
parties, the right-left division was not reflected in the views on abortion.117 
Although governments were forced to act, the type of issue did not lend it­
self to compromise. It was therefore foreseeable that whatever the political 
solution, the issue would not be ‘solved’, that is the debate on abortion 
would continue.
Section E The Legalization of Abortion
By the mid-1970s, abortion reform in Europe was no longer perceived as the 
political issue of certain political parties, but as a general problem of the 
state to be solved as soon as possible. As the president of the ‘Social 
Section’ of the French Conseit d'Etat stated: ‘lorsque une législation est ba- 
fouée ou non appliquée de cettc manière, il en résulte un discredit pour les 
institutions, pour le Parlement qui fait la loi, pour le gouvemement qui est 
chargé de l’appliquer, pour la Justice et, en definitive, une crise de l’Etat’.118
As a result reform bills are presented in Parliaments and are passed after 
long and difficult debates.
France. The first law proposal in France was presented in 1973 by the gov­
ernment and drafted by Taittinger, the Minister o f Justice. This proposal 
provided for an indications solution , not including a social indication.119 A 
working group was set up in which more than 50 MP’s participated. From 
July to November 1973 there were 42 hearings of qualified persons and in­
terest groups. The representatives of the different groups (religious, scien­
117 Outshoom, J., What's in a name? Abortion as a political issue, paper pretented al the 
ECPR Joint Sessioni and Workshops m Salzburg, April 1984.
118 Soutoul, op. cit. note 99, p. 29.
119 See for a definition of indications solution chapter HI, Section A.
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tific, medical, women’s) were divided, however. The working group pro­
nounced itself against the Taittingcr project, and the government was not 
convinced by this proposal either. A compromise between five other propos­
als was defeated in the working group by 31 votes against 30. The govern­
ment decided to defend the Taittingcr project but left the MP’s free to vote 
either way.120
During the first day of the Parliamentary Debates on the Taittingcr pro­
posal in December 1973, a postponement of the debate was asked for and 
approved by Parliament. In April 1974 President Pompidou died. This 
changed the course of the abortion reform. The newly elected President 
Giscard d ’Estaing appointed Simone Veil as Minister of Health and charged 
her with the task of drafting a new law. The President officially declared dur­
ing a press conference in July 1974 that he hoped Parliament would adopt a 
liberal solution to the abortion question.121
The proposal drafted by Simone Veil was presented to the National 
Assembly in November 1974. Although this proposal was clearly more lib­
eral than the one the National Assembly had set aside without discussion in 
December 1973, a certain number of Deputies belonging to the government 
majority now voted in favor of the reform. There are two reasons for this cu­
rious paradox. Firstly, Giscard d ’Estaing was determined to obtain a reform, 
and secondly, he had had the insight to entrust the defense of the proposal to 
a woman.122
Veil’s defense of the abortion reform was very pragmatic. The principles 
she put forward in defense of the law were that the law should be applied, 
that the law should dissuade women from having an abortion, and that it 
should protect the woman’s health. Although numerous amendments were 
proposed in the course of the debate, few were adopted and they contained no 
real changes of the proposal. The abortion reform was adopted in December 
1974 by a 284-189 vote in the National Assembly, and a 184-90 vote in the 
Senate. The parties of the Left voted unanimously for the reform.123
Germany. In January 1973 Bund esc hanccllor Brandi declared before the newly 
elected Parliament that the government wduld not reintroduce old proposals 
and would leave the abortion reform to the initiative of the parties. Between
120 Pingaud. op. cu. no*e 73, p. 143.
121 Ibid.. p. 144-146.
122 Ibid., op. cit., p. 166.
123 Ibid., op. cit., 167-210.
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March and May 1973, four proposals were presented. A majority of the 
SPD/FDP proposed a time-phasc rule combined with socio-political mea­
sures, a minority of the SPD an indications solution, a majority of the 
CDU/CSU a more stringent indications solution, and a minority of the 
CDU an indications solution with only a medical indication. During the 
Parliamentary Debates in April 1974, a ‘free vote’ did not result in a clear 
majority for any of the bills. An agreement was reached by which the minor­
ity proposals of both SPD and CDU were eliminated, as they had the small­
est support. The CDU/CSU proposal was then introduced in the form of an 
amendment and was narrowly defeated. After a debate lasting two days the 
majority voted in the third reading for the timc-phase rule by 247 votes 
against 233. This was a 51% majority of those 'present and voting’, but not 
an absolute majority of all MP’s. In the Bundesrat the proposal was rejected 
by a clear majority in May 1974. It was then referred to the Joint Arbitration 
Commission where, however, no consensus was reached. The proposal was 
then referred back to the Bundestag, which adopted the bill with an absolute 
majority of 260 votes.124
Austria. In November 1971, the government presented a Penal Code reform 
proposal to the National Assembly, including an abortion reform which was 
based on an indications solution. In April 1972, the Socialist Party changed 
its view and decided to support a time-phase rule. This position was offi­
cially adopted by the government, which now had the absolute majority in 
Parliament, in December of the same year. In spite of strong opposition by 
large sectors of society (doctors, lawyers, the Catholic Church), and of the 
parties in the opposition, the abortion reform was passed with 93 votes 
against 88 in the Nationalrat in November 1973, and with 29 votes against 
28 in the Bundesrat in December of that year. This meant that this predomi­
nantly Catholic country which used to have one of the most restrictive abor­
tion rules in Western Europe, now had one o f the most liberal abortion 
law s.125
Italy. No abortion reform was enacted in Italy until 1978, in spite of the 
very active abortion campaign led by the feminist movement and the Radical 
Party. 1975 was a crucial year for the abortion reform. In February of that
124 Gcrstein, op. cit. note 99, p. 850-857. Stem, C., Was ha ben die Parteten fu r die 
Frauen ¡elan?, Rowotili, Hamburg, 1976, p. 36-56. Potts, op. cit. noie 27, p. 395- 
396. Francome, op cit. now 33, p. 141.
125 Pom . op. cit. note 27. p. 396. Edluiger, op. cit. note 43, p. 31-94.
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year the Constitutional Court declared the existing art. 54 of the Penal Code 
unconstitutional, forcing legislation to be introduced at least to permit abor­
tion where the woman’s health was greatly endangered, (see chapter III) The 
abortion reformers then set in motion a referendum in motion in order to 
abolish the existing abortion provisions. The threat of a referendum in tum 
led to more political activity, as both the Christian Democrats and the 
Communists wanted to avoid a referendum. By the end of 1975, a draft bill 
had progressed to the stage of a detailed discussion of the grounds on which 
abortion was to be permitted. Although such legislation did not meet the 
demands for abortion on request made by the Radical Party and the feminists, 
room for compromise was made. At that point the Church intervened. In 
December 1975, the bishops condemned ‘the slaying of the innocents’ in 
one of the most vehement outbursts the hierarchy had ever made. This fur­
ther polarized the views on the subject. The fragile alliance between Right 
and Left was broken, and no compromise was agreed on. In 1976 the gov­
ernment fell as that was the only way to stop the referendum from taking 
place.126 In January 1977, the Italian Parliament finally approved by 310 
votes against 296 an abortion reform which was very similar to the French 
one, i.e. a time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements.(see chapter III, sec­
tion A) On May 18th 1978, less than one month before the planned referen­
dum set for the 15th o f June, the Senate approved the bill by 160 votes 
against 148.127
U.S. Abortion legislation in the US belongs to the realm of the states. As 
has been described above (section B), at the end of the 1960s and the begin­
ning of the 1970s reform laws and a few repeal laws were passed in about 20 
of the states, whereas reforms were still being discussed in others. However, 
by 1973 a majority of the states still had traditional 19th century legisla­
tion.128 At this point the US Supreme Court intervened with its sweeping 
Roe v. Wade decision of January 1973, by which most abortion laws, in­
cluding most of the recent reforms, were declared unconstitutional. The 
Supreme Court declared that the woman was free to decide on abortion in 
consultation with her doctor within the first three months of pregnancy.
The Italian law only allows a referendum to occur between April 15lh and June 15th
and not within one year of an election.
127 Potts, op. cu. note 27, p. 402. Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 145. Casini, C., Cieri,
F., La nuova disciplina dtlTaborto, Cedam, Padova, 1978, p. 3 ff.
128 Francome, op. cit. note 33, p. 127.
42
without any state ¡nterfcrei.ce. By this decision states were forced to adopt 
this rule in their legislation (see chapter III).
As has been pointed out in Section B, there is no doubt that individual 
national developments have influenced one another. The experience of coun­
tries with early abortion reforms, like the Scandinavian countries, the United 
Kingdom and several stales in the U.S., were scrupulously analyzed and 
evaluated by the countries on the European Continent which passed abortion 
reforms only in the mid 1970’s. The first constitutional decision on abortion 
delivered by the US Supreme Court in 1973 fuelled the debate even more. 
There are many references in the respective parliamentary debates to devel­
opments abroad.129 One of the earlier abortion reform proposals in Italy was 
almost literally based on the British Abortion Act of 1967.130 The French 
reform had an important impact on the Italian debate in a later stage.131 The 
German debate also evolved around the experiences with abortion reforms 
abroad, in particular the English, American and Scandinavian situations.132 
Furthermore, a very important motive for policymakers to look beyond their 
national borders was that an increasing number of women went abroad in 
order to obtain an abortion. These phenomena gave an international character 
to the debate. Although the developments abroad certainly did not lead to a 
consensus at the national level on the abortion issue, they gave an extra 
dimension to the national debate.
The abortion issue was not settled by the respective reforms. The views 
on abortion were too far apart to allow for a satisfactory solution for all and 
in fact the defeated opposition to abortion reform looked for ways to chal­
lenge the new situation. Three political instruments were used in an attempt 
to reverse the situation: the introduction of Amendment bills, recourse to the 
constitutional court, and the referendum. In Britain by the end of 1982, eight 
bills had been introduced to restrict the working o f the British Abortion Act 
of 1967. In Germany, France, Austria and Italy, the opposition resorted to
129 Edtinger, op cil. note 43, p. 60. See chapter IE, Section B. par. I, notes 65 and 75.
*3® Casini, op. cil. note 127, p. 4. Thii was the ‘legge Fortuna’.
131 Francome, op cit. note 33, p. 143.
132 Schroeder, F., Abtreibunf Reform del par. 218, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1972, p. 127ff; 
Hanach, E.-W., ‘Rechtsvergleichende Bemerkungen zur Strifbarkeit del Schwan- 
gerschaflsabbruch in der Westlichen W ell', in Baumann, J., (ed.X Dai AbtreibuAfs- 
verbal des par 218, Luchterhand, Berlin, 1971, p. 235 ff.; Arndt, C., Ertiard, B., 
Funcke, L , Der par 218 SlCB vor dem Bundesverfassunfsgerichl, Mueller, Heidel­
berg, 1979, p. 200 ff.. p. 248. p. 261, p. 300.
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the constitutional court for a judicial review of the new legislation. In Italy 
the instrument of the referendum was set in motion, this lime to challenge 
the new law. In the US, constitutional litigation is part o f the political pro­
cess, as has been pointed out in Scciion B, and it is therefore no surprise 
that from 1973 to ihe present date the US Supreme Court issued about 15 
rulings on abortion.133
The wave of abortion legislation in France, Germany, Austria and Italy 
was followed closely by constitutional court rulings on the constitutionality 
o f the respective abortion reforms. In Italy a referendum was also held on the 
new abortion law. The French Constitutional Council, the Austrian and 
Italian Constitutional Courts rejected the challenges to the law and upheld 
the new legislation. In Germany, on the other hand, the Federal Constitu­
tional Court declared the time-phase rule unconstitutional , and in conse­
quence a more moderate indications solution was passed by the German 
Parliam ent In the US there has been a coniinuous debate between state leg­
islatures, the federal legislature and the Supreme Court on the scope and con­
tent o f the woman’s right to have an abortion as declared in Roe v. Wade. 
The focus of this study is on these constitutional debates in the US, 
Germany, France, Italy and Austria, which will be discussed in chapter III.
C on clusion s
The constitutional debates on the abortion issue are mainly phrased in terms 
o f the right to life of the fetus and the pregnant woman’s right to self-deter­
mination, as will be shown in the next chapters. The purpose of this chapter 
has been to throw some light on all the aspects -  religious, historical, social 
and political -  which have led, first to abortion prohibitions, and then to a 
change of views on these prohibitions.
The protection of unborn life was an important motive for restricting 
abortion, but not the only one. Views on sexuality, the medical risks in­
volved in the abortion intervention, and concerns with underpopulation also 
influenced these restrictions. In the same way, the woman’s right to self-de­
133 There are clear indications that these constitutional court decisions have not con­
tributed to a 'ie t l lin |' of the abortion issue. In particular in the US, Germany and 
Austria these decisions have resulted in a greater polarization between pro- and ina- 
aboition forces. See for the US note 8 of chapter III. for Austria Mode, E., 'Abortion 
law and public policy', Comparolivt Law Ytar book, 1983. p. 33-34; for Germany 
Quaas, op. cil. note 55, p. 41 and 54 ff.
termination has not been the only basis for claiming freedom of abortion. A 
change in views on sexual and marital life, an advance in medical technol­
ogy, and problems of population growth also had an impact on the abortion 
debate. The fact that according to Catholic teachings up to the Second 
Vatican Council, and in national legislations up to quite recent times, con­
traception and abortion were more or less treated alike is very significant in 
this respect
It is important to keep all these considerations in mind when analyzing 
the constitutional arguments used for defending one or another solution to 
the abortion issue. Exactly because the tendency has been to ‘constitution- 
alize' the abortion debate, it is important to distinguish between the consti­
tutional and the non-constitutional considerations mentioned in this chapter 
which have played a role in the evolving of the abortion issue.
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Chapter II The Fundamental Values Involved 
in the Abortion Decision
Introduction
The abortion decision involves a number of parties, all with iheir own le­
gally protected interests or rights. These parties are the fetus, the pregnant 
woman, the doctor, the father of the fetus and the parents of the pregnant 
minor. The abortion decision becomes a dilemma when these interests are in 
conflict with each other, as when the pregnant woman claims her freedom of 
choice against the fetus* claim to have its life protected, or the doctor claims 
that he cannot perform an abortion because his conscience does not allow 
him to, or the father of the fetus disagrees with the pregnant woman’s deci­
sion to have an abortion.
It is the duty of the state to protect these rights, but because of their con­
flicting nature, it has to place them in a hierarchical order. Traditionally, the 
state in the Western world has given an absolute priority to the right to life 
of the unborn and has therefore prohibited abortion in almost all circum­
stances. With the rise of the abortion movement and the growing public and 
political support for liberal abortion laws, however, the state had to change 
its position and come to grips with the changed values of today’s society. 
This has resulted in new, more liberal abortion legislation.
In this chapter the fundamental values involved in the abortion dilemma 
will be discussed. There are moral and philosophical reasons for granting the 
unborn an absolute or relative right to life, or no right to life at all. There 
are arguments for giving the pregnant woman an absolute, relative or no 
right to decide on abortion. Furthermore, the rights of the parents, the hus­
band, and the doctor of the pregnant woman, and of the pregnant woman her­
self will be discussed. The recognition of the right to abortion depends upon 
an assessment of these rights.
This philosophical analysis is necessary for an understanding and clarifica­
tion of the abortion discussion in general. It is in particular indispensable in
order to understand the contcnt given to these fundamental values in the var­
ious constitutional orders which are the subject of this analysis. The ques­
tions we would like to answer in the next chapter are how have legislators 
expressed and how have constitutional courts judged these fundamental val­
ues in the United States and in Europe; is there a common line of interpreta­
tion of these fundamental rights in the five countries discussed? The theoret­
ical analysis presented here is, therefore, the basis for the legal analysis 
which follows in the next chapter.
Section A The Right to Life of the Fetus
1. T he issues
The question central to the abortion debate is that of whether abortion can be 
considered the killing of a human being.
On the one extreme there are those who claim that every unborn child 
must be regarded as a person with all the rights of a person, from the mo­
ment o f conception. The unbom ’s right to life makes abortion an act of 
murder, which must never be permitted.
On the other extreme there are those who do not regard the fetus as a per­
son, at least not until the moment of viability. The fetus cannot claim any 
rights. The woman’s right to control her own body requires abortion on de­
mand.
In between these two extremes there is a wide range of middle positions. 
There are those who claim that the fetus is to be regarded as a person at 
some specific point in its development after the moment of conception. 
There are others who consider the fetus as a potential person having some 
claims against the mother, but these are less strong than the claims of full- 
fledged persons. From this viewpoint abortion is permissible in special cir­
cumstances and for serious moral reasons.
The rights claimed in the abortion debate, the right to life and the right to 
control one’s body, raise philosophical problems requiring a degree of clarity 
about basic concepts.1 What kind of entities have the rights ascribed to liv­
ing human persons? How strong is the claim of the mother to control her 
own body versus the posited right to life of the fetus?
Feinberg, J., The problem o f abortion, Wadsworth, Belmont, CA, 1973, p. 1.
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The question of the moral justification for abortion is related to problems 
concerning the moral status of the unborn and the resolution of conflicts be­
tween the claims of the mother and the posited claims of the fetus.2 Whether 
abortion is held to be morally justified depends on (a) how we conceive of 
the unborn being at the various stages of its development and on the moral 
significance we ascribe to the characteristics it is considered to possess. 
Secondly, having established the moral status of the fetus,(b) a balance has 
to be struck between the claims of the mother and the posited claims of the 
fetus.
In order to solve the dilemma of the moral status of the unborn, criteria 
are needed for determining what is meant by a ‘human life’. Biological 
knowledge will help to understand the biological status of the unborn, hence 
it is important to ascertain, first o f all, the biological facts, i.e. to describe 
the developmental process of the unborn in biological terms. However, the 
human individuality of the fetus has to be ascertained not for biological rea­
sons but in order to determine the moral and legal status of the unborn. 
What rights should the unborn have and when is abortion unjust killing? We 
ask whether or not the fetus is human because we want to know what sort of 
entity has rights. This is a moral question. We have therefore to decide what 
are the morally relevant differences between the various biological stages in 
the development of the fetus. On that basis a distinction has to be made be­
tween entities that have rights and entities that do not, and if no rights can 
be ascribed there is still the question of our moral duties towards the unborn. 
A rationally defensible, morally relevant standard must be sought by which 
to establish the moral status of the unborn.3
2. Terminology
There is a great deal o f terminological confusion in the literature. Some au­
thors call entities that have rights ‘persons’,4 others call them ‘human be­
ings’.5 Some writers accord the status of personhood (in the sense of having 
rights) only to ‘organisms that possess the concept of a self as a continuing 
subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself a
2 Ibid.
3 W ei«, R., 'The perils of personhood’. Ethics, 89. 1978, p. 67-68.
4 Ibid., p. 68
® Brody, B., Abortion and the sanctity o f human life -  a philosophical view, MIT
Press, Cambridge. 1976, p. 3.
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continuing entity’.6 Others grant the status of pcrsonhood also to less de­
veloped members of the species homo sapiens.
In order to maintain a certain clarity and coherence in the discussion, we 
have chosen the following definitions of ‘person’, ‘human life’, and ‘human 
being'.
A ‘person’ is a full-fledged member of a human community, someone 
who has moral rights as well as moral obligations; a person is responsible 
for his actions. The traits which are the most central to personhood and 
which distinguish persons from non-persons, are consciousness, reasoning, 
self-motivated activity, language and a developed concept of ‘se lf .7 Under 
this definition, the fetus is not a person.
Every member of the biological species homo sapiens is a 'human life’. 
This is a purely biological criterion, it does not offer any solution to the 
problem of the moral status of the unborn. There is no doubt that the fetus 
is a ‘human life’ because it is conceived by human parents.
Some authors only consider these two categories, the moral category of 
persons being conscious of themselves as subjects of mental states, and that 
of all the other members o f the species homo sapiens who are not yet per­
sons.8 The first have a right to life, the second have no rights. According to 
this division, however, young children would not be persons and therefore 
have no right to life, because they are not held responsible for their actions 
and they do not have moral obligations. Young children may not satisfy the 
self-consciousncss requirement but that does not exclude them from having a 
right to life. Infanticide is therefore impermissible.9 A second moral cate­
gory is therefore needed here, which we can call ‘human beings’.
Tooley, M., ‘Abortion and infanticide'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1972, p. 
49.
7 Wemer, R., ‘Hare on abortion’. Analysis, 1975/76, p. 178; Wemer, R., 'Abortion: 
the moral status of the unborn', Social theory and practice, p. 202; Warren, M.A., ‘On 
the moral and legal status of abortion’, in Wassemrom, R.A. (ed), Today s moral 
problems, Macmillan, New York. 1979, p. 45.
8 See Tooley, op cit. note 6, p. 37-65; Warren, op. cit. note 7; Narveson, J., 'Seman­
tics, future generations and the abortion problem: comments on a fallacious case 
against the morality of abortion’. Social theory and practice, 1974/75, p. 461-485; 
Me Lachlan, H.V., ‘Must we accept either the conservative or the liberal view on 
abortion’. Analysis, 1976/77, 37, p. 197- 204.
9 A nnu, P., ‘Self-consciousness and the nght to life '. Southwestern Journal o f  
Philosophy, 1975, p. 125; see for the opposite position, Tooley, op. cit. note 6.
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According to our definition, a ‘human being’ is a member of the biologi­
cal specics homo sapiens and has ccrtain natural and inherent rights, such as 
the right to life, but no moral obligations. ‘A human being has a right to 
life similar to the right to life had by you, me and so on’.10 A human being 
can claim that its right to life should receive the same protection as the right 
to life of a person. Newborn babies and young children are definitely human 
beings in that they do not have moral duties but they do have the right to 
life.11 The crucial question in the abortion debate is not whether the fetus is 
a person having rights and duties, but whether and from what moment the 
fetus can be called a human being, i.e., at what moment of their develop­
ment the unborn have the same rights as newborn babies.
Before entering into the discussion of when the fetus is to be considered a 
human being it is useful to consider different opinions concerning the gen­
eral values of society, or more specifically, concerning the value of human 
life. How can we define this value? In order to know whether the killing of 
unborn human life is wrong we must try to establish why and when the 
killing of bom human beings is wrong. This means considering the princi­
ples of the ‘sanctity of human life’ and other theories attaching value to the 
‘quality of life’.
3. The Sanctity of  Life
What does the ‘sanctity of life’ mean, and is there a moral consensus on this 
principle? Where does it come from and how can it be utilized? Daniel 
Callahan’s standard work on abortion deals extensively with these questions 
and the main lines of his thought will be set out here.12
The principle of the sanctity of life is vague in its wording, analytically 
affirmed in practice but open to innumerable differences in interpretation. 
Some would also reject it because it has a religious connotation.
N onetheless, the frequency o f  the use o f  the princip le in ethical d iscussions, 
even  by the non-relig ious, testifies to its con tinuous u tility , at least as a
10 Brody, op. cit note 5, p. 3.
11 It is not relevant to the abortion discussion to know when exactly children become 
penons, because they have, anyway, a right to life.
12 Callahan, D., Abortion law, choice and morality, Macmillan, London, 1970, chapter
9. p. 307-348.
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poin t o f departu re. T here seem s, m oreover, to be no o th er w idely affirm ed 
princip le w hich presen tly  serves so well. * 3
Catholic and Protestant thought have pushed the sanctity of life back to a 
divine origin. However, the Christian belief in the sanctity of life, it is con­
tended, has been generated by the primordial experience of being alive, of 
experiencing the elemental sensation of vitality and the elemental fear of its 
extinction.14 Although disagreeing on the source of the principle, religious 
and non-religious thinkers agree on its value as a first principle.
B oth are saying in  effect, the sam e thing: if  you  w ant to m ake anything 
sacred, if  you w ant any values honored, if  you w ant to be  able to defend  any 
rights, then  it is necessary to postulate the sanctity  o f  life (or, p resum ably , a 
princip le with the sam e general thrust).15
Many people, irrespective of their theological beliefs, experience a sense of 
abhorrence in the face of new or prospective capacities o f geneticists, neuro­
surgeons, pharmacologists, psychiatrists, psychologists and electronic engi­
neers, to intervene in what has always been regarded as man’s ‘natural’ cog­
nitive and moral powers. They are appalled by modem science’s capacity to 
modify man’s personality, his perception or imagination, or to intervene in 
his natural reproductive capacities. All such interventions are seen as dangers 
as they are a deviation from the ‘normal’ and the ‘natural’.16
Although there seems to be a social consensus on this principle, it ap­
pears to be singularly abstract and ambiguous. It can be defined in many dif­
ferent ways, as the examples have indicated. One way to find out what is 
meant by the sanctity of life is to see how rules expressing the principle of 
the sanctity of life are related to one another. ‘Our rules should form a co­
herent system, each rule consistent with and supporting the ultimate princi­
ple of the sanctity of life’.17
Callahan distinguishes the following rules and rule systems bearing on 
the ‘sanctity o f life’
13 Ibid.. p. 308.
14 Ibid., p. 313; Shils, E., 'The sanctity of life’, in Labby. D.H., Life or death, ethics or
options, L'n. of Washington Press, Seaule/London, 1968, p. 13.
^  Callahan, op. cit. note 12, p. 220-221.
16 Shils, op. cit. note 14, p. 7-10.
17 Callahan, op, cit. note 12, p. 326.
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a. The survival and integrity of the human specics. The sanctity of life re­
quires moral rules designed to aid the survival of collective human life. An 
example of such a rule is that nations ought to act so as to ensure as far as 
possible a viable life for future generations. In the language of rights, this 
rule slates that the human species has the right to exist. Nations, races and 
ethnic groups have the right to exist.18 The atomic bomb is a clear threat to 
this right.
b. The survival and integrity o f family lineages. The sanctity of life requires 
respcct for voluntary procrcativc choice and family life. In terms of rights 
this means ‘the rights of individual procreation, family planning and the 
preservation of the family lineage’.19 Genetic engineering and obligatory 
sterilization could violate this principle.
c. The integrity of bodily life. The general rule is that ‘the individual human 
being ought to be allowed to live and enjoy the protection of his fellow hu­
man beings’.20 In the language of rights this means that there is a funda­
mental right to life. Neither the individual nor the state has the right to un­
justly deprive human beings of their lives, or to permit or create those so­
cial, economic, medical and practical conditions which would have that ef­
fect. This general rule encompasses subsidiary rules relating to the conduct 
o f war, capital punishment, social conditions, the prolongation of moribund 
life, euthanasia and abortion. In the case of abortion, there is the problem of 
when human life begins.21
d. The integrity of personal choice and self-determination, menial and emo­
tional individuality. The key rule is that a person ought to be allowed to 
make for himself those choices which significantly affect his personal fate; 
people should be free to determine their own lives. In terms of rights this 
means that ‘human beings have the right to self-determination; human be­
ings have the right to their own complement of voluntarily chosen mental 
and emotional traits’.22 A person has the right to himself. The sanctity of 
life requires respect for personal identity, choice, and self-determination. ‘The
18 Ibid., p. 328.
19 Ibid., p. 330.
20 bid., p.331.
21 I but.
22 Ibid., p. 333.
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essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the 
structure of the person’s w ill’.23 Human capacities, i.e. language, self- 
consciousness, memory, logical relations, intelligence, rational choice, 
enable persons to make independent decisions regarding what this life shall 
be. This requires respect for the capacity of the individual for rational auton­
omy, or the ‘dignity of autonomy’.24
An essential element in this claim is the putative right o f  women to 
make their own decisions, uncoerccd by the state or others, about whether 
they should have an abortion or not.
e. The integrity of bodily individuality. An individual ought not to have his 
or her body, including the organs therein, violated or imposed upon, in other 
words, the ‘right to bodily individuality’ should be guaranteed.25 The sanc­
tity of life will be violated if the moral rules governing behaviour toward 
human bodies involuntarily threaten the integrity of those bodies. In the case 
of abortion, this right might be invoked in a case where a refusal to grant a 
woman an abortion could threaten her physical health, or in the case of rape, 
where an abortion would rid her body of the effect of an earlier violation of 
her bodily individuality.
The integrity of personal choice (d) and the integrity of bodily individuality 
(e). are closely connected and taken together could be called the ‘sanctity of 
individuality’.26 Psychiatric, neurosurgical and psychological technology in­
trude on this ‘sanctity of individuality’, both physically and psychologically, 
whereas this principle prohibits the complete dominion of one human being 
by another,or the complete renunciation of control over one’s self. The loss 
of all individual autonomy by the dominated person is the essential ele­
m en t27
To summarize, each of the five rule systems operative in Western culture 
gives some measure of substantive content to the principle o f the sanctity of 
life, but each from a different angle. The sanctity of life implies a spectrum 
of values ranging from the preservation of the species to the inviolability of
23 Richards, D.A.J., ‘Constitutional privacy, the right to die and the meaning of life: a 
moral analysis', William and Mary Law Review, 1981, 22, p. 340.
24 ib id ., p. 341.
25 Callahan, op. cit. note 12, p. 333.
^  Shils, op cit. note 14, p: 35.
27 Ibid.
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human bodies, from man as a member of a collectivity to man as an indi­
vidual, in the present and in the future. Each of the distinct rule systems 
overlaps another and together they form a whole. It is clear that the most dif­
ficult moral dilemmas are those which bring the different rule systems into 
apparent conflict with cach other. One solution to such conflicts is to rank 
the different rule systems in some kind of hierarchical order. Ranking, how­
ever, is complicated and conditioned by changing historical circumstances. 
Callahan emphasizes the fact that the principle of the sanctity of life implies 
but does not entail these rules. What the principle does is to establish a 
strong bias in favour of firm rules protecting life (in all its respects).But the 
rules are not self-evident. They arc not deductions from a single examination 
o f the principle itself. In cases of conflict, there must be a certain degree of 
freedom to come to the most reasonable decision we can on the relative 
ordering of rules.28 In other words, when the rules implied by the principle 
of the sanctity of life are in conflict with each other, there is more than one 
possible solution. The sanctity of life, for example, does not dictate that the 
fundamental right to life prevails in all circumstances over other rights im­
plied by the principle, such as the right to bodily integrity or the right to 
self-determination.
The multiple meaning of the sanctity of life leads Callahan to observe, 
when discussing the abortion argument, that a major objection to a rigidly 
restrictive moral code on abortion is 'that it is prone to hold that an absolute 
prohibition of induced abortion is a logical entailment of an affirmation of 
the ‘sanctity of life'. The logical route leading to this prohibition is that the 
‘sanctity of life’ means and can only mean under all circumstances that bod­
ily life is to be preserved, which in turn is taken to entail a prohibition of 
the taking of fetal life. No room is left, in this deductive chain, for a recog­
nition of other corollaries of the principle. An analogous objection can be 
levelled at those abortion-on-rcqucst arguments which hold that a woman's 
right to self-determination entails the corresponding right to be the sole 
judge of whether she ought to bear a child once conceived. In this instance, 
one aspect only of the principle of the ‘sanctity of life’ is considered, to the 
exclusion of all others'.29
The strength of Callahan’s argument is that he places the right to life and 
the right to self-determination in the same context, that o f the ‘sanctity of
»  Ibid.
28 C illih tn , op. cit. note 12, p. 338.
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life’. He also shows that one cannot infer an extreme position on abortion 
from the premise that life is sacrcd. This is not to say that the abortion issue 
is solved with his analysis.30 If the fetus is regarded as a human being from 
the moment of conception, there are very few cases under Callahan’s system 
of sanctity-of-life rules in which the obligation not to take a human being’s 
life can be overridden. Only in the case of rape and of threat to the pregnant 
woman’s health might abortion be justified. If the fetus is taken to be hu­
man being at a later stage of development, Callahan’s theory is useful in a 
wider variety of circumstances. It leaves us nonetheless with the crucial 
question of when human life begins.
4. The Q uality  of Life
Can human value be defined merely by physical existence? It seems that 
humanity is not only determined by structure i.e. by the genetic code, but 
also by function i.e. by social interaction. Our definition of humanity must 
embrace both the structural and the functional values. To deny the impor­
tance of genetic structure in determining the ‘human value’ of the unborn 
would limit the criterion of humanity to social and technological function­
ing. On the other hand, to deny some potential for social functioning as an 
index of human value would involve a priori abstractions attaching the same 
human value to test-tube babies, genetic monsters, newborn babies and 
grown up persons.31
Both within and outside the abortion question, the societal value of pro­
moting individual freedom and the overall quality of life has at times been 
deemed superior to the value of protecting all post-conception forms of 
life.32 Certain serious problems would arise if the pre-viable fetus were to be 
treated in the same way as a child already bom. Pregnant women would no 
longer have the liberty to smoke, drink alcohol, or take medication. Feticide 
would be treated like traditional murder. Such restrictions on parental and 
maternal autonomy are very much out of line with contemporary mores.33 
Hence, also outside the context of abortion, we have never treated the fetus
30 Brody, op. cit. now 5, p. 40.
31 Gerber, R.J., ‘Abortion: parameters for decision’. Ethics, 82, 1972, pp. 138-149.
Pamess, J.A., ‘Social commentary: values and legal personhood'. West Virginia Law
Review, 83, 1981, p. 494.
33 Ibid., p. 500-501.
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as a (full) human being deserving the same attention and protection as 
newborn babies.
Furthermore, today’s society values the quality of life of each individual 
or group of individuals rather than the number o f individuals living in the 
group. One of the arguments for liberalizing the use of contraceptives was 
that this would increase the welfare and happiness of the limited number of 
children to be bom. The conccm of modem society for the quality of life 
places emphasis on the social utility of every individual in asking what are 
the effects of denied abortions upon the development of the ‘unwanted chil­
dren’, and what arc the conscquences for society? Phrased in utilitarian terms, 
the question is whether ‘in the given circumstances in which we find our­
selves, the damage likely to arise from general abortion on demand is likely 
lo be greater or smaller than the damage involved when women have un­
wanted babies’.34 Following this line of reasoning, abortion should be al­
lowed 'if  the total circumstances are such that the child bom at a particular 
time and under particular circumstances will not receive a fair stake in 
life’.35
Richard Hare has developed a theory based on these premises. He appeals 
to the Christian and pre-Christian Golden Rule that we should do unto 
others as we wish them to do unto us, or, slightly changed, that ‘we should 
do to others what we are glad was done to us’.36 If we are glad that nobody 
terminated the pregnancy that resulted in our birth, then we are enjoined, ce­
teris paribus, lo halt the termination of any pregnancy which will result in 
the birth of a person having a life like ours. Of course, we have to rely on 
relevant similarity, on those things about our life which make us glad that 
we were bom. Therefore, according to this theory, the general rule for abor­
tion is that abortion is prohibited if the fetus concerned will, if not aborted, 
turn into someone who will be glad to be alive.37
The advantage of these theories which value the quality of life is that they 
take account of the results or consequences of a pro- or anti-abortion policy 
for the childrcn-to-be and for society. The risk of this approach is, first of 
all, that it prejudges for others (potential persons) what makes life worth­
34 Benn. S.I., 'Abortion, infanticide and respect for persons', in Feinberg. op. ch., p. 
103.
35 Gerber, op. cit. note 31, p. 153.




while. How can we establish objective criteria for measuring the future qual­
ity of life of the child-to-be? Another argument against this way of reason­
ing is that we cannot know what human potential may achieve in the distant 
future. Society has always treated children as human beings of great value 
because of the untapped promise they hold for their social functioning in the 
future.38 A third objection is that the fetus is without recourse and remedy 
whereas the mother has alternatives such as contraception and adoption. A 
fourth critical note on the quality-of-life arguments is that it is not always 
clear whose quality of life we are speaking about, that of the child to be bom 
or that of the parents. It is interesting to note, for example, that many op­
ponents of abortion who attack these quality-of-life arguments, and hence re­
ject abortion on social grounds, implicitly adhere to quality-of-life principles 
when they allow for abortion on eugenic grounds. If there is a considerable 
risk that the pregnant woman will give birth to a deformed child, it is ar­
gued, the life of the deformed child is so much more miserable than the life 
of a normal child that an abortion is justified. One could add, in this case, 
that abortion is allowed bccause the birth of a deformed child would be too 
much of a burden for the parents. What this example shows is that there are 
often incoherences in the positions taken up by the pro- and anti-abortion­
ists.
Undeniably, however, there has been universal acceptance of the ‘social 
consequences’ arguments39, in that we have never treated the fetus in exactly 
the same way as a newborn baby. The question is: to what extent must we 
define the value of human life by its function? We accept the use of con­
traceptives in order to prevent ‘unwanted children' being bom. To what ex­
tent can we compare contraception to abortion? This brings us back to the 
question of when human life begins and to the ‘sanctity-of-life’ arguments, 
i.e. the two aspects o f  human life, structural and functional, are inseparable. 
*A truly liberal law is one which seeks to enhance and preserve the most 
varied expression of life’.40
5. The Moral Status and the Legal Rights of the Unborn
There is a large number of possible opinions concerning the point at which 
the fetus becomes a human being. The following alternatives have been put
38 Gerber, op. cil. note 31, p. 149.
39 Callahan, op. cil. note 12, p. 392.
Gerber, op. cil. nole 31, p. 150.
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forward in the abortion debate as cut-off points at which the fetus can be 
considered as a human being.4*
1. The Moment o f Conception
The first argument for choosing this point is a genetic one. At the moment 
of conception, the biological characteristics of the fetus are determined by its 
genetic code. From that point onwards, it is a unique individual creature. As 
John Noonan, the leading advocate of this argument, expressed this view as 
follows:
T he positive  a rgum ent for concep tion  as the decisive  m om ent o f h u m an ­
ization is that a t conception  the new being  rece ives the genetic code. It is 
this genetic  inform ation w hich de term ines his characteristics, w hich is the 
biological carrier o f the possib ilities o f  hum an w isdom , w hich m akes him  a 
self-evolving being. A being with a genetic codc is a m an 42
T hereafte r ... (co n ccp tio n ) ... his sub seq u en t developm en t cannot be d e ­
scribed as his becom ing som eone he now  is not. It can only be described as a 
process o f  achieving, a process o f  becom ing the one he already is. G enetics 
teaches that we w ere from the beginning w hat we essentially  still axe in every 
cell and in every hum an attribute and in every  individual attribute.43
The second argument is one of 'potentiality’. Before conception, there is 
only a chance of less than 1 in 200 million that a spermatozoon will de­
velop into a reasoning being. At the moment of conception there is a 80% 
chance that the zygote44 will further develop into a baby.45 ‘The zygote is 
the first link in the spatiotcmporal chain to identity we know as a human 
being’.46
The third argument is one of continuity. From the moment of conception 
the unborn goes through a continuous development. It acquires structures 
and new characteristics, but there is no one stage that is markedly different in
4* Brody, op. cit note 5, gives a very clear overview of the alternatives proposed in 
chapter 5, p. 80-85.
42 Noonan, J.T.,(ed), The morality o f abortion legal and historical perspectives. 
Harvard Un. Press. Cambridge Miss., 1970, p. 57.
43 Ramsey, P., in Noonan, op cit note 42, p. 66-67.
44 For a very short penod after the moment of conception -  appr. two weeks -  the devel­
oping human life is cillcd 'zygote': up to three months after conception it is called 
‘embryo’, and after three months 'fetus’. Usually, the term ‘fetus’ is meant to cover 
the whole gestational period.
4^ Noonan, op cit. note 42, p. 57.
46 Callahan, op. cit. note 12, p. 371.
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quality from the previous or succccding stages. Only the moment of concep­
tion introduces discontinuity. Therefore, only the moment of conception can 
be justified as being the moment at which the fetus becomes a human being.
2. The Moment o f  Implantation
By the sixth or seventh day after conception, the zygote begins the process 
of implantation into the wall of the uterus. By the eleventh day implantation 
is completed.47 The argument for regarding implantation as decisive is one 
of probabilities. The probability that the conceptus will develop into a hu­
man being is higher than at conception bccausc a considerable number of fer­
tilized eggs is not implanted. The argument for implantation as a cut-off 
point has been used to justify some means of contraception which would 
otherwise be abortifacents.
3. Fetal Brain Activity
At about six weeks after conception, eicctroencephalographic waves are de­
tectable and therefore the fetal brain must be functioning. The argument for 
regarding brain activity as a qualitative jump in fetal development is based 
on the anthropological philosophy which considers man as qualitatively dis­
tinct from the rest of nature because endowed with the capacity for ‘symbolic 
activity’. Therefore man enjoys a particular excellence humain 48 Because 
cerebral activity is a necessary condition for ‘symbolic activity’, we can as­
sume the absence of symbolic activity until the moment that the embryo 
shows a complete and functioning brain.49 As Joseph Fletcher has said:
the neocortical function  is the key to hum anness, the essen tia l trait, the 
hum an sine qua non  ... To be truly hom o sap iens  w e m ust be sapient, however 
m inim ally ... The brain is the singular focus o f the em bodim ent o f  the m ind, 
and in its abscnce man as a person is absent.50
Another reason for considering brain activity as a starting point for human 
life is that it is the mirror image of what happens at death. According to the 
‘brain death theory’, for as long as there is not an irrevocable cessation of
47 Mon, M., ‘II diriuo alia vita e il paradosso della posizione anuabortista', Rivista 
Internationale di Filosofía del Dir ato, 1979, p. 197.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., p. 218.
50 Fletcher, J., ‘Four indicators of humanhood: the enquiry matures’, Hastings Center 
Report, 1974, p. 6. See also Blumenfeld, J.B., ‘Abortion and the human brain'. 
Philosophical Studies, 1977, p. 251-268.
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brain function, a dying person continues to exist no matter what else has 
happened to him, only cessation of the cercbral function marks the end of 
life. If so, it seems that there is only one property, apart from those entailed 
by this one property, which is possessed by every human being, namely the 
possession of a functioning brain. Any other property (movement, heart 
function) is not essential bccausc without it man has still not ceased to ex­
ist. Accordingly, it is held that when the fetus acquires this property it be­
comes a human being.51
Development of the brain in the human fetus is thought to recapitulate its 
changes during evolution. Although spontaneous electrical activity of the fe­
tal brain can be detected from about the sixth week of gestation, such activ­
ity can also be rccordcd in the brains of many other animals. It is only in the 
12th week of gestation that the human brain distinguishes itself from the 
brains of other animals. At that stage it ailains its general structural fea­
tures...52 This argument supports the view that only in the 12th week after 
conception the fetus can be considered a human being.
4. Sentience
Sentience is the capacity for feeling or affect In its most primitive form, it 
is the ability to experience sensations of pleasure and pain, the ability to en­
joy and suffer. Sentience is more than consciousness. It is possible for be­
ings to be conscious whilst lacking feelings. More rational beings are ca­
pable o f finding either fulfillment or frustration in activities and circum­
stances to which less developed creatures are blind both cognitively and af­
fectively. It is because of this broader and deeper sensibility that a higher be­
ing is capable of a richer, fuller and more varied existence.53
Biologically, sentience is marked by the emergence in the first vertebrates 
of ihe'forebrain. As far as can be determined, even the simple capacity for 
pleasure and pain is not possessed by invertebrate animals. To accord more 
moral standing to higher animals than to lower ones seems to accord with 
the general feeling that the lower animals count for very liule, higher ani­
mals like chimpanzees count for more, and human beings count for most of 
all.54 Sentience seems therefore to be a distinctive feature of human beings.
51 Thii poiiiion is defended by Brody, op. cit. note 5, chapter 7, p. 100-114.
52 Blumenfeld, op. cit. note 50, p. 263-264.
53 Sumner, L.W., Abortion and moral theory, Prineeion U.P., Princelon, New Jersey,
1981, p. 142-143.
54 Ibid., p. 144.
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Sentience as a cut-off point also allows for the full protection of the men­
tally abnormal. Even the grossly retarded or deranged will still be capablc of 
some forms of enjoyment and suffering. There arc some problems in deter­
mining at which stage of fetal development we can speak of a sentient be­
ing. There is no quantum leap into consciousness during fetal development. 
There is no sharp boundary between sentient and non-sentient beings. First 
trimester fetuses are clearly not yet sentient, third trimester fetuses possess 
some degree of sentience, however minimal, so that the threshold of sen­
tience thus appears to fall in the second trimester.55
5. The Moment o f Quickening
Sometime between the 13th and 16th week of pregnancy, the woman is 
likely to feel fetal movements, ‘quickening’ as the old phrase has it.56 The 
argument for considering quickening as a decisive point in pregnancy is that 
fetal movement is the most obvious sign of quickening, and the ability to 
move is one o f those characteristics that are essential to human beings. 
Secondly, only at the moment of quickening can the fetus be perceived by 
the mother and others by ordinary means.57 When we discuss whether a fetus 
is a human being we do not only refer to ncccssary and sufficient conditions 
for being human. We also react by seeing the fetus at some stage as a 
human being. We imagine the fetus to be a human being if there is a com­
plex set o f possible interactions between ourselves and the fetus. Given 
these interactions between ourselves and the fetus, we see it as ‘one of us’, 
as a member of the human community.58 The first of such interactions is 
when the pregnant woman feels the fetus moving inside her. There are thus 
two reasons, one biological and one functional, for regarding quickening as a 
relevant point.
55 ibid., p. 147-150.
56 Callahan, op. cit. note 12, p. 373. Originally, this is the Amtotelian notion of en-
soulmenl.
57 Brody, op. cil. note 5. p. 83.
58 Zaitchik, A, ‘Viability and the morality of abortion", Philosophy and Public Affairs,
10. 1981, p. 23.
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6. The Moment o f  Viability
When we say lhai the fetus is viable we mean that it could be saved through 
artificial means given the ‘current state of mcdical technology', i.e. the med­
ical technology available in principle.59 Viability is thus by its very nature 
a changing criterion. It might well be that x years from now a fetus will be 
viable at the 20th week of gestation, whereas today a fetus is considered vi­
able at between the 24th and 28th week of pregnancy. There are various rea­
sons for regarding the moment of viability as the decisive point at which a 
fetus becomes a human being.
One might argue that being capable of a separate and independent exis­
tence is essential to being human. Although the fetus has not yet reached a 
separate and independent existence at the moment of viability, it has the ca­
pacity for such an existence.60 When a fetus has reached this stage, even 
though it is still in fact inside the mother, we can nonetheless easily imag­
ine it already outside its mother’s body doing well in an artificial incubator. 
It is only due to the fetus’ ‘bad luck’, that it is still trapped in the body of a 
woman (who wants it destroyed, in case of abortion).61
What we said before about possible interactions between ourselves and the 
fetus at the moment of quickening applies a fortiori to the moment of via­
bility. We can imagine the viable fetus as a human being, imagine handling 
it, feeding it, caring for it, talking to it, etc.62
Another argument in support o f this view is that there is no essential dif­
ference between a viable fetus and a newborn infant, who is a human being. 
Therefore to make a morally relevant distinction between a viable fetus and a 
newborn infant would be unjustified.
Finally, viability is a changing criterion, but it is not morally arbitrary 
just because it is a shifting standard. It is certainly possible that medical 
technology may make it possible some day for the fetus to be capable of a 
separate and independent existence, so that we can interact with it at an ear-
59 Ibid., p. 20. M ed ial technology ‘in principle available', as opposed to ‘actually 
available'. Whether a fetus is viable should not depend on the stale of technology in a 
particular place, but on the state of technology in general; otherwise, a woman could 
have a pre-viabte fetus in Calcutta and a viable fetus in a more advanced part of the 
world.
60 King, P.A., ‘The juridical status of the fetus: a proposal for legal protection of the 
unborn’, Michigan La*/ Review, 77, 1979, p. 1647-1687.
61 Zaitchik, op. cil note 58. p. 21.
62 Ibid., p. 26.
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licr stage in its development. All sorts of things arc logically possible, but 
wc have no expericncc of the logical possibilities imagined. There is noth­
ing we can do to realize these logical possibilities now. Historical contin­
gencies shape the general framework of the possibilities that prompt our 
moral responses.63 What prompts our moral response that the fetus is a 
human being at the moment of viability is that at that point it is capable of 
a separate and independent existence and that we can interact with it. If future 
medical technology can changc the moment at which these two conditions 
are fulfilled, we will probably change our mind about the moment at which 
the fetus becomes a human being.
7. The Moment o f Birth
Only at birth does the fetus acquire a separate and independent existence. It is 
no longer part of the mother. Although it has the capacity for a separate ex­
istence before that, it does not enter upon that independent existence until 
birth. Only after birth can the infant interact with others. Such interaction, 
not the mere possibility of it, is an essential characteristic of a human be­
ing.64
8. Discussing the Alternatives
The ‘genetic school’,65 which proposes the moment of conception as the 
point at which the fetus becomes a human being, has quite a narrow view of 
‘potentiality’ because it only considers the genetic potential of the fetus. An 
individual, however, is something more than his genetic potential. Who this 
being becomes will be determined not only by his genetic potential but also 
by his interaction with the environment, i.e. there is a distinction to be 
made between structure and function. Instead of trying to provide a broad def­
inition of ‘being human’, this position takes only genetic individuality into 
consideration.66
Secondly, although it is true that one can easily show resemblances be­
tween consecutive stages of fetal development, it is equally easy to show dif­
ferences between the various developmental stages.67 What is, for example,
63 bid., p. 23-25.
64 Brody, op. cit. note 6, p. 84.
65 So called by Callahan.
66 C illahin, op. cit. note 12, p. 383.
67 Wertheimer, R.. ‘Undemanding the abortion argument'. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs. 1971, p. 85.
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the resemblance between a zygote of two weeks and a viable fetus? This 
makes the ‘continuity’ argument seem rather weak.
Finally, although this position is clearly the ‘safest’ policy in the sense 
of protecting human life, it lacks the capacity to do justice to the nuances in 
the conflict o f values found in abortion cases. It tends to lump all abortion 
cases together and to deal with them as a uniform category, thus losing sen­
sitivity to the individual nature of each case. Why is a distinction made be­
tween a pregnancy resulting from rape and a pregnancy resulting from volun­
tary intercourse? Would it make any difference in the abortion debate if a 
woman were pregnant for nine years instead of nine months?68 One cannot 
treat all cases in which abortions are performed as being morally on a par. A 
strict application of the genetic school position would not even allow abor­
tion in all cases of a threat to the mother’s life, because the self-defense ar­
gument would only be valid in exceptional cases.69 The Catholic doctrine of 
the ‘double effect’ rules out abortion to save the mother’s life, as we have 
seen, except in very particular circumstances.70
The argument for the moment of implantation as a decisive point in the 
development of the fetus does not seem persuasive. There is no qualitative 
difference whatsoever between the zygote at the moment of conception and a 
zygote at the moment of implantation. There is merely a greater chance that 
the developing organism will become a human being. But this argument can 
be applied to any point during pregnancy in relation to previous stages.
If we regard fetal brain activity, sentience, quickening, viability or birth, 
as decisive criteria, we move beyond sheer potentiality and require some ac­
tualization, in that different values are assigned to the different stages o f hu­
man life according to the degree to which genetic potentiality is actually re­
alized. Callahan calls those who defend this position the ‘developmental 
school’. They maintain that while conception does establish the genetic ba­
sis for an individual human being, some degree of development is required
68 Thomson, J.J.. ’A defense of abortion'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1971, p.
49,57.
69 We will deal with this point Uicr on in this chapter under B.3.
70 According to the Catholic principle of the 'double effect', abortion is only permitted
if there is a threat to the mother's life and the only way to save her is a licit medical 
intervention which 'indirectly' kills the fetus. Two cases are accepted: a cancerous 
uterus and in  ectopic pregnancy. The intention, in these two cases, is to remove the 
pathological condition (the 'direct' effcct), which has as bad effect (‘indirect’ effect) 
the killing of the fetus. Any intervention which ‘directly’ kills the fetus is imper­
missible under Catholic doctrine. See Noonan, op. cil. note 42, p. 48-50.
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before one can speak of the life in question as being that o f an individual 
human being.71 Within this ‘school’ there are differences of opinion con­
cerning just how much development is required before the decisive point 
when the fetus can be called a human being.
The arguments for taking the start of fetal brain activity as a cut-off point 
seem quite persuasive in the sense that consciousness is central to the con­
cept of personhood and the brain is the center of a person’s individuality. 
This view is widely defended.72 Fetal brain activity, however, represents 
only ‘potential consciousness', a potential which is determined at the mo­
ment of conception by the genetic code. The brain waves do not in them­
selves actualize the potentiality of personhood, they signify only a more de­
veloped stage in potentiality. Reasoning along these lines, no one cut-off 
point (except viability and birth) can be said to be more than just ‘a more 
developed stage of potentiality’.73
Secondly, the question is not whether the fetus belongs to the species 
homo sapiens or not. We all know that it will develop into a human being 
and we do not need to wait for fetal brain activity to prove that.
To lake sentience as a decisive point is to propose an achieved ability and 
as such has a stronger claim than fetal brain activity. The weak point of this 
argument, however, is the hierarchy it establishes in the rights assigned to 
animals according to their level of development This certainly does not cor­
respond to reality. Examination of the rights o f animals shows us in fact 
how arbitrary we are in according such rights. Although a chimpanzee is 
higher in the animal hierarchy than a dog, in many cases we assign a higher 
value to our house pet than to a chimpanzee out in the jungle. Much de­
pends on our sentimental links with animals rather than on their biological 
ranking. It seems to be almost impossible to develop a moral category for 
according the right to life based on these scientific, i.e. biological considera­
tions. However developed a chimpanzee may be, it will never have a higher 
moral status than a mentally handicapped person, although the chimpanzee 
may have a higher level of sentience. We have accorded the right to life to 
human beings because they are human beings, because they belong to our
7 * Callahan, op. cit. note 12. p. 384.
See Fletcher, op. cit. noie 50; Mori, op. cit. note 47; Pluhar, W.S., 'Abortion and
simple consciousness’. The Journal o f Philosophy, p. 159-172; Warren, op. cit. note
6; Tooley, op. cit. note 7.
73 Callahan, op. cit. note 12, p. 389.
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spccics. The biological or scicniiflc explanations for the superiority of the 
human spccics seem to be mere justifications.
The reasons for granting the right to life to a sentient fetus seem, there­
fore, to be more emotionally than rationally founded. The idea that the fetus 
can feel may induce us to regard it as a ‘living’ being and therefore accord it 
the right to life. One of the emotive strengths of the anti-abortion move­
ments is to refer to the ‘feelings’ of the fetus, to evoke the image of the 
‘crying’ fetus.
The arguments for regarding the moment of quickening as the crucial 
moment are raiher arbitrary. Because fetal movements make us aware of the 
existence of the fetus, we consider it as ‘one of us’, and therefore grant it the 
right to life. The basic weakness of this position, which can be considered 
part of the ‘social consequences school’.74 is that there is no underlying ob­
jective or scientific criterion here at all. It is based purely on our own and 
the outside world’s perceptions.
Viability as a criterion for having a right to life is qualitatively different 
from the previously discussed criteria. On the premise that a newborn baby 
is a human being having a right to life, there is no reason why a viable fetus 
should be treated differently. The viable fetus is ready to have an independent 
existence, it has the actual possibility to live independently from the 
mother. The only difference between a viable fetus and a newborn infant is 
that the fetus lives inside instead of outside the mother’s womb. Only at this 
point is the termination of pregnancy possible without killing the fetus.
The question which can be raised, however, is that if there is no difference 
between a viable fetus and a newborn baby, is there a difference between a 
viable fetus of, let us say, 28 weeks, and a pre-viable fetus of 24 weeks? 
After all, the fetal development is a continuous one. What we can establish 
with regard to the moment of viability is that by that stage the fetus should 
definitely be regarded as a human being, but that it may possibly be consid­
ered a human being even at an earlier stage. There is no reason for assuming 
that a fetus is not a human being, having the right to life, before the mo­
ment of viability. In conclusion, none of the proposed cut-off points pro­
vides a satisfactory solution. It seems to be impossible to decide on the 
moral and legal status of the unborn between the lower limit o f conception 
and the upper limit o f viability.
74 ibid., p. 392.
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W hen hum an beings are looked at in all their diversity , as individuals o r as 
m em bers o f a species, it becom es extraordinarily  d ifficu lt to single ou t one 
hum an attribute that can be countcd as norm ative and decisive. Hum an beings 
are rational and irrational, individual and com m unal, b iological and cultural. 
A ny single defin ition , stressing  one attribute, invariably  fails to catch  the 
full m easure o f m an.75
There appears to be no rationally defensible definition of humanity which 
demarcates between human beings and potential human beings. An embryo 
of two weeks and a fetus of six months are both human life, both potential 
persons. There can be sentimental, emotional or practical reasons for calling 
the one more human than the other, but there is no rational reason for doing 
so.
Some have tried to solve the problem of cut-off points by the idea of the 
gradual development of personhood, of the rights of the fetus keeping pace 
with its biological development. As Jonathan Glover has pointed out, 'i t  
seems more defensible to abandon the view that there is an abrupt transition 
to the status of a person and to replace it by the view that being a person is 
a matter of degree. A one-year old child is much more of a person than a 
newborn baby or a fetus just before birth, but each of these is much more of 
a person than the embryo’.76
It has been argued that fetuses are ... *a class of persons ... who neverthe­
less need not be accordcd equal protection of the laws, the extent of whose 
rights each state may determine legislatively (within lim its)’,77 or that 
‘some legal prohibitions on abortion might be justified in the name of the 
fetus qua human fetus, just as we accord some legal protection to animals, 
not for the sake of the owners but for the benefit of the animals them­
selves’.78
What seems so attractive about this idea of gradually developing person­
hood is that it permits nuanced justice to be done in the conflict of values in 
particular cases. It provides flexibility, and forms the basis for a moderate 
position in the abortion debate. Instead of giving absolute solutions, it 
stresses the relative rightness or wrongness of certain solutions.
The problem remains, however, o f how much actualization of potential 
personhood should prohibit abortion in specific cases. There has to be a gen­
75 Ibid., p. 389.
76 Glover. }., Causing death and saving live«, Penguin books, 1977, p. 127.
77 Newion, L.H., 'Abortion in law -  essay on absurdity', Ethics, 1977, p. 249.
78 Wertheimer, op. cit. note 67, p. 89; see also Pluhar, op cit. note 72.
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eral rule laying down the conditions under which abortion is not permissi­
ble. This implies that a decision has to be taken as to what is essential to 
being human. The central question of what is a relevant demarcation point 
presents itself again. Furthermore, the very idea that a fundamental right 
such as the right to life increases and decreases with, and depends in every 
specific case on variables such as the stage of development and the weight of 
the pregnant woman’s counterclaims seems to make the substance of a right 
to life rather dubious.
In this light, it might be preferable to shift the emphasis from the rights 
of the fetus to the duties of moral agents like the mother.79 We can also do 
wrong without violating a right. As H.L.A. Hart has pointed out, if X 
promises Y to look after Y’s mother, then it is surely wrong for X not to 
look after Y’s mother, in which case X has wronged both Y and Y’s mother, 
i.e. he has broken a promise to Y and he has neglected Y’s mother. Only 
one o f these wrongs, however, involves the violation of a right, the other 
does not.80 In terms of the abortion issue, our duties as moral agents 
(deriving from our special role as friends, parents, doctors etc.) must have an 
impact on the rightness and wrongness of abortion. The question of the 
‘humanity of the fetus’ varies with our duties as moral agents. Our duties 
towards humans may be stronger than our duties to non-humans. Similarly, 
our duties towards non-innocents are probably not as great as towards the in­
nocent fetus.81
In this light the issues in the abortion question are less antagonistic. It is 
no longer a question of the conflict between the rights claimed by the 
mother and the rights claimed by the fetus, but a question of the moral du­
ties of the mother towards the developing child in her womb. Motherhood 
creates responsibilities for the pregnant woman bccause the unborn is totally 
dependent upon her. How far these moral duties go will depend on the cir­
cumstances. In certain, very burdensome situations she is allowed not to 
bring her pregnancy to term. This approach allows for a flexible and moder­
ate position on abortion without all the problems of defining the rights of
79 W ei«, R-, op. cu. noie 3. p. 72-75, Varveson, op. cil note 8, and McLachlan, op.
a t. note 8, come 10 the same conclusion.
80 Hart, H.L.A., ‘Are there any natural nghts', in Qumion, A.,(ed) Political philosophy,
Oxford readings in philosophy, Oxford. 1973 (reprint from the P hilosoph ica l 
Review, 1955), p. 57. Judith Jarvis Thomson uses similar arguments, op. cil. note 
68. p. 59-62.
81 Weiss, op. cil. note 3, p. 72-75.
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the fetus at each point in its development. It does not answer, however, the 
question of when an unborn human life can claim the fundamental right to 
life, a question which has to be faced by legislators and constitutional 
courts.
What emerges from this discussion is that there is no rationally defensible 
answer to the question of when the fetus becomes a human being and can 
therefore claim the right to life. Some solutions seem to have a better scien­
tific basis, others seem to do more nuanced justice to the conflicting inter­
ests involved in the abortion decision, but to none can be ascribed an abso­
lute value. The dilemma presented by the structural and functional aspects of 
humanity seems impossible to solve. The decision to allow abortion in cer­
tain circumstances is ultimately based on a compromise between different 
moral values, not on the right solution.
Section B. The Pregnant W oman’s Rights 
Introduction
Until now we have discussed the abortion decision from the point of view of 
the fetus. We shall now consider the possible claims of the pregnant woman 
with regard to the abortion decision. We have seen above that the ‘sanctity 
of individuality’ or the ‘integrity of personal choice’ is part of the principle 
o f the sanctity of life. This fundamental value is invoked by the abortion 
movement in order to claim the woman’s right to decide on abortion.
A second fundamental principle which has been invoked is the woman’s 
right to freedom of religion. Abortion restrictions, it is contended, are based 
on religious thought and are therefore in violation of the principles o f the 
secular state. The pregnant woman can also demand her right to have an 
abortion in special and particularly burdensome cases. In this case, the 
premise that abortion is generally wrong is accepted. When discussing the 
first two demands put forward by the pregnant woman, we have to bear in 
mind that these claims are based on the premise that the fetus is not a hu­
man being from the moment of conception. If the fetus were considered a 
human being from the moment of conception, abortion would be the killing 
o f an innocent human being, which is permitted only in the very special cir­
cumstances of ‘killing in self-defense’. We will discuss this aspect in par.3.
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1. The Woman’s Right to Self-Determination
Various fundamental rights have been invoked as the basis of the woman’s 
right to abortion. It has been claimed that the right to abortion is part of the 
woman’s right to privacy.82
The word ‘privacy’ has a very broad meaning and is used in quite different 
circumstances. The right to privacy has been called the ‘right to selective 
disclosure’8̂ , i.e. the right to determine for oneself when, how, and to what
extent information about oneself is communicated to others. This right to 
‘selective disclosure’, or ‘power of exclusion’84, can refer to the physical 
concept o f privacy, i.e. living and working out of sight or hearing o f other 
people. This is privacy in the sense of seclusion (the right to be left alone) 
and can be invoked, for example, against wiretapping, bugging etc.85 The 
right to privacy in the sense of ‘selective disclosure’ is also used in the sense 
of ‘secrecy’, i.e. the right to protection of private information about oneself. 
Privacy in this sense can be invoked, for example, against databanks.86 
Another meaning of privacy refers to the concept of intimacy, that is the 
right to take decisions for oneself within the sphere of personal intimacy. 
The right to free access to contraceptives or the right to marry the person of 
one's choice are such privacy rights.
What seems to be common to these different senses of privacy is the con­
cept of 'autonomy' i.e. a sphere of decisions which each individual must be 
able to take without outside interference.87 It is important to emphasize the
82 At in the U.S. Supreme Court decision of 1973, Rot v. Wade, 35 L Hd 2d.
Beardsley, E., 'Privacy: autonomy and selective disclosure', in Pennock, J.R., and 
Chapman, J.W. (eds), Privacy, Atherton Press, New York, 1971, p. 56-70, quoted in 
(note Baker, T.), 'Roe and Paris: does privacy have a principle?’, Stanford Law 
Review, 26, 1973/74, p. 463; see also Wassemrom, R.A., 'Privacy', in Wasserstrom 
(ed), Today's moral problems, MacMillan, New York, 1979, p. 393: he defines the 
right to privacy as the right to control over information about oneself, related to 
private situations and private information.
84 Grots, H., Privacy -  Us legal protection, Oceana, New York, 1976, p. xiii.
85 Posner, R.A., ‘The uncertain protection of privacy by the Supreme Court', Supreme
Court R tv itw , 1979, p. 173-217. See also Rigaux, F., ‘L'ilaboretion d'un 'right of 
privacy’ par la jurisprudence améncaine', Revue Internationale de Droit Compari, 32, 
1980, p. 708.
86 Posner, op. cit. note 85.
87 Rigaux, op. cit. note 85.
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spiritual nature of privacy as opposed to the material nature of property.88 
The right to seclusion or secrecy is not a right against physical appropria­
tion or theft. It is not the principle of private property, but that of inviolate 
personality. The secrecy of mail, for example, is not directed against its ap­
propriation but against its publication. Ultimately, privacy is part of the 
more general right to immunity of the person, the right to one’s personality. 
It is based on the supremacy of the individual conscience, the high value of 
the individual’s inferiority and autonomy.89
Privacy can be experienced only within a certain area from which all 
others can be excluded and only those of one’s own choice admitted. The ex­
istence of a public space and the existence of a private space are, there- 
fore.each necessary to the other.90 Right-to-privacy cases typically arise in 
this grey area between the public and the private. The right to privacy is 
claimed when certain areas of conduct are no longer a proper object of public 
concern, for example when there is a strong conventional wisdom that cer­
tain conduct is morally wrong and where the justice o f that wisdom is under 
fundamental attack. The reason why ‘free access to contraceptives’ is nowa­
days considered to be part of the right to privacy is that rigid moral rules 
prohibiting forms of non-procreational sex are no longer perceived as justi­
fied by moral considerations. The view that sexual experience is intrinsically 
degrading has ceased to exist. The idea that sexual needs are largely indepen­
dent of the reproductive cycle has been established and accepted.91
The right to privacy in the sense of the right to contraceptive freedom can 
also be considered as part of the fundamental freedom to intimate associa­
tion.92 Intimate association means a close and familiar personal relationship 
with another that is in some significant way comparable to marriage or fam­
ily relationship. The values that 'intimate association’ embodies are society, 
caring and commitment, intimacy and self-identification.93 The right to
88 Cranston, M., ‘Is there a right to privacy', unpublished paper presented 11 the 
European University Institute, 1980, p. 4.
89 Ibid.
*> IbUt.
91 Richards, D.A.J., 'Sexual autonomy and the constitutional right to privacy: a case 
study in human rights and the unwritten constitution', Hastings Law Journal, 30, 
1979, p. 980.
92 Karst. K .L , 'The freedom of intimate association', Yale Law Journal, 1980, 89, p. 
624-692.
93 Ibid., p. 629-636.
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sexual intimacy is pan of the freedom of intimate association. The decision 
to have a child involves, in particular, the values of caring and commitment, 
intimacy and sclf-idcntificaiion. As the state is, in principle,not allowed to 
interfere with the decision to procreate, this being part of the freedom of in­
timate association, in the same way state interference with the choice not to 
procreate requires justification by reference to state interests o f the highest 
order. Given today’s contraceptive facilities, one chooses to be a parent, 
much as one chooses to marry. The right to contraceptive freedom, which is 
by now well established, defends these values of non-association. In particu­
lar it protects women against the enforced intimate society of unwanted chil­
dren, against unchosen commitment, and against compelled identification 
with the social role of parent. Coerced intimate association in the sense of 
forced childbearing or parenthood is no less serious an invasion of the sense 
of self than is forced marriage or forced sexual intimacy.94
The right to contraceptive freedom can thus be ranked under the right to 
privacy in the sense of the right to individual autonomy,95 the freedom of 
intimate association,96 or the right to reproductive autonomy.97 Could the 
woman’s right to abortion be defined in the same way?
The reason why the right to contraceptive freedom has been discussed here 
is that the basic postulates for granting such freedom are the same as those 
for granting the right to abortion. The trend throughout the industrialized 
west has been towards a re-evaluation of women’s place in society.98 One of 
the basic conditions for guaranteeing equal chances for women in society is 
granting them the right to reproductive freedom. To forbid access to contra­
ceptives nowadays would create a situation in which ‘the people who get 
children are not the ones who want them most, but the ones who can least
94 Ibid., p. 636-640.
95 Cranston, op. eit. note 88, Gross, H-, 'Privacy and autonomy', in Pennock and 
Chapman, op. cil. note 83, p. 169-181; Gross signals the confusion being made (as 
in the U.S. Supreme Court decision Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 14 L Ed 2d S10) 
in the use of the word 'autonomy' as a synonym of ‘privacy’, ...'while an offense lo 
privacy is an offense to autonomy, not every curtailment of autonomy is a compro­
mise of privacy’ (p. 181).
96 Karst, op. cit. note 92, p. 626.
^  Tribe, L.H., American constitutional law. Foundation Press, Mineola NY, 1978, p.
922.
98 Karst, op. cit. note 92, p. 626.
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do wiihoul sex’. "  In other words, by accepting contraceptive freedom, we 
have accepted the idea that sexual life and procreation are two distinct things. 
Reproductive freedom is only possible with effective methods of birth con­
trol. Abortion, in this view, is complementary to the other, not totally ef­
fective, methods of birth control. When we establish the principles which 
rule the abortion decision we have to make sure that they are consistent with 
the principles which rule other decisions in the same sphere, such as the use 
of contraceptives. It is important to point out, for example, that some of the 
anti-abortion arguments apply equally against the use of contraceptives. The 
argument that every life is a valuable life and that abortion will only in­
crease the shortage of children available for adoption applies equally to 
‘failing to conceive’.100 Hence, if the premise for contraceptive freedom has 
been the avoidance of the birth of unwanted children, we can see that this 
premise applies equally to abortion freedom.
This is not to say that there are no valid reasons for accepting contracep­
tive freedom and for rejecting abortion. What separates the two is, obvi­
ously, the question of the moral and legal status of the fetus. For those who 
accept that the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception, the 
right to reproductive freedom does not include the right to abortion. To take 
the ‘right to reproductive freedom’ or the ‘freedom of intimate association’ as 
the basis of the right to abortion would therefore be too broad. For the 
reasons mentioned above ‘the right to privacy’ also has too broad a meaning 
and insufficiently expresses the essence of the right to abortion. Another dif­
ference between contraceptive freedom and abortion freedom is that the first 
applies to couples or partners in general whereas the latter is more strictly 
linked to the pregnant woman. One of the basic claims of the abortion 
movement is that pregnant women should have the sole right of decision on 
abortion, without any outside intervention.101 In order to express clearly 
what is essential about the right to abortion, and at the same time to distin­
guish between abortion freedom and contraceptive freedom, it is preferable to 
regard the ‘right to self-determination' as the fundamental value underlying 
the right to abortion. This right implies that a person ought to be allowed to 
make for herself or himself those choices which significantly affect hers or
"  Radcliffe Richards, J., The sceptical feminist, Roulledge Sl K Paul, London, 1980, p. 
210 .
100 Ibid., p. 214.
101 Jagger, A., ‘Abortion and a woman’« right to decide', Philosophical Forum, 1973, 
p .36.
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his personal fate.102 This is basically the same as the above mentioned right 
to ‘individual autonomy’ , which is part of the broader right to privacy. We 
have chosen the term ‘self-determination’ because it emphasizes the fact that 
a pregnant woman wants to decide ‘on her own*. Furthermore, the right to 
self-determination is the most commonly used in support o f  a woman’s 
right to abortion.
Countries who have adopted a time-phase rule have implicitly recognized 
the woman’s right to self-determination, because up to the time limit set by 
the law the decision to have an abortion is left to the pregnant woman.
2. The Woman’s Right to Freedom of Religion
Pro-abortionists have claimed that the state has no right to impose a certain 
religious belief on women who do not share that belief. The argument that 
abortion is the unjust killing of human life is founded on a specific religious 
belief of the Catholic and part o f the Protestant Church. The decision to 
terminate a pregnancy is a matter of private conscience, protected by the free 
exercise of religion and outside the scope o f government control and author­
ity. As long as the question of when life begins is a matter of religious con­
troversy and no choice can be rationalized on a purely secular premise it is 
claimed that by outlawing abortion people would be establishing one reli­
gious view, and thus inhibiting the free exercise of religion of others.103
The question is what does ‘purely secular premise’ mean? Is it possible to 
make a strict separation between moral and legal rules based on a secular 
premise and those based on a religious premise? Are all rules based on a 
Christian premise a ‘violation of the freedom of religion’?
When we discussed the principle of the ‘sanctity o f life ', we said that the 
rules implied by this principle are universally accepted, independently of 
religious beliefs. Both the right to life and the right to self-determination are 
part of the ‘sanctity of life’. Secondly, the question of when the unborn can 
be considered as human beings is a difficult one, also from a secular point of 
view. Many of the origins of our beliefs with respect to the status of the 
unborn might derive from Christian principles, as do many of our moral 
principles. That does not mean, however, that they express only one reli­
gious belief. As we have seen, the controversy over the moral and legal sta-
102 Callahan, op. cil note 12. p. 331.
10^ Thil it the opinion of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Constitutional aspects 
of the right to limit childbearing, Washington, 1975, p. 31.
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Uis of the unborn is not (only) one between religious and non-religious prin­
ciples, but between different sets of moral principles. Whatever the outcome 
of the balancing of the right to life against the right to self-determination, it 
would be just as objectionable -  under the the ’sanctity of life’ principle -  to 
grant the fetus an absolute right to life as it would be to recognize the 
woman’s absolute right to self-determination.
3. T he W om an’s R ight to L im it C h ild b earin g
The passive side of the woman’s right to self-determination is her ‘right to 
limit childbearing’.104 It is a passive right because it sets limits to the gen­
eral prohibition of abortion on the grounds that it is the moral duty of the 
pregnant woman to carry her pregnancy to term, because abortion is the 
killing of a human being. It is the right not to be forced to bear a child in 
circumstances which constitute a burden the pregnant woman cannot be ex­
pected to bear. The ‘indications’ solution105, is the statutory form of this 
right.
The right to limit childbearing could find a basis in the concept of 
‘killing in self-defence’. If the fetus has the right to life, then abortion can 
be justified only when either the fetus is not innocent or the killing is not 
direct. The latter justification for abortion rests on the Catholic doctrine of 
‘double effect’ and this applies to a very few situations in which the preg­
nant woman is afflicted by a life-threatening disease.106 We shall now con­
sider the question of the innocence of the fetus.
If one contrasts innocence with guilt, emphasizing the mens rea of an act, 
and thus speaking of moral p i l t ,  then it is certainly always wrong to kill a 
fetus, because a fetus can certainly not be considered ‘guilty’. If one uses 
‘innocence’ in a technical sense, however, the position of the unborn is dif­
ferent, in that a being is technically innocent if it is not at present threaten­
ing the life of some other being. Hence, being technically innocent is not 
the opposite o f being guilty but of ‘being a threat’. Beings incapable of 
moral agency may still be a threat. For example, if my life is being threat­
ened by a gun wielding agent incapable of mens rea (a madman, or a child,
104 Term used by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, op. cil. note 103.
105 Under an indications solution, a woman is not allowed to have an abortion except in 
very special, well -defined circumstances, e.g. a medical, eugenic or ethical indication.
1 A jC
We have seen in Section A that this applies only to very rare circumstances, negli­
gible in statistical terms. See also footnote 70.
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or sleepwalker) my right of self-defence permits me to kill the attacker if 
that is the only means of protecting myself. Similarly abortion in self-de- 
fence may be allowable. It is clearly a case of self-defence when the pregnant 
woman will die if she continues her pregnancy, and if the pregnancy is due 
to rape. As we move further away from these clear-cut cases, the right to 
abort in self-defence is weakened. As the woman becomes more responsible 
for her pregnancy, as the threat to life becomes more remote, as the value 
threatened alters from life to some lesser good, etc., abortion in self-defence 
will be less justified. In situations other than abortion, the right to kill in 
self-defence has been extended to include some situations in which the de­
fender has placed herself at risk, in which the threat to life is merely proba­
ble, or in which not life but liberty or bodily integrity were at stake. 
Whether abortion in self-defence is justified has to be decided on a case-by- 
case basis.107
A second reason for supporting a moderate abortion policy (indications 
solution) lies in the special relationship between mother and fetus. Even as­
suming that both parties (pregnant woman and the fetus) have full rights, an 
abortion might be justified because of this special relationship. A common 
feature of all pregnancies is that the relation of fetus to mother is parasitic. 
The fetus is dependent for life support on being physically connected to the 
body of the mother and the fetus makes no reciprocal contribution to the 
physical well-being of the mother.108 Depending on the circumstances, the 
relationship can be burdensome to the mother. It can be inconvenient, un­
pleasant and even life-threatening. The relationship may be involuntary,if it 
was not consented to by the mother.109
If the relationship between mother and fetus displays these features, i.e. it 
is besides being parasitic burdensome and involuntary, one could contend 
that the mother has no moral duty to continue providing life support for the 
parasite despite the fact that the parasite has a right to life. In this view, the 
content of the right to life is defined by the duties it imposes on others, in 
this case, the mother. The right to life could be interpreted as the right to be 
given the necessities of life. This right is not unqualified, however, for
107 Sumner, op. cu. nole 53, p. 114
108 Intending that the pregnancy it not desired. In the case that the mother wants to give 
birth, pregnancy might have a positive effect on the well-being of the mother. But in 
that case this discussion is not relevant as there is not the intention to have an abor­
tion.
109 Ibid., p. 65; Thomson, op. cit. note 68, p. 65.
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others may sometimes have no duty to provide such necessities. As Judith 
Thomson has pointed out,
having a right to life does not guarantee having e ither a right to be given the 
use of, or a r ig h t to be  allow ed continued use of. another p e rso n 's  body -  
even if  one needs it for life itself.* *0
What this argument comes down to is that the right to life does not include 
the right to life support provided by someone else’s body, if this relation­
ship is burdensome and involuntary. If a pregnant woman wants an abortion 
in these circumstances it could be justified. A clear example would be ‘a sick 
and desperately frightened fourteen-year-old schoolgirl, pregnant due to 
rape’.111 Our assessment of a particular case will depend, firstly, on ho w  the 
pregnancy came about (the extent to which it was agreed lo or invited) and, 
secondly, on the burden pregnancy imposes on the woman (the extent of the 
threat to her life, liberty and well-being). Cases in which abortion could be 
allowed following this way of reasoning would be a pregnancy due to rape 
and a pregnancy which poses a substantial threat to the pregnant woman’s 
life.*12 The two reasons discussed here for allowing abortion in some 
circumstances -  the concept of killing in self-defence and the special 
relationship between mother and fetus -  would, however, in practice apply 
in very few cases. The percentage of abortion requests because of a preg­
nancy due to rape or because of a pregnancy which is life-threatening, is very 
sm all.113
In practice, the following rights have been derived from the right to limit 
childbearing, within the legal framework of an indications solution.
a. The right to physical and mental well-being (medical indication).
One cannot possibly expect a pregnant woman to suffer a serious threat to 
her physical and mental health. This argument is a corollary of the above- 
mentioned right to integrity of personal bodily individuality, i.e. rules 
should not involuntarily threaten the integrity of the body.114
110 Thomson, op. cit. note 68, p. 56. Quoted also in Sumner, op. cit. note 53, p. 66.
111 Sumner, op. cit. note 53, p. 69. Thomson, op. cit. note 68, p. 65.
112 Ibid.
113 See par. 4 for a further discussion on this point
114 See alto the arguments on the moral duty of the mother, under Section A (supra) in 
this chapter.
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b. The right noi lo bear a child which is the product of rape or incest (cthical 
indication).
The argument here is that a pregnant woman cannot be expected to give 
birth to a child which has been forced upon her. The pregnant woman has, in 
general, a special responsibility deriving from the fact that she is the mother 
of the fetus, which is dependent upon her. She can only be held responsible, 
however, if her pregnancy has resulted from a voluntary act.115 In case of 
rape or incest, she cannot be held responsible for the resultant pregnancy, 
and therefore abortion is permitted. Another reason for allowing abortion in 
this case is that abortion would rid the pregnant woman’s body of the effect 
of an earlier violation of her bodily integrity.
c. The right to avoid the birth of a deformed child (eugenic indication).
One argument for allowing abortion is a high probability that the pregnant 
woman will give birth to a deformed child who would be unlikely to have a 
worth-while life, or be glad to be alive.116 Another argument for allowing 
abortion in such a case is that we cannot expect the woman and her family 
to bear the burden of the care and education of a deformed child, which would 
be so much more difficult than the upbringing of a normal child.
d. The woman’s right to her well-being and to that o f her family in terms of 
health and quality of life (social indication).
One cannot expect a woman to give birth to an additional child if the socio­
economic conditions in which she lives do not permit her to give the child a 
reasonable life and future. This argument applies especially to poor women 
who can only overcome the situation in which they live if they can effec­
tively limit the size of their family. The right to abortion on social grounds 
is subject to much criticism because the meaning of 'social indication’ can 
be easily stretched to encompass all kinds of less urgent reasons for obtain­
ing an abortion. It is clear that in less developed areas and countries social 
circumstances can be a valid reason for obtaining abortion within the context 
of the ‘sanctity of life’. The question is what would be valid social reasons 
in a modem welfare state society.
115 Thom ion, op. cii. note 68, p. 64-65.
116 See supra under A.
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4. D iscussing the P reg n an t W om an’s C laim s
It is important to be coherent in the set of values we proclaim. If we want to 
be clear about what are the values underlying the abortion argument, we 
must come up with a genuine set of consistent principles. That is to say, if 
the principles we proclaim for or against abortion freedom are contradictory, 
the pro or contra abortion arguments themselves should be questioned. At 
any point where principles are inconsistent, there is no control over what is 
permissible.117
When we discuss the pregnant woman’s claims we start from certain 
premises regarding the moral status of the fetus. The woman’s right to self- 
determination is claimed by the abortion movement on the assumption that 
the fetus is not a human being, at least not until a certain stage of gestation. 
This claim as such does not, therefore, pose problems of consistency in that 
the interest of the fetus is simply considered to be non-existent. Hence no 
balancing of the interests of the pregnant woman and of the fetus is needed.
The woman’s claim to limit childbearing in certain very burdensome cir­
cumstances, on the other hand, does pose problems of consistency, precisely 
because this claim is based on the premise that the fetus has the right to life 
and that therefore abortion is generally wrong. A balancing of two interests 
is needed, the fetus’ claim to life against the woman’s claim to self-defence 
or to bodily integrity. The problem is that the woman’s justifications for 
having an abortion (self-defence, special relationship to the fetus), do not 
cover all the indications generally covered by an indications solution. The 
principle of killing in self-defence clearly justifies an abortion if there is a 
serious threat to the life of the pregnant woman (medical indication), and the 
principle of bodily integrity (special mother-fetus relationship), could justify 
an abortion in the case of rape. But even if we stretch the principle of self- 
defence beyond its conventional limits, it is difficult to see how it could 
cover an abortion if there is the risk of a deformed child being bom. In this 
case it is clear that there is no threat to the pregnant woman. The only threat 
is that the child will have an unhappy life. The social indication takes us 
even further away from the principle of self-defence. What seems to have 
happened is that in these cases we have abandoned the idea that the fetus is a 
human being, and this is where the inconsistencies enter into the debate.
Among these inconsistencies in the commonly held views on abortion is, 
for example, the argument that abortion is generally wrong because it is the
117 Radcliffe Richards, op. cit. note 99, p. 218.
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killing of innoccnt human life; but yet, exceptionally, abortions are allowed 
on medical, ethical and eugcnic grounds. It is claimcd that these exceptions 
do not violate the basic premise that the unborn has the right to life from 
the moment of conccption. When analyzed, however, the motives for allow­
ing abortion in these cases, but for not allowing abortion in general, show 
us that the general prohibition of abortion may well be based on the idea of 
punishment rather than on that of the fundamental right to life of the un­
born.
An example of this type of exception is abortion in the case of rape, in 
which the status o f the fetus is no different from that of the fetus of a preg­
nant woman not subjected to rape. Abortion is permitted, as we have seen 
before, because the raped mother cannot be held responsible for her unwel­
come position, whereas the non-violatcd mother can. The only thing which 
the woman who has conceived accidentally has done which differentiates her 
from the raped woman, is that she has indulged willingly in sex without be­
ing willing to bear a child. It might therefore be argued that behind the ar­
gument for not allowing abortion in general, but allowing it in the case of 
rape seems to be the wish to punish women who could have prevented con­
ception, for having intercourse. If not, why is the raped woman, but not 
others, allowed to sacrifice the unborn child’s life? The distinction made in 
the case of abortion due to rape is only explicable if the child is not consid­
ered a human being having a right to life but regarded as the instrument of 
punishment for the sexual activity of the mother. The logical conclusion 
seems to be that anyone who regards rape as a sufficient condition for abor­
tion on request by the mother should be willing to allow abortion in all 
cases. Conversely, anyone who is not willing to allow abortion on demand 
should not regard rape as a sufficient condition for allowing abortion.118
One of the reasons for allowing abortion in the case of a deformed child 
is, generally, to prevent the suffering of the mother and other members of 
the family. The position seems also to be based on the idea that there is an 
intrinsic diflcrcncc between deformed and undeformed children. The mentally 
abnormal child does not seem to count as fully human and therefore has to 
be spared a life of suffering. But why do the same considerations not apply 
to a mentally abnormal infant? ‘It seems rather hard that you should be eli­
gible to be spared a life of misery if you are lucky enough to be discovered 
in time, but not if you have the misfortune to have your disabilities unde-
1 ,8  Ibid., p. 222-226.
81
tectcd until birth’.119 If these principles permit abortion, they should also 
permit infanticide. Here again, the justification for allowing abortion in this 
case seems to be determined by social attitudes towards mothers rather than 
by the desire to protect all unborn life. A woman who wants a child, but by 
misfortune is carrying one of the wrong sort which will bring her unhappi­
ness by no fault of her own, is to be pitied and allowed to have an abortion. 
The real purpose behind this practice seems to be to protect ‘innocent’ 
women, while not providing a general escapc route for the ‘guilty’.120
What these examples show is that there arc inconsistencies in the argu­
ments of those who adhere to the sanctity of unborn life from the moment 
of conception and at the same time accept abortion on ethical and eugenic 
grounds. Consciously or unconsciously, some of the motives for prohibit­
ing abortion seem to have something to do with a condemnation of non-pro- 
creational sexual love, with an underlying vindictive attitude towards the 
sexual freedom of women. Here contraceptive freedom and abortion freedom 
are closely linked in that the reasons for not allowing abortion in all circum­
stances are related to the reasons for not allowing contraceptive freedom,, i.e. 
for not accepting sexual freedom independent of procreation.
In short, once the premise is acceptcd that the unborn has the right to life 
from the moment o f conception, very few cases of abortion will be justified. 
As there seems to be a trend to allow abortion in some circumstances, this 
implies that we have abandoned the idea that the unborn is a human being 
from the moment o f conception, because there arc very few situations in 
which it could be sustained that the right to life of a human being counts 
less than the right to self-determination or autonomy of another human be­
ing. Furthermore, in practice the circumstances under which the killing of a 
human being might be justified present themselves very rarely.
Section C Moral and Legal Claims Contingent upon 
the Right to Abortion
Whether the state will permit abortion in certain circumstances will depend 
on how the legally guaranteed claims of the fetus and of the pregnant woman
119 Ibid., p. 227. This question is under discussion at the moment. Yet not *11 people who 
allow for abortion on an eugenic indication would allow for infanticide or euthanasia 
of deformed children.
Radcliffe Richards, op. cit. noie 99, p. 229-230.
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arc weighed against each olhcr. According to the priority given to certain 
claims rather than to others, the state will either adopt an indications solu­
tion, or a timc-phase rule, or totally prohibit abortion. Once abortion is le­
gal, additional questions arise such as whether the pregnant woman has the 
exclusive right to decide on abortion, or whether her parents, her physician, 
and the father of the fetus should also have a say in the decision. Could the 
pregnant woman seeking abortion claim from the state that her right to abor­
tion should be guaranteed in the same way as the right of a pregnant woman 
to give birth, subsidized by the state? This raises the general question of the 
limits o f the right to abortion.
1. T he F a th e r’s R ights
What is the position of the father of the fetus in the abortion decision? He 
can claim his right to procreation.to family life, and to equal protection be­
fore the laws against the woman’s claim to have the exclusive right to deci­
sion on abortion. Procreation requires the involvement of two individuals. It 
might be argued that excluding the father of the fetus from the abortion deci­
sion means that his right to procreation becomes illusory. If the woman is 
given the exclusive right to decide whether or not to terminate her preg­
nancy, she is free to choose or to reject motherhood, whereas the father is 
denied the equivalent right to choose or reject fatherhood.121 There are sev­
eral arguments, however, for not involving the father in the abortion deci­
sion. Firstly, although it may be true that a father can claim certain rights 
with respect to his offspring, to give him the right to block the decision of 
the pregnant woman would mean giving him the right to force the status of 
motherhood on her. Given the fact that in the case of disagreement only one 
of the two partners can decide, and given the fact that the mother is much 
more directly affected by the pregnancy and the birth of a child, it would be 
unfair not to give her the priority in the abortion decision. Another argu­
ment against the recognition of the father’s rights is that in today’s society a 
sexual relationship is no longer regarded as implying procreation, and since 
the decision to have a sexual relationship is separate from the decision to 
have a child, a man cannot claim to have the right to procreation on the ba­
sis of his sexual relation with a woman.
121 See Teo, W.D.H., ‘Abortion -  husband's constitutional rights'. Ethics, 1975, p. 337- 
342; and see also the reaction of Purdy, L.M., 'Abortion and the husband's rights’. 
Ethics, 1975/76, p. 247-251.
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2. T h e  P a r e n t s ’ R ig h t s
If the pregnant woman is unmarried and has not yet rcachcd majority age, her 
parents can claim a role in the abortion decision. They can claim the right to 
have a say in the decision because they have a right to family life. They 
have a right to decide in affairs that affect family relationships such as their 
pregnant daughter’s decision to have an abortion. Secondly, they can claim 
that as legal representatives of their daughter they represent her interests and 
therefore must have a say in the abortion decision.
As for the rights claimed by the father of the fetus, here too counter ar­
guments based on today’s societal values can be put forward. To give the 
parents a right to veto the decision of their pregnant daughter would be to 
ignore the increasingly independent position of minors in today’s society. If 
minors no longer need the conscnt of their parents in order to obtain contra­
ceptives, and if minors live independently of their parents, it would be diffi­
cult to maintain that in the case of a pregnancy, which affects a minor so 
deeply, parental consent would nonetheless be required for an abortion in all 
cases. Furthermore, the view that parents ‘act in the best interests of their 
child’ is no longer accepted as a general rule.
Whether a minor is ‘grown up’ enough to decide alone on abortion or 
whether she should have the approval of her parents will depend on the par­
ticular circumstances of each case, on whether the minor is still dependent 
on her parents, on her level o f maturity etc. It is, anyhow, difficult to treat 
all minors alike and to maintain that none of them is mature enough to de­
cide alone on abortion.
3. The D octo r’s R ight to Freedom  of Action
The doctor can claim his right to freedom of action. By virtue of his profes­
sion, he has the right to practise according to the norms valid for the medical 
profession. This means that he has the freedom to perform or not perform an 
abortion and to choose the way in which to perform it. Only in emergency 
cases where there is a threat to the woman’s life is he obliged to perform an 
abortion in order to save her life.
The question is, however, whether abortion can be considered a normal 
medical act which falls within the competence of the medical profession. 
One of the central arguments in the abortion debate is that the decision to 
have an abortion requires a moral judgment and, therefore, cannot be left ex-
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clusivcly to the doctor. In this view, the doctor can only act when certain 
conditions, set by law, are fulfilled. The doctor’s right to professional free­
dom is in this case guaranteed by granting him the right to refuse to conduct 
an abortion on grounds of conscicnce. He can claim that he has been trained 
to save human life under all circumstances and that abortion, therefore, goes 
against the principles of his profession.
It seems clear that whether one adopts the first or the second position, the 
medical profession has a very powerful role. In the first case, it is the doctor 
who decides whether an abortion will be performed. In the second case, 
although a doctor has to rcspcct the legal requirements, he can nevertheless 
refuse to collaborate. Whether a woman's right to abortion is effective will 
ultimately depend on the attitude of the doctor she resorts to. Even under a 
time-phase rule a pregnant woman still has to find a doctor who is willing 
to perform an abortion.
4. T he W om an’s R ight to  Subsidized A bortion
The principle of equality requires that like cases be treated alike and different 
cases differently, and that there is an objective justification for treating like 
cases differently. Pregnant women seeking abortion could claim that they 
should not be discriminated against because they want an abortion, if abor­
tion in the particular case is legally permitted. They can claim that there 
should be no discrimination between women seeking abortion and women 
preferring childbirth. Thus pregnant women seeking abortion should have 
the same public financial assistance as women opting for childbirth.
The decisive element is whether abortion and childbirth or abortion and 
other health care differ in a significant way. One could say, for example, that 
abortions and appendectomies differ in a significant way and that this is a 
valid reason for a government to fund one and not the other. Secondly, non- 
therapeutic abortions are not aimed primarily at improving health in the nar­
row sense, which might be a good reason for not funding them.122
The same, however, can be said about childbirth. In the present days of 
contraceptive freedom, childbirth is no longer something that ‘inflicts’ 
women like an appendicitis. Given the availability of contraceptives, to have 
a child is a conscious choice. In this view, there is just as little reason to 
fund childbirth as there is to fund contact lenses. Secondly, childbirth is not
122 Sher, G., ‘Subsidized »bornon: moral rights »nd moral compromise'. Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 10, 1981. p. 362-363.
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aimed at improving health carc in the narrow sense. Both abortion and child­
birth arc aimed at improving health care in the broader sense.
Subsidized abortion could be claimcd as a generalized welfare right, i.e. a 
right to have one’s basic needs met by society if one cannot meet them one­
self.123 Abortion is often as necessary for a poor woman as access to general 
medical carc, education, food, and clothing. An abortion can in many eases 
alleviate the economic problems of a family unit, as an extra child brings 
with it extra costs, and prevents the mother from working etc.
Against the recognition of subsidized abortion as a welfare right one could 
argue that the welfare of poor women would be served equally well by pro­
viding them with enough additional money and ancillary services to support 
their unabortcd children.124 Another argument against subsidized abortion is 
that abortion is such a divisive issue that one cannot require people who 
have moral objections to abortion to contribute taxes to permit abortion 
subsid ies.125 The subsidizing of abortion, according to this argument, 
should be left to private initiatives.
The first argument against subsidized abortion only holds if the govern­
ment actually provides poor women with enough ancillary services to make 
abortion superfluous. A welfare state which provides its citizens with all 
their basic needs could in this way decide not to subsidize abortion. How 
many states would fulfil this requirement, however?
The second argument against the funding of abortion seems quite convinc­
ing at first, but does not hold if we apply it to other similar issues. A good 
example is defcncc policy. Do all citizens agree with the defence policy of 
their country and on the use of their tax money for employing nuclear 
weapons? The answer is clearly ‘no’, yet we do not leave the funding of nu- 
clcar weapons to the sphere of private initiative. Although there is strong 
opposition to the use o f  certain weapons, citizens are forced to contribute 
their tax money to the decisions their government takes in the field of de­
fence policy. Reasoning along the same lines, there is no way citizens could 
refuse their tax contributions for the public funding of abortion.
123 Ibid., p. 363.
124 Ibid., p. 364.
125 Ibid., p. 368.
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Section D The Role of the Law
Depending on the stance a government adopts in respect of the moral status 
of the unborn, the claims of the pregnant woman, and the balance between 
the two, it will draft certain legal provisions with regard to abortion. These 
legal provisions can have multiple aims transcending the principal moral is­
sues at stake. We can distinguish, roughly, between three types of abortion 
regulations in the five countries discussed in this study, i.e. the time-phase 
rule, the time-phase rule with dissuasion and counselling provisions, and the 
indications solution. The time-phase rule allows for abortion in all circum­
stances up to a ccrtain time limit. The time-phase rule with counselling 
provisions allows for abortion within a certain time limit on the condition 
that state agcncics try to dissuade the pregnant woman from having an abor­
tion and provide her with all the means to continue her pregnancy and pre­
vent an unwanted pregnancy in the future. The indications solution allows 
for abortion in certain strictly defined circumstances, e.g. medical, eugenic, 
ethical and/or social indications.
As we have already noted, government purposes vary according to the 
type of abortion legislation. At the two extremes we have the liberal and the 
conservative viewpoint. A liberal viewpoint will result in a time-phase rule 
in order to promote the view that abortion is a matter for private autonomy, 
and that abortion is necessary to give women an equal position in society. 
The conservative viewpoint, represented by an indications solution, is that 
the law should protect every unborn life except in very special circum­
stances. An indications solution can also have an ethical goal, in that the 
function of the law is to educate society, to show citizens what is right and 
what is wrong.
In between these two views, the law can have a more pragmatic function 
independent of the basic issues at stake. One of the principal aims o f most 
abortion laws is to prevent illegal and unskilled abortions. Another more 
pragmatic aim of abortion legislation can be to reduce the total number of 
abortions. By making abortion legal and at the same time providing all the 
means (contraceptive education etc.) of preventing unwanted pregnancies, a 
government can hope to reduce the total number of abortions in the long 
run. Another function of abortion legislation can be to follow societal 
changes. If public opinion is largely in favour of abortion freedom (in cer­
tain circumstances), it can be argued that the law should keep pace with 
these developments in order to be effective. We will see in the next chapter
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which legal systems have taken a stand on principle, and which have taken a 
more pragmatic view on abortion.
C onclusions
What we have done in this chapter is to set out all the arguments and 
counter arguments for recognizing the right to life of the fetus, the pregnant 
woman’s right to self-determination and to limit child bearing, the father’s 
and parents’ rights to decide on abortion, the doctor’s righi to refuse co-oper­
ation, and the woman’s right to subsidized abortion. An attempt has been 
made to analyze the underlying motives for supporting or opposing liberal 
abortion laws, and to point at inconsistencies in the abortion debate. The 
purpose of this ‘exposé’ was not to find solutions to the abortion dilemma. 
In fact, to discuss the various standpoints shows the full extend of the con­
fusion in the abortion debaie. Ultimately, the intention of this chapter is to 
clarify the underlying issues in order to understand better how legislators and 
constitutional courts have treated the abortion issue, the central theme of 
this thesis. We shall see in the next chapter that many elements o f this theo­
retical discussion can be traced back in the arguments and modes of reason­
ing of courts and legislators.
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Chapter III The Constitutional Protection of 
the Fundamental Values Involved in the 
Abortion Decision
Introduction
The purpose o f this chapter is to see how far the theoretical questions 
discussed in chapter II are reflected in abortion law reforms and constitutional 
decisions on abortion. How have legislators and constitutional courts solved 
the issue of the legal status of the unborn? Have they expressed themselves 
in a principled way on the legal status of the fetus, or on the woman’s right 
to decide, or have they adopted a compromise solution, striking a balance be­
tween the right to life of the fetus and the woman’s right to self-determina- 
tion? What role has been assigned to the doctor in the abortion procedure? 
And what arguments have been used to establish the role of the parents in 
the decision of an under-age daughter, and of the partner of the pregnant 
woman? Has the public funding of abortion been accepted? These questions, 
which were discussed at a theoretical level in chapter II, will now be exam­
ined in the constitutional context, that is, in the context o f legislation in 
combination with constitutional court rulings.
Section A will briefly outline the content of the abortion law reforms in 
the five countries discussed: the US, West Germany, France, Italy and 
Austria. It is clear that these reforms were partly the result of the interven­
tion by the constitutional courts. How the fundamental values identified in 
chapter II have been reflected constitutionally will be discussed in Section B 
in the following order the legal status of the unborn (sub 1), the pregnant 
woman’s right to self-determination and to limit childbearing (sub 2), the 
rights of the father of the fetus (sub 3), the rights o f the pregnant minor’s 
parents (sub 4), the doctor’s rights (sub 5), and the pregnant woman’s right 
to subsidized abortion (sub 6). In par. 7 there will be a more general discus­
sion on the role of the law in the abortion issue, i.e., the aims of the vari­
ous laws in relation to the means they provide. Par. 8 will deal with the role
of ihe European Convention on Human Rights, as (here have been two deci­
sions on abortion by the European Commission o f Human Rights. The 
conclusions of this chapter will attempt to indicate convergences and diver­
gences in the interpretation of these fundamental rights in the five constitu­
tional orders.
Section A. The Content of the Abortion Law Reforms
In the relatively short stretch of time between 1973 and 1978, abortion laws 
were liberalized in the United States, Austria, France, W est Germany and 
Italy. Although legislators certainly looked at each other’s work, this did not 
lead to the same degree of liberalization of abortion in all of these countries. 
In this section, the substance of the abortion law reforms in these five juris­
dictions will be briefly reviewed.
Abortion regulations permitting abortion are usually divided into two cat­
egories: the time-phase rule and the indications solution. Under a time-phase 
rule the only limitation on the woman’s right to abortion is a time limita­
tion: up to a certain number of weeks or months of gestation she is free to 
have an abortion without having to give a reason for her abortion request. 
As the pregnant woman can decide alone on abortion, her right to self-deter­
mination is recognized by the time-phase rule. Under an indications solu­
tion, abortion is generally prohibited except in certain clearly defined cir­
cumstances (indications) which are verified by a doctor (or other agent). 
Whereas the time-phase rule leaves the justification of abortion to the 
(moral) responsibility of the pregnant woman, the indications solution sets 
out the legitimate justifications for abortion.
There is a third category of abortion regulations which is very close to the 
time-phase rule, but in practice much more burdensome. We will call this 
category a *time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements'. What distin­
guishes this type of abortion regulation from a time-phase rule is that the 
woman has to go through a procedure which is meant to make her reflect se­
riously on her decision, to help her in finding alternatives to abortion, and 
ultimately, to dissuade her from her decision to have an abortion. The proce­
dure the pregnant woman has to follow in this case usually includes a medi­
cal and a social counselling session, and a waiting or reflection period. The 
medical and social counsellors have the task of pointing out the alternatives 
open to her, and have to try and persuade her to continue her pregnancy. The
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final decision, however, is lefl lo the pregnant woman, the determinant ele­
ment of a time-phase rule.
Of the five countries here discussed, two have a time-phase rule (US, 
Austria), one has an indications solution (West Germany), and two have a 
time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements (France, Italy).
1. U.S.
The first and most radical step in the field of abortion liberalization was 
made by the U.S. Supreme Court. Abortion legislation falls under the juris­
diction of the individual states. Up until 1973, when the Supreme Court de­
livered the Roe v. Wade decision,1 abortion laws varied widely from state to 
state. At the end of the 1960’s the first reform laws were passed which ex­
tended the grounds for legal abortion along the lines of the American Law 
Institute’s Model Penal Code.2 All these reforms included a threat to life or 
health, and either rape or incest or both as justifiable grounds for abortion, 
but the statutes were not uniform. Some states, e.g. New York, Hawaii and 
Alaska, went even further and did not require any justification/ground for 
abortion. They passed the so-called repeal bills, which set out only procedu­
ral requirements for abortion.3
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its first decision on abortion. 
Roe v. Wade * under which the majority o f  the state abortion laws were 
struck off, including the laws drafted on the basis o f  the Model Penal Code.3 
This and subsequent decisions on abortion by the Supreme Court resulted in 
a uniformity o f  state abortion legislation on many basic points. Very few
1 Roe ». W adi, 410 US 113, 35 LE d  2d, 147 (1973); reported in Cappelletti, M.,
Cohen, W., eds. Comparative Constitutional Law: cases and materials (hereafter cited
a j Comp. Const. /..), 1979, p. 563 ft.
2 Model Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft, American Law Institute, 1962, Section 
230.3 sub (2), Justifiable abortion: ‘A licensed physician is justified in terminating a 
pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy 
would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the mother or that the child 
would be bom with grave physical or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted 
from rape, incest or other felonious intercoune'.
3 Sarvis, B., Rodman, H., The abortion controversy, Columbia Un. Press, New York, 
1974, chapter 3. See chapter I. section B, par. 2. supra.
4 See supra note 1.
3 i.e., establishing an indications solution, see supra note Z
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aspects of the abortion procedure are by now left to the discretion of the in­
dividual states.
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court declared that the pregnant woman has 
the right to decide on abortion during the first three months of pregnancy, on 
the basis of her constitutional right to privacy implicit in the Due Process 
Clause of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.6 During that period,
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to deter­
mine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the pa­
tient's pregnancy should be terminated?
For the period between three and six months of pregnancy, a state is only al­
lowed to limit abortion freedom in order to protect the health of the pregnant 
woman. This might imply regulations as to who can perform abortions, the 
place where abortion interventions have to take place and other technical re­
quirements. Only from the moment of viability of the fetus, described as at 
about the end of the 2nd trimester, can the state claim a compelling interest 
in the protection of the life of the unborn and therefore limit and prohibit 
abortions.
By this ruling, women throughout the U.S. obtained the right to have an 
abortion on request within the first three months of pregnancy.
This sweeping decision by the Supreme Court, which had a profound effect 
on state abortion laws, certainly did not calm down the abortion controversy. 
On the contrary, it had a polarizing effect, and the debate is still going on 
today.8 State legislatures have tried to regain some of their legislative power 
in the field of abortion, but with very little success. In subsequent decisions 
the Supreme Court has maintained a firm stand on freedom of abortion as 
stated in Roe v. Wade. State laws which required the approval of the abor-
6  The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution: '... nor shall any Slate deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property, without Due Process of Law’.
7 Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1. p. 570; 35 LEd 2d, p. 183.
a
It is well known that President Reagan was fiercely opposed to abonion and made a 
restriction of the abortion practice an important item of his policy. He supported a 
constitutional amendment banning abonion, which does not seem to make much 
chance, however. See N ew sw eek, June 27, 1983 and February 6, 1984; Time- 
magazine, 6 April 1981, ‘The battle over abonion’; Spiegel, 30 Aug. 1982, pp. 146- 
MS; Donovan, P., ‘Half a loaf: a new anti-abortion strategy’. Family Planning 
Perspectives, 13, 1981, p. 262 ff. One more conservative appointment could change 
the balance in the Court and could reverse the trend in the Court’s jurisprudence. If the 
Senate had accepted in October 1987 the nomination of Justice Boik by President 
Reagan, such a shift would have most likely occurred.
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Lion request by an abortion committee or by two other doctors were declared 
unconstitutional.9 The Court also struck down state provisions which re­
quired the consent of the pregnant woman's husband, or which fixed the via­
bility point,10 or required a 24 hour wailing period and a counselling ses­
sion,1 1 or prescribed certain abortion techniques.12 A residence requirement 
was also held unconstitutional.13 Only with respect to the public funding of 
abortion and, to a certain extent, parental authority over minors, has the 
Supreme Court given the states some legislative freedom (see section B).
The Roe v. Wade decision has had a great impact in Europe in that it has 
conditioned the abortion debate, be it in the negative or in the positive 
sense.(see supra chapter I). Legislators had an example before them with 
which to compare their own ideas on abortion. The Roe line was certainly 
not accepted by all, but the Supreme Court decision was an important point 
of reference both for supporters and opponents of liberal abortion proposals. 
Simone Veil used arguments similar to those used in the Roe decision to 
gain support for her abortion law proposal in the French Parliament.14 A 
representative of the German Bundestag pleading before the Federal 
Constitutional Court referred to Roe in his defense of the recently passed 
liberal abortion law.15 In the same way, the opposition to abortion freedom 
used the American experience as a deterrent for abortion liberalization.
2. A ustria
The Austrian abortion law reform was part o f the general Penal Code reform 
which was passed in 1974. A s the governing Socialist Party had the abso­
lute majority in Parliament, there was no need for a thorough defense of the 
reform. The parliamentary debates on the abortion reform were, therefore, 
mere formalities. The discussion was characterized by the stating of opposite
9 Doe v. Bolton. 35 LEd 2d. 201 (1973); 93 S O . 739.
to Planned Parenthood o f Central Missouri v. Danforth, 49 LEd  2d; 96 S.Ct. 
(1976).
11 i i t y  o f Akron v. Akron Center fo r Reproductive Health, 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983).
12 Colauiti v Franklin. 99 S.Ct. 675 (1979).
13 Doe v. Bolton, op. cit. note 9.
14 See infra section B. par. 1.
15 Ibid.
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views, raihcr than by reaching compromises, and throughout the socialists 
were blamed by the opposition for making no concessions.16
Paragraphs 96 and 97 of the Penal Code concern abortion. Par. 96 states 
the general prohibition of abortion and the penal sanctions imposed. Par. 97 
gives three exceptions to the general prohibition. Abortion is not punishable 
when performed by a doctor after medical consultation within the first three 
months of gestation, (par. 97(1).1) Pregnancy is considered to begin at the 
moment of nidation (i.e. the implantation of the fertilized ovum in the wall 
of the uterus).17
A second case in which abortion is allowed (par. 97(1).2) is when there is 
a serious and unavoidable risk to the life or to the physical or mental health 
of the pregnant woman (medical indication), or if there is a serious danger 
that the child may be mentally or physically deformed (fetal indication), or if 
the woman was under 18 years of age or under guardianship at the time of 
conception (partial ethical indication). In this case too, the abortion has to 
be performed by a doctor.
Abortion is not punishable (par. 97(1 ).3) when the pregnancy is termi­
nated in order to save the woman's life from an immediate and unavoidable 
danger and medical help was not available in time. In this case, abortion 
does not need to be performed by a doctor.
In short, the Austrian abortion reform establishes a time-phase nile for 
the first three months of pregnancy, and an indications solution for the pe­
riod after three months of gestation. The law is very short and simple: it 
does not provide details on the counselling requirements, nor does it require 
hospital treatment or any formal procedure such as a written request, a wait­
ing period, etc.
The abortion reform was challenged by the Salzburg provincial govern­
ment, which claimed that it was a violation o f the right to life and of the 
right to equality laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights 
and the Siaatsgrundgesetz of 1867. The reform was, however, upheld by the 
Constitutional Court in its decision of 11 October 1974.18
16 See the Pirlum enury Debaies, National»! XII GP- Sitzung 84-27 November 1973.
17 Strafgesetzbuch, kommenuert von Foregger, H., and Serini, H., Wien, 197S. See
Parliamentary Debates, op. eit. note 16, p. 8174.
Translated in Comp. Const L ., op. eit. note 1, p. 615 ff.
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3. F rance
The French Abortion Act, Law no 75-17 of 17 January 1975, was drafted for 
the government by Simone Veil as Minister of Health and was passed after 
long debates with a few minor changes. In contrast to what happened in 
Austria, the French bill was definitely a compromise between opposing 
views in Parliament. The 1975 law was o f a provisional nature, but was 
adopted in a definite form in 1979 with some changes, mainly aimed at a 
better application of the law.19 The abortion provisions were incorporated in 
the Public Health Act (Code de la Santé Publique).
Art. 1 of the Abortion Act
guarantees the respecting of every human being from the beginning of life; 
this principle will not be violated except in case of necessity and subject to 
the conditions of the present law.20
The wording of this article has merely a symbolic, not a substantive mean­
ing, because the law in fact establishes a time-phase rule with dissuasion re­
quirements for the first ten weeks of pregnancy, and an indications solution 
for the period after ten weeks’ gestation. A rt 162-1 of the Code de la Santé 
Publique states that
a pregnant woman whose condition places her in a situation of distress can 
request a doctor to terminate her pregnancy. This interruption can only take 
place within the first ten weeks of pregnancy.21
Before the intervention can take place the pregnant woman has to go through 
a number of formalities, but the judgment whether there is a 'situation of 
distress’ is left to her. There are only penal sanctions on the requirements 
that the abortion has to take place within the first ten weeks of pregnancy, 
that it be performed by a doctor, and that it take place in a hospital or recog­
nized clinic (an. 2 Abortion Act). The existence of a 'situation of distress’ is 
not subject to penal sanctions, i.e. the ultimate validity of a woman’s claim
19 See the additions to the articlet 162-3, 162-S, and 162-8 of the Public Health Act 
made by Law no 79-1204 of 31 Dec. 1979.
óriginal text: 'La loi garantit le respect de lout être humain dèi le commencement de la 
vie. n  ne saurait être porti aueinte i  ce principe qu'en cas de nécessité et selon les 
conditions définies par la présente loi'.
21 Original text: *L» femme enceinte que son état place dans une situation de détresse peut 
demander à un médecin 1'interruption de sa grossesse. Cette interruption ne peut être 
pratiquée qu’avant la fin de la dixième semaine de grossesse*.
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to be in extremis cannot be decided by any outsider, be it a doctor, judge etc. 
Therefore, it is the woman who ultimately decides. A woman who wants an 
abortion has to obtain medical and social counselling. The doctor she makes 
her request to must inform her of the medical risks and must give her a 
dossier-guide which contains information on the rights a pregnant woman 
has, and an address list of all the organizations which provide social coun­
selling and of the places where abortions are performed (art. 162-3 CSP) The 
social counsellor has to give her all the social assistance she needs and has 
to help her to solve her social problems, and especially to continue her 
pregnancy (a rt 162-4). After the counselling sessions, the pregnant woman 
has to give written confirmation of her abortion request and is thus enabled 
to have an abortion after a waiting period of seven days from the moment of 
her first request. If there is the risk that the ten weeks time limit will be 
overstepped, the doctor can decide to reduce the waiting period.(art. 162-5 
)The intervention must be performed by a doc tew in a public hospital or in a 
recognized private institution, (art. 162-1, 162-2 ) Abortion is possible at 
any time during the pregnancy, if two doctors certify
that the continuation of pregnancy would seriously endanger the woman’s 
health, or that there is a high probability that the fetus is affected by a seri­
ous disease acknowledged as incurable at the moment of the diagnosis.22
In case of such a medical and fetal indication, the woman has also to go 
through the counselling formalities and the waiting period of seven days.23 
Pregnant minors need the approval of one of their parents or of their legal 
representative (art. 162-7 CSP). Foreign women can only have an abortion 
if they have been resident in France for at least three months (art. 162-11, 
and Décret no 75-354, 13 May 1975). This is in order to avoid abortion 
tourism and the commercialization of abortion.24 The legislator was opposed 
to the establishment of ‘abortion clinics’25 and therefore enacted a r t  178-1 
which states that no more than one quarter of all surgical and obstetrical in­
terventions in a hospital unit may be abortions. Propaganda or publicity for 
abortion is a criminal offence (art. 647 CSP), as is the sale of abortifacients, 
unless on a medical prescription (art 645 CSP). Both these activities carry
22 Art. 162-12, Code de la Same Publique.
23 Art. 162-13, Code de la Samé Publique.
24 See the Parliamentary Debate!, Assemblée Nationale, 27, 28, and 29 November 1974, 
Journal Officiel, 1974, p. 7224.
25 Simone Veil, Minister of Health, Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 24, p. 7000.
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the threat o f penal sanctions. The fees for an abortion intervention are fixed 
by decret (art. 8 Abortion Act) and are adjusted regularly. Since 1 January 
1983,75% o f the fees are paid for out o f public funds.
The members of the French National Assembly who had voted against the 
‘loi V eil’, appealed to the Constitutional Council before the new law came 
into force and claimed that the time-phase rule laid down by the Abortion 
Act was incompatible with the Preamble of the French Constitution and 
with art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights which protects 
the right to life. In its decision of IS January 197S, the Constitutional 
Council upheld the Abortion Act.26
4. G erm an y
On 26 April 1974, the German Bundestag adopted the Fifth Criminal Law 
Reform A ct The Act was promulgated on 21 June 1974 and contained a re­
form of the abortion provisions. A time-phase rule was adopted for the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy, and an indications solution for the whole dura­
tion of pregnancy. Par. 218a of the Penal Code stated that abortion was not 
punishable if performed by a doctor, with the pregnant woman’s consent, 
and if no more than twelve weeks had elapsed from the moment of concep­
tion. Par. 218b established that abortion was not punishable after twelve 
weeks of pregnancy if there existed a medical, fetal or ethical indication in 
the eyes of the medical profession and if the abortion was certified by the 
competent authority. In both cases pregnant women had to consult a doctor 
-  under the threat of a penal sanction -  in order to be informed about the as­
sistance available. This applied particularly to those women who wanted to 
continue their pregnancy (a rt 218c)
On 20 June 1974, the government of the Land of Baden-Württemberg re­
quested the Federal Constitutional Court to suspend, by provisional ruling, 
the coming into force of the Fifth Criminal Law Reform A c t On 21 June 
1974, the Federal Constitutional Court issued a provisional ruling by which 
the coming into force of par. 218a (time-phase rule) of the new Penal Code 
was suspended, and it declared that the indications solution would also be 
applicable to abortions performed within the first twelve weeks o f preg­
nancy. In short, it established an ethical indication for abortion during the 
first twelve weeks of pregnancy.
26 Journal Officitl, 1975, p. 671. Translated in Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1, p. 577 
ft.
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On 21 June 1974, 193 members of the Bundestag and the governments of 
Five Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein and 
Rheinland-Palatinate) instituted proceedings for a review of par. 218a as to 
its conformity with the Constitution. They invoked in particular art. 2(2) in 
conjunction with art. 1(1) and a rt 1(4) of the Constitution which protect the 
right to life and to dignity.27 In its judgment of 25 February 1975, the 
Constitutional Court declared par. 218a unconstitutional insofar as it ex­
empted abortion from punishment even if no reasons were given for the 
abortion which could be justified under the system of values incorporated in 
the C onstitution.28 The Court ruled that art. 2(2) o f the Constitution 
(‘everyone shall have the right to life’) also protected developing life as an 
independent legal interest from the 14th day after conception. The Court at­
tacked the abortion reform for the fact that it did not include a legal condem­
nation of abortion and that it did not provide for penal sanctions in cases in 
which abortion was not justified. The Court gave clear guidelines to the leg­
islature as to how to modify the reform. It indicated that the legislature 
should make a differentiated penal regulation which clearly distinguished 
cases of legal abortion from cases in which abortion was illegal.29
The Federal Constitutional C ourt’s decision was followed by the 
Fifteenth Criminal Law Amendment Act of 12-2-1976 which established an 
indications solution. The new art. 218a stated that an abortion performed by 
a doctor and with the pregnant woman’s consent was not punishable if medi­
cal evidence showed that
(1) in view of her present and future living conditions the termination of 
pregnancy is advisable in order to avert a danger to her life, or the danger of a 
serious injury to her physical or mental health, provided that the danger can­
not be averted in any other way she can reasonably be expected to bear;
(2) there are strong reasons to suggest that, as a result of a genetic trait or 
harmful influence prior to birth, the child would suffer from an incurable in­
27 Art. 2(2) of the Basic Law: ‘Everyone shall have the light to life and to the inviolabil­
ity of his penon. The liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may 
only be encroached upon pursuant to a law*. Art. 1(1): ‘The dignity of man shall be 
inviolable. To respect and promote it shall be the duty of all slate authority.' 
Translation by Finer, S., Five Constitutions, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1979.
^  Urteil vom 23.2.1975, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, 39, 1975, 
pp. 1-95. Also published in Juristemeitung, 1975, pp. 205-222. Translated in Comp. 
Const. L., op. eil. note 1, p. 586 ff, and in Gorby, J.D., Jonas, R .E , ‘West German 
abortion decision: a contrast U> Roe. v. Wade', John Marshall Journal o f Praciict and 
Procedure, 9, 1976, n.3, p. 605 ff.
29 Comp. Const. L., op. cil. note 1, pp. 594-597.
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jury lo its health which is so serious that the pregnant woman cannot be re­
quired to continue her pregnancy;
(3) an unlawful act (rape, incest) has been committed and there are strong rea­
sons to suggest that the pregnancy is a result of that offense;
(4) the termination of pregnancy is otherwise advisable in order to avert the 
danger of a distress which is so serious that the pregnant woman cannot be 
required to continue her pregnancy, and which cannot be averted in any other 
way she can reasonably be expected to bear.^O
In short, abortion on a medical (1) or fetal (2) indication is under the present 
law allowed up to 22 weeks of pregnancy, and on an ethical (3) or social(4) 
indication up to 12 weeks o f pregnancy.(art. 2 18a. 3 ) In order to have an 
abortion, the pregnant woman has to receive medical and social counselling, 
and delay her decision for three days. She also needs the approval o f two doc­
tors, and failure to seek this carries the threat of penal sancdons.(arts. 218b 
and 219) The counsellor has to inform her ‘of the public and private assis­
tance available to pregnant women, mothers and children, in particular such 
assistance as facilitates the continuance of pregnancy and alleviates the situa­
tion o f mother and child’, and ‘of the medically significant aspects’ (a rt 
218b (1)). A written certificate has to be submitted by a doctor to the doctor 
who performs the abortion, testifying that an indication exists. Failure to do 
so means the threat of a penal sanction (art. 219). Par. 219b and 219c im­
pose a penal sanction on the advertizing of abortion services, and on the use 
and sale of abortifacients.31
5. Italy
The history of the Italian Abortion Act, law no 194 of 22 May 1978, dates 
back to 1971 when the first drafts for an abortion bill were presented. In 
1975 the Constitutional Court examined whether the Fascist Penal Code 
provisions which prohibited abortion in all circumstances were constitu-
Translation by the Council of Europe in the Briiggeman and Scheuten case, report of
the European Commission of Human Rights adopted on 12 July 1977, pp. 9-10. There
is, however, no sanction on the existence of an indication for women. According to 
par. 218.3.2., the pregnant woman is not punishable when the abortion has been per­
formed by a doctor, after counselling, within the first 22 weeks of pregnancy. See
Schmitt, R., 'von der Aufgabe. Gesetze zu machen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der 
Reform unseres Abtreibungsstnfrechts', Ztiltchri)i fu r  das gtsam le Fomit it nr t  chi,
1976, p. 595 ff.
31 Ibid. See for an evaluation of the law in the light of the Constitutional Court decision,
Beulke. W., ‘Zur Reform des Schwangenchaftsabbruchs durch das IS. Strafrecht-
anderungsgesetz', Zeitschrift fu r  das gesamtt Famdienrechl. 1976, p. 596 ff.
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Uonai, and ruled that although the Constitution protects unborn life, the 
right to life and to health o f the pregnant woman have priority over the 
claim to life of the unborn during the early stages of pregnancy.32 In its de­
cision the Court invited the legislature to draft new abortion provisions 
which would allow for abortion
when further development of the gestation could imply injury or danger 
which is grave, medically ascertained and not otherwise avoidable, for the 
health of the mother.
It is the legislature's obligation, says the Court, to
forbid the procuring of an abortion without careful ascertainment of the real­
ity and gravity of injury or danger which might happen to the mother as a re­
sult of the continuation of pregnancy.33
This wording seems to suggest that the Constitutional Court had an indica­
tions solution in mind as the constitutional basis for abortion.
The 1978 Abortion Act, however, is definitely more liberal than the Court 
intended. Under the threat of a referendum, a unified proposal for the liberal­
ization of abortion was finally passed by the Chamber of Deputies and by 
the Senate at the beginning of 1978. The Italian Abortion Act is, both in its 
wording and in its ideological foundation, quite similar to the French abor­
tion provisions.
Art. 1 declares that
the state guarantees the right to conscious and responsible procreation, that 
it recognizes the social value of motherhood and that it protects human life 
from the beginning.34
Abortion is not a means of birth control (art. 1.2), and public health services 
will be promoted to that effect (art. 1.3). 50 Billion lire will be made avail­
able by the Treasury for family planning services (consultorifamiliari).
These ‘restrictive’ statements have no substantive meaning, however, be­
cause art. 4 establishes a time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements for 
the first 90 days of pregnancy.
32 Cone Costituiionale, decision of 18 Feb. 1975, no. 27, 20 Giurisprudema Costitu­
zionale, 1975, p. 117 ff. Translation in Comp. Const. L., op. ctf. note 1, p. 612 ff.
33 Comp. Const. L., p. 614. C turisprudenia Costituzionale, 1975, p. 120.
Art. 1.1 of the Law of 22 May 1978, n. 194: ‘Lo sialo garantisce il diritto alla procre­
azione cosciente e responsabile, riconosce il valore sociale della maternità e tutela la 
vita umana dal suo inizio'.
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For an interruption of pregnancy, within the first 90 days, a woman who 
claims circumstances under which the continuation of her pregnancy, deliv­
ery, or the state of motherhood, would be a serious threat to her physical or 
psychological health, with respect to her health, heT economic, social, or 
family situation, to the circumstances under which she became pregnant, or 
the possibility of a deformed child, can make an abortion request to a doctor 
or a family planning service (an. 4).3S
The doctor or family planning service has lo give her medical and social 
counselling in order to help her solve her problems and to try to persuade her 
to continue her pregnancy. The pregnant woman has to sign a document 
confirming her abortion request and after a seven day waiting period (art. 5) 
she can obtain an abortion by presenting this document to a doctor in an ob­
stetrical or gynaecological department of a public hospital (art 8). Abortions 
during the first 90 days of pregnancy can also be performed in public poly­
clinics or in private clinics authorized by the regional health authorities (art. 
8). An upper limit to the number of abortions in private clinics is to be 
fixed in order to avoid the phenomenon of ‘abortion clinics’.(art. 8) Whereas 
the language of a r t  4 seems to point to indications, there are no penal sanc­
tions on the existence of the ‘circumstances’ mentioned under art. 4. Arts. 
17-20 of the Abortion Act imposing penal sanctions on the non-fulfillment 
of the procedural requirements (like counselling, waiting period, approval 
given by the woman). Abortions must be performed by a doctor in a public 
hospital or recognized private clinic, and after 90 days of pregnancy can only 
be performed if there is a medical indication. Again, like in the French case,
^  Original text: ‘Per l'interruzione volontaria deUa gravidanza entro i primi novanta 
giorni, la donna che accusi circostanze per le quali la prosecuzione della gravidanza, il 
parto o la maternità comporterebbero un serio pericolo per la sua salute fisica o 
psichica, in relazione o al suo stato di sahile, o alle sue condizioni economiche, o 
sociali o  familiari, o alle circostanze in cui è avvenuto il concepimento, o a previ­
sioni di anomalie o malformazioni del concepito...' For comments on the contradic­
tion between ait. 1 and ait. 4 of the Italian law see Busnelli. F.O., e.o., ‘Legge 22 
maggio 1978. n. 194', L t nuovt Itggi civili commentati, 1978, p. l593-1608.See 
alio the ‘lavori preparatori' reported in Galli, G., Italia, V., Realroonie, F., Spina, 
M., Traverso, C.E., L 'ùuernaioiu volontaria dilla gravidanza, commento alla legge
22 maggio 1978, n. 194, Giuffrt, Milano, 1978, p. 402, in which the pngm atic po­
sition of the law it emphasized. According to Bognetti, G„ ‘Abortion law and public 
policy'. Comparative Law Yearbook, 1983, p. 88, an. I hat been included in order to 
pay lip-service to the ‘dicta' of the Constitutional Court and in order to sooth and 
propiuate the conservative side of public opinion: 'The protection the statute ac­
corded to the life of the unborn is therefore, to speak frankly, so weak as u> be practi­
cally illusory'.
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the ultimate validity of a woman’s claim to be in extremis cannot be 
checked by an outsider (doctor, judge etc). This provision can therefore be 
classified as a time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements, like in the 
French case.
Abortion is possible after 90 days of pregnancy when there is a serious 
threat to the life of the woman or when there is the possibility of a deformed 
child, which would constitute a serious risk to the physical or psychological 
health of the woman (art. 6). The existence of an indication has to be certi­
fied by a doctor belonging to an obstetrical-gynaecological department (art. 
7). Only in the case of a serious threat to the life of the woman, an abortion 
can be performed after the moment of viability, and in that case the doctor 
performing the operation has to use all possible means to save the life of the 
fetus, (art 7) If the pregnant woman has not yet reached the age of 18, she 
needs the approval of one of her parents or of a legal representative. If this 
causes serious problems, the Juvenile Court can authorize the abortion if it 
is performed within the first 90 days of pregnancy (art. 12). For abortions 
after the first 90 days, minors do not need parental authorization.
On the 17th o f May 1981, two referenda were held on the validity of the 
Abortion Act, which aimed at attacking it from the left (Radical Party) and 
from the right (Pro-Life movement). The Radical Party’s proposal was to 
abolish all the articles of the Abortion Act which limit the woman's right to 
choose (counselling, waiting period, penal sanctions). The Right’s proposal 
was to abolish all the provisions which permitted abortion except for thera­
peutic reasons. Both proposals were defeated by a clear majority, and the 
1978 law remained unchanged.36
In June 1981, the Constitutional Court published its decisions taken in 
January of that year, upholding the 1978 Abortion A c t37 The Court rejected 
claims which challenged the pregnant woman’s right to decide and the preg­
nant minor’s position. The Court ruled that an intervention by the Court 
into the choices made by the legislator, as demanded by the appellants, 
would result in new penal norms. As the creation of new criminal provi­
sions belongs to the exclusive competence of the legislature (art. 15.2 of the
36 The pro-life amendment was opposed by 67.9% of the voter», the Radical Party's pro­
posal by 88.5%.
37 Decision of 25 June 1981, no 108 and 109, Ciurisprudenza Cosutuiionalt, 1981, pp. 
909-967. According to Bognetti, G., op. eil. note 35, p. 92, these decisions can be 
regarded as a careful adjustment of the Court’s jurisprudence to the development that 
had meanwhile occurred in the legal system, and above all, in public opinion.
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Constitution), the Court refused to enter into this argument, (decision no 
108) As far as the minor’s position was concerned, the Court decided that the 
choice of the legislator was justified by the intention to prevent clandestine 
abortions, (decision no 109)
Section B. The Fundamental Values Recognized by 
the Constitutional Order
This section will discuss how legislatures and constitutional courts dealt 
with the definition of the fundamental values involved in the abortion deci­
sion and contingent upon the right to abortion.38
1. The Legal Status o f the Unborn
U.S.
The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution declares: '...nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without Due Process of 
Law’. In the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973,39 the US Supreme Court dealt 
with the question whether the unborn can claim a right to life under the ‘Due 
Process Clause’ of the 14th Amendment. The answer was negative on the 
basis of two arguments.
First of all, the Court discussed whether the fetus is a ‘person’ as defined 
by the 14th Amendment. The Constitution does not define ‘person’ in so 
many words, but the Court claimed that in nearly all instances in which the 
word ‘person’ is used in the Constitution it has a postnatal application only. 
Furthermore the Court argued that this view was supported by the history of 
abortion prohibitions. Under common law, abortion performed before quick­
ening was not an indictable offense. It now appeared doubtful that ‘abortion 
was ever firmly established as a common law crime even with respect to the 
destruction of a quick fetus’.40 Until the middle of the 19th century, the law 
in effect in all but a few states was the pre-existing English common law. 
Only in the middle and late 19th century did the quickening distinction dis-
3® An English translation of the respective Constitution*! Coon decision» can be found 
in Cappetleui, Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1.
39 See supra note 1.
40 35 LEd 2d. p. 167.
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appear and were the degree of offence and the penalties increased. This brings 
the Court to the observation that
at common law, at the time of adoption of our Constitution, and throughout 
the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor 
than under most American statutes currently in effect.4'
The Court therefore concluded that the word ‘person’ as used in the 14th 
Amendment does nol include the unborn.
Secondly, the Coyrt tackled the question of when human life begins. It 
gave a survey of the ‘wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and 
difficult question’: the Stoics held that life does not begin before birth, 
which is also the predominant attitude of the Jewish faith; common law 
found a greater significance in quickening; physicians and scientists focused 
upon conception, live birth, or the interim point of viability; the 
Aristotelian theory of ‘mediate animation’ was the official Catholic Doctrine 
until the 19th century, and current data indicate that conception is a ‘process’ 
over a period of time.42 On the basis of this ‘divergence of views’, the Court 
decided that there was no need to resolve this difficult question:
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and 
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in 
the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to 
the answer.43
The Court accepted that the state had certain interests in regulating or pro­
hibiting abortion. One important and legitimate state interest was the 
preservation and protection of the health of the pregnant woman. Another 
was the protection of the potentiality of human life. These valid state inter­
ests grew ‘in substantiality as the woman approaches term’, but they only 
become ‘compelling’ at a certain stage in pregnancy.44
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in the health of 
the mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of the present medical 
knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so be­
cause of the now established medical fact ... that until the end of the first
41 Ibid., p. 170.
42 Ibid., p. 181.
43 bid:. Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1, p. 569.
44 35 LEd 2d, p. 182; Comp. Const. L., op. eil. note 1, p. 569.
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trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal child­
b irth .^
From this point onwards the state may, therefore, regulate the abortion pro­
cedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation 
and protection of maternal health. This refers to who is going to perform the 
abortion, the facilities where abortion interventions can take place etc.
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in potential life, 
the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then pre­
sumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. 
State regulations protective of fetal life after viability thus have both logical 
and biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life 
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, 
except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.46
The Court defines ‘viable’ as ‘rotentially able to live outside the mother’s 
womb, albeit with artificial aiu '. It adds that viability is usually placed at 
about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.47
This division of the pregnancy into trimesters elaborated by the Court 
implies that there is no compelling state interest during the first trimester of 
pregnancy which can proscribe or regulate abortion. The woman’s right to 
privacy, which is according to the Court ‘broad enough to encompass the 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy'48 (see under 
2.) can, therefore, not be interfered with during the first three months of 
pregnancy. Therefore the Court states:
... for the period prior to this ‘compelling' point (end of the first trimester), 
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to deter­
mine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the pa­
tient's pregnancy should be terminated.4?
It is interesting to see the leap in the Court's way of reasoning. Although it 
declares that there is no need to decide on the question of when human life 
begins, it then rules that the value of unborn life is only sufficiently impor­
tant as to outlaw abortion from the moment of viability. In this way the
4^ Comp. Const. L., op. cil. note 1, p. 569. 35 LEd 2d, p. 182.
46 Comp. Const. L., op. tit. note 1. p. 570.35 LEd 2d, p. 183.
47 35 LEd 2d, p. 181.
48 Comp Const. L., op. cil note 1, p. 567. 35 LEd 2d, p. 177.
4? Comp. Const, L., op. cit. note 1, p. 570. 35 LEd 2d, p. 183.
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Court imposes the view on the state legislatures that the unborn can only be 
considered a human being at the moment of viability. Thus it has already 
reached a decision on the question of when human life begins. Secondly, 
apart from the fact that it decides on a question which did not initially con­
cern it, it does not give any arguments for considering viability as a cut-off 
point. Although there are sound reasons for granting the same rights to the 
fetus at the moment o f viability as to the newborn child, some justifications 
are needed for not doing the same for pre-viable fetuses.50 Given the fact that 
this question is so difficult to answer, one might have expected some flexi­
bility from the Court, in the sense that it left at least some freedom to the 
states to decide this question. It is interesting to note at this point that the 
Court is flexible with respect to the protection of the fetus after viability: ‘If 
the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far 
as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to 
preserve the life or health of the mother’.51 This implies that states are al­
lowed to permit abortion of viable fetuses up to the moment of birth.
In short, the Supreme Court is quite contradictory in its statements in 
Roe v. Wade. After having recognized that the question of when the fetus 
can be considered a human being is very difficult, and that no clear answer is 
possible, it then makes a very rigid division o f the pregnancy into three 
trimesters, and rules that the fetus cannot be considered a human being be­
fore the end o f the second trimester. This view is imposed on the states. The 
statement that the state’s interest in protecting the potentiality of human life 
‘grows in substantiality as the woman approaches term ’52 implies that the 
Court has adopted a developmental criterion of ‘humanness’. Furthermore, 
the Court ruled that only from the moment of viability is human life worth 
protection. The Court has thus given some answers to the ‘difficult question 
o f when life begins’.
Germany
The German abortion discussion has evolved around the opposite premise, 
that is that unborn human life needs protection from the beginning. The
See chapter II, lection A, par. 5.7 and S.8. See also Tribe, L.H., 'Toward a model of 
roles in the due process of life and law'. Harvard Law Review, 87, 1973, p. 4-5. See 
also Dellapenna, J.W., ‘Nor piety nor wit: the Supreme Court on abortion', Columbia 
Human Rights Review, 1975, p. 379 ff.
51 Ibid.
52 Comp. Const. L., op. cil. note 1, p. 569. 35 LEd 2d, p. 182.
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question was not if but how unborn life had to be protected. The time-phase 
rule adopted by the Bundestag (par. 218 of the Penal Code) was struck down 
by the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision of 25 February 1975.53 
We will give a brief description of that decision and subsequently the analyt­
ical basis o f this ruling will be discussed.
The Constitutional Court ruled that art. 2(2) of the Constitution 
(‘everyone shall have the right to life’)54 also protects developing life as an 
independent legal interest from the 14th day after conception. The following 
reasons are given for this viewpoint Firstly, art. 2(2) of the Constitution is 
a reaction against the experience o f National Socialism. Secondly, according 
to established biological and physiological findings, life begins at the 14th 
day after conception. The Court refers here to a legal expert’s statement. 
Thirdly, the sense and purpose of art. 2(2) require that the term 
‘everyone’(69) should also refer to developing life. Fourthly, the legislative 
history of art. 2(2) suggests that it includes nascent life. The Court adds that 
the process of the development o f  human life is a continuous one, in that no 
distinction can be made between the various stages, and that the ‘everyone’ 
referred to in a rt 2(2) covers all stages of life.55
This right to life is not merely a subjective, defensive right. The constitu­
tional norms represent an objective order of values providing guidelines and 
impetus to the legislature, judiciary and administration. Therefore, the state 
has to safeguard unborn life also from illegal encroachments by others.56
The Court recognizes that the woman’s right to freedom of her personal­
ity, protected by a rt 2(1) of the Constitution,57 comprises the woman’s re­
sponsibility to decide against parenthood. However,
a compromise which guarantees the protection of the life of the one to be 
bom and permits the pregnant woman the freedom of abortion is not possible 
since the interruption of pregnancy always means the destruction of unborn 
life ... A decision oriented on Art 1, Par. 1, of the Basic Law must come down 
in favor of the precedence of the protection of life of the child en ventre de sa 
m ire  over the right of the pregnant woman to self-determination ... This
53 See supra note 28.
54 See supra noce 27.
55 Comp. Const. L., op. a t. noce 1, p. 586-587. JuristenzeUung, 1975, p. 207-208.
56 Comp Const. L ,  op. cit. note I, p. 588. Jurisienseitung, 1975, p. 208.
57 Art. 2(1) of the B ute Law: ’Everyone thall hive the right to the free development of 
hit personality insofir as he does not violile the rights of others or offend against 
the constitutional order or the moral code.' Translation in Finer, op. cit note 27.
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precedence exists as a matter of principle for the entire duration of pregnancy 
and may not be placed in question for any particular time.38
Therefore, the state must view abortion as an injustice and the condemnation 
of abortion must be clearly expressed in the legal order.59 
How the state fulfils its obligation to provide an effective protection of de­
veloping life is, according to the Court, in the first instance, to be dccided 
by the legislature. The legislature is not obliged to employ the same penal 
measures for the protection o f unborn life as those it considers appropriate 
for those already bom. The use of penal law in order to protect developing 
life against action taken by the mother may give rise to special problems 
which result from the unique situation of the pregnant woman. In individual 
cases difficult, even life-threatening situations of conflict may arise. The 
question is what the pregnant woman may be reasonable expected to endure. 
Indeed, very serious circumstances must exist which make it so difficult for 
the woman to fulfil her duly that she cannot be expected to carry her preg­
nancy to term. It is not necessary to continue the pregnancy, especially if 
abortion is necessary in order to avert a danger to the life o f the pregnant 
woman or the danger of a grave injury to her health. In this case, her own 
‘right to life and bodily inviolability’ (protected by art. 2(2) of the 
Constitution) is at stake, which she cannot be expected to sacrifice for the 
unborn. In the case of other extraordinary burdens for the pregnant woman, 
continuation of pregnancy cannot be forced. Cases of fetal, ethical, social 
indications for abortion can be included in this category. The decisive point 
is that
in all these cases another interest equally worthy of protection by the 
Constitution asserts itself with such urgency that the state's legal order can­
not demand here that the pregnant woman under all circumstances concede 
pre-eminence to the right of the unborn ... Also the indication of a general 
necessity (social indication) may be included here. For the general social sit­
uation of the pregnant woman and of her family may bring forth conflicts of 
such gravity that sacrifices in favor of the pre-natal life exceeding a certain 
measure cannot be exacted by the instrumentalities of criminal law.60
Corby, op. tit. note 28, p. 643. See 1U0 Comp. Const. L., op. tit. note 1, p. 589. 
For the original text tee Juristtm eitung, 1975, p. 208.
CQ
Comp. Const. L., op. til. note 1, p. 590.
Comp. Const. L.. op. tit. note 1, p. 592. Juru tin ze itu n f, 1975, p. 210.
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In all other cases, abortion remains a wrong deserving of punishment. The 
legislator was only allowed to dispense with the criminal sanction if there 
was another equally effective legal sanction at his disposal which clearly rec­
ognized abortion as wrong and prevented abortions as effectively as a penal 
provision.
The state is also expected to offer counselling and assistance ‘for the pur­
pose of admonishing the pregnant woman as to her fundamental duty to re­
spect the life of the unborn’ and to encourage her to continue her preg­
nancy.61
The Court condemned par. 218 of the Penal Code on the following 
grounds.
1. The legal condemnation of abortion must clearly appear in the legal order. 
With the time-phase rule it is unclear whether an abortion which is not indi­
cated is legal or illegal. Also the fact that abortion is funded in all circum­
stances by social security gives the impression that all abortions are legal.
2. By the repeal of penal sanctions, par. 218a hands the unborn over to the 
completely unrestricted power of disposition of the woman.
a. A penal norni has a general preventive function.
The mere existence of such a penal sanction exercises an influence upon the 
value concepts and the manner of conduct of the population.62 
A repeal of punishability ... must confuse the concepts of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
dominant in the populace ... The impression that abortion is legally permit­
ted will raise the impression that, therefore, abortion is even from a socio- 
ethical point of view no longer to be condemned. This is the dangerous infer­
ence of moral permissibility from a legal absence of sanction.6^
b. The concept, central to the time-phase rule, that the developing life is bet­
ter protected by individual counselling of the pregnant woman than by a pe­
nal sanction which has proved to be ineffective, is unconstitutional. The 
policy of taking into account total numbers of abortions which leads to the 
'decriminalization of the destruction of a supposedly smaller number of lives 
in the ... interest of the preservation of an allegedly higher number is incom­
patible with the obligation of giving individual protection to every single
Comp. Const. L .,op. cit. note I, p. 593.
62 Ibid., p. 595. Jurtstenttilung, p. 212.
®  Gorby, op. cit. note 28, p. 654. Jurislenztilun f, 1975, p. 212.
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actual life’.64 The socio-political goal o f the ‘containing of the abortion epi­
demic’,65 however worthy of pursuit, cannot take priority over fundamental 
legal protection in individual cases.
c. There is insufficient basis for the conclusion that the number of abortions 
in the future will be lower than under the previous penal provisions.
3. The counselling and instruction under par. 218c are not suitable for effect­
ing a continuation of pregnancy. There should be special counselling cen­
ters, which aim at dissuading the pregnant woman from having an abortion. 
The physician is not the right person to provide these counselling services. 
There should also be a waiting period of at least two days before the abortion 
is performed.
The Constitutional Court concludes that the legislature should attempt to 
achieve a differentiated penal regulation by subjecting those cases to pun­
ishment in which abortion is to be condemned on constitutional grounds. 
There should be a clear distinction between legal and illegal cases of abor­
tion. The Court adds that the fact that this type of regulation (i.e. time-phase 
rule) is defended in other countries, cannot influence its decision, because 
‘the legal standards which apply to the actions of the legislator there differ 
substantially from those of the Federal Republic of Germany’.66 The princi­
ples underlying the Constitution can only be explained
by reference to the historical experience and the intellectual and moral set­
tling of accounts with the preceding system of National Socialism. As a bul­
wark against the omnipotence of the totalitarian State, which arrogated un­
limited dominion over all areas of social life and for which consideration for 
the life of the individual fundamentally amounted to nothing in the pursuit of 
its governmental objectives, the Basic Law has erected a value-oriented order 
which, places the individual human being and his dignity at the center of all 
its determinations...67
Even a general change of the viewpoints dominant in the populace on this 
subject -  if such a change could be established at all -  would change noth­
ing.6®
64 Comp. Const. L.. op. cit. note 1, p. 596. Juristtn tttiung , 1975, p. 212.
65 Gorby, op. cit. note 28, p. 656. Juristem eilung, 1975, p. 212.
66 Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1, p. 597. Juristtn ttitung , 1975, p. 214.
67 Ibid.
Gorby, op. cil. note 28, p. 662. Juristtn ttitung , 1975, p. 214.
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The question of the legal status of the unborn was the object of lengthy de­
bates during the proceedings before the Constitutional Court The representa­
tives o f the Bundestag and the government defending ihe time-phase rule 
agreed that the unborn are protected by art. 2(2) of the Constitution. 
However, they contested that this right had absolute priority. The representa­
tive of the Bundestag  stated that the question o f when human life begins 
cannot be answered with religious or philosophical arguments, nor can the 
legal status of the unborn be decided by biological or medical science (an ar­
gument similar to the one put forward in Roe v. Wade).69 The legal status 
of the unborn can only be decided by social and legal reasoning, it was ar­
gued. The unborn have always been less protected than those already bom. 
The fact that even the opponents of this law considered indications other 
than medical as constitutional demonstrated, in the eyes of the defendant of 
the time-phase rule, that the two are not equal.70 According to the represen­
tative o f the Bundestag  it was rational to consider the unborn in an early 
stage of development as being different from life in later stages of develop­
m en t71
The Constitutional Court, however, did not accept these arguments. As 
we have seen, it ruled that unborn life is an independent legal interest pro­
tected by a r t  2(2) of the Constitution from the 14th day of conception. It 
based this decision on a historical and systematic interpretation of the 
Constitution (see above). It is not merely a subjective, defensive right but 
an objective value for which state action is imperative. The protection of the 
unborn has in principle priority over the pregnant woman’s right to free de­
velopment of her personality protected by art. 2(1) of the Constitution. A 
compromise between the two rights is not possible (see supra ).
The C ourt’s viewpoint and way of reasoning require some comment. 
Some of the reasons for giving the unborn the right to life are especially 
questionable. The Court states that according to definite biological and phys­
iological knowledge, life exists from the 14th day after conception. As has 
been pointed out in chapter II, biological findings alone do not determine the 
moral and legal status of the unborn.72 And irrespective of the legal implica-
Arndt, C ., Erhard, B .. Funcke, L ., D tr  par. 218 StGB vor dem
Bundesvtrfassungtgerichl, C.F. Muller, Heidelberg, Karlsruhe, 1979, p. 184.
70 He it referring here to the CDU/CSU proposal which allows for abortion on a fetal or
ethical indication and in case of distress.
71 Arndt, op. eil. note 69, p. 190-196.
72 See Chapter II, Section A.I.
I l l
tions of scicntific facts, what are the reasons for indicating the moment of 
nidation as the beginning of human life? The Court merely refers to a legal 
expert without giving any further explanation for this choice. The arguments 
for considering conception as the beginning of human life are probably 
much stronger (see supra chapter II section A, under 5.). This would mean 
that the Court’s motivation for choosing nidation as the decisive point is a 
pragmatic one, namely aimed at excluding certain means of birth control 
(moming-after-pill, I.U.D.) which could be considered abortifacients under 
the abortion law.73 The use of the legislative history of art. 2(2) is also 
questionable. The defenders of the time-phase rule contended that the parlia­
mentary discussion on this article of the Constitution did not result in a 
consensus concerning the status of unborn life.74 Finally, it seems strange 
that the Court quotes the Nazi experience for determining the legal status of 
the unborn. Quite apart from the fact that under the Nazi regime abortion 
was in principle strictly forbidden for German women,75 it is difficult to ar­
gue that that period was marked by inhuman treatment of the unborn in par­
ticular. The reasons why the Nazi experience is referred to might be deeper 
and not directly related to the abortion issue.(see infra chapter IV section B) 
However, irrespective of these points which have less bearing on the is­
sue, the Court’s basic arguments seem incoherent The Court states that the 
fetus has the right to life under the Constitution at every stage of its devel­
opment, and that abortion is always an illegal act. However, if there are 
genuine cases of conflict recognizable under the Constitution the legislature 
may remove these cases from the protection of penal law without violating 
its duty to protect human life. The Court thus makes a distinction between 
constitutional acts and criminal acts, i.e. abortion is always illegal (in con­
stitutional terms) but in circumstances which are exceptionally burdensome 
for the pregnant woman it is not a criminal act. The Court seems to give the 
impression by reasoning in this way, that is by accepting only cases of con­
flict in which ‘another interest equally worthy o f protection by the 
Constitution’ is involved, that the criminality or non-criminality of abortion
7*1 t
Naujoks, ‘Verbesserte Fristcnlösung oder befristete Lösung', Europäische Grundrechte 
Zeitschrift, 1975, p. 959. See par. 219.d. which explicitly excludes aborufaciems, 
taken before the moment of nidation from the realm of the law.
74 See Kriele, M., Juristenzeitung, 1975, p. 225; Ortino, S., 'La rifomta del par. 218 CP 
della Repubblica Federale Tedesco suH’aborto*, Giurisprudenia Costituiionale, 23. 
1978, p. 381. This will be discussed in chapter IV, section B, infra.
75 See chapter I, section B, supra.
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depends on the situation of the mother and has nothing to do with the status 
o f the unborn. However, would the Court really accept these same 
‘constitutionally-based’ reasons for considering the killing of newborn ba­
bies as a non-criminal act? A newborn baby could create a very burdensome 
situation for the mother. A medically-indicated abortion could be interpreted 
in terms of ‘self-defence’ as has been shown in chapter II section B, indepen­
dent of the status of the unborn. But the fetal and social indications are not 
so much related to the state of pregnancy as to the state of motherhood and 
could not be described as a form of ‘self-defence’. Would the Court accept 
that the killing of a newborn baby for fetal or social reasons could be a non- 
criminal act?76
Although the Court tries to give the impression that it is only concerned 
with the situation of the woman irrespective of the stage of development of 
the fetus, it is contradicting its own statement that no distinction can be 
made between individual stages of developing human life (i.e. between un- 
bom and bom). The fact that the Court allows for a fetal and a social indica­
tion, indicates that the fetus has not been granted a right to life protected by 
art. 2(2) of the Constitution equal to the right to life of human beings al­
ready bom. The Court seems to have been affected by Fetusschizofrenie 77 
instead of being guided by constitutional principles. The indications solution 
suggested by the Court in reality violates that ‘inviolability of unborn hu­
man life’ which it proclaims.
As Giselher Riipke has put i t
Das letzllich trotz allem das individuelle Leben des Nascitums als ein durch
diese Gesetzesmodelle geschOtztes Rechtsgut zu gelten habe, darin liege ein
Protest gegen das eigene gesetzgeberische H ande In.7*
The differentiated time-limit adopted in the amended abortion law (22 weeks 
for a fetal indication, 12 weeks for a social or ethical indication), also shows 
that the fetus is treated differently according to its stage of development. In a
76 At the 6lh of November 1981, a British doctor who let a handicapped baby (Down’s 
syndrom) die was acquitted of the charge of attempted murder.
Riipke, G., Sckwangerschafisabbruch and Griuidgeselz, Suhritamp Veriag, Frankfurt, 
1976, p. 38. See also Ortino, op. cil. note 74, p. 379.
7® Rupke, op. cit. note 77, p. 44. Translation (my own): ‘That in the end, in spite of 
everything, the individual life of the nasciturat should be considered as protected by 
this legislative model, shows a protest against the legislative action itself'.
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later stage, more serious reasons for abortion are required than in earlier 
stages.
In conclusion, the German Federal Constitutional Court has been caught 
in the same trap as the US Supreme Court. It has not succeeded in being co­
herent in the defence of its viewpoint on the constitutional protection of un­
born life. The German Court claims that unborn human life is inviolable 
from the 14th day after conception, but in its ruling it implicitly adheres to 
the view that the right to life of the unborn can be overridden by a fetal and a 
social indication. Secondly, in spite of the Court’s statement that ‘no dis­
tinction can be made between individual stages of the developing life before 
birth or between prenatal and postnatal life’, the German legislator has rec­
ognized differences between these stages by allowing less serious indications 
for abortion during the initial stage of pregnancy than during the later stages. 
This solution was adopted in the Court’s provisional ruling, (see supra sec­
tion A, under 4.)
In conclusion, the two constitutional courts which took a principled atti­
tude versus the abortion issue, proclaiming -  in the American case -  the 
woman’s right to abortion and -  in the German case -  the fetus’ right to 
life, have been only partially successful in the defence of their principles. 
Furthermore, what emerges is that although the two courts seem to take two 
extreme positions on the the abortion issue, their stand is in fact more mod­
erate than the one proclaimed. The US Supreme Court states the woman’s 
right to decide on abortion. By ruling that states are not obliged to prohibit 
abortion from the moment of viability it implicitly recognizes a right to life 
only from the moment of birth. This position, however, is mitigated by its 
more moderate statements. It claims that the states have an interest in the 
protection of the potentiality of human life, which grows in substantiality 
during pregnancy, and that the states have a compelling interest in the pro­
tection of human life from the moment of viability. Thus the Court seems 
to adhere to a developmental criterion of humanness.
The German Court too takes, in fact, a more moderate stand than the one 
declared. Although it defends the right to life from the moment of concep­
tion, it also seems to recognize a developmental criterion by allowing for 
abortion in certain circumstances depending on the stage of development. 
Furthermore, if the right to life of the unborn were really protected by the 
German decision, abortion could only be permitted on a strictly medical (i.e. 
vital) indication, and not on the social, fetal and ethical grounds also fore­
seen by the Court. Such a strict indications solution would mean a step
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backwards in respect to the existing abortion practice, which was obviously 
not desirable and would have been impossible to apply in practice.
What these two rulings show is that the extreme positions on abortion 
seem to be untenable. The German Court was unable to defend the right to 
life from the moment of conception in a realistic way. The American Court, 
on the other hand, was not able to follow through its position that the preg­
nant woman should have the right to self-determination throughout preg­
nancy. These constitutional rulings on abortion therefore reflect the dilem­
mas pointed out in the theoretical discussion (chapter II)- It appears to be 
impossible to define the right to life in a principled and consistent way. The 
tendency to take an intermediate position, to seek a compromise between the 
protection of unborn life and the respect for the woman's right to self-deter- 
mination, has been reconfirmed by these constitutional rulings.
The constitutional value of the broad indications solution adopted by the 
German abortion law deserves further comment. A major objection against 
this indications solution is that it does not respect the right to life of the 
unborn as claimed by the German Court. It also gives the impression o f be­
ing an objective standard, which in reality it is not. There is no way that the 
very flexible and vague standard of the social indication can be applied in 
practice in an objective manner. Its content will depend on the personal 
views of the individual doctor, on the way the pregnant woman is able to 
present her case and convince her doctor of the validity of her arguments, and 
other such subjective elements. In contrast to the medical, fetal and ethical 
indications, which can be objectively ascertained by a doctor, the rightness 
and validity of the social justifications for abortion claimed by the pregnant 
woman can certainly not be checked by one or even two doctors. The result 
of this is that the attitude of an individual doctor is crucial to a liberal abor­
tion policy based on an indications solution. Most abortions in Germany are 
in fact performed on the basis of a social indication.79 This creates an unfair 
situation in which women are able to obtain an abortion more or less easily 
depending on the attitude of their doctor and independently of the validity of 
their motives. One could argue that a fairer solution, which respects every­
body's right to equality would be a time-phase rule. Thus the indications so­
79 See Berichl d tr  'Kommission zur Auswertung (Ur Erfahrungtn mil dem reformtrten  
par. 218 del Strafgcsetzbuches, DeuUcher Bundestag, 8. Wahlperiode, Dracksache 
8/3630, 31.01.1980, p. 37 ff., for the first yean after the pasting of the abortion 
reform. The figures on the % of abortions performed on a social indication nationally 
and by region are collected by the Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, and are pub­
lished yearly in Wiruchafi und Slatisiik.
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lution adopted in the German case seems to lack a sound constitutional ba­
sis. The unsuitability of the indications solution for furthering the aims pro­
claimed by the German Constitutional Court is reconfirmed by the abortion 
practice. Abortion rates in Germany are not lower than abortion rates in 
countries with a more liberal legislation. Furthermore, there are gTeat re­
gional variations in abortion rates, which indicate the ‘flexibility’ o f the 
indications solution, as argued above.80
One last question arising from the indications solution is: why should it 
be the doctor who decides on whether the reasons given by a pregnant 
woman justify an abortion? Again, in contrast to medical, fetal and ethical 
grounds for abortion, the social reasons for asking an abortion do not require 
a medical, but rather a moral judgment. Thus they do not fall exclusively 
within the competence of the medical profession.
France
The French Abortion Act does not give an answer to the question of the le­
gal status of the unborn. Art. 1 declares the respect for unborn human life, 
but this is a general, introductory statement without specific application.81 
The significance of this provision is probably largely symbolic in the sense 
that it seeks to express the legislator’s concern with the protection o f the 
unborn. However, there is no commitment on the part of the legislators to 
the right to life o f the fetus. One could argue that the protection o f the un- 
bom is implicitly guaranteed by the many procedural requirements set by the 
law, such as counselling, a reflection period, prohibition of publicity for and 
commercialization of abortion, and by the ten weeks time lim it The law in 
fact establishes a time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements. According to 
art. 2, abortion is not punishable if performed by a doctor in a hospital, and 
before the end of the tenth week of pregnancy. The ‘situation o f distress’ 
which the woman has to claim (a rt 162-1) is not checked by the doctor, and 
an amendment to that effect was not adopted.82 The government expressed 
itself in terms similar to those used by the US Supreme Court in the Roe  
decision:
SO Ibid. See «iso Ketting, E., van Pnag, P., Abortus provocalus wet tn  prakiijk, Zeist,
NTSSO, 1983, p. 125, for an evaluation of these regional disparities.
81 This article was added by amendment. There was nothing 10 this respect in the origi­
nal proposal.
82 Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 24, p. 7728.
116
Je me refuse à entrer dans les discussions scientifiques et philosophiques dont 
les auditions de la Commission ont montré qu’elles posaient un problème in­
soluble.83
In contrast to the US Supreme Court, in this case the law leaves the ques­
tion really open, and sets down a compromise between the two opposing 
views. The abortion décision is left to the woman, but she has to go 
through certain formalities in order to make sure that her decision is taken 
carefully and to dissuade her from that decision. The law implicitly recog­
nizes a developmental criterion of humanness, in that during the first ten 
weeks of pregnancy the ‘distress’ of the pregnant woman is a sufficient rea­
son for abortion. However, after ten weeks gestation more serious reasons 
have to be ctaimcd and ascertained by her doctor.
The members o f the French National Assembly who appealed to the 
Constitutional Council claimed that the time-phase rule laid down in the 
Abortion Act violated the Preamble of the Constitution and art. 2 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which protects the right to life. In 
its decision of 15 January 1975, the Court denied the competence to judge 
the abortion provisions in the light of art. 2 of the European Convention.84
As to the Preamble of the French Constitution, which does not mention 
the right to life, the Court ruled that none of the provisions of the Abortion 
Act are a violation of the fundamental principles laid down in the Preamble. 
Art. 2 of the Déclaration des droits de i  homme et du citoyen of 1789 de­
clares that ‘le but de toute association politique est la conservation des droits 
naturels et imprescriptibles de l'homme. Ces droits sont la liberté, la pro­
priété, la sûreté, et la résistance à l’oppression’ The Constitutional Council 
ruled that the Abortion Act respects the liberty of persons who seek an abor­
tion, and those who perform or attend at an abortion. Therefore the law does 
not infringe upon the ‘liberty’ referred to in the 1789 Declaration.
The Preamble of the 1946 Constitution states that ‘Elle (la nation) garan­
tit à tous, notamment à l’enfant, à la mère et aux vieux travailleurs, la pro­
tection de la santé, la sécurité matérielle, le repos et les loisirs’. The Court
83 Simone Veil, Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. noie 24, p. 7000.
84 Sec for a discussion of thii aspea of the decision, Ruzie, D., ‘La Constitution 
française el le droil international ( i  propos de la décision du Conseil Constitutionnel 
du 15 janvier 197S), Journal du Droit International, 197S, p. 249-268. See alio 
Robert, J., ‘La décision du Conseil Constitutionnel du 15 janvier 175 sur l'in ter­
ruption volontaire de grossesse’. Revu* International de Droit Comparé, 27, 1975, 
p. 873 ff.
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said in this respect that the abortion law does not authorize any violation of 
the principle of respect for every human being from the beginning of life, as 
stated in a r t  1 of the Abortion Act, except in cases of necessity and accord­
ing to the conditions and limitations laid down by the law. Finally, the 
Court did not find any violation of the principle o f the protection of chil­
dren’s health as laid down in the 1946 Preamble.
With this one page decision the Constitutional Council summarily re­
jected the objections raised by the opposition in Parliam ent Like the gov­
ernment, the Court refrained from expressing a position on the legal status 
of the unborn. It simply declared that the limitations on the freedom of abor­
tion as laid down in the law were sufficient guarantees of the protection of 
unborn life. The Court did not go beyond a mere repetition of the wording of 
the abortion law. It made it very d ea r that the legislature had the last word
in this matter. 
h o ly
In its decision of 18 February 1975,85 the Italian Constitutional Court, 
deciding on the validity of the Fascist Penal Code provisions on abortion, 
declared that the fetus does not have a right to life from the moment of con­
ception. The Court declared that the protection of conception has a constitu­
tional foundation, and the legal situation of the fetus is protected by a r t  2 of 
the Constitution which imposes the protection of motherhood and guaran­
tees the inviolable rights of man.86 However,
the interests of the fetus may conflict with other values which are themselves 
constitutionally protected...Consequently, the law cannot place a total and 
absolute priority on the first interest, denying adequate protection to 
others...There is no equivalence between the right not only to life but also to 
health of one who -  like the pregnant woman -  is already a person, and the 
safeguard of an embryo which has yet to become a person.87
85 See supra, note 32.
Of.
A rt 31.2: La Repubblica ...‘protegge li  maternità, l'in finz ii e l i  gioventù, favorendo 
gli istituti necessari i  u le  scopo'. An. 2: ‘La Repubblici riconosce e g inn tisce  i 
diritti inviolibili dell'uomo, sii come singolo sia nelle formizioni so d ili ove si 
svolge la sui personalità, e richiede l'idepimento dei doveri inderogibili di solidari­
età politica, economica e sociale'. This provision does not contain in  explicit ‘right 
to life'. See Birtole, S., ‘Scelte di valore più o meno implicite in uni liconici sen­
tenza sull'aborto'. Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1975, p. 2105 £f.
87 Comp. Const. L., p. 613. Giurisprudenza Costituzionali, 1975, p. 120. Il is not cleir 
why the Court uses the word ‘embryo' here ind not ‘fetus' like in the rest of the deci-
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What the Court seems to be saying here is that although the Constitution 
protects unborn life, it does not grant the unborn -  at least in the early 
stages of their development8* -  a right to life equal to that of human beings. 
Whatever the protection of the unborn implies, the right to life and to health 
of the pregnant woman has priority over the fetus’ claim to life during the 
early stages of pregnancy.
In its decision the Court invites the legislature to draft a law which rec­
ognizes abortion
when further development of the gestation could imply injury or danger 
which is grave, medically ascertained and not otherwise avoidable, for the
health of the mother.
It is the legislator’s obligation
to forbid the procuring of an abortion without careful ascertainment of the re­
ality and gravity of injury or danger which might happen to the mother as the 
result of the continuation of pregnancy.*9
This last phrase seems to indicate that the legislature should draft an abor­
tion law establishing an indications solution.90
As has been pointed out in Section A, the legislator adopted a more liberal 
solution than the one suggested by the Constitutional Court. The 1978 
Abortion Act establishes, in fact, a time-phase rule with dissuasion require­
ments.
As in the French law, the beginning o f life has not been specified in the 
Italian Abortion Act. Amendments which defined the beginning of life were 
rejected.91 There was a conscious effort on the part of the drafters not to deal 
with this question. As was said in the report on the bill before the Senate,
lion. This could imply that the Court is suggesting that the embryo is certainly no« a 
human being bui that a fetus at some point it.
88 The use of the word ‘embryo’ poinu at the early tu g e  of fetal development. See note 
*7.
89 Comp. Const. L.. op. cit. note 1, p. 614. Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 1975, p. 
120.
90 In this way the Court issued a decision which could be read in different ways. 
Bogneui, op. cit. note 35, calli it a 'Salomonic decision*. See also D'Alessio, R., 
‘L’aborto nella prospettiva della Corte C ostituzionale’, G iu r isp r u d e n z a  
Costituzionale, 1975, p. 538 ff; Battole, op. cit. noie 86. p. 2102.
91 Casini, C , Cieri, F.. La nuova disciplina dell'aborto, Cedam, Padova, 1978, p. 45.
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lo stato rimane neutrale nei confronti dei problemi di principio posti dalla in­
ternment della gravidanza.92
This position is constantly repeated in the preparatory works. The aims ex­
pressed in a r t  1 (the right to procreation, the social value of motherhood and 
the protection of human life from the beginning) are general principles al­
ready protected by the Constitution and by law, they do not introduce any­
thing new. Like in the French case, the meaning of art. 1 is largely sym­
bolic, expressing a general concern with the protection of life -  which is 
guaranteed by the procedural requirements and the 90 days time limit -  with­
out declaring a right to life. The only certainty the law gives as to the status 
o f the unborn is that at the moment of viability the unborn life has to be 
saved at any cost. At that point it has to be treated like a human being.93 
During the period up to the moment of viability, the fetus receives increas­
ing protection as the stage of development advances. After 90 days of gesta­
tion, the woman has to provide very serious reasons for obtaining an abor­
tion.
Although the Constitutional Court had suggested a more restrictive solu­
tion in its 1975 decision, it upheld the 1978 Abortion Act in 1981, when it 
was asked its opinion on the new abortion rule. The claim that the abortion 
law violates art. 2 of the Constitution which states the sanctity of life94 was 
rejected by the Court.
Austria
The most curious of all constitutional decisions on abortion is the Austrian 
one. When the Austrian Constitutional Court was asked to give its opinion 
on the fairly liberal Austrian abortion law, it upheld the law, employing a 
very formalistic, historical interpretation of the Constitution, which bore no 
relation to contemporary reality.
^  Quoted in Caiini, op. cit. note 91, p. 14. Translation (my own): 'The State remains 
neuval with respect to the basic problems posed by an interruption of pregnancy.' 
See also the ‘lavori preparaiori' repotted in Galli, e.o., op. cit. note 35, p. 402, in 
which the pragmatic position of the law is emphasized. See Busnelli, op. cit. note 35, 
p. 1593-1608, for a comment on the apparent contrast between principles and solu­
tions adopted by the law.
93 See a r t 7.3 of the Abortion Act which states that an abonion after the moment of vi­
ability can only be performed if there is a serious danger to the life of the mother, in 
such case the doctor has to try at any cost to save the life of the fetus.
94 See note 86.
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The 1974 abortion provisions do not express any concern for the protec­
tion o f unborn life. In the Parliamentary Debates the question of the begin­
ning of human life was not answered by the governing Socialist Party. It 
could easily ignore this question, because with its absolute majority in 
Parliament, there was no need to defend the law. After the passing of the law 
the Salzburg provincial government appealed to the Constitutional Court 
and claimed that the new abortion provisions violated the right to life and 
the right to equality before the law under national constitutional law and un­
der the European Convention on Human Rights, which has constitutional 
rank in Austria.
In its decision of 1974,95 the Constitutional Court gave a very narrow in­
terpretation of the right to life laid down in the Constitution of 1867.96 The 
Court ruled that the Constitution only protects the individual against attacks 
on his life by the state, and that it does not, however, guarantee an individ­
ual’s right to life against attacks by others. Thus the right to life is only a 
defensive right against the state. The Court stated that since the abortion 
provisions laid down in the Penal Code do not concern an interference with 
life by the state, there is no violation of the right to life under national law. 
In this way, the Court avoided the question of the legal status o f the un­
born.97
Secondly, the Court rejected the claim that art. 2 o f the European 
Convention protects unborn life. An. 2 states that
everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
The Court ruled that neither the legal history, nor the interpretation by the 
European Commission and the European Court, nor the divergent opinions
9^ See noce 18.
^  The Slaatsgrundgtstlz of 1867 which has according to ait. 149.1 of the Constitution 
constitutional force, does not mention the right to life, but the fundamental rights 
laid down in it presuppose alio the right to life.
97 See for comments on this aspect of the decision, Groiss, W.. Schantl, G., Welan, H., 
‘Der verfajsungsrechtliche Schütz des mentchlichen Lebens', Ô sttrre ich isch t  
Juristen-Zeitung, 33, 1978, p. 1 ff.; Nowakowski, ‘Die Grand- und Menschenrechte in 
Relation zur nrafrichtlichen Gewalt', ÔsUrreichiscke Jurisuit-Zeitung, 1965, p. 281; 
Waldslem, Das M tnschtnrtcht zum L tb tn , Berlin, 1982, p. 50 ff; Schambeck, ‘Die 
Grundrechie im demokratiichen Verfassungsstaai’, Ordnung im soiialtn  Wandel, 
Festschrift fur J. Mesmer, Berlin, 1976, p. 484, cited in MOCK, E., ‘Abortion law and 
public policy', Comparative Law Yearbook, 1983, p. 31.
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in the literature, nor the text of art. 2, gave any solution to the question of 
whether unborn life was protected by this article. Considering the whole 
context o f art. 2 (art. 2.1 makes an exception for capital punishment but 
does not mention abortion), the Court came to the conclusion that art. 2 did 
not cover unborn life.
The fact that the Penal Code treats abortion differently depending on 
whether it takes place within the first three months of pregnancy or there­
after raised the question of the equal treatment of the ‘fetus in the womb’. 
Concerning this equal-protection claim, the Court ruled that ‘these various 
developmental phases of the biological entity ‘fetus in the womb' do not 
necessarily represent one and the same thing in the meaning of the constitu­
tional principle of equality’.98 The legislator was therefore allowed to treat 
abortion differently depending on the stage of development of the embryo in 
the womb without infringing the equality principle.
Just as the life o f  a bom  hum an being is evaluated m ore h ighly  than that o f  an 
unborn  em bryo, so the value o f  the unborn fetus could  no t be set equal in each 
stage o f  developm ent.99
4 .
The Court acknowledged that it would not be justifiable to leave the decision 
to abort to the woman at the moment of viability, but that since after three 
months’ gestation the development of the fetus is still far away from the 
moment of viability, the three months' time limit of the time-phase rule 
was justifiable.
In conclusion, the Austrian constitutional order does not recognize the 
right to life of the unborn. The value of unborn human life increases as the 
pregnancy advances. Up to three months’ gestation the fetus is not protected, 
but after the moment of viability the decision to abort cannot be left to the 
pregnant woman. As the abortion law does not set an upper time-limit for 
abortion, the Constitutional Court’s decision implies that an abortion after 
the moment of viability might be justified if the necessity is certified by, for 
example, a doctor. It is quite clear that the Court did everything possible to 
remain out of the debate by applying a very formal, literal, and restrictive in­
terpretation of the Constitution. The result was that a liberal law was upheld 
with very traditional arguments.




Legislatures and constitutional courts have struggled with the question of the 
legal status of the unborn. In both the United Stales and in Austria, the idea 
that the unborn has a right to life, protected by the Constitution, was re­
jected. In Austria, the question of the beginning of human life was not an­
swered by the legislature, but a certain value was accorded to unborn human 
life which increases with the biological development of the fetus. Abortion 
is allowed during the first three months of pregnancy, thereafter it has to be 
indicated on medical or fetal grounds. A developmental criterion has thus 
been adopted. The US Supreme Court ruled that the question of the begin­
ning of human life could not be answered, but instead of leaving the solu­
tion to that question to the discretion of the state legislatures, it imposed 
upon the states the view that only at the moment of viability the potential­
ity of human life is a sufficiently compelling reason for prohibiting abor­
tion. In fact, the Supreme Court decided that unborn life can be treated as a 
human being from the moment of viability.
The French and Italian Abortion Acts declare respect for developing hu­
man life. However, neither the French nor the Italian legislature or judiciary 
have expressed a principled opinion on the question o f when human life be­
gins, nor have they arrived at a clearer definition of respect for human life. 
The value of human life is balanced against the woman’s interests. The re­
sult of this balancing is that the abortion decision is left to the woman dur­
ing the early stages of pregnancy, and that after approximately three months’ 
gestation abortion is only allowed on certain indications (medical, fetal) 
which are defined by the law and certified by a doctor. The Italian law recog­
nizes that at the moment of viability the unborn is a human being. From 
that moment onwards the doctor has to use all means in order to save the life 
of the unborn. In Italy and France a developmental criterion of humanness 
has thus been implicitly adopted.
The German situation offers quite a sharp contrast to the American, 
Austrian, French and Italian positions. Whereas the original abortion reform 
adopted the French/Italian approach to the status of the unborn, this was de­
clared unconstitutional by the German Federal Constitutional Court. The 
Court ruled that human life begins at the fourteenth day after conception and 
that from that moment the unborn is an independent human being with a 
right to life protected by the Constitution. However, as we have already 
seen, the unbom’s right to life recognized by the Court is not equal to the 
right to life of living human beings, because the Court allows for abortion
also in the case of a fetal and a social indication, and the fetus receives more 
protection as its development advances. The German Constitutional Court 
seems to have been affected by ‘fetus-schizophrenia’, and has, in fact, 
adopted a developmental criterion of humanness.
In conclusion, whereas the German Constitutional Court proclaims the 
unbom’s right to life, in Italy and France the protection  o f unborn human 
life is regarded as a duty of the state. In the US and Austria, the protection of 
unborn human life is regarded as an interest of the state from a certain stage 
of development of the fetus (three months gestation in Austria, and the mo­
ment of viability in the US). In all cases a developmental criterion of human 
life has been adopted.
2. The Pregnant W om an’s Rights
t/.5.The Supreme Court ruled in Roe v. Wade that ‘the wom an’s right to 
privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy’.100 The Constitution does not mention any right 
to privacy, but the Court refers to a number of decisions in which the right 
to personal privacy has been recognized with respect to activities relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child-rearing and 
education.101 The Court does not explain what ‘privacy’ means, except that 
it is to be found in the 14th Amendment’s concept o f personal liberty.102 
The Court justifies its decision to grant the pregnant woman the constitu­
tional right to abortion in terms of the negative effects of abortion prohibi­
tions.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny­
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm medically di- 
agnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or additional 
offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and future. 
Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be 
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated 
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a 
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other 
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of un­
100 Comp. Const. L.. p. 567. 35 LEd  2d, p. 177.
101 Griswold v. Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965); Eistnsiadt v. Baird. 405 US 438 (1972). 
See chapter IV, Section C.2, for t  short discussion of these decisions.
102 The 14ih Amendment to the US Constitution: '...nor shall any Stile deprive uiy per­
son of life, liberty or property, without Due Process of Law'.
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wed motherhood may be involved. All these are factors the woman and her re­
sponsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation. ̂ 3
The right to abortion is a fundamental right, says the Court, but it ‘cannot 
be said lo be absolute’.104 This right must be weighed against important 
state interests in regulation. According to the Supreme Court’s ‘Due Process 
doctrine’, a ‘fundamental right’ can only be limited by a ‘compelling state 
interest'. The State has an important and legitimate interest in preserving 
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman, and also in protecting the 
potentiality of human life. As has been shown in section A, par. 1, the 
Court ruled that the State’s interest in the protection of the woman’s health 
becomes ‘compelling’ at the end of the first trimester, and in the protection 
of the potentiality of human life at the end of the second trimester. This 
means that
for the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling point’ (at the end of the 
first trimester), ‘the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is 
free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judg­
ment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.105
The result of this decision is that a pregnant woman can obtain an abortion 
without any limitations during the first three months o f pregnancy if she 
finds a physician who is willing to co-operate. Her right to self-determina­
tion has been (implicitly) recognized by the Court. A liberal state policy 
will permit her to have an abortion until very late in her pregnancy, as the 
Supreme Court did not set an absolute limit to the right to abortion. A state 
can regulate abortion after the third month of pregnancy, and can regulate or 
proscribe abortion after the sixth month, but is not obliged to do so.
The foundation of the woman’s right to abortion seems to be rather am­
biguous. The Court calls the right to abortion a 'fundamental’ right implicit 
in the right to privacy, but it does not define this right to privacy, except to 
say that it is ‘founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal 
liberty’.106 The only motive or justification for granting the right to abor­
tion seems to be the negative effects of abortion restrictions. The statement 
that
103 Comp Const L. . p. 567 35 LEd 2d, p. 177.
104 Ibid.
10^ Comp. Const. L., p. 183. 35 LEd 2d, p. 183.
106 Comp. Const. L., p. 567. 35 LEd 2d, p. 177.
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this right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision 
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy
is immediately followed by:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by deny­
ing this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm. etc. (see 
supra)A^
The main question that arises from the Roe decision is: what is the Court 
trying to vindicate? The Court is almost implying in the passage quoted here 
that the pregnant woman should have the right to abortion on medical, so­
cial and other grounds and that the physician must certify these grounds. 
Nothing in the language of this decision refers to the concept of the 
woman’s right to self-determination or to arrive at autonomous decision. 
Not only that, the Court slates that the abortion decision is
inherently and primarily a medical decision... and the basic responsibility 
rests with the physician.108
The emphasis on the physician’s role is repeated in most of the subsequent 
Court rulings (see infra under 5.). It almost seems as if the Court is trying 
to make its radical statement that the pregnant woman’s right to abortion is 
a fundamental right more acceptable by referring to the negative social and 
other effects of enforced motherhood. In his concurring opinion Justice 
Douglas does refer to the right to self-determination. He says that the pri­
vacy right comes within the scope of ‘liberty’ as used in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which includes the ‘freedom of choice in the basic decisions of 
one’s life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the 
education and upbringing of children’.109 The majority opinion, however, is 
much vaguer. It merely states that the right to privacy 'has some extension 
to the activities relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela­
tionships, and child-rearing and education’.110 It does not say more than that 
the right to privacy is based on the concept of personal liberty.
t Cfl According to Kelso, C.D., and Kelso, R R ., ‘Abortion law and public policy'. 
Comparative Law Yearbook, 1983, p. 75, Justice Blackmun’s opinion reflects i  
moderate instrumentalist and natural law position because of its concerns with indi­
vidual liberty and wiih the social consequent» of the ruling.
108 35 LEd 2d, p. 184.
109 Comp, Const. L., op. cit. note 1. p. 574.
110 Comp. Const L ,  op. cit. note 1, p. 567.
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The Roe-dec is ion can therefore be criticized on two counts. Firstly, the 
Court proclaims the ‘right to privacy’, not mentioned in the Constitution, 
without defining the substance of that right.111 Secondly, nothing in the 
language of the decision refers to the concept of privacy in the sense of 
‘autonomy’ or ‘self-determination’. One would have expected this right to be 
the foundation of the ‘fundamental right to abortion’. Instead, the emphasis 
is put on the social and medical reasons for permitting abortion -  as if to 
suggest an indications solution -  and on the ccntral role of the physician.
In the years after the 1973 decision, many questions left open by Roe 
were submitted to the Supreme Court. The Court struck off most o f the 
state provisions regulating the abortion procedure during the first three 
months of pregnancy. Only record keeping and reporting requirements, and 
the provision that the pregnant woman has to give her ‘informed written 
consent’ were upheld in Doe v. Bolton (1973) and in Planned Parenthood o f  
Missouri v. Danforth (1976) respectively112 (see infra par. 5). Any other re­
quirement during the first trimester, -  such as the approval of an abortion 
commiuee or of two other physicians (Doe v. Bolton), a hospitalization re­
quirement (Doe), a residence requirement (Doe), a spousal consent provision 
(Danforth), and a parental consent provision for all minors (Danforth) -  was 
declared unconstitutional (see infra par. 3 and 4). The emphasis in these deci­
sions taken between 1973 and 1976, is on the ‘inviolability’ of the decision 
taken by the physician in consultation with his patient during the first three 
months of pregnancy.
When the Court had to decide on the public funding of abortion, between 
1977 and 1980, the tone of its rulings changed. The questions under review 
were ‘Equal-Protection’ cases, so a strict comparison with the previous
111 In Griswold v. Connecticut (1965, see note 101), the decision in which the Supreme 
Court mentioned for the first time the 'fundamental right to privacy*, privacy was used 
in the sense of ‘privacy of the home’, i.e. a physical concept (see chapter II, section 
B. supra). This time privacy is used in the sense of ‘autonomy', t  completely different 
and very broad concept See Ely, J.H., 'The wages of crying wolT, Yale Law Journal. 
82, 1973, p. 929-932. See also Wellington. H.. Yale Law Journal, 83. 1973, p. 303, 
staling that the Court's use of 'privacy* is 'Pickwickian' because abortions are per­
formed not in marital beds but in hospitals. See also Tribe, L.H., ‘Toward a model of 
roles in the due process of life and law '. Harvard Law Review, 1973, p. 3 and 82: 
Henkin, L-, ‘Privacy and autonomy', Columbia Law Review, 74, 1974, p. 1424- 
1425; Vanderveeren, C., *De ontwikkeling van het recht op privacy in de U.S.A.’, 
Tijdschrift voor Besluurswetenschappen tn  Publitkrecht, 39, 1984, p. 251. See also 
chapter IV, section C.2.
112 See notes 9 and 10.
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‘Due-Process’ cases is not possible. The language in which these cases are 
couched is, however, very different. The emphasis is no longer on the social 
needs of the pregnant woman and on her fundamental right to abortion, but 
on the legitimate state interest of promoting childbirth (see par. 6).
The most recent abortion decisions of 1983 show however, that the Court 
has taken up the arguments put forward in the Roe case again. Ten years 
after Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court had to pass judgem ent on several 
state provisions which affected the woman's right to privacy and the physi­
cian’s right to professional freedom (City o f  Akron v. Akron Center o f  
Reproductive Health).113 The Akron, Ohio, ordinance under review required 
all abortions performed after the first trimester of pregnancy to be performed 
in a hospital. The Supreme Court repeated its Roe ruling: ihe right of pri­
vacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to have an abortion; 
this right is to be found in the Due Process Clause: one of the liberties pro­
tected in the Due Process Clause is an individual’s freedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life and the Roe decision was ‘based 
firmly on this long recognized and essential element of personal liberty’. 
The Court also repeated that the pregnant woman’s physician should be 
given ‘the room he needs to make his best medical judgm ent’ (Doe v. 
Bolton).
T he p h y sic ian 's  exercise  o f  his m edical ju d gm en t en com passes bo th  assist­
ing the w om an in the decision-m aking  process and im plem en ting  her d ec i­
sion should  she choose abortion .**4
The Court recognized the State’s interest in the health of the pregnant 
woman from the end of the first trimester, but
the S ta te 's  d iscretion  to regu late  on  this basis, does not, how ever, perm it it 
to adopt abortion  regulations that depart from  acccpted  m edical p rac tice .115
The health standards adopted must be legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish. ‘There can be no doubt’, says the Court, that a 
‘second trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle on 
the path of women seeking abortion’.116 A primary burden created by the re­
quirement puts a large financial burden on the woman, because a second
113 103 S.Cl. 2481 (1983).
114 Ibid., p. 2491.
115 Ibid., p. 2493.
116 Ibid., p. 2495.
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trimesier abortion costs more than twice as much in a hospital as in a clinic. 
Secondly, second trimester abortions were rarely performed in Akron hospi­
tals, which implied that women had to travel to find available facilities. ‘It 
is therefore apparent’, continues the Court, ‘that a second trimester hospital­
ization requirement may significantly limit a woman’s ability to obtain an 
abortion’.117
Improved technology is also an important factor. The Court acknowledged 
that at the time of Roe v. Wade, hospitalization for second trimester abor­
tions was recommended by the American Public Health Association but, 
‘since then the safety of second-trimester abortions has increased dramati­
cally’.118 ‘The principal reason is that the D&E procedure is now widely and 
successfully used for second-trimester abortions'. This is also carried out on 
an outpatient basis between the 12th and 16th week of pregnancy.119 The 
Court concluded that ‘these developments and the professional commentary 
supporting them, constitute impressive evidence that -  at least during the 
early weeks of the second trimester -  D&E abortions may be performed as 
safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hospital’.120 Hence, 
‘present medical knowledge... convincingly undercuts Akron’s justification 
for requiring that all second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospi­
tal’.121 And finally, ‘Akron has imposed a heavy, and unnecessary, burden 
on women’s access to a relatively inexpensive, otherwise accessible, and safe 
abortion procedure’. The ordinance has the ‘effect of inhibiting ... the vast 
majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks’ ... ‘and therefore unreasonably 
infringes upon a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion’.122
This decision sets out clearly the double constitutional basis of the right 
to abortion. The woman’s right to personal liberty together with the physi­
cian’s right to freedom of profession constitute the freedom to have an abor­
tion. The two rights are closely interconnected. The statement that.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid., p. 2496.
119 D & E  sunds for ‘dilatation and evacuation'. See for a description of this abortion 
method Tiet2e, Ch., Induced abortion, a world review, 4th ed.. The Population 
Council, New Yojfc, 1981, p. 71.
120 lbid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., p. 2497.
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the full vindication of the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires
that her physician be given the room he needs to make his best medical
judgm en t. *23
actually suggests that the physician’s right to freedom of practice is part of 
the woman’s right to abortion.
Akron restates the importance of the woman’s right to abortion and of the 
physician’s right to professional discretion. The fact that a second-trimester 
abortion in a hospital costs twice as much as in a clinic together with the 
fact that women would have to travel to find a hospital, ‘significantly limit 
a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion’, and are, therefore, an infringement 
of the woman’s right to abortion. At the same time the Court gives a high 
priority to what it calls, ‘accepted medical practice’. Even though, back in 
1973, the Supreme Court accepted that second-trimester abortions could be 
required to take place in hospital, the state of present technology is a suffi­
cient reason for ‘adapting’ its views. As there is medical evidence that sec­
ond-trimester abortions can be performed safely in an outpatient clinic up to 
16 weeks gestation, the hospitalization requirement is held invalid, even 
though such a condition would be justified for most of the second trimester. 
Although the Court does not say so, it has changed its trimester division 
given in Roe. By accepting the view that abortions up to 16 weeks can be 
performed as safely as abortions up to twelve weeks, it has done away with 
the rationale for adopting a first trimester limit on the woman’s freedom to 
have an abortion. After Akron it will be very difficult for a state to come up 
with good reasons for regulating the abortion intervention up to 16 weeks of 
pregnancy in the name of the protection of the pregnant woman’s health. In 
the future, the 16 weeks’ limit might be extended even further.
The woman’s right to abortion within the first three months of pregnancy 
seems to be firmly established in the American constitutional order. The 
Supreme Court has made it very clear, however, that the collaboration of the 
physician is an indispensable element of the woman’s right to abortion. The 
woman’s right to abortion is a right not to decide alone on abortion but in 
consultation with her physician. In practice, a woman is ultimately always 
dependent on a physician, because he is the one who has to perform the in­
tervention. The Supreme Court has, however, explicitly recognized the 
physician’s role in the decision making process and has given him ultimate
123 Ibid.. p. 2491.
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control over the abortion decision. The doctor’s role will be dealt with more 
specifically under 5.
Austria  is the only other country with a time-phase rule. The Austrian 
Constitutional Court did not discuss the pregnant woman’s rights as it had 
already rejected the claims put forward by the parliamentary opposition on 
the basis of the constitutional provisions protecting the right to life (see 
supra, par. 1). There is no doubt, however, that the defence of women’s 
rights was a basic principle underlying the Austrian abortion reform. The 
drafters of the law put great emphasis on the conflict situation in which the 
pregnant woman finds herself, her right to an equal position in society, 
e tc.124
As has already been demonstrated, the French and Italian abortion laws re­
flect a compromise between opposing views. Both the protection of unborn 
human life and the pregnant woman’s freedom to decide on abortion are in­
cluded in the respective laws. We have seen, however, that the ‘right to life 
o f the unborn from the beginning’ proclaimed by both laws has no substan­
tial meaning. In fact, the woman's right to decide is recognized, subject to 
the condition that she goes through a certain procedure (counselling, waiting 
period). This is where the compromise lies. It is sufficient for the pregnant 
woman to claim to be in a ‘situation o f distress’ in the French case, or in 
the ‘circumstances’ summed up in art. 4 o f the Italian Abortion Act. She 
does not have to prove that this is the case, nor does the doctor have to ver­
ify her claims. As both abortion laws leave the ultimate decision on abor­
tion to the pregnant woman they therefore implicitly recognize the woman’s 
right to self-determination up to the time-limit set by the law .125 For the 
period after ten weeks’ pregnancy (France) and 90 days’ (Italy), the woman’s 
right to limit child-bearing on medical and fetal grounds has been recognized.
The principle of self-determination was re-affirmed by the French 
Constitutional Council, which stated that the abortion law ‘respecte la li­
berté des personnes appellées à recourir ... à une interruption de gros­
sesse’.126 In the preparatory works of the Italian abortion law, the right to 
self-determination is declared as one of the basic principles o f the abortion
124 See the Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 16.
12^ In the preparatory works of the Italian Abortion Acl the woman's right to self-deter­
mination is declared to be one of the basic principles of the law. See Casini, op. cit. 
note 91, p. 63.
126 Journal Officiel. 1975, p. 671.
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reform.(46) The Italian Constitutional Court rejected the challenges that 
were made to the woman's right to self-determination, as laid down in the 
Abortion Act, in its decision of 25 June 1981.127
Germany is the only country discussed here which has a constitutional pro­
vision that specificly protects the right to self-determination. Art. 2(1) of the 
Basic Law states:
Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in­
sofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the consti­
tutional order or the moral code. 128
The German Federal Constitutional Court is also the only court which dis­
cussed the content of this right in the context of abortion.
The representative of the B u n d esta g  in the proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court defended the time-phase rule, amongst others, on the 
basis of the woman’s right to self-determination. He argued that art. 1(1) and 
an. 2(1) of the Constitution,129 which protect the dignity of man and the 
right to self-determination, not only protect against the threats to life and 
body but also against physical and psychological burdens connected with 
pregnancy and the duties related to motherhood.130
The Constitutional Coun did not accept this interpretation, as has been 
pointed out in par. 1. The Coun recognized that ‘pregnancy belongs to the 
intimate sphere of the woman whose protection is constitutionally guaran­
teed by an. 2, par.l, in conjunction with a rt.l, par. 1 of the Constitution’ 
... ‘but this right is not given without lim itation’131... A compromise 
between the right to life of the nasciturus and the woman’s freedom to have 
an abortion is not possible. The protection of the unborn has in principle 
precedence over a woman’s right to self-determination for the entire duration 
of pregnancy, (see par. 1). The time-phase rule adopted by Parliament was 
therefore declared unconstitutional.
127 Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 19S1, no. 108.
128 Translation by finer, op. cit. note 27.
129 Art. 1(1) of the Basic Law: ‘The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and 
protect it shall be the duty of all su te authority.' Translation by Finer, op. cit, note 
27. Ait. 2(1), see note 53.
' 3® Arndt, op. cit. note 69, p. 202-204.
131 Comp. Const. L., op. cit. note 1, p. 589.
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The Constitutional Court decision was followed by an amendment of the 
Abortion Act in 1976 which established an indications solution for the 
whole duration of pregnancy. The present abortion provisions recognize the 
woman’s right to limit childbearing on medical, ethical, fetal and social 
indications. Furthermore, it establishes the duty o f the State to offer the 
pregnant woman counselling and assistance in order to remind her o f her 
fundamental duty (par. 218b Penal Code).
A Woman s Right to Freedom o f Religion
Although religious arguments have largely dominated the abortion debate, 
none of the Constitutional Courts or legislators have used or accepted reli­
gious beliefs or the right to freedom of religion for deciding one or the other 
way.
In Roe v. Wade the Supreme Court pointed at the various religious be­
liefs concerning abortion but rejected them all.132 In Harris v. McRae the 
Court denied that the funding limitations violated the freedom of religion.133 
Also in the German case there is no indication that religious thinking influ­
enced the decision taken by the Constitutional C ourt The judges had differ­
ent religious backgrounds, and in any case their way of reasoning was 
strictly juridical. There is not even an allusion to religious or Christian 
thought in the decision.134 The reimbursement of socially indicated abor­
tions by the German Health Insurance Program was recently attacked as a 
violation of the right to freedom of religion and of conscience of those who 
are opposed to abortion and contribute through tax payments to the public 
funding o f abortion. The Constitutional Court rejected this complaint on 
formal grounds in June 1984.135 The French Constitutional Council ignored 
the proposal to link the constitutionality of the abortion reform to the prin-
132 See supra, section B.l.
133 100 S.Cl. 267 (1980). See Bitkin, J.C., ‘The Hyde Amendment: in  infringement 
upon the Free Exercise Clause?', Rutgers Law Review, 1981, 33, p. 1054 ff; Skahn, 
S.L., ‘Abortion laws, religious beliefs and the First Amendment’, Valparaiso Univer­
sity Law Review, 1980, p. 487 ff.
134 Gorby, op. cil. note 28, p. 278-279. Kommers, D.P., ‘Abortion and Constitution: 
United States and West-Germany1, American Journal o f Comparative Law, 25, 1977, 
pp.278 ff.
^35 This constitutional question was presented by the ‘Sozialgericht Dortmund’, 
VorlagebeschluB 29.9.1981. See Pro Familia Magaziti, 1981, n. 3, and Wendi. S., 
’Abtreibung auf Krankenschein verfassungswidrig’, Kritische Justiz, 1983, p. 198- 
208.
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ciplc of the secularly of the state.136 Finally, in both the abortion eases be­
fore the European Commission of Human Rights, the Commission did not 
find the claims based on the right to freedom of religion (art. 9 of the 
European Convention) relevant.137
Conclusions
A woman’s right to decide on abortion without limitations has been recog­
nized for the first three months of pregnancy in the US and Austria, and in 
France and Italy on the condition that the woman follows a procedure which 
aims to dissuade her from her decision to have an abortion. In Germany, a 
woman’s right to decide on abortion during the first three months of preg­
nancy was declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court. A 
pregnant woman is only allowed to have an abortion in specific situations 
defined by the law and certified by two doctors. In France, Italy and Austria, 
a woman can have an abortion after three months gestation on a medical or 
fetal indication certified by a doctor. In the US. where the woman’s right to 
abortion has been recognized for the entire period of pregnancy, the states are 
nevertheless free to limit abortion after three months o f gestation. These 
limitations are aimed at serving the state interest of protecting the woman’s 
health.
The overall picture is that the US, Austria, France and Italy have implic­
itly recognized a woman’s right to self-determination for the early stage of 
pregnancy, whereas in Germany only her right to limit child-bearing was de­
clared constitutional. However, none of the courts which recognized the 
woman’s right to decide on abortion mentioned or referred to her right to 
self-determination explicitly. This is understandable in the case of the French 
and Italian laws as they are compromise solutions and do not represent a 
principled stand on the abortion problem. It is however remarkable in the 
American case, where the Supreme Court in its sweeping Roe decision de­
clared almost all state abortion laws unconstitutional and proclaimed the 
woman's ’fundamental’ right to abortion.
1 Rivero. nole in Comp. Const. L-. op. cit. nole 1, p. 580.
137 Final decision of the Commission of 19 May 1976 as to ihe admissibility of applica­
tion no 6959nS, the Bruggeman and Scheuien case. Council of Europe, European 
Commission of Human Rights, p.54. Application no 8416/78 by William Paton 
against the United Kingdom, Council of Europe, European Commission of Human 
Rights, 1978, p. 11.
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Another remarkable fact is that none of the legislatures or constitutional 
courts, except the American Supreme Court, has ever mentioned the preg­
nant woman’s right to abortion. The language of the European abortion laws 
is in negative or conditional terms and is characterized by phrases like 
‘abortion is not punishable i f ...’ or ‘a woman can request an abortion if 
,..’138 Even in the Austrian case where a time-phase rule was enacted, the 
language of the abortion provisions makes it clear that the circumstances 
under which abortion is permitted are an exception to the general rule that 
abortion is wrong.139 Furthermore, abortion is definitely not treated like any 
other medical act in Europe. All European abortion laws include specific pe­
nal sanctions for the abortion procedure (time-limit, counselling, waiting pe­
riod). In this sense there is a clear distinction between the US and 
Europe.(see infra under 5.) The US Supreme Court expressly declared that a 
woman has the right to abortion, and that the decision to have an abortion, 
taken by the doctor in consultation with the pregnant woman, cannot be in­
terfered with in any way during the first three months o f pregnancy. The 
Court also made it clear that the usual remedies applicable to medical acts 
are available in the case of abortion. The European legislators and courts, on 
the other hand, have cautiously defined the situations in which abortion is 
permitted and have set out rules to be followed by the doctor performing an 
abortion, avoiding ‘radical’ language and never mentioning a ‘right’ to abor­
tion.
One last observation is that none of the constitutional courts or legisla­
tures used religious arguments for defending a more restrictive law. Nor did 
they accept a more liberal abortion reform on the basis of the fundamental 
right to freedom of religion. This is a remarkable fact given the many reli­
gious arguments used in the abortion debate.
138 German Penal Code. par. 218a(l): ‘Der Abbruch der Schwangerschift durch einen A m
ist nichl nach par. 218 strafbar, wenn...'. Art. 162-1 of the French Public Health Act:
‘La femme enceinte que son étal place dans une situation de détresse peut demander...'. 
The Italian provision (an. 4 of the Abortion Art) stating that ‘la donna ehe accusi cir- 
cosunze..., si rivolge al...", is in this respect the least ‘conditional'.
139 Par. 97(1) of the Austrian Penal Code: ‘Die Tat ist nach par. 96 nicht strafbar,
w enn...’.
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3. The F a th e r ’s R ights
There is little divergence in the interpretation of the rights o f the father of 
the fetus. None of the countries here discussed has recognized a father’s right 
in the abortion decision.
In the 1976 decision Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, the US Supreme 
court dealt with the role o f the pregnant woman’s husband in the abortion 
decision.140 The question for decision was whether a state regulation requir­
ing prior written consent o f the spouse of the woman seeking abortion was 
constitutional. This was one of the questions left open by the Roe decision. 
The Court recognized the importance of the marital relationship and agreed 
that ideally the abortion decision should be taken by both wife and husband.
N either has this C ourt fa iled  to appreciate the im portance o f  the m arital re la ­
tionship in our society ... W e recogn ize  that the decision w hether to undergo 
or to forgo an abortion m ay have  profound effects on the future o f  any m ar­
riage, effects that are both physical and m ental, and possib ly  d e le te rio u s .141
The fact, however, that partners disagree on such an issue, said the Court, 
shows that the marriage is not successful...
it is d ifficult to believe that the goal o f  fostering m utuality  and trust in a m ar­
riage, and o f streng then ing  the m arital re la tionsh ip  and the m arriage  in stitu ­
tion. w ill be ach ieved  by g iv ing  the  husband  a ve to -pow er exerc isab le  for 
any reason w hatsoever o r for no reason ar a ll.142
And, proceeded the C ourt
when the wife and the husband disagree  on  this decision, the view  o f  on ly  one 
o f  the tw o m arriage partners can prevail. Inasm uch as it is the  w om an who 
physically  bears the child  and w ho is the m ore d irectly  and im m ediately  af­
fected by the pregnancy , as be tw een  the two, the balance w eighs in he r fa ­
v o r .143
The attribution of such a veto-power to the husband would not further the 
interests o f the state in protecting the mutuality of decision vital to the mar­
ital relationship. The Court, therefore, declared any state provision which re­
quired the husband’s consent for abortion as unconstitutional.
140 See supra, note 9.
141 49 LEd 2d, p. 805
142 Ibid., p. 806.
143 Ibid.
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Art. 162-4 of the French Public Health Act states:
C haque fois que cela est possible, le couple participe à la consu lta tion  et à la 
décision  à prendre.
According to the drafters o f the law, the ideal situation would be for the fa­
ther of the fetus to be involved in the abortion decision. But this is not, and 
cannot be, a legal obligation.144 The French law expresses thus the same 
opinion as the US Supreme Court.
According to a rt 5 o f the Italian Abortion Act, the counselling session 
can involve the father if the woman agrees:
II consu lto rio  e ... hanno il com pito  ... di esam inare con la donna e con il 
pad re  del concep ito , ove la donna lo conseilla,... le possib ili so luzion i dei 
p ro b lem i p ro p o sti...
The decision to cxcludc, in principle, the father of the unborn from the abor­
tion decision was a clear choice by the drafters of the law which was subject 
to intensive debate during the preparatory works.145
One o f the objections raised by the opposition in the Bundestag  to the 
original German abortion law was that the father’s rights were not taken into 
consideration.146 The Federal Constitutional Court ignored this claim and 
the amended abortion law has no provisions to that effect
The Austrian abortion law does not mention anything about the role of 
the father of the unborn in the abortion decision.
In conclusion, the role of the father of the unborn in the abortion decision 
has not been a real point of discussion. In none of the abortion rules here 
discussed has the father’s right to decide or to be consulted on abortion been 
recognized, although in some instances (France, Italy) the desirability of the 
involvement of the pregnant woman’s partner has been expressed.
4. P a re n ts ’ R ights
The role of parents in the abortion decision of an underage daughter raises 
the question of what role parents ought to have in the decisions of their chil­
dren. Minors often need the consent of their parents for certain acts because 
they are considered not mature enough to take the right decision, and because
144 Simone Veil, Parliamentary Debates, op. cil. nole 24. p.7209.
145 Casini, op. cil., p. 91.
146 Amdl, op. cit., p. 69.
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parents are supposed to act in the best interests of their children. The posi­
tion of parents is particularly difficult in the case of abortion, because the 
decision whether or not to have an abortion deeply affects the life o f a 
woman, and this is even more true of a minor.Furthermore, not all minors 
under the age of 18 are as immature as the law presupposes. In some cases 
some ‘guidance’ can be considered necessary, whereas in other cases outside 
interference with the abortion decision seems inappropriate. We will see that 
the various abortion legislations and constitutional court decisions dearly  
express this dilemma.
In the German abortion law no specific provisions are included concerning 
the position of minors requesting an abortion. The Bundestag explicitly re­
fused to settle this matter as the question of the minor’s consent to medical 
interventions in general required a comprehensive regulation which ought 
not be prejudged by the specific case of an abortion intervention. The general 
rules and principles of the case law therefore apply to the abortion decision. 
Whether the pregnant minor has the capacity to give her consent to abortion 
depends on the natürliche Einsichts- und Urteilsfähigkeit der Schwangeren. 
‘Einer Minderjährigen kann das höchstpersönliche Einwilligungsrecht im 
Sinne von par. 218a, Abs. 1 nr. 1 ohne Rücksicht auf die Zustimmung der 
gesetzlichen Vertreter zustehen, wenn sie die erforderliche Reife und 
Urteilsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Tragweite eines Schwangerschaftsabbruchs 
besitzt'.147 The capacity to give consent is generally considered not to exist 
up to the age of 14. Between 14 and 16, this depends on the individual case 
and from the age of 16, the minor is considered capable of giving her con­
sent.148 These general guidelines arc quite flexible and are, therefore, subject 
to personal interpretation. It will very much depend on the individual physi­
cian whether parental approval of the abortion request is required.
A similar principle operates in Austria. There is no specific provision for 
minors in the abortion law, but here too the general doctrine of the natür­
liche Einsichts- und Urteilsfähigkeit applies. If a pregnant minor shows that 
she is sufficiently ‘mature’ to take the abortion decision, no parental ap-
*
147 Bericht der ’Kommission zur Auswertung der Erfahrungen mit dem reformierten par. 
218 des Strafgesetzbuches', Deutscher Bundestag, 8 Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
8/3630, 31.01.1980, p. 22. Translation (my own):’A minor can give her personal 
consent without the approval of her legal representative, if she possesses the neces­




provaJ is needed. If this is not the case, her legal representative has to decide. 
However, given the very personal character of the abortion decision, the le­
gal guardian can only take a decision against the will of the pregnant minor 
on very specific grounds.149 The Austrian rule is therefore slightly more in 
favor of the minor’s independence than the German one. In both cases, how­
ever, the question whether this ‘natural capacity to decide’ exists is a very 
subjective judgm ent
The French and Italian laws contain specific rules concerning the abortion 
decision of pregnant minors. Art. 162-7 of the French law states that a preg­
nant minor cannot decide on abortion without the approval of one of her par­
ents or her legal representative. In Italy, a minor needs the approval of her 
legal representatives. However, if there are serious reasons for not consulting 
her legal representatives, or if they refuse to give their approval to the abor­
tion decision of their daughter, the doctor can request the Juvenile Court 10 
decide within five days (art. 12 Italian Abortion Act).
Both the French and Italian provisions have been subject to intensive de­
bate as it has been ascertained that a considerable percentage of pregnant mi­
nors, probably because of these restrictions, resort to the clandestine market. 
There have been no changes in the abortion laws so far. In its decision of 
June 1981 the Italian Constitutional Court ruled that the relevant provisions 
rightly entrust the decision whether or not to inform the parents of a preg­
nant minor that their daughter desires an abortion to the careful assessment 
o f the judge.150 The Court responded to objections from two sides in this 
case. On the one hand, it was claimed that these provisions discriminated 
against pregnant women on the basis of their age, imposing the will o f their 
parents upon women under the age of 18. On the other hand, these rules 
were accused of being too permissive as they did not give the decision-mak­
ing power in all cases to the parents.
The position of minors was one of the questions left open by the US 
Supreme Court in its Roe decision of 1973. In the 1976 decision Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, the Court had to review a state law which required 
parental approval of a minor’s abortion decision. The parents of a pregnant 
unmarried minor claimed they had to approve of their daughter’s decision to 
have an abortion on the basis of their interest in the safeguarding of family 
unity and parental authority. The Supreme Court used almost the same ar-
14^ See Strafgesetzbuch, op cit. note 17.
150 Decision of 25 June 1981, Giurtsprudeiua Costituzionalt. 1981, no. 109.
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gumcnts as it had used with respect to the husband’s claims in the abortion 
decision o f his wife. Providing a parent with the absolute power to overrule 
a decision made by the physician and his patient would not serve family 
unity. Such a veto-power would not enhance parental authority or control 
where the minor and the non-consenting parent were so fundamentally in 
conflict, and the very existence of the pregnancy had already fractured the 
family structure.
A ny independent interest the parent m ay have in the term ination  o f the m inor 
d a u g h te r 's  p regnancy  is no m ore w eighty than the right to p rivacy  o f  the 
com peten t m inor m ature  enough to have becom e p r e g n a n t . ' 51
The Court added, however, that this
does no t suggest that every m inor, regardless o f  age or m aturity , may give e f­
fective consen t for term ination  o f  her p r e g n a n c y . * 5 ^
In 1979, the Supreme Court was called to decide on a Massachusetts parental 
consent provision (Bellotti v. Baird) The statute required parental consent 
before an abortion could be performed on an unmarried woman under the age 
o f 18. If one of the parents refused, the abortion could be obtained by order 
of a judge of the Superior Court 'for good cause shown’. The Supreme 
Court argued that,
as im m ature m inors often lack the ability to m ake fully inform ed choices that 
take account o f  both im m ediate and long range consequences, a State reason­
ably  m ay  de term ine  that paren tal consu lta tion  often  is desirab le  and in the 
best in terest o f  the  m in o r.154
However, given the seriousness of the abortion decision and the conse­
quences of a denial of abortion the Court stated that
the S ta te  m ay no t -  as sta ted  in D anforth, -  im pose a b lanket provision re ­
qu iring  the consen t o f  a parent o r person in loco paren tis as a condition  for 
ab o rtio n  o f  an u n m arried  m inor du ring  the first 12 w eeks o f  her p re g ­
n a n c y .155
151 49 LEd 2d, p. SOS.
152 ¡bid.
153 99 S.Cl 3035 (1979).
154 Ibid., p 3046.
155 bid., p. 3048.
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The Court, therefore, concluded that
if  the State decides to require  a pregnant m inor to ob tain  one or both paren ts ' 
consent lo an abortion, it also m ust provide an a lternative p rocedure  whereby 
authorization for the abortion can be obtained.
A pregnant m inor is entitled in such a proceeding to show  either: (1 ) that she 
is m ature enough and well inform ed to m ake her abortion  decision , in consu l­
tation  with her physic ian , independently  o f her p a ren ts ' w ishes; or (2) that 
even if  she is no t able to m ake this decision independently , the desired  abor­
tion w ould be in her best i n t e r e s t s . '5 7
The Court added that the procedure must take place with anonymity and suf­
ficient speed.
The 1981 decision H L . v. Matheson 158 dealt with a Utah statute which 
required a physician ‘to notify, if possible’ the parents or guardian of a preg­
nant minor before providing her with an abortion. The plaintiff was an un­
married, fifteen-year-old girl.
As the plaintiff depended financially upon her parents, resided at home, 
and had not demonstrated her maturity, the Court decided that she had the 
right to challenge the statute only as it applied to unemancipated and imma­
ture minors. The case under review was thus narrowed down to the question 
of whether a state can require the notification of the parents of an ‘immature’ 
minor. Recognizing the traditional authority of parents over the upbringing 
and welfare of their immature children, the Court upheld the challenged noti­
fication statute because it was ‘reasonably calculated’ to promote family in­
tegrity, encourage parental consultation, and allow parents the opportunity 
to supply essential medical and other information to the physician.
The key to the decision lies in the consideration of the role of the parents 
in the abortion decision of their immature daughter. To the extent that the 
right to decide presupposes the capacity to make a mature choice, parental 
notification statutes do not interfere with the constitutional right of imma­
ture minors to decide to have an abortion. That seems to be the rationale of 
this ruling. A parental notification requirement is justified because it allows 
for adult involvement in the abortion decision of a minor who cannot other­
wise make a mature choice. This is in line with the tradition of Supreme 





158 101 S.Ct. 1164 (1981).
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than adults, and follows the rationale of Bellotti that ‘a state reasonably may 
determine that parental consultation often is desirable and in the best inter­
ests of the (immature) minor’.159
The Court makes a very clear distinction, in this decision, between 
‘mature’ and ‘immature’ minors. One of the questions left open in this deci­
sion was whether a consent provision for ‘mature’ minors would be consti­
tutional. Although the Court ruled in Danforth that a consent provision for 
minors was unconstitutional, this applied to all minors, irrespective of their 
level of maturity. In the M atheson  case it is clear that there are no clear 
guidelines given concerning the criteria to adopt for deciding whether a mi­
nor is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision independently.160 
The Court merely decided that in this particular case, which concerned a fif­
teen -  year-old girl, not financially independent, and living at home -  the 
minor had not demonstrated her maturity.
In City o f  Akron v. Akron Center fo r  Reproductive Health (1983),161 the 
Supreme court struck down a state provision which prohibited a physician 
from performing an abortion on a pregnant minor under the age o f 15 unless 
he obtained ‘the informed written consent o f her parents or her legal 
guardian’, or unless the minor obtained ‘an order from a court having juris­
diction over her that the abortion be performed or induced’. The Court re­
peated its Bellotti statement that ‘the state must provide an alternative proce­
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently ma­
ture to make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an 
abortion would be in her best interest’. 162
The provision under review was unconstitutional because it was
a b lanket determ ination that all m inors undeT the age o f  15 are too im m ature 
to  m ake this decision  or that an abortion never m ay be in  the m in o r's  best in ­
terest w ithout parental a p p ro v a l.'63
159 99 S.Ct. 3046 (1979).
160 ■parenla] notification prior to abortions for immature minors' (H.L. V. Matheson), 
Harvard Law Review, 95, 1981, p. 150.
161 103 S.Ct. 2481 (1983).
162 Ibid., p. 2498.
163 IHd.
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Finally, in Planned Parenthood, Kansas City, MO, v. Ashcroft (1983),164 
the Court tackled the question of a parental consent provision for immature 
minors. The Court stated that
a S la te ’s interest in protecting  im m ature m inors w ill sustain a  requirem ent o f
a consent substitu te , e ither parental or ju d ic ia l.165
As the Missouri statute under review provided a judicial procedure in which 
it was ascertained whether the minor is sufficiently mature to decide on abor­
tion, the provision was declared constitutional. The determining factor for 
accepting parental involvement in the form of consultation or consent was, 
therefore, that the minor had not demonstrated that she was mature enough 
to dccide alone on abortion, or that an abortion would not be in her best in­
terest. That seems to be the present position of the Supreme Court as con­
cerns the minor’s right to decide on abortion.
Some observations can be made on these Supreme Court rulings. First of 
all, the lone of the decisions seems to have changed over the years. Whereas 
Danforth emphasizes the independent position o f minors and of the limits to 
parental authority, in Matheson the positive aspects of parental authority are 
highlighted. Secondly, the distinction introduced by the Court in Bellotti be­
tween consent and consultation of the parents is definitely abandoned in 
Ashcroft. From the distinction between consent and consultation, the Court 
moved to the distinction between ‘immature’ and ‘mature’ minors. Whereas 
a ‘mature’ minor is treated like an adult woman, an ‘immature’ minor needs 
a ‘consent substitute’ by parents or judge.
The Supreme Court rulings perhaps best illustrate the difficulties in­
volved in the abortion requests of minors. By distinguishing between 
‘mature’ and ‘immature’ minors, the Court has taken a ‘middle position' 
which takes account of both the parental role and the independent position of 
‘mature’ minors. It has thus abandoned the legal distinction between minor­
ity and majority age. This seems to be a very realistic position. It has been 
shown that the German and Austrian abortion laws have adopted a similar 
distinction, although the German one is somewhat more rigid. The Italian 
Abortion Act does not distinguish between mature and immature minors but 
allows for an ‘escape route’ via the Juvenile Court. France is the only coun­
164 103 S.Ci. 2517 (1983).
165 Ibid. p. 2525.
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try where the possible maturity of minors is completely ignored by the abor­
tion law.
5. T he D o c to r’s R ights
The doctor’s professional freedom has been largely respected in all jurisdic­
tions. There are two aspects of professional freedom in the context o f abor­
tion. On the one hand it involves the right to perform or to refuse assistance 
in an abortion. On the other hand, it also involves the right to determine 
how the abortion is to be earned out. Whereas in Europe the first aspect of 
professional freedom has been emphasized most, in the US the discussion 
before the Supreme Court has centered on the second aspect.
The freedom of choice of a doctor with respect to an abortion request is 
expressed in abortion legislation by giving him the right to refuse abortion 
assistance (the right to give abortion assistance is taken for granted). In the 
four European abortion regulations a distinction can be made between 
‘refusal clauses’ and ‘conscience clauses’. Under a ‘refusal clause’, a doctor 
has the very general right to refuse collaboration in an abortion intervention. 
He can decide on a case-by-case basis whether he will give abortion assis­
tance or not and he does not have to give reasons for his refusal. A 
‘conscience clause’, on the other hand, limits the right to refuse abortion as­
sistance to those who have conscientious objections to abortion. The dis­
tinction might seem trivial, but is quite significant in practice. A doctor can 
invoice a ‘refusal clause’ at any time and for any reason; he does not have to 
account for his refusal. A doctor who invokes a ‘conscience clause', on the 
other hand, has to be consistent. He cannot accept abortion patients one day 
and refuse them the next, i.e. he must raise conscientious objections to all 
abortion requests or. all similar abortion requests. He cannot switch position 
depending on the circumstances. In this sense, his right to freedom of pro­
fession is somewhat limited. Italy is the only country which has enacted a 
‘conscience clause’ as opposed to the ‘refusal clauses’ in force in the 
German, Austrian and French abortion provisions.
A rt 162-8 of the French abortion law states that ‘un médecin n ’est jamais 
tenu de pratiquer une interruption volontaire de la grossesse, mais il doit in­
former, au plus tard lors de la première visite, l’intéressée de son refus’. No 
midwife, nurse or medical assistant is obliged to assist at an abortion (art. 
162-8.2 CSP), and private hospitals can refuse to accept abortion patients 
unless they are part o f the public health service (a rt 162-8.3).Par. 5 of art.
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162-8 states the obligation of public hospitals to provide abortion ser­
vices.166
Under the Austrian abortion law no doctor is obliged to perform or to as­
sist in an abortion except when it is necessary to save the woman’s life. 
This also applies to nursing staff and persons employed in technical, medical 
or health assistance services.(par. 97.3(2)). In 1975 the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the legal representative (i.e. director) of a hospital was allowed to 
prohibit access to abortion patients.167 With this decision the Court struck 
down a regional law which established that public or private hospitals could 
not refuse to accept abortion patients.
Art. 2 of the German 15 Sir. AG contains a ‘refusal clause’. Nobody is 
obliged to assist at an abortion (except in the case of a threat to the life or 
health of the woman), irrespective of the motives for this refusal.168 This 
clause covers doctors, medical assistants and hospital administrators. The 
question of whether public hospitals have a right to refuse abortion patients 
has to be settled by administrative courts.169
Art. 9 of the Italian Abortion Act, in contrast to the other European pro­
visions, contains a very elaborate ‘conscience clause’. A doctor can only 
refuse to participate in, or perform an abortion if he has previously declared 
his conscientious objections to abortion to the provincial health authorities 
or to the director of the hospital he is employed by, within a month of the 
coming into force of the law, or within a month of the moment he started
The following additions h»ve been made in 1979 to art. 162-8 of the Public Health 
Act. 162-8.5: 'Les catégories d'établissements publics qui sont tenus de disposer des 
moyens permettant la pratique des interruptions volontaires de la grossesse sont 
fixées par décret' 162-8.6: ‘Dans les établissements hospitaliers appartenant aux 
catégories mentionnées à l'alinea précédent, le conseil d'administration désigne le 
service dans lequel les interruptions volontaires de la grossesse sont pratiquées.' 162- 
8.7: 'Lorsque le chef de service concerné refuse d'en assumer la responsabilité, le con­
seil d'administration doit créer une unité dotée des moyens permettant la pratique des 
interruptions volontaires de la grossesse.' See for a discussion of the scope and limits 
of professional freedom in the French case Clavel, E., 'La clause de conscience du 
médecin dans la loi du 17 janvier 1975 relative à l ’interruption volontaire de 
grossesse'. La Semaine Juridique Juris-Classeur Périodique, 52, 1978, p. 2915 ff.
167 See note 18.
An. 2.1 15 Str.AG: ‘Niemand ist verpflichtet, an einem Schwangerschaftsabbruch 
mitzuwirken.‘ ‘Absaiz 1 gih nichl, wenn die Mitwirkung notwendig ist, um von der 
Frau eine anders nicht abwendbare Gefahr des Todes oder einer schweren 
Gesundheitsschidigung abzuwenden'.
169 See Horton, K.C., ‘Abortion law reform: the German Federal Republic'. International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1979, p. 288.
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his employment in a hospital (art. 9.1). A doctor can always revoke his ob­
jections, but this will only take effect one month after he has officially de­
clared the revocation o f his conscientious objections to abortion (art. 9.2). 
The ‘conscience clause’ only applies to procedures and activities directly re­
lated to the abortion intervention, not to the assistance given to the woman 
prior to and after the intervention (art. 9.3). Public hospitals and private 
clinics are obliged to guarantee the procedures related to abortion and the per­
formance o f abortion (art. 9.4), and in the case o f a threat to the woman’s 
life the conscience clause cannot be invoked (art. 9.5). Conscientious objec­
tions arc considered to be cancclled with immediate effect for persons who in 
spile of what they officially declared take part in abortion procedures or in­
terventions (art. 9.6). Finally, the penal sanctions on non-compliance with 
the provisions of the Abortion Act are higher for doctors who have declared 
their conscientious objections. With these very detailed and stringent provi­
sions the Italian legislator seems to have made an effort to limit the use and 
abuse of the conscience clause by the medical profession.
In contrast to the European emphasis on the doctor’s right to refuse abor­
tion assistance, in the US the central role o f the physician in the abortion 
decision of a pregnant woman is at the core of the US Supreme Court abor­
tion decisions. As has been pointed out in par. 2, the woman’s right to per­
sonal liberty together with the physician’s right to professional freedom 
constitute the freedom to have an abortion. The question of whether a doctor 
has the right to refuse abortion assistance was not discussed specifically be­
cause it is implied in the view of the Supreme Court that ‘the abortion deci­
sion is inherently and primarily a medical decision, and basic responsibility 
must rest with the physician’ (see par. I).170 A hospital is free not to admit 
a patient for an abortion and a physician or any other employee has the right 
to refuse to perform or assist at an abortion. These freedoms are taken as a 
matter of course by the Supreme Court.171 In almost all Supreme Court de­
cisions it is clear that the physician is considered to be in the best position 
to judge the pregnant woman’s situation. As the Court states in Doe v. 
Bolton (1973),
... the consc ien tious physician , p a rticu larly  the o b ste tric ian , w hose p ro fe s­
sional activ ity  is concerned with the physical and m ental w elfare, the woes,
the em otions, and the concern o f  his fem ale patien ts . He, perhaps m ore than
170 35 L E d 2 d ,p . 184.
171 See Doe v. Bolton, 35 LEd 2d, p. 216.
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anyone else, is knowledgeable in this area of patient care, and he is aware of 
human frailty, so-called ‘error’ and needs. The good physician ... will have 
sympathy and understanding for the pregnant patient that probably is not ex­
ceeded by those who participate in other areas of professional counseling.'72
These words show that the Supreme Court has gieat confidence in the quali­
fications of the physician and leaves it to the physician to make the ultimate 
judgment on the question o f whether abortion is appropriate or not. The 
Court seems to be saying that the abortion decision is ‘safe’ in the hands of 
the physician.173
In the US, the professional freedom o f doctors has been interpreted more 
broadly than in Europe, because the Supreme Court extended professional 
freedom also to the abortion intervention. This approach was less commonly 
adopted in Europe. As we have seen in section A, the European abortion 
laws, with the exception of the Austrian, have regulated in detail the formal­
ities a pregnant woman has to go through before she can obtain an abortion, 
e.g. counselling, waiting period, hospitalization etc. Although the French 
and Italian abortion laws respect the woman’s right to decide up to approxi­
mately three months of pregnancy, and have guaranteed the physician’s right 
to refuse abortion assistance, they have attached specific penal sanctions to 
the abortion procedure. The US Supreme Court, in contrast, has made sure 
that, within the limits outlined in Roe v. Wade, the physician has the free­
dom to determine the procedure to be followed. Furthermore, his discretion 
cannot be constrained by specific penal sanctions, as the Court made clear in 
Roe:
If an individual practitioner abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical 
judgment, the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are avail­
ab le .'74
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that abortion has to be treated like any 
other medical or surgical procedure. State regulations which set more strin­
gent conditions for abortion than for other (comparable) medical acts have 
been struck o ff,175 except for the funding cases (see infra  under 6.). In
172 35 LEd 2d, p. 215.
173 As Laurence Tribe has pointed out {op. eit. no«* 111, 1973, p. 37): ‘There is much in 
the Court's opinions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v, Bolton that can be read to suggest a 
desire to make the ultimate decision that of a medical expert*.
174 Ibid., p. 184.
175 Doe v Bolton, 35 LEd 2d, p. 217.
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Europe, on the other hand, abortion is not considered to be like any other 
medical act, as has been made clear by the legislators (see supra section A). 
If we were to describe the differences in emphasis in Europe and the US in 
greater detail, we could say that the prime concern o f the European legisla­
tors and courts has been to grant the doctor the right to refuse abortion assis­
tance, whereas the Supreme Court has taken pains to guarantee him the 
largest possible freedom in providing abortion assistance. The Supreme 
Court rulings illustrate this difference.
The requirement that two licensed physicians must concur in the abortion 
decision, or that an abortion committee must decide on the necessity of an 
abortion, was declared unconstitutional in Doe v. Bolton  by the Supreme 
Court as being an infringement of the physician’s right to practise.176 The 
Court stated that the physician will be called upon to make a professional 
statement as to whether an abortion is necessary.
The medical judgment may be exercised in the light o f all factors -  physical, 
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age relevant to the 
well-being of the patient All these factors may relate to health. This allows 
the attending physician the room he needs to make his best medical judg­
m ent.177
Doe v. Bolton therefore underscores the importance of affording the physi­
cian adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judgment. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth (1976), the Supreme Court had to decide whether a 
state statute can define the moment of viability .The Court again stresses the 
doctor's freedom of judgment in the abortion decision.
Viability is
... a mailer of medical judgment, skill and technical ability, and we preserved 
(in Roe) the flexibility of the term.178 In any event... it is not the proper 
function of the legislature or the courts to place viability, which is essen­
tially a medical concept, at a specific point in the gestation period. The time 
when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the determina­
tion of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the 
judgment of the responsible attending p h y sic ian .17^
176 Ibid., p. 214-217.
177 Ibid., p. 212.
178 49 LEd 2d, p. 802. 96 S.Ct. 2839.
17’  Ibid.
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This principle is reaffirmed in Colautti v. Franklin (1979):
Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending physician on the 
particular facts before him. there is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sus­
tained survival outside the womb, with or without artificial support.180
The Court answered the question, also raised in Colautti v. Franklin, 
whether a state can prescribe that for viable fetuses an abortion technique 
will be used which provides the best opportunity for the fetus to be aborted 
alive:
The choice of an appropriate abortion technique,... is a complex medical 
judgment about which experts can -  and do -  disagree.181
State requirements which obliged the physician to give the pregnant woman 
mcdical and other information aimed, amongst others, at dissuading her 
(similar to the French and Italian provisions), were struck down by the 
Supreme Court in its 1983 Akron decision as being
an intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician.182 ... It 
remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that appro­
priate information is conveyed to his patient, depending upon her particular 
circumstances(2500) By insisting upon recitation of a lengthy and inflexible 
list of information, the statute has unreasonably placed obstacles on the path 
of the doctor upon whom (the woman) is entitled to rely for advice in connec­
tion with her decision.18^
In the same decision, a mandatory waiting period of 24 hours after the preg­
nant woman had signed a consent form, was held invalid if the physician 
was to be afforded adequate discretion in the exercise of his medical judg­
ment.184
Aspects of the abortion procedure -  like the place of the intervention, the 
counselling rules, waiting period etc. -  which European legislators have not 
hesitated to regulate, are left by the US Supreme Court to the discretion of 
the physician. This means that a physician is free to give extensive coun­
selling, require a waiting period etc. The Court has not prohibited him from
180 99 S O . 683 (1979).
181 Ibid., p. 688.
182 103 S.Ct. 2499.
183 Ibid., p. 2501.
184 Ibid., p. 2503.
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applying a more lengthy procedure, it has only prevented the states from 
imposing any rules on the physician. At this point it is interesting to note 
that some of the provisions which were aimed by the legislator at making 
the abortion procedure more difficult for the woman (counselling, wailing 
period), are dealt with by the Supreme Court as if they were a burden on the 
professional freedom of the physician.
In very few instances has the Supreme Court upheld state laws which 
regulated the abortion procedure. A state law which required that the woman, 
prior to undergoing an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, 
certify in writing that she consented to the procedure and ‘that her consent is 
informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion’, was held consti­
tutional in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,185 The Court ruled that ‘the de­
cision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is 
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and 
consequences... her awareness of the decision and its significance may be as­
sured, constitutionally, by the State to the extent o f requiring her prior writ­
ten consent’.186 As the more recent Akron  decision of 1983 shows, the 
Court does not allow for more specific counselling requirements.
In the same Danforth decision, the Court held that ‘record-keeping and re­
porting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of ma­
ternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and privacy 
arc permissible’.187 As these statistical requirements did not have a legally 
significant impact on the abortion decision or on the physician-patient rela­
tionship, they were declared constitutional by the Supreme Court
In its most recent A shcro ft decision of 1983,188 the Supreme Court 
upheld a provision which requires the attendance of a second physician at the 
abortion of a viable fetus. The Court gives the following explanation for its 
decision. As many of these late abortions are emergency operations to save 
the life or health o f the mother, the first physician will be fully occupied 
with the woman and will need the assistance of another physician to take 
care of the fetus. This provision, therefore, does not interfere with the physi­
185 49 LEd 2d, p. 803.
186 Ibid.
187 49 LEd 2d, p. 811.
188 Planned Parenthood, Kansas City, MO, v. Ashcroft, 103 S.Ct. 2517 (1983).
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cian’s freedom of action bccause the ‘second physician may be of assistance 
to the woman’s physician in preserving the health and life of the child’.189
The same Missouri law required that ‘all tissue surgically removed shall 
be examined by a pathologist’. This examination by a pathologist, which is 
important for the study of long-range complications and their effects on sub­
sequent pregnancies, was considered ‘accepted medical practice’ by the 
C ourt.190 This requirement was therefore judged constitutional because it 
was useful to the State’s interest in protecting the health of its female citi­
zens and because this examination was considered a relatively insignificant 
burden.191
The cases show that the states are only allowed to intervene in minor 
aspects of the abortion intervention. The Supreme Court has given ample 
scope to doctors to decide how to perform an abortion, and how to inform 
the pregnant woman. The central role of the physician has been expressed in 
almost all decisions, with a major emphasis in the most recent rulings 
(Akron, Ashcroft). Even the trimester approach adopted in Roe  has been 
blurred in favor of the freedom of medical judgment, because the question 
when the moment of viability begins (Danforth, Coiauui), and whether a 
second-trimester abortion can be treated in the same way as a first-trimester 
abortion (Akron), is left to medical discretion. The Supreme Court has taken 
pains to leave as much professional freedom to the physician in the case of 
abortion as in other mcdical acts.
Although in Europe abortion is not treated like a normal medical act, as 
has been pointed out, and although the doctor’s role is, in principle, contin­
gent on the right to abortion in that the conditions set out by the law have 
to be fulfilled before he can act, in some aspects, however, the doctor does 
take part in the abortion decision of the pregnant woman. In some cases the 
doctor has been given an additional task which goes beyond his professional 
freedom to give or refuse abortion assistance. Under the German indications 
solution, for example, it is the doctor who decides on abortion as he is the 
one who decides on the existence of an indication. This might seem natural 
in the case o f a medical, fetal or ethical indication which require mainly med­
ical knowledge. It is, however, curious that the physician should be the one 
who decides whether a social indication exists, as the evaluation of a
189 Ibid., p. 2522.
190 Ibid., p. 2523.
191 bid., p. 2524-2525.
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woman's social circumstances does not necessarily fall within the compe­
tence of a doctor (see the discussion under 1., supra). Given the fact that the 
bulk of abortion interventions are based on a social indication, the doctor’s 
competence to certify the indication is an important one. In Italy and France 
the doctor is called upon to influence the decision of the pregnant woman in 
that he has to try and dissuade her, and to show her alternatives to the option 
of abortion. These tasks make his position -  as with the refusal clause -  
less contingent, and make him take part in the abortion decision.
At this point we may conclude that the doctor’s right to professional free­
dom has been largely respected both in Europe and in the US. The main dis­
tinction between the American and the European approach is that the US 
Supreme Court has taken pains to treat abortion like any other medical act 
and, therefore, not only to respect the doctor’s right to refuse abortion assis­
tance, but also to emphasize the doctor’s central role in the abortion decision 
and in the determination of the abortion procedure. In Europe, on the other 
hand, abortion is not considered to be a regular medical intervention, and the 
doctor's right to professional freedom is contingent on the woman’s right to 
abortion: he can only act once the legal conditions are fulfilled. There is a 
certain ambiguity, however, in the European treatment of the doctor’s role. 
Although the detailed instructions of the European laws as to the abortion 
decision and the abortion procedure make clear that abortion is not just a 
medical act, in some aspects they give the doctor a role in the decision mak­
ing process, suggesting that the decision on abortion falls within the compe­
tence of the medical profession. The German indications solution is the 
most striking example in this respect, but the Italian and French counselling 
rules and the French and Austrian refusal clauses also point in this direction. 
It is therefore fair to state that in Europe, too, the medical profession has a 
central role in the abortion procedure which goes beyond the mere perfor­
mance or refusal to perform abortions.
6. The pregnant w om an’s right to subsidized abortion
It has been shown in chapter II, section C, under 4 that a pregnant woman 
who obtains an abortion may make two separate claims. She may demand to 
be treated in the same way as others who receive similar medical care. She 
may also claim that abortion should be a welfare right subsidized by the 
state.
In Italy, Germany, and to a certain extent France, abortion is funded like 
other medical care. Italy has a National Health Service and abortion is in­
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eluded in general health care. The Italian Abortion Act in fact states that ex­
tra funds will be made available for the newly established family planning 
centers (consuliori familiari) which should play a central role in the abortion 
procedure (arts. 2 and 3).
The German Health Insurance Program (Krankenkassen), in which almost 
90% of the population participates, covers abortion comprehensively, in­
cluding medical consultation, abortion intervention, drugs and medication, 
sickness benefits and sickness assistance. However, there has been a strong 
reaction recently in Germany against health insurance coverage of non-medi­
cal ly indicated abortions, in particular the Notlage Indikation (social indica­
tion). The Sozialgericht Dortmund presented this question for judicial review 
to the Federal Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court issued its de­
cision in June 1984. It did not deal with the question of whether the reim­
bursement of socially indicated abortions is compatible with the Consti­
tution because it rejected the complaint on procedural grounds.192 The 
present center-right government stated in June 1983 that an alteration of the 
Health Insurance Program with respect to abortion would be discussed as 
soon as the Constitutional Court announced its judgment. In February 1984, 
members of the CDU/CSU introduced a draft bill in Parliament to alter the 
Health Insurance Program (Reichsversicherungsordnung) in such a way as to 
exclude insurance cover for abortions performed on a social indication.193 It 
seems, however, that there is no parliamentary majority for this pro­
posal.194
The original 1975 French abortion law did not provide for health insur­
ance cover of abortion interventions. A rt 8 of the Abortion Act, however, 
fixes the tariffs for abortion, which are adjusted regularly. In addition, the 
‘needy’ can claim Aide Médicale as part of the Social Assistance Scheme 
(a rt 182-2 Code de la Famille et de l’Aide Sociale). The 1975 law made a
192 See Pro Familia Informatiorun, 5, 1984, p. 14 ff. See for a discussion of the German 
Health Insurance Program and the coverage of abortion interventions Hsser, A., 
Hirsch. H.A., Sterilisation und Schwangerschafisabbruch. Enke Verlag, Stuttgart, 
1980, p. 221-223; Eska, B ‘The social security system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany’, Social Service Revtew, 1980. p. 113ff; Altensteuer, CH., Health Policy­
making and administration in West Germany and the United Stales, Sage, Beverly 
Hills, 1974, p 46ff.
193 Information given in 'Determinants of abortion policy in West-Germ any’, paper pre­
sented by Ursula Beer to the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Salzburg, April 
1984.
194 See note 192.
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d ear distinction between necessary and unnecessary médical acts such as 
abortions, which had to be considered as exceptional, voluntary interven­
tions.195 The ideology behind this system was that it should not be finan­
cially impossible to have an abortion (therefore Aide Médicale), It was also 
felt, however, that funds should be withheld for medical interventions which 
were not strictly necessary.196 Abuse of financial resources was prevented 
through the system of fixed tariffs. The Mitterrand government, which came 
into power in 1981, included the coverage of abortion interventions by so­
cial security in its program. Due to budgetary problems it took until 1983 
for a new regulation to come into force. As from 1-1-1983, 75% of abortion 
costs (following the fixed tariffs) are funded out o f public resources. The 
woman has to pay the remaining 25%.197
After the introduction of the time-phase rule in Austria, there was still no 
agreement about who was to pay for the costs of abortion. In practice, the 
Health Insurance Program pays only for abortions on a medical indication. 
In all other cases the pregnant woman has to pay the full am ount.198 
Furthermore, there are no fixed tariffs for abortion interventions. It seems 
rather curious that a country with one of the most liberal abortion laws does 
not provide for public funding o f abortion. The aura of taboo which still sur­
rounds abortion in Austria probably provides the explanation for this. Apart 
from passing the law, the Socialist government has completely withdrawn 
from the abortion issue.
The US differs in one basic aspect from Europe in that there is no com­
prehensive public health insurance scheme for the majority of the popula­
tion. Health insurance is considered as belonging to the private sphere. There 
is only Medicaid, which is a medical assistance program for the indigent. It 
is, therefore, inappropriate to compare Medicaid to any of the health insur­
ance programs in Europe, because of its limited and ‘social assistance' na­
ture. It could probably be best compared to the French Aide Médicale. Since 
Medicaid only concerns the poor, the impact of restrictions in Medicaid fund­
ing on access to abortion is much stronger than would be restrictions in, for
195 Simone Veil. Parliamentary Debate«, op. cil. noie 24, p. 7001.
196 Ibid. She compares abortion to dental care, eyeglasses and voluntary vaccination 
which are not funded by Social Security.




example, funding by the German Health Insurance Program, which is not 
limited to the poor.
In reaction to the US Supreme Court decisions Roe v. Wade (1973) and 
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth (1976), which proclaimed the woman’s free­
dom to have an abortion without any outside interference during the first 
three months o f pregnancy, attempts were made by the states and by 
Congress to limit the impact of these decisions as much as possible. In 
Congress, anti-abortion riders were attached to bills apparently not related to 
abortion,199 the most conspicuous example of which has been the limiting 
of federal funds for abortion.
Medicaid is the federal system of medical assistance for the indigent, 
which was enacted in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act. Title 
XIX was passed by Congress in order to enable states to provide free medical 
service to persons who were unable to meet the cost of necessary treatment. 
Funded joindy by state and federal governments, Medicaid is a state-adminis­
tered program. States are not required to participate in Medicaid, but if they 
choose to do so, they must comply with the general program requirements 
outlined by the federal statutes and regulations. One of the conditions for 
participation is the commitment to provide ‘necessary medical service’ for 
indigent persons.200 What the term ‘necessary medical service’ actually 
means and whether abortion is included in this term was the subject of an in­
tensive debate after the 1973 abortion decision.
In response to the Roe decision many states adopted laws which limited 
access to abortion by prohibiting Medicaid payments for abortion. State 
policies restricting Medicaid payment generally demanded that abortion be 
‘medically indicated’, that is necessitated by a threat to the mother’s life and 
health, or by other factors such as rape and incest, or the likelihood that the 
child would be deformed. States justified such restrictions on the grounds
199 United Stales Commission on Civil Rights, Constitutional aspects o f the right to 
limit childbearing, Washington, I97S, p. 11-15. Mentioned an; the abortion related 
conscience clause in the Health Programs Extension Act, an abortion funding ban in 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. a provision in the Legal Services Corporation 
Act prohibiting legal services attorneys from handling abortion related cases.
200 Butler, P.A., 'Right to Medicaid payment for abortion', Hastings Law Journal, 28.
1977, p. 939. Stingle, K.D.. 'Denial of public funds for non-therapeutic abortions -  
Beal v. Doe, Maher v. Roe, Poelker v. Doe', Connecticut Law Review, 10, 1978, p. 
487-510.
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that the federal Medicaid law authorized payment of federal funds only for 
these ‘medically necessary services’.201
Congress amended the Medicaid Statute in 1972 to include family plan­
ning services, but it did not refer to abortion in enacting these amendments. 
However, at the height of the abortion discussion, reactivated by the 1973 
Roe v. Wade decision, the Hyde Amendment was passed in 1976. This ap­
propriations amendment to Title XIX of the Social Security Act prohibits 
the use of any federal funds to reimburse the costs of abortion under the 
Medicaid program, except in certain specific circumstances. The conference 
report on the amendment explained that Congress intended to limit funding 
of abortion to cases of ‘medical necessity’, which meant in cases of medical, 
fetal or ethical indications. At the end of the fiscal year 1976, Congress 
adopted the Hyde Amendment, overriding a presidential veto of the bill.202
Consequently, many suits which challenged the restrictive state Medicaid 
programs resulting from this federal restriction were filed at state level. 
Some lower state and federal courts struck down such regulations on the ba­
sis of the Equal Protection Clause o f the 14th Amendment.203 The matter 
was decided by the Supreme Court in 1977.
In Maher v. Roe (1977),204 the Supreme Court ruled on the question of 
whether it is constitutional for a state welfare program to deny payment for 
non-therapeutic abortions whilst reimbursing the medical expenses of child­
birth. The Supreme Court, in contrast to the lower court decisions, upheld 
such a welfare regulation against an equal protection challenge.
The Court ruled that the regulations challenged in this way might result 
in discriminatory treatment of indigent women, but according to the ‘Equal 
Protection-doctrine’ such discrimination did not require ‘strict constitutional 
scrutiny’ because it did not create a ‘suspect class’, nor did it impinge on a
201 Bullcr. op. cii. note 200, p. 943-944.
202 Ibid.. p. 942-943.
203 The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment: ‘...nor (shall any Sute) deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’.
204 Maher v Roe, 97 5 .0 .  2376 (1977). Two companion cases dealing with public fund­
ing of abortion were decided at the same moment, Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Cl. 2366, and 
Poelker v. Doe. 97 5 .0 .  2391.
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‘fundamental right’.205 Indigency in itself, said the Court, has never been 
accepted as creating a ‘suspect class’.
The indigency that may make it difficult -  and in some cases perhaps, impos­
sible -  for some women to have an abortion, is neither (Teatcd nor in any way 
affccted by the Connecticut r e g u l a t i o n . 206
As to the woman’s fundamental right to abortion, recognized in Roe, the 
Court ruled that this right protects a woman from unduly burdensome inter­
ference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy or no t 
It does not imply, however, that a state can make no value judgment favor­
ing childbirth over abortion, nor implement that judgment by the allocation 
Of funds.
The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles -  absolute or otherwise -  in 
the pregnant woman's path to an abortion. An indigent woman who desires 
an abortion suffers no disadvantages as a consequence of Connecticut's deci­
sion to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private 
sources for the service she desires.207
As no ‘suspect class’ was created, nor any ‘fundamental right’ violated, no 
‘strict scrutiny’ was required. The Court, therefore, applied the less rigorous 
‘rational relationship-test’ and held the Connecticut regulation to be consti­
tutional because reasonably related to a legitimate state interest o f encourag­
ing childbirth (recognized in Roe v. Wade). The Court added:
We are certainly not unsympathetic to the plight of an indigent woman who 
desires an abortion, but the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies 
for every social and economic ill ... When an issue involves policy choices 
as sensitive as the funding of non-lherapeutic abortions, the appropriate 
forum for their resolution in a democracy is the legislature.208
Under the Equal Protection Clauie courts traditionally apply the 's t r ia  scratiny’-iest 
or the ‘rational relationship’-test to determine whether a discriminatory classification 
violate* the Constitution. The ‘strict scrutiny’-lest is applied when either a ‘fun 
damental interest’ or a ‘suspect classification' has been identified. In this case, the 
suie must show a 'compelling interest' in order to justify the discriminatofy classifi­
cation or the violation of the fundamental right. When neither a suspect class nor a 
fundamental right is at stake, the Court applies the less stringent 'rational rela- 
tionship-teil. Under thii ten there need to be only some rational relation between the 
discriminatory classification and a legitimate stale interest.




This decision has been widely criticized for its blindness to the social reality 
in the US, where access to abortion for the poor is so dependent on Medicaid 
funding.209 Whereas the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade justified the right 
to abortion by pointing to the distressful life o f women who are forced to 
have children, here it declares that the ‘Constitution does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill’. In expressing his dissent to the 
Maher judgement Justice Marshall pointed out that the Court’s acceptance of 
governmental actions ostensibly taken to ‘encourage’ women to carry their 
pregnancies to term are in reality intended to impose a moral viewpoint that 
no state may constitutionally enforce.210 The result of this decision has 
been that most state legislatures have limited reimbursement for abortion to 
abortions on medical, fetal and ethical indications. In the light o f this devel­
opment cases were presented in 1978 and 1979 in an attempt to gain the le­
gal entitlement to federal Medicaid funding for non-therapeutic abortions. In 
some cases lower courts allowed a more liberal interpretation of the ‘medical 
necessity’ clause in the Hyde A m endm ent211 This trend, however, was 
completely reversed by the 1980 Supreme Court decision H arris  v. 
McRae212 on the question of whether the Hyde Amendment was constitu­
tional. The 1977 version of the Hyde Amendment allowed federal funds to be 
used only if the mother’s life would be endangered by the pregnancy. In 
1978 and 1979 there was an additional exception made for ‘instances where 
severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if 
the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physi­
cians’.213 This last clause was removed in 1980, but an additional exception 
was made for the victims o f rape and incest. Thus not all medically neces­
sary abortions were funded by Medicaid in the period 1977-1980. The appel­
lants in Harris v. McRae claimed that the Hyde Amendment, by not funding
209 See Appleton, S.F., 'Abortion -  funding cases ind population control -  imaginary 
law suit', Michigan Law Review, 77, 1979. p. 1688-1729. Builer, op. cii. Friedman, 
S.W., 'Indigent women, what right to abortion?', New York Law School Law Review,
1978, pp. 709-741. Lincoln, R. e.o., 'The Court, the Congress and the President: 
turning back the clock on the pregnant poor'. Family Planning Perspectivei, 9, 
1977, pp 207-214. O'Fallon, ‘Adjudication and contested concepts: the case of equal 
protection. New York University Law Review, 54, 1979, p. 19 ff.
210 Stingle, op. cit. note 200, p. 507.
211 See Mendelson, J.E., Domotlcy, S., 'The courts and elective abortion under Medicaid', 
Social Service Review, 1980, pp. 124-135.
212 Harris v. Me. Rae, see note 133.
2 ,3  bid., pp. 2680-2681.
158
all mcdically necessary abortions (1), impinged on the ‘liberty’ protected by 
the 14th Amendment as recognized in Roe v. Wade, and (2) violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. As to the first claim, the 
Court ruled that, whether the woman’s right to decide on abortion
lies *t the core or the periphery of the Due Process liberty recognized in Roe 
v. Wade, it simply does not follow that ■ woman's freedom of choice carries 
with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself 
of the full range of protected choices ... The fact remains that the Hyde 
Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice 
in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would 
have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care at all.214
Answering to the second claim, the Court repeated its Maher arguments: no 
fundamental right was violated, and financial need alone does not create a 
suspect class. The fact
that Maher involved a refusal to fund non-therapeutic abortions, whereas the 
present case involves a refusal to fund medically necessary abortions, has no 
bearing at the factors that render a classification ‘suspect’ within the mean­
ing of the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection ... The Hyde 
Amendment by encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circum­
stances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of pro­
tecting potential life ... Nor is it irrational that Congress has not authorized 
federal reimbursement for certain medically necessary abortions. Abortion is 
inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other proce­
dure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.215
The language of this decision almost reverses the ideas expressed in Roe v. 
Wade. In Roe the woman’s right to decide on abortion was the central argu­
ment. Here, the importance of encouraging childbirth and the protection of 
potential life against its ‘purposeful termination’ seems to be the central ar­
gument. The intentions behind the Hyde Amendment were clear: to stop the 
liberalization of abortion in practice. As Henry Hyde announced during the 
defence of the amendment,
we have decided not to fund abortion because it's killing of an innocently in­
convenient pre-bom child ... We are not going to stand by and be accessories 
to the elimination of hundreds of thousands of unborn children.216
214 Ibid., P 2688.
2 ,5  Ibid., p. 2692.
216 Perry, M J.. ‘Why the Supreme Court was plainly wrong in the Hyde Amendment case: 
a brief comment on Harris v. McRae’, Stanford Law Review, 1980, p. 1126.
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In his comment on M cRae  Michael Perry stated that ‘while Roe  quite 
plainly does not forbid all government action that might have the effect of 
making a woman prefer childbirth to abortion. Roe does require that gov­
ernment take no action including the selective withholding of Medicaid 
funds, predicated on the view that abortion is per se morally objection­
a b le '.217 Judicial enquiry into the legislative motivation would show that 
the supporters of the Hyde Amendment were not concemcd with the financial 
aspects of Medicaid funding for abortion, but that they sought to narrow the 
scope of Medicaid to reflect their moral objection to abortion.
The result of the passing of the Hyde Amendment, together with the 
M aher and M cRae rulings, is that federal funding is limited to abortions 
considered ‘medically necessary* in the narrow sense, and that states have the 
constitutional right to apply the same restrictions to state funding of abor­
tions. What is most striking in these funding cases is the strict distinction 
between the right to abortion and the financial access to that right. The prin­
ciple that ‘indigency’ does not crcate a ‘suspect class' seems to be at the core 
o f these decisions. Precisely this distinction shows the difference between 
American and European values. The fact that in Europe indigency is consid­
ered as ‘suspect’ has led to Health Insurance Programs in which the majority 
of the population is included, or even, as in Italy, to the creation o f a 
National Health Service. The limitations on Medicaid funding for abortion 
therefore fit very closely into general American attitudes towards public as­
sistance to the ‘needy’.What distinguishes the US from Europe is, therefore, 
not the fact that abortion is not funded by Medicaid, but that health insur­
ance in general is considered a private matter, not a public concern.218
Apart from this general difference in views on public health assistance, 
the debates on public funding of abortion have been quite similar in the US 
and in Europe. The viewpoint that ‘non-therapeutic’ abortions do not deserve 
the same treatment as other necessary medical acts was originally adopted by 
the French government, has now been adopted by the German government, 
and is implicitly adhered to in Austria. Italy is the only exception in this re­
spect, but this is probably also due to the existence of a National Health 
Service.
217 Ibid., p. 1122.
218 Although severe cuts hive been m ide in social benefits in most European countries, 
this distinction is, in my view, still valid.
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The question of whether abortion should be considered as a welfare right has 
been answered in the negative by all European governments. The passing of 
abortion laws coincided in most countries with the adoption o f policies 
aimed at better contraceptive information and education, better facilities for 
mothers with children, etc. In France, Germany and Italy in particular, abor­
tion was considered as a last resort to be prevented at any cost, especially by 
the creation of an environment more favorable to children. Instead of allevi­
ating the social circumstances in which women live by accepting abortion as 
a welfare right, the policy has been 10 improve the social circumstances so 
that women can have children without worries. In this ideology, the idea of 
abortion as a welfare right is firmly refuted. Whether today’s reality corre­
sponds to these beliefs remains an open question, but those are the princi­
ples underlying the abortion policy. That abortion as a welfare right is re­
jected in the US is implicit in the view that ‘indigent’ people are not ‘a sus- 
pcct class’.
7. T he Role of the Law
The original abortion prohibitions constituted a serious problem for gov­
ernments. The abortion provisions were disobeyed on a large scale and cre­
ated a serious health risk for women who resorted to backstreet abortionists. 
Any abortion law reform had at least to serve the purpose o f suppressing il­
legal and unskilled abortions. Apart from this very general aim, which is 
common to all abortion reforms discussed here, governments differed sub­
stantially on the principal aims to be pursued and the ways of reaching these 
objectives. Some took a principled position towards the aims of the law, i.e. 
liberal or conservative, others took a more pragmatic view, i.e. they opted 
for a compromise solution. The solutions governments opted for have been 
discussed in this chapter, as have the objectives governments had in mind. In 
this section we will see how governments and courts conceived of how 
means and aims were connected, i.e. the role of the law therein.
It has been shown that the German Federal Constitutional Court gave 
priority to the protection of unborn life from the 14th day after conception. 
In relation to this position the question o f  the role of criminal law turned 
out to be a central issue in the debate before the Constitutional C ourt
The purpose of the original German time-phase rule was 10 reduce the to­
tal number of (illegal and legal) abortions by relying on the pregnant
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woman’s sense of responsibility, developed by counselling.219 Criminal law 
was not considered by the SPD/FDP majority to be the appropriate means of 
reducing the number of abortions, because a pregnant woman who wanted an 
abortion would look for a way to obtain iL This was demonstrated by the 
widespread practice of illegal abortion. After having been given counselling 
and assistance the woman’s feeling of responsibility would be reinforced. In 
this new, the protection of unborn life could only be achieved with the co­
operation of pregnant women. Furthermore, counselling would only be ef­
fective without the threat of criminal sanctions. The SPD/FDP proposal 
therefore contained a time-phase rule with obligatory counselling ensured 
through a penal sanction.220 Strengthening the insight and the feeling of 
personal responsibility of the woman was considered to be more successful 
than building on the woman’s fear of a penal sanction. The aim o f the 
statute was not, said the Minister o f Justice, the decriminalization o f abor­
tion, but rather the guaranteeing of an ‘appropriate and effective protection 
for unborn life’ even if instead of punishment for abortion an obligatory 
regulation was proposed which ‘for the first twelve weeks of pregnancy at­
tributes to counselling as a preventive measure a greater effectiveness than 
the threat of punishment’.221 It was believed that through counselling and an 
appeal to the woman’s feeling of responsibility the total number of abor­
tions would eventually go down.
These arguments were firmly rejected by the Federal Constitutional 
Court. Although it acknowledged that a penal sanction is often ineffective, 
the Court stressed the general preventive function of criminal law: ‘the mere 
existence of such a penal sanction has influence on the value concepts and 
the manner of conduct of the population’(see supra section B, under 1.). In 
the view of the Court, a repeal o f penal sanctions would confuse the con­
cepts of right and wrong, and abortion would no longer be morally con­
demned by the public. The Court also disapproved of the law’s aim of reduc­
ing the total number of abortions. The achievement of a socio-political goal, 
said the Court, can never be more important than the individual protection of 
each single life. A ‘socio-technical’ use of the law was not permitted in this 
case. The indications solution was suggested as the only correct solution for 
the protection of every individual unborn life.
219 SPD/FDP proposti, Deutscher Bundestag, Dracksache 7/1981, p .l.
220 Ibid., p. 10.
221 Goiby, op. cit. noie 28, p. 630.
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Instead of an ‘ethical-pragmatic'222 approach to the abortion problem the 
Court seems to have adopted a conservative and paternalistic approach. It is 
conservative because the right to life is the central value in its arguments, 
which do not give serious consideration to the ways in which this principle 
can be realized.223 It is paternalistic because criminal law is used as both a 
punitive-corrective and an educative device.224
The opposite viewpoint was taken by the Austrian legislator. The drafters 
of the abortion law did not make any commitment to the protection of un- 
bom life. They accepted the fact that in today’s pluralistic society people’s 
views may differ concerning the moral and legal status of the unborn.225 
The purpose of the time-phase rule, it would appear from the Parliamentary 
Debates, is to suppress illegal and unskilled abortions and to give women an 
equal position in society. The abortion decision is left to the pregnant 
woman, the person the most directly involved in this decision. The 
Constitutional Court made a conscious effort to leave this question to the 
legislature.
The US Supreme Court took a principled stand on the abortion question, 
but in a slightly different way from the Austrian legislator. Like the drafters 
of the Austrian law, the Supreme Court stated that the question of the be­
ginning of human life cannot be answered, thereby suggesting that this 
should be left to the private morality of the citizens. As has been pointed 
out, however, the Court carefully avoided language which might allude to 
the concept o f self-determination, or to the woman's right to an equal posi­
tion in society. It did not base its decision on feminist principles, but rather 
on the concept of individual liberty. The abortion decision could therefore be 
seen in the light of ideological individualism, a value traditionally protected
222 Kriele. M., Zeitschrift fü r  Rtchtspolitik, April 1975, 8, pp. 73-74. See for a discus­
sion of the effectiveness of penal sanctions in relation to the German abortion deci­
sion Geddert, H., ‘Abtreibungsverbot und Grundgesetz (BVerfGE 39, Iff) ', in 
Lüdensen, K., Sack, F., Vom Nutten und Nachteil d tr  Soiialwissenchafltn fü r das 
Slrafrtchl, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1980, p. 333 ff.
223 Ibid.
224 Gerstem, H., Lowry, D., ‘Abortion, abstnct normt and social control: the decision of 
the West German Federal Constitutional Court’, Emory Law Journal. 25, 1976, p. 
869.
225 Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 16, p. 7997.
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by the Supreme Court.226 In this case, the right to liberty has been inter­
preted as the right of the individual to make for himself those fundamental 
decisions that shape family life, such as decisions on marriage, procreation 
and child-rearing. Besides the woman’s right to individual liberty, much em­
phasis was given to the doctor’s right to professional freedom (see supra un­
der 5.) The time-phase rule as set out in Roe v. Wade should therefore fur­
ther the aim of the woman’s and the doctor’s personal liberty against state 
interference.
The French and Italian legislators, on the other hand, took a more prag­
matic view of the abortion issue. The objective of the French government 
was to make a law which would be applied, but which would at the same 
time dissuade women from having an abortion, in order to reduce the number 
of abortions.227 The means o f reducing the number of abortions is dissua­
sion, the means of achieving application of the law is to leave the ultimate 
decision to the pregnant woman. On the one hand, the law grants the woman 
the Final decision on abortion (during the first ten weeks of pregnancy), 
although not on feminist grounds, and on the other hand the pregnant 
woman has to be dissuaded, although not on the basis of a specific concept 
of the legal status of the unborn. The law thus seems to seek a compromise 
between two opposing views. The ambiguity of the ‘situation of distress’ 
requirement, which alludes to an indications solution should be seen in this 
light. The law, according to the French government, should follow societal 
changes and should be based on social consensus, tolerance, and on a social
and liberal conception of the responsible individual.228 As Simone Veil said 
in defense of the law: 'la  nature des lois humaines est d ’être soumise à tous 
les accidents qui arrivent et de varier à mesure que les volontés des hommes 
changent’.229 Unlike the German Federal Constitutional Court, the govern­
ment did not concern itself with the ethical function of the law, but with a 
‘pragmatisme, raisonable e t hum aine’.230 In contrast to the German and 
American solutions, the French law seems to have tried to minimize the so­
226 Bogneui, C., ‘Esperienze ttnniere: la liberti di abort ire, diritto delle donne, costi- 
tunonalmenie garanlito'. Rivista Italiana di Diritto e Proctdura Ptnale, 17, 1974. p. 
34.
227 Simone Veil, Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 24, p. 7000.
22® Parliamentary Debates, op. cit. note 24, 7027.
229 Simone Veil, Parliamentary Debites, op. cit. note 24, p. 7001.
230 See noie 228.
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cial conflicts raised by abortion, and to find a solution which was the least 
offensive politically.
A similarly pragmatic position was adopted by the drafters o f the Italian 
Abortion Act. Their aim was to reduce the number of abortions by means of 
preventive social measures. Assistance to the pregnant woman and general 
information and educalion in birth control was considered the only way to 
achieve a long-term reduction in the number of abortions.231 The abortion 
question was considered as a social problem to be solved by social means in­
stead o f criminal sanctions.232 This meant that the ultimate decision was 
left to the pregnant woman.233 Like the French law, the Italian law does not 
take a clear stand on any of the basic questions (right to life, right to self-de­
termination). It opts for a pragmatic compromise solution in the form o f a 
time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements.
In conclusion, all abortion reforms sought to prevent illegal and unskilled 
abortions. The objective of ihe adoption of a time-phase rule in Austria was 
to give women an equal position in society. In the U.S., the time-phase rule 
was not meant to serve egalitarian purposes, but had a more libertarian aim, 
that is to protect matters which affect the private and family life of the indi­
vidual from government interference. Both in Austria and in the US the idea 
was accepted that abortion is a question of private morality. The Italian and 
French solutions, a time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements, tried to 
achieve two opposite objectives. On the one hand, abortion was considered 
as a problem and therefore the aim of the law was to reduce the total number 
of abortions. On the other hand, there was a general awareness that the only 
way to achieve a long-term reduction in the number of abortions was 
through the co-operation of pregnant women. The ultimate decision was 
thus left to the woman. The procedural requirements (counselling, waiting 
period), aimed at dissuading the pregnant woman from her decision to have 
an abortion. Underlying this French/Italian solution was the belief that the 
abortion problem could only be solved by social means, not by criminal 
sanctions. The German Federal Constitutional Court rejected the Italian and 
French way of reasoning and set two clear objectives to be achieved by the 
abortion law, i.e. the protection of every individual unborn life and the edu­
231 Prep*r*lory work«, Casini, op cit. note 91, p. 100. ‘L ivon preparalori*. reported in 
Galli, op cit. note 35, p. 402.
232 Ibid., p. 99.
233 Ibid., p. 63. See ihe criticism of Busnelii, op. cit. note 35, on this aspect of the law.
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cation of society as to what is right and wrong. In this view the indications 
solution was the only suitable regulation of the abortion issue.
8. The Role of the  E u ro p ean  C onvention on H um an R ights
Art. 25 of the European Convention on Human Rights states:
T h e  C om m ission  m ay receive petitions addressed to the Secretary G eneral o f  
the C o uncil o f  E urope from any person, non-governm ental o rgan ization , or 
g roup  o f  ind iv iduals claim ing to be the v ictim  o f  a v io la tion  by one o f  the 
H igh C on trac ting  Parties o f the rights set forth in this C onvention, provided 
that the High C ontracting Party against w hich the com plain t has been lodged 
has declared  that it recognizes the com petence o f  the C om m ission  to receive 
such  p e titions.
In the context of abortion this means, that any citizen of a state which has 
recognized the Commission’s competence to receive individual petitions can 
file a complaint that the national abortion law violates one of the rights laid 
down in the European Convention.234 The European Commission of 
Human Rights has twice dealt with the abortion question.
In the Bruggeman and Scheuten case of 1975,235 two German women 
complained of the fact that their right to respect for their private life, 
protected by a r t  8 o f the European Convention (‘Everyone has the right to 
respcct for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’), 
was violated by the indications solution of the amended German abortion 
law. Rose Marie Bruggeman was unmarried and feared the disadvantages of 
being an unwed mother. Adelheid Scheuten was married, had two children, 
and wanted no more children. They alleged that they were not free to have an 
unwanted child aborted. The European Commission declared the complaint 
admissible. In spite of the fact that neither of them was pregnant, and that 
they had not asked, nor had been refused an abortion, nor had been prosecuted 
for illegal abortion, they were considered ‘victims’ as defined by art. 25 of
234 The following states hive ratified or made i  declarauon to n tify  the Commission's 
competence to receive individual petitions under in . 24 of the Convention (up to 1 - 
12- 1983): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherland, Norway, Portugil, Spun, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Application no 6959/75 by Rose Marie Bruggeman and Adelheid Scheuten against the 
Federal Republic of Germany.
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the European Convention.236 This is quite remarkable given the fact that up 
to 1978 only 2% of all registered complaints were declared admissible.237
The Commission accepted the claim that pregnancy and the interruption 
of pregnancy are part of private life (and also in certain circumstances of 
family life). It further considered that
re sp ec t fo r p rivate  life  com prises also, to a certa in  d eg ree , the r ig h t to 
estab lish  and to dev elo p  relationships with o th er hum an beings, especially  
in  the em o tio n a l field , for the developm ent and fu lfillm en t o f  o n e ’s ow n 
p e rso n ality  (D ecision  A pplication no 6825/74 X against Iceland), and that 
therefore sexual life is also part o f private life: and in particu lar that the legal 
reg u la tio n  o f  abortion  is an intervention in p rivate  life  w hich  m ay or m ay 
n o t be ju s tified  under article 8(2).^3®
As to the examination of the merits (art. 31 o f  the Convention), the 
Commission ruled, however, that
art. 8(1) can n o t be interpreted  in such a way that p regnancy  and its term i­
nation  are, as a principle, solely a m atter o f  the private life o f  the m other.239
According to the Commission in this particular case the legal norms in force 
in Germany (i.e. the indications solution), which allow for a social indica­
tion, did not interfere with the respect for private life as laid down in an. 8.1 
of the Conveniion.The Commission added that the law on abortion in ail 
Member States was at least as restrictive as the German one.
In m any European countries the problem  o f abortion is o r has been subject o f 
heated  debates or legal reform  since „. T here  is no  ev idence that it was the 
in ten tion  o f  the Parties to the C onvention  to  b ind them selves in favour o f  
any particu la r solution under d iscussion -  e.g. a  so lu tion  o f  the k ind set out 
in the F ifth  C rim ina l Law Reform  Act (F r is ie n ld su n g  -  tim e lim ita tion )
236 See V. Dijlt. P., van Hoof, GJ.H., Thtory and Practice o f the European Convention 
on Human Righls, Kluwer. Devenler, 1984, p. 38.
237 On Dec. 31, 1981, out of a toul of 9.620 ippli cations registered only 255 cases were 
ultimately declared admissible, which is less than 3%. Only about one out of five 
complaints is registered yearly. See v. DUK, op. cii. note 236, p. 46.
23® Final decision of the Commission of 19 May 1976 as to the admissibility of applica­
tion no 6959/75, the Bruggeman and Schtulen case, op. cii. note 121, p. 53.
23^ Opinion of the Commission of 12 July 1977, the Bruggeman and Scheultn case. op. 
cit. note 137, p. 19.
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which was not yet under public discussion at the time the Convention was 
drafted and adopted. 240
The second claim of violation of the European Convention came from the 
United Kingdom, in the Paton  case of 1978.241 The applicant, William 
Paton, complained o f the refusal by the British High Court o f Justice to 
prevent his wife from having an abortion. He alleged that the British 
Abortion Act of 1967, under which the abortion was authorized and carried 
out, violated, inter alia, art. 2 of the European Convention, which protects 
the right to life.242 The Commission accepted that the applicant, as 
potential father, was so closely affected by the termination of pregnancy by 
his wife that he could claim to be a ‘victim’ of the legislation in the sense 
of art. 25 of the Convention.
This was the first time that the Commission dealt with the meaning of 
art. 2 (‘everyone’s life shall be protected by law’) in the context of abortion. 
The Commission first went into the question of whether ‘everyone’ in art. 2 
included the unborn. ‘Everyone’ is not defined in the Convention, and in 
nearly all instances the use of the word can only have a postnatal applica­
tion. The context o f art. 2 also supports this view in that all the limitations 
to the right to life summed up concern persons already bom.243 Therefore, 
concluded the Commission, ‘everyone’ in art. 2 does not include the unborn.
The Commission then examined the question of whether the term ‘life’ in 
art. 2 was to be interpreted as also covering the ‘unborn life’ o f the fetus. 
‘Life’, too, was not defined in the Convention. The Commission quoted the 
decisions by the American Supreme Court and by the German and Austrian 
Constitutional Courts on this matter, and then proposed three alternatives:
(1) a r t  2 does not cover the fetus at all,
(2) the fetus has a right to life with certain implied limitations,
(3) the fetus has an absolute right to life.
240 Ibid., p. 20. The Committee of Minister! deciding on the case according to art. 32 of 
the Convention, agreed with the opinion expressed by the Commission and declared 
that there was no violation of the Convention. See Resolution DH (78)1 of the 
Council of Ministers adopted on 17 March 1978.
241 Application no 8416/78 by William Paton against the United Kingdom.
242 Art. 2.1 of the European Convention: 'Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by 
law'.
243 The Commission refers here to the limitations of ‘everyone’s nght to life’ announced 
in par 1 and par 2 of an. 2. All these clauses concern by their nature persons already 
bom and cannot be applied to the fetus, says the Commission. This argument is very 
similar to the one used by the Austrian Constitutional Court.(see Section B. 1).
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The Commission stated that if the fetus had an absolute right to life it 
would be regarded as being of higher value than the life o f  the pregnant 
woman. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the object and purpose 
o f the Convention. Even when the Convention was signed, all High 
Contracting Parlies (with one possible exception) permitted abortion if nec­
essary to save the life of the mother, and in the meantime the national abor­
tion legislation has shown a tendency towards further liberalization. Thus, 
according to the Commission, the unborn does not have an absolute right to 
life.
The abortion in the Paton case was carried out at the initial stage of preg­
nancy (ten weeks) and on a medical indication. The Commission decided to 
deal only with the right to life in these, specific circumstances, i.e. when the 
pregnancy was at an early stage and an abortion was indicated on medical 
grounds. The Commission did not find it necessary to decide the broader 
questions of whether art. 2 applied to the fetus (1), or whether art. 2 recog­
nized a ‘right to life’ of the fetus with implied lim itations (2). The 
Commission limited itself to this narrower issue.
The Commission concluded that the authorization of the abortion in the 
Paton case was compatible with art. 2 of the Convention, because it was 
carried out at the initial stage of pregnancy and covered by the limitations of 
a medical indication. The question of other possible limitations (ethical, 
fetal, or social) did not arise.
It (the Commission) finds lhat the authorization, by the United Kingdom 
authorities, of the abortion complained of is compatible with An. 2(1), first 
sentence, because, if one assumes that this provision applies at the initial 
stage of the pregnancy, the abortion is covered by an implied limitation, 
protecting the life and health of the woman at that stage, of the ‘right to life’
of the foetus.244
The applicant further complained of a violation of his right to respect for his 
family life (a rt 8.1), because
(a) the 1967 British Abortion Act did not require the husband's consent for 
abortion, and
(b) the 1967 Abortion Act denied the father the right to be consulted.
The Commission ruled lhat the decision to terminate the pregnancy of the 
applicant’s wife ‘insofar as it interfered in itself with the applicant’s right to
244 The Paton cate, op cit. note 241, p. 10.
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respect for his family life, was justified under para 2 of art. 8 as being neces­
sary for the protection of the rights of another person’.245
As to the father’s right to be consulted, the Commission ruled that, first 
of all, ‘the right o f the pregnant woman being the person primarily con­
cerned in the pregnancy and its continuation or termination, to respect for 
her private life’ had to be taken into consideration. In the Paton  case, the 
Commission did not find that the father’s right to respect for his private and 
family life ‘can be interpreted so widely as to embrace such procedural rights 
as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be consulted, or a right to make 
applications, about an abortion which his wife intends to have performed on 
her’.246 In short, the father’s right to respect for his private and family life 
does not include the right to be consulted about his wife’s decision to have 
an abortion.
The tone of this decision seems to leave the door open for a wide interpre­
tation of art. 2 of the Convention. The Commission stated that the unborn 
does not have a right to life equal to that of living human beings, and it did 
not emphasize the respect for human life from the moment of conception. 
O f course, one should not forget that the abortion provisions challenged 
before the Commission were fairly liberal. In upholding the national 
legislation, the Commission could use therefore more liberal language. The 
question remains whether the Commission would make such a decision in 
another case which condemned a national provision. Any answer to this 
question is speculative because the language of the Paton case indicates that 
the Commission decided on the basis o f the particularities of this case, and 
avoided making any generalization.247
So far, the Commission has remained within the ‘safe* limits of abortion 
regulations. It has not yet dealt with the question of the social indication or 
the time-phase rule vis-à-vis the right to life of the unborn, a question much 
more subject to debate than abortion on a medical indication. It has to be 
kept in mind, however, that the grounds on which the abortion was per­
formed in this case was a medical indication in the wide sense of the word, 
which could be -  and was, in fact,-- interpreted as also including social
245 Ibid., p. I t .
246 Ibui.
247 This aspect was very much emphasized during a conversation I had in February 1982 
with Mr. K. Rogge, the reporter of the Commission on both abortion cases.
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grounds.248 Other questions left open by this decision are those concerning 
late abortions and the rights of pregnant minors. No further applications 
have been filed with the Commission, but future questions could arise in the 
area of medical freedom. For example individual doctors could complain 
about anti-abortion rules in public or private hospitals which prohibit them 
from performing abortions.249
One interesting aspect of these abortion decisions is that the Commission 
follows the basic arguments used by the US Supreme Court. It accepts the 
view that the abortion decision is pan o f the pregnant woman’s private life. 
This is all the more remarkable because it is the only instance in Europe in 
which this viewpoint, expressed for the first time in Roe v. Wade, has been 
adopted. The Commission also refers to Roe in the Paton case. This implies 
that the Commission lakes a broad perspective, and looks beyond the fron­
tiers of the Member States of the Council of Europe.
What is, or could be, the integrating force of the European Convention of 
Human Rights?
First o f  all, the fact that most European countries have recognized the 
competence of the Commission to receive individual petitions is signifi­
cant.250 This means that any individual can complain about a national abor­
tion regulation. In the two cases discussed the Commission applied very 
flexible standards of admissibility, thus showing that it does not try to avoid 
the abortion issue .251 This is a very significant fact, given the
24® The British Abortion Act, Section 1(1) permits the termination of a pregnancy by a 
registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners find: (a)’lhat the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, 
or of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing 
children of her family, greater (Mart if the pregnancy were terminated-, or (b) ihat there 
is a substantial risk that if the child were bom it would suffer from such physical or 
mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.' In determining the risk of 
injury to health ‘account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonably 
foreseeable environment.(Section 1(2)) This last paragraph is called the ‘social 
clause'; it applies, however, only to the Health of the pregnant woman. See Keuing, 
op. cu. note 197, p. 32. The underlined phrase under (a) opens the door to a wide 
interpretation of this ‘medical ground’ as, given the present state of medical 
technology, an abortion involves in most cases lest physical risk than childbirth. 
See Francome, C.p Abortion freedom -  a worldwide movement, George Allen £  
Unwin, London, 1984, p. 99.
249 This was suggested by Mr. H. Kruger, the Secretary to the European Commission of 
Human Rights during a conversation I had in Feb. 1982.
25® See art. 25 quoted in the text.
251 See Rogge, K„ EuGRZ, 1981, pp 22-23.
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Com m ission’s restrictive ‘policy’ with regard to adm issibility.252 Any 
husband can, as a potential father, claim to be the victim of his w ife’s 
decision to have an abortion (invoking the right to life), and thus challenge a 
liberal legislation. Any woman can claim to be the victim of a restrictive 
abortion law (and thus invoke the right to privacy). That seems to be the 
implication of the two abortion cases for the admissibility o f  individual 
complaints. There are, moreover, signs that the number and importance of 
the cases decided by the Court and the Commission are increasing, and that 
"the interpretation of at least some of the provisions is changingTnlavor of 
the interests of the individual as opposed to those of the state. It appears that 
ih e i£ .ii a more ‘constitutional’ approach towards the fundamental -values 
enclosed in the Convention.253
It seems unlikely, however, that the Commission or the Court will hold 
a national abortion legislation to be in violation of the Convention on the 
basis of the right to life or the right to privacy. Art. 8, which protects the 
right to privacy, specifically allows for restrictions on this right by a public 
authority (section 2) ‘in accordance with the law and ... necessary in a demo­
cratic society ... for the protection of health and morals, or for the protection 
o f the rights and freedoms of others.’ The Court has in various instances ex­
pressed itself on the interpretation of such clauses (occurring in each of the 
articles 8-11). In the Handyside case of 1976,254 concerning pornography, 
the Court stated that the view taken by national laws on morals varies from 
time to time and from place to place. The right invoked in this case was the 
right to freedom of expression (art. 10) which allows -  like the right to 
privacy -  for restrictions ‘necessary in a democratic society ...’ (section 
2).255
The Court ruled in this case that state authorities are in principle in a bet­
ter position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact con­
tent of these requirements. Therefore, the Contracting States have a ‘margin 
of appreciation’, both the domestic legislature and the judiciary, in making 
the initial assessment of what restriction of a Convention right is ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’.256 The Court expanded the ‘margin of appreciation’
252 See V. Dijk, op. cil. note 236, p. 459.
253 Ibid., p. 478.
254 Handyside case, Europe«! Court of Human Rights, 1976, Series A, no 24.
255 Ibid., p. 22. The Court refen here to par. 2 of art. 8.
256 Judgement of Oct. 22, 1981, PubLECHR, Series A, voL 45.
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principle to include die principle that interference with a right protected by 
the Convention needs to be proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
In the Dudgeon case of 1981, concerning homosexual acts between con­
senting adult males in private, the Court ruled that the national law prohibit­
ing homosexual acts between consenting adults violated the right to privacy 
under the Convention. The Court declared that in this case the restriction 
imposed upon Mr. D udgeon’s ‘private m anifestations of the human 
personality’ was disproportionate to the government’s aim, namely the 
prevention of the erosion of existing moral standards.
Although the Dudgeon case is an important precedent in which the right 
to privacy was upheld against a national law, it is difficult to imagine, how­
ever, that abortion would be treated in the same way as homosexuality. 
Abortion is not only a question of private or public morality. It also con­
cerns the protection of unborn life. This aspect could be considered as a re­
striction of the woman’s right to privacy in the sense o f art. 8, sub 2. 
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the Court would impose its own inter­
pretation of the ‘right to life' on a national legislator, especially in countries 
where the abortion laws have been recently reformed. This is what the last 
comment in the Briiggeman case seems to suggest (see supra). It seems 
more likely that the Commission or the C ourt could step in on the 
interpretation of values contingent on the right to abortion which have not 
been worked out in detail by the national legislature. Some examples of this 
are the pregnant minor’s rights vis-à-vis her parents, or the physician’s right 
to freedom of action vis-à-vis a hospital’s prohibition to perform abortions.
C onclusions
In the two-year period between 1973 and 1975 five major constitutional 
courts decided on the abortion issue. The US Supreme Court rulings Roe v. 
Wade and Doe v. Bolton resulted in a liberalization of almost all state abor­
tion laws. Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, abortion law reforms 
were passed in Germany, France and Austria (1974-1975), and were subse­
quently presented to the respective constitutional courts for judicial review. 
The Italian Constitutional Court ruling on abortion of 1975 preceded the 
abortion law reform which was passed in 1978, and then again considered by 
the Constitutional Court in 1981. In this chapter an attempt has been made 
to evaluate the various abortion law reforms in combination with constitu­
tional court rulings in the light of the theoretical discussion presented in 
chapter II. The objective has been to see how legislatures and constitutional
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courts have answered the questions raised in chapter II. We have taken into 
consideration the fundamental values involved in the abortion decision such 
as the legal status o f the fetus, the pregnant woman’s rights, the rights of 
the father of the fetus, of the parents of a pregnant minor, and of the preg­
nant woman’s doctor.
Our investigations have shown that the most important and most difficult 
question of the legal status o f the unborn has not received a profound and co­
herent answer from any of the legislators or courts. The conclusion drawn at 
the end of chapter II, namely that there is no right or rational answer to the 
question o f  when human life begins, has been confirmed by the constitu­
tional solutions presented.
The US Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
have taken a principled stand versus the abortion issue. The former has pro­
claimed the woman’s right to abortion, and the latter the unbom ’s right to 
life. This contrasts with the pragmatic solutions adopted by the French and 
Italians, which represent a compromise between the two opposing view­
points. The American and German Courts have not succeeded, however, in 
presenting their viewpoints without running into contradictions.
The US Supreme Court, although declaring that there is no need to re­
solve the difficult question of when human life begins, ruled in fact that 
only from the moment of viability does the unborn deserve protection, and 
that the right to life can only be claimed at the moment of birth. As has 
been pointed out in chapter II, more arguments are needed for taking 
viability and not an earlier point in pregnancy as the cut off point than the 
short statem ent that from that moment onwards the fetus can have a 
meaningful life outside the mother’s womb. Given the wide impact of this 
ruling, which establishes a very rigid scheme for state legislatures to follow, 
one might have expected a more extensive justification for this choice. In 
more recent decisions the Supreme Court emphasized that the moment of 
viability is not fixed, but is dependent on the stage of technology in that the 
fetus is viable at an earlier stage o f its development than the end of the 
second trimester. The implication of-this position is that the protection of 
the unborn becomes more extensive as medical technology advances, and 
therefore contradicts the Court’s own rigid division o f the pregnancy into 
three trimesters. Furthermore, the Court's statement that the state interest in 
the protection of human life grows as pregnancy advances and that it 
becomes ‘compelling’ at the moment of viability, indicates that the Court 
uses a developmental criterion of humanness. The emphasis put on this state
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interest in its more recent decisions also gives a very ‘relative’ significance 
to the proclaimed ‘fundamental right to abortion’.
The German Constitutional Court took the opposite viewpoint, namely 
that the unborn has the right to life from the 14th day after conception. 
There is some controversy, however, as to why nidation marks the begin­
ning of the right to life. The Court does not explain at all why nidation and 
not the moment of conception is crucial for recognizing the legal status of 
the unborn. Furthermore, the Court, in proclaiming the constitutional right 
to life of the unborn, ends up contradicting itself. By allowing for a fetal and 
a social indication for abortion, and by suggesting a law reform which gives 
more protection to the unborn as pregnancy advances, the Court no longer 
maintains that the unborn has the same constitutional protection as a bom 
human being.
In reality these two courts take a more moderate stand on abortion than 
their principled position proclaimed. These rulings indicate that extreme po­
sitions on abortion -  that is the exclusive recognition o f the unbom’s right 
to life or the woman’s right to self-determination -  seem to be untenable. 
These constitutional rulings on abortion therefore reflect the dilemmas ana­
lyzed at the theoretical level: the impossibility of defining the right to life in 
a coherent way leads to a compromise position, a compromise between the 
protection of unborn life which increases as pregnancy advances and the re­
spect for the woman’s right to self-determination which decreases during the 
gestation period. The Austrian abortion law expresses no concern for the 
protection of unborn life up to the time limit o f 12 weeks. The question of 
when human life begins remained unanswered during the Parliamentary de­
bates. The Constitutional Court, appealed to by the defeated minority in 
Parliament, also avoided this question by giving a historical interpretation of 
the Constitution which excluded the horizontal effect of the right to life. So 
although the Austrian constitutional order rejected the value of unborn life 
up to a certain moment, it gave no justification for its decision. The French 
and Italian abortion reforms have consciously avoided a principled position 
towards the question o f unborn life and the pregnant woman’s rights and 
have instead opted for a pragmatic solution which is a compromise between 
the two opposite views. No answer has been given to the question of when 
the fetus is considered a human being. Some protection is, however, given 
to the fetus, and this protection increases as pregnancy advances. Implicitly, 
the French and Italian legislatures have adopted a developmental criterion of
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humanness. The solutions chosen by the legislatures have not been touched 
on by the Constitutional Courts.
All abortion reforms, except the German one, have implicitly accepted the 
woman’s right to self-determination. The US Supreme Court declared in Roe 
v. Wade that the woman’s right to privacy, based on the concept of personal 
liberty protected by the 14th Amendment, also encompassed the woman’s 
decision to have an abortion. The Supreme Court avoided any language 
which might allude to the woman’s equal position in society, and instead 
emphasized the libertarian principle underlying this abortion freedom, i.e. 
the freedom of the pregnant woman and her attending physician to decide on 
abortion without state interference. The Austrian time-phase rule is based on 
the defence of women’s rights, as the Parliamentary debates indicate. The 
French and Italian abortion laws do recognize the woman's freedom to decide 
on abortion, subject however to the condition that she be counselled with 
the objective of dissuading her from her decision. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court, on the other hand, firmly rejected the woman’s right 
to self-determination in the abortion decision.
In four out o f the five countries discussed here the woman’s right to self- 
determination has been recognized, although more expressly in the US and 
in Austria. However, neither the legislatures nor the constitutional courts 
mention this right. Furthermore, in none of the five countries except the US 
has the pregnant woman been granted the right to abortion. Only the US 
Supreme Court expressly mentions the pregnant woman’s fundamental right 
to abortion; the French, Italian and Austrian abortion laws merely create the 
possibility of abortion on certain conditions.
The comparative analysis of these five abortion decisions teaches us the 
following about the validity of the claims in favour of the unborn's right to 
life from the moment o f conception and the pregnant woman’s right to self- 
determination throughout pregnancy. Given present moral and social values, 
a principled, i.e. extreme, position towards the abortion issue seems to be 
untenable. To recognize the right to life of the fetus from the moment of 
conception would mean a step backwards even with respect to the existing 
abortion legislation, which allowed for some medical indications. The analy­
sis o f the German Constitutional C ourt's decision shows that such a posi­
tion leads to inconsistencies if one does not want to outlaw all abortions ex­
cept the ones on a strictly medical .i.e. vital, indication. The proclamation of 
a woman’s right to decide on abortion throughout pregnancy based on her 
right to self-determination, seems to be equally problematic. Although it is
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difficult to define at what moment in pregnancy the fetus has a right to life, 
the protection  o f unborn life seems nevertheless to be a moral concern. 
Notwithstanding the fact that these five constitutional courts proclaim quite 
different principles, the substance of these rulings seems to point at a ten­
dency to take a moderate position on abortion. Abortion practice seems to 
reconfirm this tendency. The practice of abortion in Germany, for example, 
is not more restrictive than in France or Italy, although the principles pro­
claimed by the German Constitutional Court and laid down in the new abor­
tion reform by the legislature would suggest so.
How can such a moderate position be translated into a legal solution with 
a sound constitutional basis? The indications solution as proposed by the 
German Constitutional Court has discriminatory effects in that the reasons 
why women request an abortion are judged on the basis of vague and subjec­
tive criteria. The woman’s right to equal treatment by the law is definitely 
violated by an indications solution. The alternative solution of the time 
phase rule, however, seems insufficient to guarantee the protection of 
unborn life, an essential element of a compromise solution. A time-phase 
rule with dissuasion requirements aims at strengthening the pregnant 
wom an's sense o f responsibility. Given the inadequacy of penal sanctions 
for the prevention or reduction o f abortion, as demonstrated by the high 
number of clandestine abortions under restrictive abortion laws, the 
collaboration of the woman seems a necessary instrument for reducing the 
number of abortions. The time-phase rule with dissuasion requirements 
seems therefore to be the best guarantee of the protection of unborn life. At 
the same lime it also respects the woman's right to equality.
The rights of the father of the unborn in the abortion decision have been 
quite unanimously rejected in all countries and have not been a real point of 
discussion. The French and Italian laws provide for the possibility o f  the 
partner of the pregnant woman participating in the counselling session, if 
the pregnant woman desires. The woman’s autonomy in the abortion deci­
sion with respect to her partner has thus been respected even in the quite re­
strictive German abortion law. This means that the father’s right to procreate 
or to family life has not been accepted with respect to the abortion decision, 
which in turn implies that in this case the separation between sexual life and 
procreation has been fully recognized.
That parents have the right to be consulted in the abortion decision of 
their minor daughter has been accepted in some cases. The French law re­
quires parental involvement in all cases. Under the Italian law, a m inor can
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resort lo the Juvenile Court if she does not want to consult her parents 
which can give the required authorization. In Germany and Austria a doctor 
can require the parents’ consent if he thinks the minor is not mature enough 
to dccide alone. The US Supreme Court has developed a case law which is 
based on a similar criterion as the one used in Austria and Germany, i.e. the 
level o f maturity of the minor. A state can, according to the jurisprudence of 
the Supreme Court, only require parental consent if there is an alternative 
procedure open to the minor in which she can show herself to be sufficiently 
mature to make the abortion decision independently, or can show that an 
abortion is in her best interests. Only if neither of these conditions is ful­
filled according to the judge do the parents have the right to be consulted. In 
this way the Supreme Court has abandoned the formal distinction between 
minority and majority age and has instead adopted a rule based on the level 
o f maturity of the minor or on her best interests.
The doctor’s freedom to refuse abortion assistance as part of his profes­
sional freedom has been largely respected in all countries discussed. In Italy 
the doctor’s refusal can only be based on conscientious objections to abor­
tion which have to be officially registered and which apply to all abortion re­
quests. An Italian doctor who has raised conscientious objections cannot per­
form abortions at all, and a doctor who has not raised such objections must 
provide abortion assistance to all women who make an abortion request. In 
the other four countries doctors do not have to show such a consistent atti­
tude towards abortion requests; they can give or refuse abortion assistance 
depending on the circumstances without having to give any reason for their 
position. These refusal clauses -  in contrast to the conscience clause in force 
in Italy -  add a normative aspect to the role of the medical profession in that 
the refusal clause can be used by doctors as an instrument of control over the 
w om an's reasons for abortion. This makes his right to refuse abortion assis­
tance not as much contingent bur rather part of the abortion decision. The 
right to refuse abortion assistance cannot be invoked by public hospitals in 
France and Italy, as the French and Italian abortion laws state that public 
hospitals are under an obligation lo provide abortion assistance. A similar 
provision does not exist in Germany, Austria or the US. This does not im­
ply however that the doctors employed in French or Italian public hospitals 
are under any obligation to perform abortions. As a result, not all public 
hospitals do, in fact, provide abortion assistance.
The doctor’s right to professional freedom has been largely respected in all 
the countries discussed. W hereas in Europe the debate has centered on the
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doctor’s right to refuse abortion assistance, in the US the Supreme Court 
has emphasized the doctor’s right to determine the abortion procedure and to 
take part in the abortion decision.
In its abortion rulings the US Supreme Court has made it clear that the 
physician is free to determine how the abortion intervention has to be carried 
out, within the time limits set out in Roe. Procedural requirements such as 
counselling, waiting period, the place of the intervention, and the determina­
tion of the moment of viability have been left exclusively to the discretion 
of the doctor. Only marginal requirements set by state laws, such as the reg­
istering of abortion interventions for health purposes and the prior written 
consent of the pregnant woman were upheld by the Supreme Court. The 
weight o f the Court’s jurisprudence seems to be that abortion has to be 
treated like any other medical act and has to be judged in the context of 
'accepted medical practice’. As we have already seen, the Supreme Court has 
also made clear that, although it recognizes the woman’s right to privacy 
with respect to the abortion decision, the decision to have an abortion has to 
be taken by the pregnant woman together with her physician. The woman’s 
autonomy has been emphasized with respect to state interference, but not 
with respect to her attending physician.
The European abortion laws, on the other hand, -with the possible excep­
tion o f the Austrian abortion law- draw a clear distinction between abortion 
and other medical acts, in that the abortion procedure is regulated in detail by 
the respective abortion laws, e.g. where the intervention has to take place, 
the counselling procedure to be followed, the wailing period etc. The 
doctor’s right to professional freedom is contingent on these legal 
conditions. The fact that the respective laws specifically recognize the 
doctor's right to refuse abortion assistance supports this view. In several 
ways, however, the European approach to the doctor’s role in the abortion 
procedure and the abortion decision is ambiguous. Although the decision to 
abort is not considered a medical decision, the doctor has nevertheless been 
given a role in the decision making process. The most clear example of this 
is the German indications solution. It is the doctor who decides whether the 
w om an’s reasons for seeking an abortion are legally justified or not, 
although in most cases this decision does not require medical expertise. In 
France and Italy the doctor has a more subtle role in the decision making 
process in that he has to try to dissuade the pregnant woman from her 
intention to have an abortion and show her alternative solutions. The fact 
that the French, Austrian and German laws allow the doctor to refuse
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abortion assistance depending on the case before them -without having to 
show a consistent altitude towards abortion requests- also shows lhai his 
right to refuse is not so much contingent on, but is rather part o f  ihe 
decision.
On the whole, the doctor plays a key role in the abortion procedure. He 
has the right to refuse abortion assistance but the extend to which he takes 
part in the abortion decision varies depending on the country. This double 
role of the doctor -  decision maker and executor of the decision- is natural if 
one views abortion as a normal medical intervention, like in the US. It is 
curious, however, that in Europe a distinction is made between abortion and 
other medical acts, yet ihe doctor has been assigned a role in the decision­
making process as if abortion were a normal medical procedure.
Whether abortion should be funded like other medical care is a subject of 
discussion in some countries. In Italy, abortion is included in the National 
Health Service and this has never been a real issue. The Health Insurance in 
Germany gives a comprehensive coverage of abortion. The public funding of 
socially-indicated abortions is under serious attack, however, and the present 
government has announced that it will propose changes in this respect. The 
Constitutional Court had to decide on whether such funding is constitu­
tional. In France, the opposite developm ent has taken place. The original 
1975 abortion law did not include public funding o f  abortion, as abortion 
was not considered a necessary medical a c t The Mitterrand government has 
reversed this decision and 75% o f the abortion costs -  following the fixed 
rates -  are now reimbursed out o f public funds. Both in Germany and in 
France the funding of abortion has thus been a political issue. The Austrian 
Health Insurance program only covers medically indicated abortions. That 
the Socialist government has never made the public funding o f abortion an 
issue should be seen against the background of the aura o f taboo surrounding 
abortion. Up to now, the public funding o f abortion has thus not been a 
constitutional but only a political issue in some cases in Europe.
In the US, on the other hand, the public funding of abortion has been ex­
tensively debated before the Supreme Court. In a series of decisions between 
1977 and 1980, the Supreme Court made il very clear that ihe right to abor­
tion did not entail the right to public -  federal or state -  funding o f abortion. 
The Equal Protection challenge that M edicaid recipients seeking abortion 
should be funded in the same way as Medicaid recipients giving birth was re­
jected. The Court ruled that the refusal to fund abortions did not constitute 
an infringement of the fundamental right to abortion, and that poverty alone
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(i.e. Medicaid recipients) does not make for a ‘suspect class’. Hence, the le­
gitimate state or federal interest in childbirth justified the limitation on fed­
eral or state funding o f abortions. In these decisions the Supreme Court 
states the logical consequence o f its position that abortion is a private mat­
te r  as state intervention has been banned in the abortion decision there is no 
reason why the state should be required to finance abortion assistance.
What distinguishes the American from the European discussion on the 
funding o f abortion is not the question of whether abortion should be treated 
like other necessary mcdical acts. On both continents there is disagreement 
over the question of whether a non-medicaJly indicated abortion is part of 
necessary medical care. The American position differs from the European one 
on the question o f public assistance to the poor in society, i.e. on whether 
poverty is a private matter or a public concern. In Europe it would be con­
sidered as a basic right that the needy should receive social assistance, includ­
ing such health care as abortion; that welfare recipients should have the pos­
sibility of having an abortion was therefore never disputed. In the US, on 
the other hand, health care is still considered to a large extent as a private 
matter. Although many states do give health assistance and do fund 
abortions, this is not based on a constitutional right but on a political 
decision, subject to change. The Medicaid cases should be seen in this 
context.
The claim that the public funding of abortion is a welfare right has been 
rejected in Europe and in the US. In the US, this rejection is implicit in the 
statement that the poor are not ‘suspcct’. In Europe, government policies are 
aimed at making abortion superfluous, rather than at accepting abortion as a 
welfare right. Most measures are aimed at the prevention of abortion through 
the promotion o f contraceptive methods of birth control or by providing 
more assistance to unwed mothers, and a common concern of the European 
governments is the reduction in the number of abortions.
The legislative reforms in combination with the constitutional decisions 
show that the objectives governments set themselves and the means adopted 
to reach these objectives vary from country to country. A common objective 
of all countries was the suppression o f illegal and unskilled abortions. The 
existence of abortion law reforms, and the legalization of abortion itself was 
seen as the means to achieve this aim.
The objective o f the Austrian drafters was to give women an equal posi­
tion in society. The US Supreme Court did not so much em phasize this 
egalitarian idea as the libertarian principle o f  personal freedom in matters of
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family life. In both cases the time-phase rule was seen as the best way to 
reach these objectives. The German Constitutional C ourt on the other hand, 
considered the protection of unborn human life as the central objective of an 
abortion law reform. The only way to achieve this was, in the Court’s view, 
through an indications solution which clearly distinguished between legal 
and illegal reasons for abortion.
The French and Italian legislators took a more pragmatic view in that 
they neither proclaimed the woman’s right to self- determination nor the pro­
tection of unborn life as the major objective of the law. The aims of these 
abortion reforms were rather the application of the law and a resultant reduc­
tion in the number of abortions. It was thought that the way to achieve ap­
plication of the law was to seek the cooperation o f the pregnant woman by 
leaving the ultimate decision to her. A reduction in the number o f abortions 
could only be obtained by counselling and dissuading pregnant women, help­
ing them to find solutions, and giving contraceptive advice. A time-phase 
rule with dissuasion requirements was thus viewed as the best way to reach 
these objectives. Underlying these compromise solutions was the belief that 
the abortion question could only be tackled by social means, not by criminal 
sanctions. It was in this respect that the French and Italian view differed 
from the German one.
In two instances the European Commission o f Human Rights has re­
sponded to complaints raised by individual citizens against abortion provi­
sions under art. 25 of the European Convention. These decisions are not 
very surprising as they upheld recently passed moderate abortion reforms. It 
could have been expected that the Commission would respect recently 
formed national opinion on such a basic value as the right to life. What is 
interesting in these rulings is that they opened up new perspectives for the 
future, as the Commission applied very flexible standards for the admission 
of individual complaints. Furthermore, it gave no definite answers on the 
scope o f the right to life so as to leave the way open for future rulings.
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The preceding chaptcr has indicated ihe differences in interpretation of the 
fundamental values involved in the abortion decision. The legislatures and 
constitutional courts of the five countries discusscd here have not come to 
the same conclusions conccming the legal status of the fetus, the pregnant 
woman’s right to decide on abortion, and ihe fundamental rights of parents, 
husbands and doctors in the abortion decision. This chapter will attempt to 
formulate some explanations for the divergences and convergences in 
interpretation o f these fundamental values by the respective constitutional 
courts. The solutions adopted by the legislatures were based on the balance 
o f  forces existing in the respective parliaments, and hence on political condi­
tions. The decisions made by the constitutional courts go beyond political 
reasons and need 10 be explained by reference to the set of values incorpo­
rated in the constitutional order, i.e. the constitution itself,the competences 
given to the constitutional court, the role of the constitutional court in the 
political system o f the country, and the social philosophy expressed in the 
constitution. These factors will provide the basis for an analysis of the abor­
tion decisions.
The first step will be to look at the texts of the various constitutions 
(section  A), and at ihe history of these texts in relation to the history of 
abortion legislation (section B). It might be that the wording of the various 
fundamental rights or their history can throw some light on the interpreta­
tion given by the constitutional courts.
The role played by the various constitutional courts is not the same in all 
constitutional systems. The concept o f democracy in the US is quite differ­
ent from the one existing in France, for example. The US Supreme Court 
has a much more important and decisive role than the French Constitutional
Council. An analysis of the position of the constitutional court with respect 
to the legislature and of the selection, background, and training of the judges 
might throw some light on the different national outcomes of the abortion 
decisions, (section Q
The constitutional courts were subject to various constraints at the time 
they issued the abortion rulings. First o f  all, not all courts had the discre­
tionary power to ‘take or rcjcct’ the abortion issue, most of them had merely 
to decide on the particular case before them. Secondly, the type of abortion 
law under review and the political climate in which the courts had to decide 
may have influenced ihcir decision. This will be discussed in section D.
A final factor which may have had an impact on the constitutional inter­
pretation of the abortion issue is the difference between the social philoso­
phies prevailing in the various countries (section E). The place of the indi­
vidual in society is viewed quite differently in, for example, the US and 
West Germany.
Section A The Constitutional Texts
A first glance at the five constitutions discussed here shows that not all of 
them mention both the right to life and the right to freedom or self-determi­
nation. The French constitutional provisions do not mention the right to 
life, neither in the 1789 Declaration o f the Rights o f M an, nor in the 
Preambles to the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions. The French Constitutional 
Council nevertheless recognizcd in its abortion decision the 'respect for ev­
ery human being from the very commencement of life’,1 as laid down in the 
Abortion AcL It gave a dual meaning to the right to liberty, as written down 
in the 1789 Declaration o f the Rights of M an.2 In the opinion o f the 
Council, the right to freedom encompasses both the right to freedom of the 
person who has to perform the abortion and the right to freedom o f the 
woman who seeks an abortion. It thus emphasized the positive and the nega-
 ̂ A rt 1 of ihe French Abortion Act, Loi no 75-17 of 17-1-1975.
2 ‘The final end of every political institution is the preservation o f the nauinl and im­
prescriptible rights of man. These fights are those of liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression', an. 2 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the citi­
zen of 1789, translation by Finer, S.E.. F iv t Constitutions, The Harvester Press, 
Sussex, 1979.
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live side of ihc right 10 freedom in the abortion context, i.e., the freedom to 
have an abortion and the freedom to refuse assistance at an abortion.
Art. 2 of the Italian Constitution states that the Republic recognizes and 
guarantees the inviolable rights o f man.3 There are two opposing views on 
the interpretation of art. 2. There are those who claim that it has an interpre­
tative function for situations not foreseen by articles 13 et. seq. 
(enumerating the fundamental rights), and those who claim that art. 2 is 
merely an introduction to ihe fundamental rights mentioned in art. 13 et. 
seq.4 In the 1975 abortion decision the Constitutional Court adhered to the 
first view by declaring that art. 2 also included ‘the legal status o f the fe­
tus’.5 In spite of the fact that there was no express ‘right to life’ provision 
in the Italian Constitution, the Constitutional Court did recognize the value 
o f unborn life.
This shows that the Frcnch C onstitutional Council and the Italian 
Constitutional Court could have rejected the whole right-to-life argument by 
simply referring to the absence of a specific constitutional provision. They 
did not do so. Although there is no clear reference point in the constitution, 
they both accepted the value of unborn human life, without, however, ac­
cepting that the unborn have the right to life.
The Austrian abortion law reform was challenged on the basis o f two con­
stitutional guarantees of the right to life, the Constitution (S taa tsgrund­
gesetz) of 1867, and art. 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
As has been shown in chapter III, Section B, the Constitutional C ourt 
rejected these arguments, giving a historical and grammatical interpretation 
of these fundamental rights which did not include the duty o f the state to 
protect unborn life against others.6
The 14th Amendment to the US Constitution says that ‘... nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without Due Process of 
L aw ’. The US Supreme Court could have used the arguments o f  the 
Austrian Constitutional Court, namely that this provision merely estab-
3 Art- 2: 'La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i dirmi inviolabili dell'uomo, sia come 
singolo, su  nelle formazioni sociali ove si svolge la sua personalità'.
4 Zagrebelsky. G.. 'Object et portée de la protection des droits fondamentaux -  Cour 
constitutionnelle italienne', Revue Internationale de Droit C ompari, 33, 1981, pp. 
514-519.
5 Cappelletti, M., Cohen, W . eds. Comparative Constitutional Law: cases and materi­
ali, 1979, p. 613. Gmrisprudema Costiluiionate, 1975, p. 119.
6 See Machacek, R., 'Das Rccht auf Leben in Österreich', EuGRZ. 10, 1983, p. 453 ff.
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lishcs a defensive right against the state and docs not apply to relations be­
tween individuals. The Supreme Court, however, did not reject the right-to- 
life argument on this basis. It accepted that the 14th Amendment applied in 
principle to the abortion situation, but held that the unborn were not pro­
tected by it until the moment of viability. The right to liberty, on the other 
hand, was given an extensive interpretation. The right to liberty was seen to 
include the right to privacy which encompasses the woman’s right to have 
an abortion (up to the third month of pregnancy).
The German Constitution (Grundgesetz) of 1949 contains very specific 
‘life' and ‘liberty’ provisions. Art. 2.2 guarantees the right to life and art. 
2.1 proclaims the right to the free development of one's personality.7 Of the 
five countries discussed, the Germán Constitution makes the most specific 
provisions for the rights relevant to the abortion decision. The balancing of 
these two fundamental rights by the Federal Constitutional Court resulted in 
an absolute priority being given to the right to life of the unborn for the 
whole duration of pregnancy, and consequently, in the denial of the woman’s 
right to a free development of her personality as far as the abortion decision 
was concerned.
Considering these five decisions together, we conclude that the constitu­
tional texts have been rather irrelevant to the abortion decisions. The absence 
of ‘life’ provisions has not prevented courts from recognizing the value of 
unborn life, and the presence of ‘liberty’ provisions has not always led to the 
recognition of the woman’s right to decide on abortion. Given the wording 
of the relevant fundamental rights, the constitutional courts could have come 
to quite different conclusions. The abortion cases illustrate therefore once 
again the ‘vagueness’ of constitutional rights and the importance of judicial 
interpretation in determining their contcnt.
Section B The Legal History
The US Supreme Court, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the 
Austrian Constitutional Court used historical arguments in their abortion
Art. 2(1); 'Everyone shall have the right to the free development of hu  personality 
insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional 
order or the moral code.' Art. 2(2): 'Everyone shall have the right to life and to the 
inviolability of his person. The liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. Illese 
rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law'. Translation by Finer. S., Ftvt 
Consmuiions, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1979.
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rulings. In all three of these constitutional decisions, the history of the 
‘right to life’ provisions was taken into considération. The fact that 
‘abortion practices in the 19th ccntury were far freer than they are today’8 led 
the US Supreme Court to the conclusion that the protection of life by the 
Due Process Clause, added to the Constitution in that time, did not include 
unborn life. The Austrian Constitutional Court, too, went back to the period 
when the Constitution of 1867 was drafted , and held that the fundamental 
rights contained in it had to be seen in the light of 19th century legal think­
ing, and, therefore, were merely defensive rights against state action. Both 
the US Supreme Court and the Austrian constitutional court hence used his­
torical arguments for limiting the scope of the ‘right to life’-provisions. 
They both interpreted the fundamental right to life in question as it was con- 
ccivcd by the drafters o f the Constitution.
The German Federal Constitutional Court arrived at the opposite conclu­
sion on the basis of a historical interpretation of the right to life contained 
in the Constitution o f 1949. The core of the Court’s argument is that the 
Constitution of 1949 was a reaction against the historical experience of 
National Socialism. Firstly, the fundamental rights laid down in the Basic 
Law were not merely defensive rights, but guidelines for all branches of 
government, the legislature included. The Austrian view was hereby rejected. 
Secondly, the Constitutional Court maintained that the drafters of the 
Constitution intended to protect unborn life. In this respect the situation in 
Germany differed from the situation in the U.S.
There arc valid arguments for maintaining that the ‘life’-provision of the 
14th Amendment to the US Constitution has a different meaning, histori­
cally, from the ‘right to life' protected by the German Constitution. When 
the 14th Amendment was added to the Constitution (after the Civil War of 
1868-1870), the common law applied in most of the States. As the common 
law did not consider the fetus to be a human being until the moment of 
quickening, and in many cases not until the moment o f birth, ‘life’ in the 
14th Amendment was therefore not meant to cover ‘unborn life '.9 In 
Germany, on the other hand, the question of the protection of unborn life 
was discusscd more than once during the preparatory work for the 
Constitution. A proposal was made to expressly mention the protection of 
unborn life in art. 2. In the light of the National-Socialist experience, pro-
8 Rot V Wadt. 35 LEd 2d. p. 180.
9 bid., p. 165-167. See chafKer I, section B. 1.
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tcciion o f life without mentioning unborn life was not considered sufficient. 
The proposal was not adopted, however.10 There is some disagreement on 
the question of why this proposal was not adopted. Some argue that an ex­
press provision was superfluous, as the protection of unborn life was natu­
rally included in the ‘right to life’ provision.11 Others hold that the proposal 
was rejected bccausc no agreement was reached, due to the opposition of 
SPD members, on the protection of unborn life.12 The fact remains, how­
ever, that the question of the protection of unborn life was discussed during 
the drafting of the Constitution, and that a substantial number of the drafters 
(the CDU/CSU members) supported the view that unborn life was protected 
by the Constitution.
Another difference between the US and Germany is that the protection of 
unborn life from the moment of conception has an older legal history in 
Germany than in the U.S. The history o f  abortion legislation in Germany 
shows that the view that life begins at the moment of quickening was aban­
doned much earlier than in the US.13 Even the law of the Prussian State of 
1794 and the general civil code for the Krdnl&nder o f the Austrian Empire of 
1811 established that all law applies equally to the unborn from the moment 
of conception.14
On the basis of these historical arguments for the protection o f unborn 
life it seems justified that art. 2.2 of the German Constitution should estab­
lish a duty for the state also to guarantee,the protection of unborn life. The 
next question is whether the state should impose a penal sanction for the 
protection of unborn life. Two decisions taken after World War II on the use 
of euthanasia indicate that the right to life is considered a fundamental right 
of the first order. The prohibition of the arbitrary killing of innocent people 
is considered of such fundamental importance, in these decisions, that the
10 Reis, H., "Rechtsprcchung ties  US-Suprcme Court aim  Schwingerschafuabbmch und 
die deutiche Rechutradilion', in Menschtnwurde und frtih titliche  Rechtsordnung. 
Festschrift fu r  Willi Geiger turn 65. Geburtstag, J.C.B. .Mohr. Tubingen, 1974, p. 
121 .
11 Ibid., pp. 118-121.
12 Kommcnlar rum Bonner Grundgcsctz, » it . 2, p. 3. Sec alto Kricle, M., Juristen-
zeitung, 1975, p. 225, Onino, S., ‘Riforma del par. 218 CP dell* Repubblic* Federate
Tedcsco sull'ahono'. Giuruprudtnza Costiluiionalt, 23, 1978, p. 381; REIS, op cit. 
note 10, p. 133.
13 Reij, op cti. noie 10, p. 125-127.
14 Ibid.. p. 126.
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penal sanctions for the protection of life cannot be abridged by law.15 Such 
seems to be the principle expressed as well in the abortion décision.
The difference between the American and the German ‘life’-provisions 
seems therefore to be twofold. Whereas the view that human life begins at 
the moment of quickening was commonly held in the US up to the middle 
of the 19th century, this position was abandoned much earlier in Germany. 
Secondly, the ‘right to life’ laid down in art. 2.2 of the German Constitution 
has to be seen as a réaction against the arbitrary killing of human life during 
the Nazi period. The drafters o f the Constitution were very anxious to give 
the broadest possible scope to the right to life. Whether there was a consen­
sus on ihc inclusion of unborn life in the protection of an . 2.2 is not clear. 
However, this question was discussed during the preparatory works and there 
was considerable support for the protection of unborn life.
There is no doubt that the National Socialist experience has deeply condi­
tioned the German abortion debate, not, however, bccause that historical pe­
riod was marked by abortion excesses. On the contrary, as has been pointed 
out in chapter I (section B, under 2), abortion was strictly prohibited to all 
women of (he German ‘race’ during the nazi period. The most marked feature 
of this period was that the value of human life as such was largely ignored. 
The protection of fundamental human rights against the legislature (the 
-principle) was therefore of primary importance after the war. The 
primacy of art. 1 of the Constitution which protects man’s dignity, is cen­
tral to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional C ourt.16 The fact that in the 
abortion issue the court emphasized the value of the ‘individual human being 
and his dignity’ is therefore not surprising. The fact that the Constitutional 
Court made sure o f being on ‘the safe side' with the application of a r t  2.2 
to the abortion issue should therefore be seen in the light o f the German his­
torical experience.
It is curious to see that in the Italian abortion debate too the Fascist expe­
rience played a role although with very different results. The Italian 
Constitution, too, represents a reaction against the Fascist experience,17 and
15 Ibid.. pp 143-145.
16 Kommers, D.P., Judicial politics in West Germany, a study o f the Federal
Constitutional Court. Sage. London. 1976, p. 216.
*7 The Italian Constitution adopted in 1948 is ’rigid’ in contrast to the previous
•flexible' Statulo Alhcnino which could be changed by the legislature at any time by 
ordinary statute. See Cappelletti, M. Judicial review in the contemporary world, 
Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971, pp. viii and 24.
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the major task of the Constitutional Court after the war was to d e a r  Fascist 
legislation from Italian law. As the abortion prohibition existing up to 1978 
was part of Fascist legislation, the striking down of this provision and the 
liberalization of abortion was seen as a reaction against Fascism.18 What the 
différence between the Italian and German constitutional response to abortion 
shows is that it is the disregard for ‘human values’ experienced in both coun­
tries during the Second World War that has a direct bearing on the abortion 
issue. The different ouicomc of the German and Italian abortion rulings 
should be seen in the light of a different interpretation of what is represented 
by ‘human values’.
The history o f  art. 2 o f the European Convention on Human Rights, 
drafted in the same period in réaction to the Second World War experience, 
docs not give any clarification on the question o f the protection of unborn 
life. No clear decision was taken by the drafters about the protection of un- 
bom life. It seems that the question was not even discussed.19
One important question remains, however, and that is whether a constitu­
tional décision on abortion should be based on historical argumems. The 
reason why abortion became an issue in the 1960’s and the 1970’s was that 
the old values regarding procréation and childbearing were no longer ac­
cepted. Given the vague wording of constitutional provisions, and given 
their dynamic nature, it seems rather strange to judge a new problem such as 
abortion on the basis of the intentions of the drafters of a constitution which 
dates back to 1867, 1879 or 1949. If this line were to be adopted, similar is­
sues such as capital punishment, suicide, and euthanasia could not be given 
a ‘new’ solution. From this viewpoint it was in fact rather easy for the US 
Supreme Court and the Austrian Constitutional Court to say that unborn 
life was not protected by the drafters o f  the Constitution back in the 19th 
century. Similarly, it is indeed understandable that the drafters of a r t  2 of the 
European Convention did not consider unborn life, as the abortion issue did 
not exist at the time.
18 Casini has pointed out that the Fatcist penal code did in fact not alter the legal sutus 
of abortion. The only novelty introduced by Fascism was that abortion became a 
cnme against offspring (‘siirpc’). The law did not make a racial distinction, however, 
as in the German case. The only concern of this law was to stimulate population 
growth, and therefore prohibit abortion, without a racial connotation. See Casmi, C., 
Cien, F., La nuova disciplina dell'aborto. Cedam. Padova, 1978, p. 8-9.
19 De Blois, M., 'Abortus en an. 2 van de Europese Convenlie voor de Rechten van de 
Mens', Nedertands Jurisltnblad, 1981, p. 146.
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This raises the question of whether the historical arguments were an 
essential part of the constitutional rulings. It seems rather strange that the 
US Supreme Court first used historical arguments in the interpretation of 
the ‘life1 provision of the 14th Amendment, and then gave a very modem in­
terpretation to the right to liberty laid down in the same Amendment. It is 
tempting to assume that the Supreme Court used these historical arguments 
to make its radical ruling more acceptable.
The historical interpretation given by the Austrian Constitutional Court 
should be seen in the light o f the Court’s positivist view on constitutional 
interpretation, (sec infra Section C) Although one might have expected ar­
guments which were more related to contemporary social reality from the 
German Court, it still appears that the historical aspect did play a role in the 
German decision.
Section C The Judiciary versus the Legislature: the 
Concept of Democracy
1. Selection, B ackground  and  T ra in ing  of the  Ju d g es
A great deal has been written on the differences between the common law 
and the civil law judge. In the common law world, a judge is a
cultural hero, even something of a father figure. Many of the great names of 
the common law are those of judges: Coke, Mansfield. Marshall, Story , 
Holmes. Brandéis. Cardozo. We know that there is an abundance of legisla­
tion in force, and we rccognize that there is a legislative function. But to us 
common law means the law crcatcd and molded by the judges, and we still 
think (often quite inaccurately) of legislation as serving a supplementary 
function. We also know where our judges come from. We know that they at­
tend law school and then have successful careers either in private practice or 
in government, frequently as district attorneys. They are appointed or elected 
to judicial positions on the basis of a variety of factors, including success in 
practice, their reputation among fellow lawyers, and political influence.
If he (the judge) sits on the highest court of a state or is high in the federal ju­
diciary, his name may be a household word. His opinions will be discussed in 
the newspapers and disscctcd and criticized in legal periodicals. He is a very 
important person.20
^  Merryman. J.H. The civil law tradition, Stanford Un. Press. Stanford, 1969, pp 35- 
36.
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In a common law system, where the case and the judge arc central to the le­
gal life o f socicty, the judge is encouraged to leave his mark on the law in a 
way his continental colleagues are not.21 Many of the US Supreme Court 
Justices lack practical judicial experience when they come into office, but 
the list o f totally inexperienced Justices contains many of the greatest 
names, such as Chief Justice Earl Warren.22 All of the present Justices on 
the Supreme Court have had considerable experience in public life. This 
public exposure makes for forceful personalities.23
Cautiousness, self-restraint, anonymity and a high degree of professional­
ism are common characteristics of most continental judges.24
... in the civil law world ... a judge is ... a civil servant, a functionary ... A ju ­
dicial career is one of several possibilities open to a student graduating from 
a university law school. Shortly after graduation, if he wishes to follow a ju­
dicial career, he will take a state examination for aspirant to the judiciary and, 
if successful, will be appointed as a junior judge ... In time, he will rise in the 
judiciary at a rate dependent on some combination of demonstrated ability 
and seniority. He will receive salary increases according to pre-established 
schedules, and will belong to an organization of judges that has improvement 
of judicial salaries, working conditions, and tenure as principal objectives.2  ̂
The picture of the judicial process that emerges is one of fairly routine activ­
ity. The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. He is presented with a factual 
situation to which a ready legislative response will be readily found in all ex­
cept the extraordinary case ... The whole process of judicial decision is made 
to fit into the formal syllogism of scholastic logic.26
The great names of the civil law are not those of judges ... but those of legis­
lators (Justinian, Napoleon) and scholars ... The image of a civil law judge is 
that of a civil servant who performs important but essentially uncreative
functions.2"̂
21 Ehrmann, H.W., Comparative legal cultures, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs. New 
Jersey, 1976, p. 108.
22 Abraham, H J .,  The judicial process, Oxford Un. Press., New York. 1980, 54 ff.
23 Ehrmann, op. cil. note 21, p. 77. Abraham, op. cil. note 22, pp. 54 ff.
24 Ehrmann, op. cil. note 21, pp 76-78. Similar comments are made by Bognetu, G.. on
account of (he Italian Constitutional Court, in 'The political role of the Italian 
Constitutional Court', Noire Dame Lawyer, 49, 1974, p. 991.
Merryman, op cit. note 20, p. 36.
26 Ibid., p 37.
27 Ibid., p. 38.
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The continental mentality of a civil servant, long prevalent among continen­
tal judges, will wish to do a little more than preserve at least the outward ap- 
pcarancc of being a faithful mouthpicce.2®
The description given here of the diffcrcnccs between American and European 
continental judges is a quite caricature, although it does serve the purpose of 
pointing out the cultural differences between the two groups. Many of the 
contrasts between the common law and the civil law systems have been 
blurred in recent times. The creation of constitutional courts after World War 
II on the European continent has had the biggest impact on the evolution of 
civil law. Not all European constitutional court judges are career judges, 
they are mostly appointed by political organs, not for life, and they have 
more freedom in the exercise of their function than other judges.
The French Constitutional Council consists of nine members and all ex- 
Presidcnts of the Republic. Three members are appointed by the President of 
the Republic, three by the President of the Senate and three by the President 
o f the National Assembly. They are appointed for nine years, and there is no 
professional requirement for becoming a judge.29 In practice most o f the 
judges arc politicians, very few are lawyers.30 The average age is over 72.31 
Due to the system of appointment which means that the governing party can 
appoint the judges, the Conservatives on the Council are in the majority.
The Austrian Constitutional Court has 14 members (and six substitute 
members) who are appointed for life and obliged to retire at age 70. The 
President, vicc-Prcsident and six members are appointed on government rec­
ommendation. Three members arc appointed on the recommendation of the 
National Assembly, and three on the recommendation o f  the Federal 
Council.32 Constitutional Court judges are selected from among judges, law 
lecturers and professors, and lawyers and must have at least ten years of pro­
fessional experience. The minimum age is 35.33 In practice, the seats on the 
Constitutional Court are equally divided between the two major parties, who
28 Ehrmann, op. cit. note 21, p. 108.
29 See Luchiirc. F.. Le conseil Constitutionnel, Economica, Paris, 1980, p. 60.
30 At the moment only Vedel.
31 Luchaire, op cit. noce 29, pp. 62-63.
32 Art. 147(2) Bundes'/erfas.iiuigitgtsttl
33 Art. 147 Abi. 2,3, B-VG.
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have 7 each,34 and a candidate presented by one party is usually accepted by 
the other. In 1973, however, the Socialist government claimed an additional 
scat in order to rcflcct the changed power balance, the Socialist Party having 
obtained an absolute majority in Parliament in 1972.35 There is no public 
discussion o f the appointment o f  a constitutional court judge. It is difficult 
to form an idea of how the parties make their choice. This has led to reform 
proposals aimed at guaranteeing the high professional quality of the 
judges.36
The Italian Constitutional Court has 15 members who are appointed for 
nine years. There is no age limit. Five members are appointed by the 
President of the Republic, five by the Parliament voting with a two-thirds 
majority, and five by the high magistrature (Cone di Cassazione, Consiglio 
di Stato, C one dci Conti). The judges are selected from among magistrates, 
law professors and practising lawyers with at least 20 years of expcricncc.37
The German Federal Constitutional Court consists of two Senates of 
eight members each. The judges must be at least 40 years of age, they are 
appointed for 12 years and have to retire at 68. In order to hold judicial of­
fice, members must have German legal qualifications.38 This means that 
prospective judges must have passed the first and second major state exami­
nation in law.39 Three judges in each Senate are selected from the ranks of 
the federal judges. The other judges come from the political arena and there 
is a small quota o f law professors and civil servants from the federal and 
state administration.40
The Bundestag elects half of the judges, the Bundesrat the other half, each 
with a two-thirds majority.41 Because o f this two-thirds majority require­
ment, majority and opposition in the two Houses have to come to a com­
promise on the choice of the candidate. In practice, the posts o f judges are
34 Austria has pnctically got a two-party system. Ohlinger, T., ‘La gtunsdizione cosu- 
tuzionale in Austria’, Quademt Costituzionali, 2. 1982. pp. 554-555.
3® Ibid., pp. 554-555.
36 Ibid., p. 555.
37 Art. 135 of the liai ¡an Constitution.
3® Gesetz über das Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 12.3.1951 (BGBl I 243), par. 3 and 4. 
3^ Kommers, op cit. note 16, p. 87.
40 Constitutional Court Act, see note 34, par. 2.3. See Schlaich, K., ‘Procédures et 
techniques de protection des droits fondamentaux, le Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral 
allemand'. Revue Internationale de Droa Comparé, 33, 1981, p. 343.
4 * Constitutional Court Act, see noie 34, par. 5, 6, and 7.
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more or less equally divided between the two major party coalitions in the 
two Houses, the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Each party has the prerogative to 
propose a new candidate to replace each judge who leaves. The candidate pro­
posed is usually accepted by the other party.42
The proportional representation of each party has played a dominant role 
in the thinking and acting of the election bodies in Germany. Although an 
outside candidate can be appointed, there is very little chance of this actually 
happening. The qualificd-majority requirement has prevented the election of 
radicals, but has at the same time blocked the election of prominent person­
alities and instead favored the more mediocre candidates. The selection pro­
cess has been subject to extensive criticism -  as it has in most other coun­
tries. What has never been disputed, however, is the qualificd-majority re­
quirem ent for fear o f a party-oriented division w ithin the Court. 
Nevertheless, the conccpt of proportionate representation is, in practice, a 
basic principle in the election process.43
The Justices of the US Supreme Court are appointed by the President 
with approval by the Senate.44 They are appointed for life and there are no 
professional requirements. There seem to be four predominant factors which 
influence a President’s choice of a particular candidate: objective merit, per­
sonal friendship, the balancing of ‘representation’ (of m inorities, e.g. 
Catholics, blacks, women etc.) on the Court, and political and ideological 
compatibility.45 The overriding concern, however, seems to be the candi­
date’s ‘real’ politics.46 The selection of the Supreme Court judges is a very 
important presidential prerogative and in fact all Presidents have, to a greater 
or lesser extent, tried to ‘pack the Court’.
This short description shows that the selection procedure is quite different 
in the five countries discussed. The American system of appointment by the 
President with approval by the Senate is in accordance with the doctrine of 
‘separation of powers’ and ‘checks and balances’. The continental European
^2 Schlaich, op cit. no« 40, p. 343.
43 Billing, W., Das Problem d tr  Richitrwahl turn Buiuiesverfassungsgericht, Duncker & 
Humbloc, Berlin, 1969, p. 130 and 220. Dopolkt, F.W., Das Bundesvtrfassungs- 
gtrtchl und s tin t Umwtlt. Duncker <fc Humbloc, Berlin, 1982, p. 73, suggests that the 
Court should decide every case with a two thirds majority in order to avoid ‘propor­
tionality thinking'.
44 Article two. Section 2, par. 1 of the L'S Constitution.
45 Abraham, op. cil. note 22, p. 66.
46 Ibtd.. p. 77.
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tradition of ‘sovereignty of Parliament’ was reconsidered in the light of the 
expcricncc of the Second World War and constitutional courts were set up (in 
Italy and Germany) precisely to guarantee respect for fundamental values by 
the legislature. Although the American model was widely adopted, some of 
the features of American judicial review were consciously avoided on the 
European continent. Instead of the decentralized system of judicial review 
which existed in the US, the European countries opted for a centralized sys­
tem o f constitutional control. Furthermore, attempts were made to guarantee 
the juridical nature of the Constitutional Court, in reaction to the American 
Supreme Court’s role, which was regarded as too political. The concern in 
Europe was that the constitutional court should be ‘above the parties’, that 
is, politically neutral. That is the reason why the German Constitution pre­
scribes a qualified majority for the selection of a judge, and why the Italian 
selection process aims at a ‘mixed composition’ of the Constitutional Court 
by having the judges sclcctcd by different state powers. The history of the 
Austrian Constitutional Court and of the French Constitutional Council dif­
fers from the German and Italian one in that it is not directly related to the 
expcricncc of the Sccond World War. The creation of the Austrian Court 
dates back to 1920, and was originally aimed at the solution of disputes be­
tween federal and state powers. Although its powers were extended in 1929 
to judicial review incidenter, it was only in 1975 that the scope of its com­
petence of judicial review was extended to a level comparable to that of the 
German or Italian Constitutional Court. The selection procedure, although 
in theory biased towards the governing majority, is in practice similar to the 
procedure in Germany. The French Constitutional Council was not intended 
to deal with fundamental rights, a task assumed by the Council only in 
1972. It was in fact intended to function as a political organ. The fact that 
the selection process heavily favors the governing majority again shows the 
importance of the concept of the sovereignty of Parliament in France.
The most important common feature of the selection process is that, in 
spite of all the differences, all constitutional court judges are appointed by 
political organs, except for one-third o f  the Italian Constitutional Court 
which is selected by the judiciary itself. Although the German, Italian, and 
Austrian systems in particular have unbuilt checks on the selection of a po­
litically-biased court, pan of the criticism directed at constitutional courts is 
aimed at the way they arc selected. The outcome of certain decisions is 
blamed on the political background of the judges. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court was severely attacked for its abortion ruling which was
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perceived as a CDU/CSU manipulation of the constitutional process, the 
CDU/CSU appointees in the first Senate being in the majority.47
Experience shows, however, that it is difficult to judge a constitutional 
court’s behaviour on the basis of the political background o f its mem- 
bcrs.The American cxpcrience in particular disproves such a theory. Many 
Justices have turned against the beliefs o f the President who elected them. 
The American abortion decision is a d ear example of the unpredictability of 
the Supreme Court’s action. President Nixon appointed four Justices when 
he was in power and carefully selected those he thought to be ‘strict con­
structionists’, i.e. people who would operate within the strict limits of the 
Constitution. Nixon had also made his anti-abortion feelings very clear. 
Nevertheless, three out of the four Justices appointed by him voted with the 
majority in the floe-dccision of 1973. A recent study on the case selection 
process of the US Supreme Court shows that 'power politics’ did not play a 
central role in case sclccuon.48 The study disproves the ‘political agency’ in­
terpretation which assumes that the Justices see case selection as an oppor­
tunity to implement their liberal or conservative views. The study concludes 
that a shared conception of the proper role of a judge prevents the Justices 
from power-oriented voting in case selection.49
Donald Kommers arrives at a similar conclusion for the German Federal 
Constitutional Court.
The Justices as a whole, are a very mixed group, not easily classifiable, some 
are liberal, some are conservative, but their liberalism or conservatism varies 
from issue to issue, which seems to depend more on personality and general 
experience than on any single background characteristic.50
Even the French Consututional Council, which was dominated by conserva­
tive appointments, has shown self-restraint in judging the Socialist reforms. 
Although it has slowed down certain radical reforms, it has not totally 
blocked them.(sce infra, under 2)
47 Gerstcin, H., Lowry, D., 'Abortion, abstract norms and social control: the decision of 
ihc West German Federal Constitutional Court', Emory Law Journal, 25, 1976, p. 
861.
48 See section D. 1 infra.
49 Provine. H., Cast selection in the United States Supreme Court, Un. of Chicago Preti, 
Chicago, 1980, pp. 131-172.
Kommers, op. a t. note 16, p. 155.
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Therefore it docs not seem very convincing to explain the constitutional 
decisions on abortion by rcfcrcncc to the political background of the judges. 
The judges form an independent body which operates as a whole. The collec­
tive task the judges have before them seems to take precedcnce over their po­
litical beliefs.
Could the training o f the judges, in particular the difference in training be­
tween American and continental European judges described at the beginning 
of this section, give some insight into the way of reasoning of the American 
and the German CourLs with regard to the political decision on abortion? 
Kötz has highlighted the differences in opinion-writing of the highest courts 
o f various European countries.51 The French style is still based on the idea 
o f Montesquieu that the judge is merely a 'm outhpiece' of the law. French 
judgments are therefore very concise and short, no rcfcrcnces arc made to the 
doctrine, and they arc based only on legal provisions.
Denn viele dieser Urteile sind ... an Geschliffenheit und Ausgefeiltheit, an 
stilistischer Eleganz, an formaler Klarheit nicht zu Ubertreffen; sie sind auch, 
weil es den Richtern stets auf ein äußerstes Maß an Verdichtung und Verk­
nappung des Textes ankommt. selten länger als vier bis fünf Schreibmaschi­
nenseiten. In der Tat gibt es da keine Abschweifungen, keine gelehrten De­
monstrationen der Belesenheit; da dient alles dem Zweck, das gerichtliche 
Urteil in schlackenloser Reinheit als Ergebnis eines von Subjektivismen 
freien, mit innerer Notwendigkeit ablaufenden Subsumtionsprozesses in die 
äußere Erscheinung treten zu lassen.^2
The German jurisprudential tradition, although more creative than the French 
one, still has a very legalistic approach ...
Aber man darf nicht übersehen, das die Blütezeit des Gesetzespositivismus 
und des Kodifikationsdenkens in Deutschland noch nicht lange genug zurück­
liegt. als daß sich bei uns schon Regeln Uber den Umgang mit case law hätten 
entwickeln können, die sich an Klarheit und Ausgefeiltheit mit denen des 
Common Law vergleichen ließen ... bei der Veröffenlichung von Gerichtsent­
scheidungen in Zeitschriften und Urteilssammlungen (besteht) immer noch 
die charakteristische Neigung..., gerade den Sachverhalt, der der Entschei­
dung zugrunde gelegen hat, nur in vcmümmclter Form abzudrucken oder ihn 
ganz zu streichen.53
51 Kotz, H., 'Die Begründung höchilnchlerlicher Urteile’, Preaävies vocr d t  Ntderiandst 
Veremging voor Rechtsvcrgelijhng, Kluwer. Deventer, 1982, pp. 5-22.
52 Ibid., p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 13.
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This characterization of German jurisprudence again shows the contrast with 
the common law tradition where the judges are the lawmakers and the case is 
central to the decision, as we saw at the beginning of this section.
The American and German abortion decisions clearly reflect this contrast. 
The American Supreme Court adopted a sociological approach to the abor­
tion problem, basing its decision on legal and non-lcgal arguments and 
showing a strong concern for the social problems underlying the abortion is­
sue. The German Constitutional Court, on the other hand, took a legalistic 
approach by limiting its examination to the Constitution which is regarded 
as the sole source of constitutional values.54 The French and Austrian deci­
sions, too, were very much in line with the training of the respective 
Courts. The French decision was very short and concise, limiting the inter­
pretation of the Constitution to a minimum. The Austrian abortion ruling 
followed the Kelsenian ideas o f constitutional interpretation prevalent in 
Austria and did not go beyond a historical and grammatical interpretation of 
the Constitution. The Italian abortion decision is also based on purely legal 
reasoning and therefore reflects the training of Italian judges in legal posi­
tivism.
2. T he Role of the C o n stitu tio n a l C o u rt in Society
Although the selection, background and training of Constitutional Court 
judges gives us some insight into their characteristics and style, the real 
character of a constitutional court is determined by the perception it has of 
itself, by the role it assumes towards the legislature, by the limits it im­
poses on itself in interfering in the political process. The legitimacy o f a 
constitutional court in a democratic society is viewed differently in Europe 
and in the US, and there are also variations between the different European 
countries. How can the principle of the ‘sovereignty o f  Parliament’, based 
on the concept of a representative democracy, be reconciled with the princi­
ple of judicial review rooted in the concept of ‘checks and balances’? And if 
judicial review is considered necessary in order to protect the individual’s 
fundamental rights, what arc the limits on the power o f constitutional 
courts? These seem to be the dilemmas facing European constitutional 
courts.
Kommcrt. D.P., ‘Abortion and Constitution: United States and W eit-Germany', 
American Journal o f Comparative Law, 25, 1977, pp. 276-278.
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The US initiated the era o f ’constitutionalism’, i.e., the notion of the 
supremacy of the Constitution over ordinary laws.55 The American Bill of 
Rights of 1791 was the outgrowth of liberal democratic ideas and of a natu­
ral rights philosophy. The fundamental rights protected by it were considered 
to be pre-existing natural rights.56 The principle of the supremacy of consti­
tutional law was asserted by the Supreme Court itself, by Chief Justice 
Marshall in his famous decision Marbury v. Madison o f 1803.57
Although the American Bill of Rights repeats the classical liberties of the 
French Déclaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. France did not adopt the 
concept of constitutionalism in the American sense. In the ideology of the 
French Revolution, the legislature as the voice of popular sovereignty was 
the most important protector of fundamental rights, the judge was merely 
the ‘mouthpiece’ of the law.58 This view was predominant on the European 
continent up to the Second World War.
The notion o f  fundamental rights as pre-existing natural rights arose in 
Europe only after 1945. The atrocities committed by governments strength­
ened the view that the protection of fundamental rights had to be guaranteed. 
This resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the 
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.59 The Italian Constitution 
of 1948 and the German Constitution of 1949 are ‘rigid’ Constitutions 
which declare the supremacy of constitutional over ordinary law. They de­
veloped in this way as a reaction to Fascist and Nazi experiences. The 
German and Italian Constitutional Court were created in order to exercise 
this constitutional control over legislation. The French Constitution fol­
lowed the post-war movement in that the Preamble to the 1946 French 
Constitution reaffirmed the fundamental rights of the 1789 Declaration and 
added new ones without however accepting the supremacy of constitutional 
law. Constitutional control o f legislation was only granted in France in 
1958, and in practice the protection of fundamental rights through constitu­
55 Cappellctti, op. cit. note 17, p. 25.
See Gorby, J.D., Jonas, R E., 'W en German abortion decision, a contrast to Roe v. 
Wade', John Marshall Journal o f Practice and Procedure, 9, 1976, p. 564.
57 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
58 Cappelletti, op. cit. note 17, p. 35.
59 Gorby, op cit. note 56, p. 564.
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tional control of legislation did not start until 1971, on the Constitutional 
Council’s own initiative.60
The Austrian Constitutional Court is a spccial case in that judicial review 
of legislation was established much earlier. Austria has the oldest centralized 
system o f constitutional control o f legislation in Europe, dating back to 
1920. Austria’s reaction to World War II was to restore the constitutional 
setting of 1920 and 1929 and to declare all constitutional changes enacted 
after 1929 null and void. Some fundamental rights were added in the consti­
tutional reform of 1955 as a response to the Nazi cxpcricnce. Its powers of 
judicial review, however, remained the same until 1975 when the powers of 
the Court were considerably enlarged, (see infra, section D under 1)
The role these European constitutional courts had to play in the political 
life of their countries was -  and still is -  subject to extensive debate, partic­
ularly in the light of the American experience. The part the respective courts 
play in political life will be sketched briefly for every country. Both in the 
US and in Germany, the constitutional court judges were accused of judicial 
activism because of their abortion decisions, of having issued ‘judicial legis­
lation’. In this paragraph an attempt will be made to establish whether the 
abortion decisions can be explained in terms of a tradition o f  judicial ac­
tivism or self-restraint on the part of the constitutional courts.
U.S. The American Supreme Court decides on constitutional matters 
within the context of concrete adversary litigation to the extent that is neces­
sary for the disposition of the case before it. It is therefore the prototype of 
judicial review incidenter.61 The primary task o f the Court is appellate. 
Cases or controversies normally reach the Supreme Court for purposes of 
review under its appellate jurisdiction on a writ o f appeal, as a matter of 
right, on a writ of certiorari, as a matter o f Court discretion, or by certifica­
tion. The Court has reduced its obligatory appellate responsibilities to a 
minimum, and about 90% of its case load now consists of certiorari cases. 
Any disappointed litigant in a suit involving a ‘federal question of sub­
stance’ can petition the Supreme Court to grant him a writ o f certiorari. In 
this way the Supreme Court can decide on a wide range of constitutional 
questions.62
^  See infra Section C. 2.
6 * See Cappelletti, op. cil. note 17, p. 69-70.
62 Abraham, op cit. note 22. p. 179 ff. See also section D, par. 1 infra.
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The American Supreme Court has played an active role in government. 
The American constitutional principles of 'separation of powers’ and ‘checks 
and balances’ have legitimated such a role, but it has mostly been the Court 
itself which has asserted this position. Through the interpretation of Chief 
Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison (1803),63 the supremacy of 
the Constitution over other laws, and the judicial power to disregard uncon­
stitutional law, were affirmed. The Supreme Court provided itself in this 
way with the tool of judicial review.
The Court has adopted principles of judicial self-restraint such as the 
‘political question doctrine’ (political issues should be referred to the legisla­
ture or the executive) and the principle of stare decisis (the court is bound by 
its precedent). The interpretation of these principles has changed over lime, 
however. The meaning of a ‘political question’ was narrowed down in the 
early 1960s. Beginning with Baker v. Carr (1961),64 the Court intervened in 
the political process in disapportionment and desegregation cases. The 
Supreme Court has also never held itself absolutely bound by its precedent. 
The ‘felt necessities o f the time’ arc compelling facts of governmental life, 
as Justice Stone said, w hich justify a change of direction in the jurisprudence 
of the Court.6S It is possible to distinguish periods in which the Supreme 
Court was more active and was able to impose its will to a large extent on 
the executive. The most well-known examples arc the New Deal period and 
the Warren era.66
What are the guiding principles of the Supreme Court and can the abor­
tion decisions be deduced from such principles? Justice Stone indicated two 
national objectives to be guaranteed by the Supreme Court: ‘government by 
the people, and government for the whole people’.67 He pointed at two situ­
ations in which legislative miscalculations of the public welfare are likely to 
remain uncorrected unless the Court steps in: 1. when the legislature insu­
lates itself from demands for change in the law by hampering political ex­
pression, political organization, or voting, and 2., when the political pro­
cesses are fully operative, but prejudices against socially-insulated minorities
63 See note 57 supra.
64 Baker v Carr. 368 US 804 (1961).
®  Abraham, op. cit. note 22, p. 384.
^  Ibid., pp. 358-359. Abraham has made a scheme of the periods in which one branch 
tended towards supremacy over another or over the other two branches.
^  Lusky, L., By what right?, Michie Company, Virginia, 1975, p. 109.
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may render the legislature unresponsive to ihcir grievances.68 In E ly’s 
words, the Supreme Court has interfered with political decisions in order to 
clear the channels of political change when the political process was 
blocked, or 10 facilitate the representation of minorities.69
The protection of personal freedoms through the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution has been one of the Supreme Court’s major concerns and has 
often led to ‘judicial activism’. The 14th Amendment70 protects two aspects 
o f 'due process’, the substantive and the procedural. The Court has inter­
vened when it judged that governmental action was arbitrary, capricious, un­
reasonable, irrelevant or irrational, either in content or in procedure.71 The 
meaning of ‘substantive due process' has been considerably extended over 
lime. Originally, substantive due process only protected the property inter­
ests o f individuals. Between the beginning of the century and 1937 (the 
Lochner-era),72 most of the statutes which interfered with persons’ property 
rights, in particular their freedom of contract, were held unconstitutional by 
the Supreme Court. On these grounds a total of 16 New Deal laws were 
struck down between 1934 and 1936.73 After 1937 the Supreme Court 
switched its attention from property rights to non-economic, personal rights, 
which are called ‘basic human freedoms’ or ‘cultural freedoms’. The case 
Palko v. Connecticut (1937)74 laid down the foundation for the interpreta­
tion of these basic human rights. The Palko-opinion distinguished between 
those basic rights viewed as ‘of the very essence of a schcme of ordered lib­
erty ', and those without which ‘jusLice would not perish’.75 Justice Cardozo,
68 Ibid.. p. 110.
^  Ely, J.H., Democracy and distrust. Harvard Un. Press, Cambridge. 1980, p. 181 ff.
70 See infra Section A, par. 5.
71 Abraham, H.J., Freedom and the court, civil rights and liberties in the United Stales, 
4ih ed., Oxford University Pres*. New York, 1982, p. 96.
72 Called after the case Lochner v. New York, (198 US 45X1908). The Supreme Court 
voiced here the 'due process’ -  doctrine in the following way. ‘The act (i.e. setting the 
maximum number of working hours for bakers) must have a more direct relation, as a 
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act 
can be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be 
free in his person and in his power to contract in relation to his labor'. See 
Vanderveeren. C., 'De omwikkeling van het recht op privacy in the U.S.A.', 
Tijdschrift voor Bestuurswetenschappen tn  Pubiiekrecht, 39, 1984. p. 178.
^  Abraham, op. cil. note 71, p. 9.
74 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937).
75 Abraham, op. cit. note 71. p. 57.
who wrote the opinion, explained that 'those fundamental principles of lib­
erty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu­
tions’ belonged to the first category, and principles of justice ‘so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental’.76 
This concept of ‘preferred freedoms’ introduced a ‘double standard’ of consti­
tutional adjudication. If a dispute between an individual and state power 
touched upon one of these ‘fundamental rights’, state action would be sub­
jected to ‘strict judicial scrutiny’. This meant that the state had to show a 
‘compelling state interest’ in order to justify the violation of the fundamen­
tal right at stake. If on the other hand the personal right at stake did not be­
long to the category of ‘fundamental rights’ (e.g. property rights), the state 
had to prove only that there was a rational relation between the state action 
violating this personal right and the valid state interest pursued by this ac­
tion.
Which rights would be considered ‘fundamental’ and would therefore be 
included in the 14th Amendment’s ‘conccpt of ordered liberty’77 was subject 
to interpretation and changed over time. Cardozo had a limited view of the 
‘fundamental rights’, which he took to refer mainly to the freedom of 
thought and speech, discarding procedural rights.78 Up to 1961 Cardozo’s 
line was more or less maintained, and that period is therefore characterized by 
judicial self-restraint on the part of the Supreme Court.79 As from 1961 
there is a new period of judicial activism in which most procedural rights 
stated in the first eight Amendments to the Constitution are incorporated in 
the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.80 This ‘incorporation’ im­
plied that the federal rights contained in the first ten Amendments were held
76 ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 59.
78 Ibid., p. 58.
79 Ibid., p. 60.
The most famous ‘incorporalion'-decijion since P alko  is probably Gideon v. 
Wamwrighi, 392 US 335 (1963) in which the nghl to counsel in criminal cases gen­
erally was recognizcd under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. In effect 
the Supreme Court nationalized the nghl to counsel in all criminal cases, except for 
some cases of misdemeanors, be they capital or non-capital. See Abraham, op a t. 
note 71, p. 64.
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valid also against the states through the 14th Amendment, which is directed 
to the states.81
The fact that the Supreme Court did not hesitate to go beyond the wording 
of these federal rights to be incorporated in the 14th Amendment is shown 
by the 1965 decision Griswold v. Connecticut,82 which dealt with contracep­
tive freedom and was the precedent to the abortion cases. The state statute 
under review had made it a crime for any person, married or single, to use 
any drug or other article or device for the purpose of preventing conception. 
This law was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because it vio­
lated the ‘zone of privacy created by several fundamental guarantees’.83 
Although the Constitution does not mention any right to privacy, Justice 
Douglas stated in his majority opinion ‘that specific guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights have penumbras, formed of emanations from those guarantees that 
help give them life and substance',84 penumbras that reached areas not 
specifically mentioned in the Bill. The Amendments which created through 
their penumbras ‘zones of privacy’ were the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and 
Ninth.85 The Court stated in Griswold that ‘the right to marital privacy and 
to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the funda­
mental rights specifically protected’ by the Constitution.86 The Connecticut 
statute involved dealing with ‘a particularly important and sensitive area of 
privacy -  that o f the marital relation and the marital home’87 and was de­
clared unconstitutional as it infringed upon ‘the right of privacy in the mari­
tal relation’, considered to be fundamental within the sense of the Ninth 
Am endment.88 The aim of this argument was to show that the right to pri­
vacy was protected by the Bill of Rights and that it could be imposed on
81 See Abraham, op. cit. note 71, p. 59 ff. for * summary of the process of incorpora­
tion.
92 Cnswold  v Connecticut. 381 US 479 (1965), 85 SO  1678, 14 LEd 2d 510.
83 14 LEd 2d at 515.
84 Ibid. at 514.
85 Namely the right to association (First Amendment), prohibition of quartering of sol­
diers in homes (Third Am.), guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures
(Fourth Am.), compulsory sclf-incrimmaiion (Fifth Am.).
86 14 LEd 2d at 522.
87 Ibid. at 521.
88 Ibid. at 524.
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slate legislatures through the Fourteenth Am endm ent.89 Justice Black 
warned in his dissenting opinion that ‘privacy is a broad, abstract, and am­
biguous conccpt’ that can be readily expanded and contracted in later deci­
sions.90
Through the ‘pcnum bra-lhcory’ voiced in the G risw old  decision the 
Supreme Court had created an enormous subjective and discretionary compe­
tence to extend the number of ‘fundamental rights’ beyond the ones written 
in the Constitution. The direct result o f Griswold was that the ‘right to pri­
vacy’ had become a ‘fundamental right’, which included the freedom of mar­
riage and family relations. Any law limiting this freedom would from now 
on be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’. In the next privacy-case, Eisenstadt v. 
Baird  91 the Court again emphasized the importance of the right to privacy 
stating that
if the right to privacy m eans anything it is the right of the individual, mar­
ried or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into mat­
ters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or 
beget a child.92
Here the Court gives a much wider interpretation of the right 10 privacy than 
the one set out in Griswold. Privacy is no longer limited to the marital rela­
tionship, but extended 10 include the individual. Furthermore, the phrase ‘the 
decision whether to bear or begei a child’ leaves space for something more 
than contraceptive freedom.
What these jurisprudential references have tried to show is that the recog­
nition of the ‘right to privacy’ in Roe  v. Wade was not new. After having 
recognized in Griswold and Eisenstadt that there existed a fundamental right 
to privacy related to the use of contraceptives, it was only a small step to 
extend the meaning of privacy in such a way as to cover abortion. The new 
elements arc thai the Supreme Court in Roe based the right to privacy di­
rectly on the 14th Amendment and that the Court went as far as determining 
in detail ihe content o f abortion law reforms. The abortion decisions have
89 See Vanderveercn, op. cti. note 72. p. 245.
90 Dissenting opinion of Justice Black, 14 LEd  2d at 530.
91 Eiseiuiadi » Baird, 405 US 438 (1972), 92 SCt 1029, 31 LEd 2d 517. in this case the 
Supreme Court struck down a law which prohibited the distribution of contracepuves 
to unmarried persons as being in violation of the right to privacy. The Coun based iu 
decision this time on the Equal Protection Clause, stating that the law made an unjus­
tified distinction between mamed and unmarried persons.
92 Eiseiuiadi v. Baird, 31 LEd 2d. p. 362.
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therefore been heavily criticized for being a transgression of the limits of ju ­
dicial power.93
Is there a way to justify the /foe-decision under the general constitutional 
principles mentioned before, that is in terms of the ‘felt necessities of the 
time’ (Stone) or the ‘clearing of the channels of political change’? Michael 
Perry and Laurence Tribe have claimed that the Supreme Court based its de­
cision on an evolving moral consensus on the abortion issue.94 The crucial 
element of the abortion debate is. however, that there is no moral consensus 
on abortion. Furthermore, at the time the Roe decision was delivered the 
abortion issue was highly debated and most states were in the process of re­
forming their laws. It would therefore be difficult to explain the Court’s in­
tervention by the argument that the political channels for a change in the 
law were blocked. In short, although ‘judicial activism’ is by no means new 
in the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court, the extent to which the 
Court imposed its will on the state legislatures in the abortion decisions was 
quite uncxpcctcd and unprecedented.
Austria  was the first country in Europe to have a constitutional court. The 
Constitution of 1920 created the Verfassungsgerichtshof which had the 
power to control the constitutionality of legislation, but only principaliter, 
that is by way of direct action (abstract review). The Federal Executive could 
challenge laws of the Länder, and the Länder governments could challenge 
federal legislation before the Court. The Court therefore only dealt with 
questions concerning the division of powers between the federal government 
and the Länder, and the protection of fundamental rights remained outside its 
jurisdiction.
The constitutional reform o f 1929 granted judicial review incidenter  
(concrete review): the highest civil and criminal court and the central admin­
93 Uly, J.H., ‘The wages of crying w o lf, Yale Law Journal, 82, 1973, p. 920 ff. COX, 
A.. Tht rolt o f  the Supreme Court in American government, Clarendon Pres«. Oxford, 
1976, p. 113-114. Bickcl, A., The morality o f consent, Yale Un. Press. New Haven, 
1975, p. 28. Epstein, R.A., 'Substantive due process by any other name: the abortion 
cases'. Supreme Court Review, 1973, pp. 159 ff. A different opinion is voiced by 
Heymann, P. Barzelay, D., 'The forest and the trees: Roe v. Wade and us critics', 
Boston University Law Review, 53, 1973. p. 765ff. who argue that Roe is amply jus­
tified by precedent and by those pnnciples that have long guided the Court in matters 
of individual nghls.
94 Tnbc, L H ., in Gunther, G., Cases and materials on constitutional law, 9th ed., p. 
652. Perry, M.J., “Abortion, the public morals and the police power: the ethical 
function of substantive due proccss", UCLA Law Review, 23, 1976. p. 689 ff.
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istrative court had ihe righi and the duty to refer to the Constitutional Court 
constitutional questions which arose in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
The jurisdiction of the Court was thus extended to the area of fundamental 
rights, but limited in the sense that only the highest courts could refer con­
stitutional questions to the Court.
The constitutional reform of 1975 extended the powers of the Court in the 
field of fundamental rights. Any appeal court can now initiate proceedings 
before the Constitutional Court, and one third of the National Assembly or 
one third of the Federal Council can refer a law to the Court for judicial re­
view. In this way the power of abstract review has been established and the 
power of concrete review enlarged. The most salient feature of the constitu­
tional reform is that it is now possible for an individual citizen to make a di­
rect constitutional complaint to the C o u rt95 
In contrast to the natural law concept of fundamental rights in the other 
countries discussed here, Austrian constitutional doctrine has a positivistic 
conception of fundamental rights. The idea that fundamental rights are supe­
rior to positive law is not accepted.
... nicht das Naturrecht sondern die durch die Fälle der einzelnen Vorschriften 
durchleutenden allgemeinen Grundsätze, sind die Baugesetze des positiven
Rechts.
The Austrian Constitutional Court views constitutional law as strictly for­
mal law which is to be interpreted in strict conformity with the constitu­
tional text, and the application of which has to be limited to the concrete 
case. As Adamovich states,
... der für ihn geltende Maßstab sind ausschließlich die Verfassungsgesetze 
und keinerlei aus welchen Gründen immer gewonnene rechtliche Erwägungen 
anderer Art.^7
95 An. 140 Abs. 1 B-VG: 'Der Verfassungsgerichtihof erkennt ferner über Verfaisungs- 
widngkeit von Gesetzen auf Antrag einer Penon, die unmittelbar durch diese Ver­
fassungswidrigkeil in ihren Rechten verletzt zu sein behauptet, sofern das Gesetz 
ohne Füllung einer gerichtlichen Entscheidung oder ohne Erlassung eines Bescheides 
für diese Person wirksam geworden ist.’ See Mayer, H., Neuerungen im Verfassungs­
recht, Manzsche Verlag, Wien, 1976, pp. 92-97; Ermacora, F., Österreichische Vtr- 
fassungslehrt II, Wilhelm BraunmüUer, Wien. pp. 90-93, 1980.
96 Antoniolli, Österreichische Juristen-Zeuung, 1956, quoted in Spanner, H., ‘Aufgaben 
und Stil der deutschen und der österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit', in 
Ermacora e.o. ed.. Hundert Jahre Verfassungsgerichtbarkeit, fünfzig Jahre Ver- 
fassungsgtrichtshof in Österreich, Europa Vertag, Wien, 1968, p. 161.
97 Juristische Blätter, 1950, p. 74, quoted in Spanner, op. eil., p. 159, note 47.
208
Constitutional provisions, in the Court’s view, have to be interpreted in the 
way they were conccived by the drafters of the Constitution, and the Court 
therefore rejects the evolutive character of constitutional law,98 The gram­
matical and historical interpretation of constitutional law adopted by the 
Court -  the so-called ‘ Vcrstcincrungstheorie’99 -  has prohibited a modem, 
up-to-date interpretation of fundamental rights, and has therefore often failed 
to solve actual problem s.100. Many of the fundamental rights are to be 
found in the Constitution of 1867 which has constitutional force according 
to art. 149.1 of the Constitution. In the light of the Court’s historical ap­
proach, these fundamental rights are still conceived of as merely defensive 
rights against the slate, just as they were in the classical, liberal ideology of 
the 19th ccntury. The Court has been reluctant to consider fundamental 
rights to be binding among individuals i.e. to view them as horizontal 
righ ts.101 Thus the view of mankind held more than 100 years ago is still 
prevalent in the jurisprudence of the C o u rt102
Apart from its formalistic view of fundamental rights, the Court has aJso 
been reluctant to impose its views on the legislature. Many of the funda­
mental rights the Court has to Lake into consideration include ‘legislative re­
serve clauses’, which means that the legislature has been given some discre­
tion in giving substance to these rights. The Court has exercised no strict 
control on the concrctizaiion of these fundamental values by the legislature, 
but has interpreted these rcserve-clauses in such a way as to leave it almost 
completely up to the legislature to define the content of these constitutional 
provisions. It has imposed the same conditions as for the validity of normal 
statutory law, i.e. that they have to be clearly defined.103 The Court has
Ohltngcr, T., 'Objet cl poncc de la protection des droits fondamentaux, la cour consti­
tutionnelle autrichienne', Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 33, 1981, pp. 543- 
544. F»voreu, L., 'Rapport général in troductif. Revue Internationale de Droit 
C om paré, 33, 1981, p. 275. Walter, R., ‘Gnindrechtsverstandnis und Normen- 
kontrolle in ô jtc rm c h ’, in Grundrechtsverstàndnis und Normenkontrolte, Springer. 
Wien, 1979, pp. 2-3. Schambeck, H., ‘Môglichkeiten und Grcnzen der Verfassungs- 
intcrpretation in 0«errc ich ’, Jurùtische Blatter, May 1980, pp. 225-236.
99 Mayer, H., ‘Entwiclclungstenden7,cn in der Rechtsprechung des Verfassungsgericht- 
ihofes', Ôsterrttchische Juristen-Zeitung, 35. 1980, p. 338.
100 Ibid., p. 337 ff. See also Machacek, op cit. note 6, p. 456.
101 Ôhlinger, op ci t. noie 77, pp. 552-553.
102 Machacek, op. cit. note 6, p. 457.
103 Ohlinger, op. cit. note 77, pp. 552-553.
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shown self-restraint in particular with respect to the social and political ques­
tions tacklcd by the socialist government in power since 1970. Whenever a 
law which dealt with social or political questions has been referred to it, the 
Court has tended to interpret the legislation in conform ity with the 
C onstitution.104
This Kelsenian view o f constitutional law which allows only for a 
marginal control o f legislative actions, has left the Constitutional Court 
with a very limited role in Austrian society. Due to this tradition of self-rc- 
straint the Constitutional Court has great respect among the population.105 
The abortion decision, which emphasizes the classical liberal meaning of the 
right to life, fits into the formalistic approach of the Court towards constitu­
tional law. The Court’s refusal to deal in depth with any of the questions 
presented to it reconfirms its tendency to judicial self-restraint.
Germany. The Constitution of 1949 created the Federal Constitutional Court 
and provided it with ample powers of judicial review. All ordinary judges 
have the power and the duty to refer constitutional questions to the 
Constitutional Court (concrete review). The Federal government, the gov­
ernment of the Lander or one third of the members of the Bundestag have the 
right to challenge a law before the Constitutional Court (abstract review). 
Finally, every citizen has the right to file a constitutional complaint with 
the C ourt.106
The German Constitutional Court does not have a positivistic concept of 
constitutional law. As early as 1951, the Court decided that constitutional 
law has a higher rank than statutory law and that it is not a limited set of 
principles. The constitutional judge has the task of ‘W crtverwirklichung’, 
i.e., he has to give substance to fundamental values not just for the individ­
ual in the particular case but for society as a whole.107 The Constitution is 
not regarded as the sum of single provisions, but as a unity, as ‘ein von bes­
timmten W ertcntschcidungen, besonders den Grundrechten und den
104 Ermacora, F., 'Polnische Aspekte der Verfassungsenlwicklung in Österreich seil 
1970', Österreichisches Jahrbuch fü r  Politik, 1978, p. 82 ff. Ermacon, F., 'Procé­
dures et techniques de protection des droits fondamentaux, la cour constitutionnelle 
autrichienne’. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 33, 1981, p. 426 ff.
105 Ohltnger, op. cit. noie 34, p. 553.
106 Art. 93. of the German Constitution. See Cappelletti, op. cil. note 17, p. 76.
107 Hahn, H J., ‘Trends in the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court', 
American Journal o f Comparative Law, 11978. 26. pp. 634-635.
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Rcchtsstaatprinzip geprägtes System’.108 This value-oriented interpretation 
of ihc Constitution goes beyond the classical conception of fundamental 
rights as individually-developed guarantees against actions of the executive. 
In the German legal order, fundamental rights are objective legal values 
which are to be guiding principles for every branch of government, including 
the legislature.109 The Constitutional Court has given a certain order of pri­
ority to fundamental rights in its jurisprudence. The most important provi­
sions of the Basic Law are art. 1 (‘the dignity of man shall be inviolable. To 
respect it shall be the duty of all state authorities), and art. 2.1 (‘Everyone 
shall have the right to the free development of his personality insofar as he 
docs not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order 
or the moral code’).110
Judicial self-restraint is a basic legal principle in Germany. This is ex­
pressed by the ‘doctrine of compatibility’,111 or the ‘supposition of the con­
stitutionality o f statutes’112 (Verfassungskonforme Auslegung), i.e. where 
there are several interpretations possible, priority is given to that interpreta­
tion of the legislative act which is consistent with the Constitution, and a 
law may only be declared unconstitutional and void if an interpretation con­
sistent with the Constitution is absolutely impossible. The case law on the 
Equality Clause, for example, shows the Court’s tendency to judicial self-re- 
straint. In its decisions the Court has often stressed that it is beyond its 
powers to examine whether the legislature has used its margin of political 
discretion wisely or not.113
Few legal and constitutional principles, however, arc the subject of in­
variable application over a longer period of time. The same applies to the 
principle of Verfassungskonforme Auslegung. It is possible to distinguish 
periods characterized by self-restraint and periods characterized more by ac­
108 Constitutional Court judge Rupp-von Brünneck. W., ‘Verfassungsgenchtbariceit und 
gesetzgebende Gewalt', Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts, 102, 1977, p. 13. See also 
Kommers, op eil. note 54, p 278.
109 Par. 31.1 of the Constitutional Court Act of 1951.
110 Kommers, op. eil. note 16, p. 211.
111 Hahn, op eil. note 107, p. 634.
112 Bachof, O.. 'the West German Constitutional judge between law and politics’, Texas 
International Law Journal, 11, 1976, pp. 403-419.
113 Hahn, op. cil. note 107, p. 635.
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tivism.114 The abortion decision was issued in a period when the Court was 
subjcct to extensive criticism for its renewed activism. Three cases were pre­
sented to the Court in the early seventies which raised highly controversial 
questions (llochschulurteil, Grundvertragsurteil, AbtreibungsurteiC) } 15 and 
in all three cases the Constitutional Court declared the law under review un­
constitutional. As the Court upheld the new co-dctermi nation law and the 
divorce reform in the late seventies, the debate around the Court calmed 
down again.116
The overall picture of the German Federal Constitutional Court's attitude 
tow ards fundam ental rights is in sharp contrast to the Austrian 
Constitutional Court's approach, although both Courts have similar powers 
of judicial review. The prevailing attitude on fundamental rights has been 
expressed by the Constitutional Court in the following way:
The Basic law views the fundamental rights as valid per se, preexistent to and 
binding upon both the constitutional legislator and the ordinary legislator. 
Even though by virtue of provisions in its text it authorized the ordinary leg­
islator, in varying degrees, to derogate from the fundamental rights, it is an 
unacceptable interpretation, in law at any rate, that the legislator is entirely 
free, by virtue of these provisions, to tamper with the fundamental rights.*1'
The Court has increased its impact on political life by extending the possi­
bilities of interpretation and by increasing the binding effect o f its rulings. 
One of the principles contained in the jurisprudence of the Court, but not 
expressly  m entioned in the C onstitu tion , is the p rincip le  o f 
‘proportionality’, which allows the Court to chcck whether a law is 
‘indispensable’, ‘appropriate’ or ‘necessary’.118 This functional conception 
of constitutional law implies that the Court docs not limit its control to the
114 From 1951 to 1957, the Coon followed • policy of judicial self-restraint. After 1957 
the Court moved into a period of activism, especially in the field of social and eco­
nomic rights. Since 1968 the Court has been less innovative manifesting a greater 
tendency to sustain government policy. See Kommers, op. cu note 16, pp. 212 and 
244.
115 Hochschuluneii, 29-5-1973, 35 BVerfCE 79. Grundlagenvertragsurtetl, 31-7-1973, 
36 BVerfGE 1.
116 Ebsen, I., 'Das Bundesvcrfassungsgericht im politischen System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland', N tu t Poliiiscke Literatur, 23, 1978, p. 177. Schlaich., L, ‘Corte 
Costituzionale e con if olio suite norme nella Repubblica Federale di Germania', 
Quadtrni Costituzionali, 2, 1982, p. 579.
117 Kommers, op cu. note 16, p. 216., decision of Jan. 25 1953, BGHZ 11 (appendix).
118 Schlaich, op. cil. note 116, p. 567.
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law as the final product of the legislative process, but that it also exercises a 
control over the parliamentary proccss itself in order to test the ‘rationality’ 
o f a certain legislative solution. In the co-dctcrmination case, for exam­
ple,119 the Court studied the preparatory works in order to make sure that 
the recommendations made by the committee on co-dctcrmination were in 
line with the solution finally adopted in the statute.120 On important ques­
tions, like abortion, life imprisonment and military service, the Court has 
exercised such control on the legislative process.121 In this way the Court 
imposes on the legislature ‘une rationalité controllable de la preparation et de 
I’adoption de sa decision’.122 This raises the question of what the limits on 
the Court’s powers are and whether the Court does not in fact enter into the 
legislative process. Is the Court in a better position than the legislator to 
weigh all the factual circumstances and to decide on the appropriateness of a 
certain solution? This extended control of the Court has been criticized in the 
following way:
L'oggetto della verifica sulla costituzionalità delle leggi non è il legislatore, 
bensì la legge. Il legislatore non rende conto che della legge. Il dovere costi­
tuzionale de] metodo ottimale non è deducibile dalla legge fondamentale. E la 
legge fondamentale non fa menzione di un legislatore obbligato a ben utiliz­
zare i dall empirici e a soppesare le questioni in modo serio. Legislazione non 
è amministrazione, il controllo sulla legittimità costituzionele delle leggi 
non può imporre al legislatore degli oneri che falserebbero la procedura par­
lamentare.123
Another field in which the Constitutional Court has extended its powers is 
in the binding effect o f its decisions. Par. 31.1 o f the law on the 
Constitutional Court stales that the decisions of the Court ‘bind all the or­
119 Decision of 1-3-1979, 50 BVcrfCE 290.
120 S C IIL A IC II, K., 'Procédu rcj ct techniques de protection des droits fondamcnuux, le tri­
bunal constitutionnel fiderai allemand'. Revue Internationale de Droit Compare, 33, 
1981, pp. 390-391.
121 Schlatch, op cit. noie 116, p. 587.
122 S c h la ic h .  op. cit. note 109, p. 391.
123 Schlaich. op. cit. note 116, p. 590. Translation (my own): 'The object of control of
the consutuuonality of laws is not the legislature, but the law. The legislature refers
only to the law. A constitutional duty of the best method cannot be derived from the 
Constitution. And the Constitution does not mention that the legislature should uti­
lize well all empirical data and weigh questions in a serious manner. Legislation is not 
administration, the control of the constitutional legitimacy of the laws cannot im­
pose duues on the legislature which could distort the parliamentary procedure'.
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gans of ihc state’. The Court has interpreted this provision so as to include 
not only the decision itself but also the reasons (‘tragende G ründe’) for its 
decisions. It is d e a r  that the binding effect of the reasons can condition the 
legislature in the drafting of a new law.,24The decisions which declare a law 
unconstitutional apply ex lunc and have force of law.125 The idea is that a 
constitutional decision merely declares the validity or invalidity o f a law. In 
order to avoid the legislative gaps left by the declaration of unconstitutional­
ity, the Court has recently adopted a variant by which it only establishes the 
unconstitutionally of a law without declaring it null.126 It usually fixes a 
time-period for which the norm remains valid. The Court also has the possi­
bility (par. 32.1) of issuing a temporary solution 10 give the legislator time 
to respond. These temporary rulings, although permitting smoother collabo­
ration between the constitutional court and the legislature, have at the same 
time been an important instrument enabling the Court to push the legisla­
tive process in a certain direction. The extension of the binding effect o f its 
decisions together with the issuing of temporary rulings have given the 
Court more grip on the legislature.127
The abortion decision is a clear example of the trend just described. The 
Constitutional Court did not simply declare the abortion law null and void. 
It elaborated a provisional alternative regulation together with precise in­
structions as to what the content of the new law should be. Because of the 
binding effect o f a ruling on all organs of the state, the legislature could not 
ignore these instructions. The abortion decision, although heavily criticized, 
therefore seems to fit in with the jurisprudential trends o f  the German 
Constitutional Court. The ‘activist’ role of the Court in the abortion deci­
sion reviewing as it did not only the law as such but also the underlying ra­
tionale, and conditioning the legislative process by giving indications as to 
what should be the contcnt o f a new abortion law, may have come as a sur­
prise, but is certainly not a new element in the jurisprudence o f the Court.
Italy. The setting up of the Italian Constitutional Court caused some diffi­
culties. The drafting after the Second World War of a new ‘rigid’ constitution 
which would embody a set o f superior fixed values, and which provided for a
124 Ibid., pp. 580-582.
125 Par. 31.2 of the Constitutional Court Act (1951). See Schlaich, op. cil. noie 116, p.
574.
126 Schlaich, op. eil. noie 116, p. 575.
127 ibid., pp. 574-579.
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constitutional court, did not encounter particular opposition. The establish­
ment of a constitutional court, however, was a new feature in Italian gov­
ernment and had to overcome the differences in ideology of the various polit­
ical currents.128 Due to ideological differences and to the political debate 
over the appointment of the judges,129 the Court only started its work in 
1956.
The drafters opted for a central ¡zed system of constitutional control of leg­
islation granting the Constitutional Court the power of judicial review inci- 
dentcr (concrete review) in the area of fundamental rights.130 Its institutional 
powers are, therefore, more limited than the powers of the German and 
Austrian Courts, in that it has no powers of abstract review as far as funda­
mental rights arc conccmcd or of hearing individual citizens’ constitutional 
complaints. The only way a private citizen can claim the violation of a fun­
damental right before the Constitutional Court is indirectly, that is through 
the lower judges. As it is the lower judge who decides whether a private 
party has raised a valid constitutional objection to be adjudicated by the 
Constitutional Court, it is clear that the collaboration of the lower judges is 
indispensable for the functioning of judicial review of legislation.131
The intention of the drafters was to establish a constitutional court on the 
Kclscnian model, that is to give it only the power of a ‘negative legislature’
... tutti i costituenti si incontrarono nell’adesione ... ai dogmi della certezza 
del diritto, della rigida sottoposizione dei guidici e degli operatori in genere 
alle norme di legge, ... alla riduzione massima possibile della libertà inter­
pretativa degli operatori, da applicare ai casi c o n c r e t i .
128 Modugno, F., ‘Corte Costituzionale e potere legislativo', in Barile, P., Cheli, H., 
Grassi, S., eds. Corte Costituzionale e sviluppo dilla forma di governo in Itali*i, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1982, p. 20.
Zagrcbelsky, G., La Giustizia Costituzionale, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1977, p. 318 ff. 
Kom m en, D.P., ‘Judicial review in Italy and West Germany’, Jahrbuch des öf­
fentliches Rechts, 20, 1971, p. 120.
130 Liw of 1953, Mirch l i .
131 Kommen, op cu. noce 129. p. 128. Zagrcbelsky, op ctl. note 129, p. 356 ff.
132 Modugno, op. eil. noie 128, p. 23. Translation (my own): "... the drafters of the 
Constitution all agreed... on the dogma of the clanty of the law, of the rigid subordi­
nation of the judges and executors in general to the norm of the law ,... on the greatest 
possible reduction of interpretative freedom for those who apply the law, to be used in 
concrete cases’.
215
The Constitution itself, however, made such a restrictive role impossi­
ble.133 The Kelsenian idea presupposed a Constitution with clearly defined 
norms. The Italian Constitution, in contrast, is an enumeration of impre­
cisely defined social and political principles open to various interpretations. 
It is precisely these elastic norms that constitute the ‘political* character of 
an important part of the Constitution.134
The Constitutional Court has affirmed and consolidated its role with re­
gard to both the legislature and the judiciary. In the initial period the Court 
has been quite active in striking down legislation -  criminal and civil law -  
promulgated prior to the 1948 Constitution. It has exercised, for example, 
great vigilance over the administration of criminal justice.135 It has to be 
noted, however, that the abolition of Fascist legislation corresponded to 
government needs, or at least did not interfere with questions of a political 
nature.136
The Court has availed itself of methods of interpretation which have en­
abled it to have an im pact on the political process, going beyond the 
Kelsenian vision of merely striking off unconstitutional legislation. The 
Court introduced a category of decisions in between the striking down and 
the upholding of a law, the so-called ‘sentenze interpretative’. In these inter­
pretative rulings, the Court gives an interpretation which partially adapts the 
statute under review according to constitutional principles. Instead of strik­
ing it down altogether, the Court points out the conditions under which the
law will be constitutional. In practice, the Court has often ended up by indi­
cating the provisions of the law which were com patible with the 
Constitution and those which were unconstitutional. The ‘sentenze interpre­
tative’ or ‘sentenze manipolative' as they have been sometimes called, were 
bom out of fear of the legislative gaps which would be created by striking 
down legislation as a whole.137 Faced with the reluctance of the legislature 
to follow up constitutional decisions with legislative proposals, the Court 
has tended ‘rather to uphold the law than to strike it down, and to strike it
133 See Elia, L., ‘La Cone Ccwuiuzionale net quadro dei poteri costuuzionali’, in Banle 
e.o., op. cit. note 128, p. 524.
134 Modugno, op. cit. noie 128, p. 28.
135 Kommers, op. cit. noie 129, p. 122.
136 Zagrebelsky, op cit. noie 129, 1977, pp. 335-338.
137 Occhiocupo, N., La Cone Cosliiuzionalt Ira norma fiuridica t  realtd sociale. D 
Mulino, Bologna, 1978, p. 29 ff. Zagrebelsky, op. cil. noie 129, p. 338 ff.
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down partially rather than to strike it down completely’.138 This ‘horror 
vacui’ has definitely had a great impact on the direction of the C ourt’s 
jurisprudence.139
In recent times, the Court has extended the scope of the ‘sentenze interpre­
tative’ by giving indications to the legislature as to the principles a new law 
should embody in order to be constitutional.140 These instructions, sugges­
tions, indications, directives and sometimes even warnings have clearly con­
ditioned the legislative process, and are therefore called in the literature 
‘sentenze delega’ or 'sentenze Icgge’.141
The Court, however, has been cautious not to ‘upset’ the system, and has 
been aware of the constraints on its constitutional powers. External factors 
which have conditioned the Court arc the inertia of Parliament in following 
the C ourt’s adm onitions,142 the general inefficiency of the institutions in 
response to new demands,143 the unstable political situation ,144 and an ide­
ologically and religiously divided society.145 It has been reluctant to take a 
stand in a political conflict, i.e. has tended to compromise.146 It has also 
preferred to collaborate from the inside with the legislature and the execu­
tive,147 rather than substitute its views for theirs. On the whole, the role of 
the Italian Constitutional Court has been a pragmatic one. On the one hand, 
it has intervened in the most important and urgent questions which have 
been the subject of political and legislative debate, and in some recent cases 
it has even anticipated possible solutions148 through a creative interpretation 
of the Constitution. On the other hand, it has contributed to the stabilization
138 President Branca, quoted in Occhiocupo, op. cit. note 137, p. 29.
139 Occhiocupo. op. cit. note 137, p. 32.
140 Pizzorusso, A., "Procidurcs ct techniques de protection des droits fondameniaux, la 
cour consiitutiontielle italicnne’, Revue Inttrnaiionalt de Droit Compart, 33, 1981, 
p. 408 if.
141 Modugno, op. cit. note 128, p. 50.
142 Bognetti, G., op cit. note 24, p. 997. Occhiocupo, op. a t .  note 137, p. 32.
Zagrebelsky. op. cit. note 129, p. 363.
143 Zagrebelsky, op. cit. note 129. 1977, p. 363.
144 Kommen, op cit. note 129, p. 132. Occhiocupo, op. cit. note 137, p. 43.
14^ Bognetti, op. a t.  note 24, p. 993. Kommen, op. cit. note 129, p. 132.
146 Occhiocupo, op. ctt. note 137, p. 32. Zagrebelsky, op. cit. note 129, p. 363.
147 Zagrebelsky, op cit. note 129, p. 352. Tranfaglii, N., Datlo stato libtralt at regime
fascista , FeltrineUi, Milano, 1976, p. 277.
148 Modugno, op. a t .  note 128, p. 53.
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of ihe political system .149 This had led to the Italian Constitutional Court 
being described as ‘supremo regolatore degli equilibri’ (Crisafrulli), 
‘moderatrice’ (Elia), e ‘mediatrice di conflitti’ (Modugno).150
The Court has also served as an alternative channel for social and political 
demands.
... la crescita di una domanda, rivolta necessariamente alle forze politiche, di 
interventi idonei a fronteggiare, sul piano economico e sociale, i gravi prob­
lemi di arretratezza e di squilibrio accummulatisi in tanti anni e non risolti, e 
facilmente spiegabile come una siffatta domanda cerchi canali alternativi 
rispetto a quelli politico-pariitico-parlamcntari nei casi in cui i conflitti so­
ciali non riescano ad essere mediati e risolti attraverso i meccanismi ordinari 
della formazione della volontà politica.151
The Court has not rejected these appeals and has assumed the role of media­
tor of conflicting interests. Recently the Court has not only been called 
upon to judge legislation passed by Parliament, but also to intervene in the 
political discussions preceding a law reform,152 and has thus been invited to 
becomc involved in the legislative process.
... ciò ha portato ad una situazione in cui la Corte si trova, in misura 
sconosciuta nel passato, inserita in un processo legislativo circolare nel 
quale la sua attività si imposta strettamente con quella del legislatore, in un 
rapporto in cui non sempre appaiono con chiarezza i profili del moli rispet­
tiv i.153
149 Cheli, E-, ‘Introduzione’, in Barile e.o., op. eii. noie 128, p. 16.
150 Reported in Rodotà, S., 'La Corte, la politica, l'organizzazione sociale', in Banle 
e.o., op. cit. noie 128, p. 470.
151 Modugno, op. cu. noie 128, p. 99. Translation (my own): '...the growing demand, d i­
rected necessarily to the political forces, of appropriate interventions to face, on the 
economic and social level, the serious pcoblems of backlog and disequilibrium, accu­
mulated and not resolved in so many years.... looks for alternative channels with re­
spect to the polilical-pany-parliamentary ones, in those cases in which social con­
flicts are not mediated and resolved through the normal mechanisms of political ex­
pression'. Cheli and Rodotà arrive at Ihe same conclusion, see Barile e.o., op. cit. 
note 128, pp. 17 and 504 resp.
1 52 Zagrebelsky, G., ‘La Corte Costituzionale e il legislatore', in Barile e.o., op cil. 
note 128, p. 103.
153 Franceschi, P., Zagrebelsky, G ., ‘Corte Costituzionale -  il colegislatore e il 
Parlamento*, Quaderni Costituzionali, 1, 1981, pp. 164-165.
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The role of the Court has also been reinforced by the enormous load of ques­
tions presented to it, increasing every year, due partially to rather lax screen­
ing by the lower judges.154
On the whole, it is undeniable that the Italian Constitutional Court has 
had a considerable influence on political life. It has not, however, been ac­
tivist in the American sense.155 This is partly due to the external constraints 
mentioned above, and partly to the respect for the legislature as the expres­
sion of the popular w ill.156It has not kept aloof, however, from political 
and social demands, and has unblocked the channels of political change with 
its interpretative methods. Although the drafters envisaged a Kelsenian 
model of constitutional adjudication, the Italian Court has certainly not fol­
lowed the Austrian example.
The mediating role of the Court seems to be clearly reflected in the abor­
tion décisions. The Court did not refrain from striking down the old legisla­
tion, nor from giving instructions to the legislator as to the content of a 
new abortion law. The content o f the abortion decisions shows, however, 
that it acted as moderator between two opposing views. It neither granted the 
right to life to the unborn, nor did it recognize the woman’s right to self-de­
termination. It left the ultimate decision to the legislature, striking down a 
Fascist law which was anyway considered to be outdated. And once the legis­
lature had passed a new law -  which did not fully correspond with the 
Court’s suggestions -  the Court withdrew, and showed self-restraint with re­
spect to the majority décision taken in Parliament. Its role in the abortion 
issue seems, therefore, to be one rather of collaboration with the legislature
and the executive than of opposition or polarization. This is in line with its
jurisprudential tradition. It is quite likely that the outcome of the referendum 
on abortion was also taken into consideration in the 1981 decision, as the 
Court published its décision after the referendum had taken place.
France. The constitutional protection of fundamental rights is relatively new 
in France. Although France was the first country to proclaim the rights and 
liberties of man, liberty was identified above all with democracy.157 The
154 Ibid.. p. 162.
155 Elia, op ctl. note 133, p. 535.
15® Occhiocupo, op. cit. noie 137, p. 32.
1 Luchaire,  F., ‘Procédures el techniques de protection des droits fondamentaux, le con­
seil constitutionnel français'. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 33, 1981, p. 
285.
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ideology of the Frcnch Revolution embodied in the works of Rousseau and 
Montesquieu emphasized the superiority of statutory law, the equality of 
men before the law, and the rigid separation of powers in which the judge 
was to be only the ‘m outhpiece’ of the law. As the voice of popular 
sovereignty the legislature was considered the best guarantor of fundamental 
rig h ts .158 The Frcnch Constitutions up to 1958, although reaffirming fi­
delity to the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789, did not provide any 
judicial mechanism for ensuring the protection of these rights against the 
legislature. Only acts of the executive were under judicial control.159
The experience of the Sccond World War showed the weakness of the con­
cept of the law as an expression of the popular will. The Preamble to the 
1946 Constitution reaffirms the rights and liberties of 1789 and adds others, 
but still docs not give the power of judicial review of legislation. Only the 
Constitution of 1958 provides for a Constitutional Council which has the 
task of constitutional control o f legislative acts. This control is limited, 
however, to the period between the approval of a law by Parliament and its 
promulgation (approximately one month). Originally the right to convene 
the Council was reserved to a few political figures -  the President of the 
Republic, the Prime Minister, and the President of the National Assembly 
or the Senate -  who would usually belong to the same majority that passed 
the challenged statute.160 This was an important limitation upon the func­
tioning of the Constitutional Council.
It was not until 1971 that Ihe Council was convened for the first time in 
the field of fundamental rights. The President of the Senate appealed to the 
Council to adjudicate the compatibility of a law with the fundamental rights 
laid down in the Constitution, in this case the freedom of association. 
Although judicial review of the Preamble (which enumerates the fundamen­
tal rights) was not intended by the drafters of the 1958 Constitution, the 
Council declared the law unconstitutional as being in violation o f  the free­
158 CappelletU, op. cu. note 17, p. 35.
159 Luchaire, op cu. note 157. p. 285.
1 ¿A
Because of ihcic aspccts (preventive control limited to political initiative) tome 
claim that it ii more a political than a juridical organ. See Cappelletti, op cit. note 
17, p. 4-6, and Ahraham. op. cil. note 22, p. 315. Pizzorusso would call it a political 
organ because it has only the power of abstract control of legislation. See Pizzorasso, 
A., 'I  sistcmi di giustizia costituzionale: dai modelli alia prassi’, Q u a d trn  t 
Coililutionalt, 2, 1982, pp. 521-533. There is an ongoing debate between those who 
claim it to be a political (Chenot, Hanon) and those who claim it lo be a jundical 
(Waline, Luchaire, both judges of the CC) organ.
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dom of association laid down in the Preamble. In 1973, again on the initia­
tive of the President of the Senate, the Council struck down a law violating 
the Declaration of 1789.161 With these decisions the Constitutional Council 
established its compctcncc in the field of fundamental rights, i.e. it decided 
to include the Preambles to the 1946 and 1958 Constitutions in the review 
o f legislation. Through its decisions the Council gradually drafted a charter 
of rights and liberties, and the constitutional reform of 1974 enabled it to 
further develop the protection of fundamental rights.
Since 1974, 60 Deputies or 60 Senators have the right to refer a law to 
the Council for review. This is an important instrument enabling the oppo­
sition in Parliament to challenge decisions taken by the governm ent In the 
period between 1974 and 1981, it was convened about 60 limes by members 
of Parliament, and in 12 o f these cases it struck down the law presented to 
it. In almost all cases the laws were quite important ones.162 Since the 
Mitterrand government has been in power, the Constitutional Council has 
made about 20 rulings. In a limited number of cases, including the impor­
tant nationalization law, a law has been declared unconstitutional.163
It is clear that the French Constitutional Council has very limited powers 
in comparison with the Constitutional Courts discussed here. It cannot be 
convened on the initiative of private parties, its control is merely preventive, 
it is no more than ‘one stage in the legislative process’164 (i.e. limited to 
the period between the approval and the promulgation of a law), and it is 
limited to a very short time period. The fact that the Council only has the 
power of abstract control of legislation emphasizes its political function. As 
has been pointed out, the German and the Austrian Constitutional Courts, 
too, have this power of abstract review but they also have ample powers of 
concrete review o f legislation. This docs not, however, automatically imply 
that the French Constitutional Council is more political than, for example, 
the Italian Constitutional Court. There are many ways to turn a political is­
sue into a constitutional issue and to present it to a constitutional court, 
even within a system of concrete review. The American experience is a good 
example in this rcspcct. Whether a Constitutional Court can be described as
161 Luchitre, F., op cii., note 157, p. 287 fT.
162 Ehrmann, op. cil. note 21. p. 82.
163 plvorcu> [_i *n Conscil Constitutionnel e l’iliem inza', ZZI, 2, 1982, p. 612.
164 Cappelletti, op cil. note 17. pp. 4-5.
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a political organ or not docs not depend on the model of judicial review, i.e. 
abstract or concrctc, but on the level o f self-restraint it imposes on itself.
Up to 1985, the French Constitutional Council has shown a considerable 
amount of self-restraint in the exercise of its control. It has generally shown 
a more rigid attitude in interpreting the Constitution when it has struck off a 
law than when it has reaffirmed the constitutionality of a legislative act. 
Every time it has declared a law unconstitutional it has taken care to make 
specific reference to the constitutional provisions on which its decisions are 
based. When it has reaffirmed an act of Parliament it has shown a much 
more liberal attitude towards the interpretation of the Constitution, often not 
even mentioning the constitutional basis o f its decision.165 On the whole, 
the Council has shown the deeply rooted respect of the French for the prin­
ciple of the sovereignty of Parliament. The abortion decision seems to fol­
low this tradition.166 The Council very summarily reaffirmed the constitu­
tionality of the statute without giving a detailed justification.
The Constitutional Council Consolidated its position during the initial pe­
riod of the Mitterrand government. It did not obstruct the reforms proposed 
by the Socialist government as much as was expected. Although it made 
profound reforms impossible, the reform process as a whole was not been 
hindered. It operated rather as a filter, as a channeling process for reforms. 
Furthermore, the Council is increasingly more precise in the references it 
makes in its decisions, and the decisions themselves arc longer. In spite of a 
general mistrust of its activities, its decisions are applied and respected by 
the public authorities. It has thus succeeded in imposing its jurisdiction.167
Conclusions
This short outline of the five constitutional courts covered by this study 
shows that they each have quite a different role in their respective countries. 
If we look at the European Courts, the German Court’s position seems to be 
the closest to the American one, in that it has availed itself of ample powers 
o f judicial review, besides the extensive powers given by law, and has not 
hesitated to play a décisive role in the political life o f the country. The 
French and the Austrian Courts, on the other hand, are for different historical
165 Luchaire, op eil. noie 157, p. 312-327.
See R obert, J ., 'D écision  du C onseil C onstitu tionnel du 15 jan v ie r 1975 sur
l'in terruption volontaire de la grossesse '. Revue Internationale de Droit Comparé, 27,
1975, p. 885 ff.
167 p>voreUi 0p Clt nolc ]63 pp. 606-618.
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reasons marked by sclf-rcstraint. The role of the Italian Court is more diffi­
cult to evaluate in a comparative perspective, largely becausc of the way it is 
conditioned by national political factors. There is no doubt that it has not 
followed the French or Austrian pattern of judicial review. On the other hand 
its role is not as decisive as that of the German Court, partially because of 
its more limited powers.
The abortion decisions seem to follow the respective traditions of the 
jurisprudence of the Courts. The American and German Courts did not hesi­
tate to oppose their views to that of the legislature. The French and Austrian 
Courts carefully rcspcctcd the will of Parliament, and the Italian Court 
tended to cooperate with the legislature in order to reform the outdated abor­
tion provisions.
Section D Jurisdictional and Political Context of the 
Abortion Decisions
We have already examined the general aspects of the functioning of the con­
stitutional courts. In this section the focus will be on the specific context of 
the abortion issue. In a very short period (Jan. 1973-Feb. 1975), five major 
constitutional courts decided on abortion. l68There are a couple of questions 
which arise from this. First of all, what were the jurisdictional competences 
o f the Courts in the case of abortion? Did they have any discretionary power 
in deciding the issue? Secondly, what was the political climate like when the 
abortion decisions were issued? And thirdly, what type of law did the Courts 
have to review? An old or a new one? A conservative, liberal or compromise 
solution? It might be that the way in which the abortion issue reached the 
Courts, the political climate in which the decisions had to be delivered 
and/or the particular law under review, had an impact on the outcome of the 
decisions. These factors could clarify the role of the constitutional courts in 
the general abortion debate.
168 The US Supreme Court on Jin . 17, 1973, the Austrian Constitutional Court on Oct. 
11. 1974, the French Constitution*! Council on Jan. 15, 1975, the Italian 
C onstitutional Court on Feb. 18, 1975, and the German Federal Constitutional Court 
on Feb. 25. 1975.
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1. J u r is d ic t io n a l  C om petences
The US Supreme Court has wide discretionary powers in hearing cases. 
Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, which drastically reduced the Court’s obli­
gatory appellate responsibilities169 and greatly increased the Court’s discre­
tionary certiorari jurisdiction, the Court has tried to maximize its institu­
tional independence from Congress, litigants and other courts. At present, 
90% of the case load of the Supreme Court consists o f certiorari cases.170 
The Court has now worked itself into the position of no longer being ex­
pected to decide any ease as a matter of course.171 Because of the extension 
of its certiorari jurisdiction, the work load of the Court has dramatically in­
creased over the years due to the increasing number of filings. In particular 
the in form a pauperis eases172 have multiplied at a much faster rate than 
paid cases173 In short, the Supreme Court has intentionally made itself open 
to the widest possible range of petitions.
The Supreme Court denies review for 85-90% of all certiorari applica­
tio n s.174 This shows the importance of the case selection process. The 
Court has developed a scries of procedural standards for taking a case. It only 
reviews a ‘case or controversy’, and the parties bringing suit must have 
‘standing’, there must be a ‘substantial’ federal question etc.175 These are 
formal conditions. In this case, too, interpretation is needed, and a broad in­
terpretation of the ‘standing’ requirement can give access to more litigants, 
as in the Roe and D oe  decisions. The Supreme Court accepted in Roe v. 
Wade that Jane Roe had ‘standing’ notwithstanding the fact that she was no 
longer pregnant. In Doe v. Bolton some physicians, nurses and clergymen 
presented themselves as appellants together with Mary Doe. The Supreme
The Supreme Court di «misses over 90% of the appeals. See Abraham, op cit. note 22, 
p. 183.
17® Abraham , op. cit. note 22, p.183- PROVINE, op. cit. note 49, p. 13.
171 Provine, op cit. note 49. p. 44.
172 These are laym an-drafted petitions subm itted w ithout legal assistance and without 
paym ent o f filing fees or printing costs.
173 The num ber of these petitions went up from  951 in 1941 to 4102 in 1976. See 
Provine, op cit. noie 49, p. 18.
174 Provtne, op cit. note 49. p. 18.
175 Abraham , op cit. note 22, p. 373 ff.
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Court recogmzcd in this case that ihc physicians had standing although no 
criminal procedure had been initialed against them.176
Very little is known, however, about the substantive criteria the Court 
applies in reviewing a case. In practice, the votes of four Justices are needed 
for accepting a case, which is not a majority.177 Rule 19 178 is the Court’s 
only published guideline as to its criteria for case selection. Rule 19 basi­
cally slates that the existence of a conflict between the holdings of the 
Supreme Court and lower courts or among lower courts is a reason for re­
view. Rule 19 does not give a clear answer as to the relevance of the merits 
of the petitioner’s argument for granting review. The Justices have taken 
pains to point out that a lower court’s erroneous ruling alone, i.e a ruling 
which conflicts with other court decisions, is not a sufficient reason for re­
view. The Court’s reaction to the merits o f the cases which it accepts for re­
view docs provide an indication of the rclevance of ‘error’ and of the ‘merits’ 
in case-selection decisions. The Court’s pattern has been to reverse about 
two-thirds of the cases it decides. This means that at least one-third o f the 
cases are accepted for review for reasons other than ‘dispute-resolving’, i.e. 
‘error’. The Court seems to differentiate between cases it believes deserve ex­
tensive consideration regardless of the outcome in a lower court, and cases in 
which the lower court decision simply seems so wrong that the Court feels 
compelled to redress the damage.179 What can be concluded is that some of
176 See Dot v. Bolton, 35 LEd  2d, p. 210: 'The physician is the one against whom these 
crim inal statutes directly operate in the event he procures an abortion that does not 
m eet the statutory exceptions and conditions. The physician-appellants, therefore, 
assert a sufficiently direct threat of personal detriment, TTiey should not be required to 
■ wait and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief'.
177 See Koopm ans, T., Constitutional protection o f equality, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1975, p. 
2 3 1 .
17® See Provine, op. cit. note 49, p. 37. Rule 19 (1932) lists the follow ing as ‘character 
o f reasons which will be considered' in granting or considering ceruorari: '(a ) W here 
a state court has decided a federal question o f substance not therefore determined by 
this court, or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with applicable decisions 
of this court, (b) W here a court o f appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the 
decision o f another court of appeals on the same matter, o r has decided an important 
state or territorial question in a way in conflict with applicable state or territorial law; 
o r has decided an important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, 
settled by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with appli­
cable decisions o f this court, or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course 
o f judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to 
call for an exercise of this court's power or supervision'.
179 Provine, op cit. note 49. p. 41. Abraham, op. cit. note 22, pp. 186-187.
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the cases are selected on their merits. With respect to the abortion decisions, 
it is fair to state that the Supreme Court could have avoided the question by 
rejecting the case which was presented to it by a writ of certiorari. Therefore 
it cannot be excluded that the Court took up the abortion case because it 
wanted to decide it on its merits.180
The competence of the German Federal Constitutional Court to hear con­
stitutional complaints (Verfassungsbeschwerde) is very similar to the US 
Supreme Court’s power of review on certiorari.181 It gives wide discre­
tionary powers to the German Court to hear and reject cases. The abortion 
case, however, was presented to the Court as a case for abstract review. The 
admissibility of a constitutional challenge by the Federal government, by 
the government of one of the Länder, or by one third of the Bundestag nei­
ther requires a 'case or controversy’ nor that the complainants’ rights have 
been violated by a challenge to the law. The only condition is that there are 
disagreements or doubts about the formal and actual compatibility of the law 
with the Constitution.182 The Constitutional Court has no means of reject­
ing a constitutional challenge presented to it under this power of abstract re­
view. Although petitions of abstract review are very rare,183 they are usually 
of great political significance. They are mostly controversial questions on 
which no agreement could be reached during the legislative process.184 In 
fact, abstract review is a powerful instrum ent o f the opposition in
180 A majority of the Justices w u  in favor o f  striking down the laws under review. It ap ­
pear*, however, that the R o t and D o t  cases were accepted for review in order to d e ­
term ine whether to expand a series o f recent rulings which limited the intervention of 
federal courts in state court proceedings, i.e. for jurisdictional reasons. Another case 
which was decided just before the abortion cases posed the same jurisdictional ques­
tion. Since the Court decided this case in favor o f  the federal junsd icuon , the Court 
had effectively also decided the jurisdictional question o f the abortion cases. Quite as 
a surprise to some of the Justices, it could then proceed to decide on the m e n u  of the 
abortion case. See Woodward, B , Armstrong, Th t B rtth rtn , Avon, New York, 
1979, pp. 193-200.
181 K oopm ans, op. cit. note 177, p. 231.
182 Rupp-von Brunneck, op. cit. note 108, p. 118 ff.
183 20 up to 1982. See Schlaich, op. cil. note 116, p. 568.
184 Ibid.
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Parliament, often used to force the majority to come to a compromise.585 
Abortion was such a highly controversial and emotional issue with which 
the Court was presented and on which it had to decide.
The French and Austrian Constitutional Courts were confronted with the 
abortion issue in the same way as the German Court. The opposition to the 
new abortion laws resorted to the instrument abstract review as an instru­
ment for reinforcing its viewpoint. In Italy the situation was different There 
the abortion decisions were issued in the context of concrete judicial review. 
In this procedure the lower judge decides whether a question is constitu­
tional. and if so refers it to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court can only refuse a ease on procedural grounds.186 Whether a case will 
receive constitutional adjudication depends on the lower judge. It has to be 
borne in mind, however, that there are many ways for individual citizens to 
phrase a question in constitutional terms, and this is ccrtainly true of the 
abortion issue. The idea of an individual citizen filing a complaint is often 
rather unrealistic. The American ease Doe v. Bolton, for example, was a 
group action supported by pro-abortion organizations.187 Although abstract 
review permits a more direct political attack on a law, cases heard under the 
power o f concrete review are also very often supported by political or social 
forces.
What can be conc .-d at this point is that none of the European constitu­
tional courts was able to avoid a ruling on the abortion question, since they 
had no discretionary power to hear or reject the abortion case. The US 
Supreme Court was the only court which actually chose to decide the issue. 
This is not to say that the European Courts did not want to rule on abortion.
185 In fact, when the CDL'/CSU coalition decided 10 present the abortion question 10 the 
Constitutional Court, the Prime M inister and the federal government proposed 10 re­
open the debate with the CDU/CSU on the abortion reform. It is felt as a danger that 
Parliam ent resorts loo easily to the Constitutional Court with questions it cannot re ­
solve itself. This could crcalc a situation of the ‘politicization o f  the judiciary*. See 
Gcrontas, A., ‘Der Grundsatz des ‘political self-restraint’ untersucht am Beispiel der 
B u n d esrep u h lik  D eu tsch lan d ', E u GR Z ,  1982, p. 149; M elichar, E., ‘Zum 
SpannungsvcrhSltn is zw ischen V erfassungsgericht und G ese tzg eb er ', Salzburg  
Symposium zum Jubtlaum 60 Jakrt Bundesvtrfassung, Kiesel, Salzburg, 1980, p. 96.
1 86 See Pizzorusso, op. cii. note 140, pp. 401-404: in some cases it has refused to adjudi­
cate cases because the constitutional question was not deemed relevant fo r the deci­
sion of the case.
187 Nine licensed physicians, seven nurses, five clergymen, two social workers and two 
non-profit corporations that advocate abortion reform instituted this federal action 
together with Mary Doc. See 35 LEd 2d, p. 208 (1973).
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What is certain, however, is that in Germany, France and Austria the Court 
was required to solve a political dispute between majority and opposition in 
Parliament. It was the Court’s power of abstract review that made this pos­
sible.
2. T h e  P o litica l C lim a te
One of the reasons why these five abortion decisions were issued within 
such a short period o f time seems to be that this period coincided with the 
height of the political debate on abortion.188 Although there is some doubt 
whether the American Supreme Court had to rule on abortion in 1973, when 
many states were still in the stage of reforming their laws, the issue was cer­
tainly ‘live’ at that moment. In Europe the political force o f the abortion 
movement was so strong by 1974/1975 that governments and Parliaments 
had to decide on an abortion law reform. As the French, Austrian and 
German constitutional decisions were a kind of epilogue to the parliamentary 
debates, there can be no doubt that the political discussion was taken into 
consideration by the Courts. The Italian decision, although issued before the 
abortion reform was passed, is a product of the same political climate which 
urged for a reform o f  abortion legislation. In this case, the constitutional 
court decision served as an admonition to the legislature as to its duties in 
the field of abortion reform.
What can be concluded on the liming of the abortion decisions is that 
these five constitutional courts issued their rulings in a period when the 
abortion debate was at its height, and when the French, German and Austrian 
Parliaments had just passed a new abortion law. Although it is difficult to 
estimate the direct impact of this political context on the constitutional deci­
sions, it has to be kept in mind that these decisions were issued in a tense 
political climate.
3. T he T ype o f  L egisla tion  u n d er Review
The content of the various laws reviewed by the constitutional courts has 
been described in chaptcr III, Scction A. One of the reasons why constitu­
tional courts arrived at particular decisions can be found in the type of legis­
lation they had to judge. It seems understandable that the judges’ attitude to­
wards an old, outdated law differed from that towards a new law passed by a
1 88 See chapter I lection D.
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d e a r majority in Parliament. Judicial activism in the field o f recent legisla­
tion might more easily be considered anti-democratic. The fact that the 
Italian Constitutional Court struck down a law dating from the Fascist era 
seems, therefore, less astonishing. The striking off of an old restrictive abor­
tion law by the US Supreme Court in the Roe v. Wade decision can be re­
garded in the same way. This type of explanation does not apply, however, 
to the companion ease Doe v. Bolton which concerned a recently reformed 
abortion law based on the 1962 Model Penal Code.189 The German Court 
might have felt justified in intervening in terms of political representation in 
the sense that the abortion reform did receive a 51% majority of those 
'present and voting’, but not an absolute majority of all the deputies in 
Parliament. It has been suggested that the Court’s interference can be ex­
plained by the lack of democratic legitimacy of the reform.190 Another con­
cern of the German Court might have been that the recommendations o f the 
Sixth Bundestag, which were moderate and offered greater protection for un­
born life, were not taken into consideration in the abortion reform passed by 
the Seventh Bundestag.191 It has to be added that the Austrian and Italian 
abortion reforms also obtained a marginal majority in Parliam ent.192 The 
différence, however, between the original German law and the Italian one is 
that the former was definitely quite liberal, the latter more moderate. Would 
the German Court have acted in the same way if the law presented to it had 
been a compromise solution along the lines of the French and Italian laws?
Although no clear conclusion can be drawn from the type of legislation 
under review, it can be stated that the Italian and French Courts, in uphold­
ing a recently passed compromise solution, had an easier task than the 
German Court, which was faccd with a quite radical solution to the abortion 
question passed with a marginal majority in Parliament. The Roe decision 
by the US Supreme C ourt and the 1975 décision by the Italian 
Constitutional Court can be viewed in the same way, as they both concerned 
old, outdated legislation. There seems to be no similar explanation for the 
American Doe decision or the Austrian decision, i.e., for the fact that the US
189 See 35 LEd 2d. pp. 206-207 (1973).
1 Kommer s ,  op cit. note 54, p. 285.
191 fbtd. Sixth Bundestag, 1969-1972, Seventh Bundestag, 1972-1976.
1 9 i In France the abortion  reform  was p issed  with 284 against 189 vo les in the 
A ssem blée N ationale, and with 182 ag n n s i 82 voles in the Sénat. In A ustria, the 
abortion reform was adopted with 93 against 88 votes in the N 'ationaln t and with 29 
against 28 votes in the Bundesrat.
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Supreme Court did not hesitate to strike down a recently passed moderate 
abortion reform, and that the Austrian Constitutional Court upheld a quite 
radical reform which had received a marginal majority in Parliament
Section E The Social Philosophies
One of the explanations for the different types of judicial activism exercised 
in the American and the German Courts lies in a difference in social ideol­
ogy. The value of ideological individualism has roots in American history 
and in American constitutionalism. The Supreme Court traditionally empha­
sizes the principle of individual liberty in the exercise of personal free­
dom .193 German constitutionalism, on the other hand, has a larger collective 
thrust with a corresponding limitation of the exercise of political free­
d o m .194 As has been pointed out in chapter HI, section B, under 2, the 
Supreme Court put greater emphasis on the right to individual liberty in the 
sense of freedom from state interference than on the woman’s right to self- 
determination in the abortion cases. On the other hand, the German Court's 
view of criminal law as a force of social cohesion, as expressed in the abor­
tion decision, reflects a communitarian ideology.
Louis Henkin has given a clear synthesis o f the differences between 
American and European views on fundamental or human rights.
Rights theory, in the United States, supports rights deriving from, and vindi­
cating, individual freedom and autonomy, but not claims upon society to do 
for the individual what he cannot do for himself. It tells governments only 
what not to do. not what it must do. The explosion of rights in the United 
States in the past dccadcs have all been ‘freedoms from', not ‘rights to'. They 
still imply the purpose of government to respect and safeguard the right to be 
let alone, not to assure that no one will be left alone and abandoned when 
he/she lacks basic human needs. The equality guaranteed by the Constitution 
is the equal protection of the law and equality of opportunity. It gives no 
guarantee against other unequalitics in fact, however gross, against failure in
d
101 R ognelli, C>., ’R*pcnen7£ stram ere: la l ib e n i  di abortire delle donne, cosliiuzional- 
m cntc garanu to’. Rivtsta haUana di Dirdto e Proceduia Penate, 17, 1974, p. 34. He 
draw i attention lo  the fact that the Suprem e Court used to emphasize individualism in 
econom ic life, and now, since 20 y e a n , individualism  in the activities o f  the free 
time. See also Heymann, P R. Rarzelay, D., 'T h e  forest and the trees. Roe v. W ade and 
its c ritic s '. Bottom University Law Review, 53, 1973, pp. 765-766.
194 K om m ers, op eit. note 54, pp. 281-282. He gives the exam ple of free speech case 
law in the US and Germany in order lo illustrate this p o in t
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the pursuit of happiness or even of necessities. Lei there be no doubt. The 
United States is, and w ill remain, a welfare State. Commitment to public edu­
cation made its way into State constitutions early. Commitment to other 
minimum levels of individual welfare came much later but is deeply imbedded 
in national life and is increasingly expressed in language of societal obliga­
tion and individual right. But in constitutional principle the United States is 
a welfare State not by constitutional mandate but by grace of Congress and 
Slate legislatures.'95
This passage not only clarifies the conccpt o f liberty in American constitu­
tional doctrine as voiccd in Roe v. Wade, but also gives a clear explanation 
of the net distinction made by the Supreme Court in the funding cases be­
tween the right to abortion and the right to have access to abortion. The 
principle of public health assistance in Europe is part of the Welfare State 
ideology. The public health service in Germany is based on the constitu­
tional Soz/a/i/aa/-principlc. The state is bound by a rule of social responsi­
bility; it cannot constitutionally ignore the demands of social justice when 
making laws.196 As the passage quoted illustrates, there is no such constitu­
tional principle of social justice in the US.
The American abortion decisions emphasize the individual’s liberty to de­
cide for herself whether to have an abortion, the freedom from government 
intrusion into the woman’s privacy, i.e. into decisions concerning her pri­
vate and family life. How little abortion has to do with social values is 
shown very clearly in the Medicaid decisions which reject the idea that social 
concern for the poor is a constitutional principle. The German Federal 
Constitutional Court, on the other hand, viewed the pregnant woman as pan 
of society, a society which has to uphold the value of unborn life. Abortion 
is not considered as a private matter, as in the US, but as a public affair 
which has to be regulated with penal sanctions. Although the German Court 
recognizes the woman’s right to self-determination, the social concern for 
the protection of unborn life is given priority.
C onclusions
The five constitutional decisions on the abortion question raise some basic 
questions. Why is it that in such a short time (1973-1975) five major con­
stitutional courts dccidcd on the abortion issue? Why did the French, the
195 Hcnkin, L .  ‘Economic-social n g h u  as 'r ig h ts ': a United Slates perspective'. Human 
Rights Law Journal, 2, 1981, pp. 228-229.
196 Kommers, op. ctt. note 16, p. 210.
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Austrian and the Italian Courts rcspcct the legislature’s decision on abortion 
and why did the German and American Courts impose their will on the leg­
islator, not only by striking down abortion legislation but also by giving 
detailed instructions as to the abortion reform to be passed by the legislator? 
And why did the American and German Courts, although both intervening in 
the legislative process, issue such different decisions on the abortion issue? 
This chapter has been an attempt to give answers to these questions by look­
ing at the set o f values enclosed in the constitutional order, by examining 
the wording of the various constitutions and their history, and by investigat­
ing the position of the constitutional court versus the legislature, and the se­
lection, training, and background of the judges. We have also considered the 
context in which the abortion issue arose, and the social philosophies em ­
bodied in the respective constitutional doctrines.
The constitutional courts issued their abortion rulings at the height of the 
abortion debate. At the time of the American Supreme Court 1973 abortion 
decision, about one third of the states had reformed their abortion legislation. 
In the other states the abortion issue was still highly debated. In Europe, the 
French, Austrian and German Courts decided on abortion shortly after abor­
tion reforms had been passed by Parliament. These new legislations had not 
dampened down the debate, however. The abortion issue remained controver­
sial. The Italian Constitutional Court’s ruling was given in the same period, 
although no legislative reform had yet taken place. The European courts had 
no discretionary power in deciding the issue; they were simply presented 
with it and had to give a ruling. In Germany, France and Austria, the courts 
were seized under their power of abstract review, and as such they served as a 
political instrument for the defeated opposition in Parliament.
The constitutional court decisions on abortion thus coincided with the 
height o f the abortion debate. They were issued in a period when the politi­
cal forces urged for a reform, or a reform had just taken place but had not 
eliminated the controversy. These five decisions show how a constitutional 
court can be called into a political debate irrespective of the position it actu­
ally occupies in the political life of the country, and irrespective of whether 
it wants to intervene in the debate or not.
The positions taken by the French, Austrian and Italian Constitutional 
Courts towards the legislature are very much in line with the jurisprudential 
tradition of these Courts. In the French tradition the judge has a limited role 
as he is still considered as ‘la bouche de la loi’. The French Constitutional 
Council was not intended as a Constitutional Court in the American or
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German sense, and in fact its compctcnccs arc limited to abstract review. The 
jurisprudence of the Council is characterized by sclf-rcstraint. Its decisions 
arc short, and only give a detailed interpretation of the Constitution when it 
strikes down a law. The abortion decision follows this tradition
The Austrian Constitutional Court, although equipped with quite exten­
sive powers of judicial review also follows the positivist tradition of judicial 
interpretation. This Court still adheres to the Kelsenian view of the constitu­
tional judge as a ‘negative legislator’, someone who finds but does not in­
terpret the law. The jurisprudence of the Court is characterized by a histori­
cal-grammatical interpretation of the Constitution. In addition, the Court has 
been reluctant to impose its view on the legislator, in particular with respect 
to socio-political questions.The role of the Austrian Constitutional Court in 
the political life o f the country is, therefore, a limited one. The abortion de­
cision is very much in line with this tradition. Although presented with a 
liberal law, ihe Court succeeded on the basis o f a historical interpretation of 
the Constitution to uphold the abortion law. The tendency of judicial self-re­
straint turned out to be predominant.
The Italian Constitutional Court has played a more active role than the 
French and Austrian ones. Through the development of new methods of in­
terpretation it has tried to influence the legislative process. It has never been 
totally opposed to the views adopted by the legislature, and has always pre­
ferred collaboration. The Italian Court has always been concerned with the 
effect of its decisions and has therefore adopted more a pragmatic than a radi­
cal stance. The abortion decisions are very much in line with this pragmatic 
tradition. In the decision of 1975 the Court did not refrain from striking 
down an outdated law and suggesting the content of a new law. When the 
abortion reform was passed, however, the Court showed rcspcct in its 1981 
rulings for the decision of the legislator, although the new law is more lib­
eral than the Court suggested in its first ruling.
The French, Austrian and Italian abortion rulings can, on the whole, be 
explained quite well by the respective positions the Courts take towards the 
legislature. It has to be added, however, that the substance o f the French and 
Italian abortion reforms facilitated the task of the respective Courts. Both 
laws are pragmatic solutions to the abortion question as they reflect a com­
promise between the political forces. Such laws were easier to uphold, from 
a point o f view of political representation, than the German abortion reform 
which was more radical and reflected only the views of one party coalition in 
Parliament.
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The jurisprudential tradition of the American Supreme Court and of the 
German Federal Constitutional Court is more characterized by judicial ac­
tivism than of the courts just mentioned. Both courts have extensive powers 
of judicial review including the possibility to ‘take or reject’ cases at their 
discretion. The American Supreme Court has enlarged its influences, 
amongst others, by expanding the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
14th Amendment and by giving a nan-ower interpretation of what is a 
‘political question’, its criterion for self-restraint. Although interventions of 
the Supreme Court arc justified with the argument that the channels for po­
litical change arc blocked or that minorities arc underrepresented, they some­
times go beyond these principles. It is, for example, not always clear what 
the constitutional basis is for calling something a ‘fundamental right'. This 
applies in particular to the ‘nco-privacy’ cases , including the abortion deci­
sions.
The German Constitutional Court has enlarged the scope of its jurispru­
dence by extending both the object and the effect o f its rulings. Besides the 
law as the product of the legislative process, it has also made the legislative 
process itself subject of its control, thus checking the rationality of a ccrtain 
solution. Furthermore, the Court has been able to condition the legislature 
by extending the binding force o f its rulings to the motivations of its deci­
sions and by issuing temporary rulings which indicate the direction the leg­
islature has to follow.
Both the American and the German Courts have, therefore, not hesitated 
to impose at times their will on the legislature in quite a radical manner. 
Although the intervention of these Courts in the abortion issue might not 
have been expectcd, it was not the first time they look such a step. On the 
whole the abortion decisions fit quite well into the jurisprudential tradition 
of the respective Courts, although the radical impact of these decisions defi­
nitely came as a surprise. On both occasions the courts clearly did not act as 
a negative legislature, simply striking down the law. On the contrary, their 
decisions contained prccisc instructions to the legislature as to the content of 
the future abortion legislation, leaving very little legislative freedom.
A surprising fact is that the American and German Court took such oppo­
site views on the abortion issue. An explanation for the principled opposi­
tion of these Courts can be found in the historical arguments they them­
selves put forward, and in the differences in social ideology which underlay 
these decisions.
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The American Supreme Court used a historical argument for rejecting the 
unbom’s right to life, and the German Court used similar arguments for af­
firming it. As has already been pointed out, it seems strange that a historical 
interpretation of the Constitution should play a role in the adjudication of 
the abortion issue, as this issue has only appeared in recent times. This ar­
gument is especially true for the American Supreme Court as this Court did 
not refrain from giving a very modem interpretation to the woman’s right to 
liberty. The historical arguments used by the Supreme Court do not there­
fore seem to give a full explanation of the American viewpoint. In the 
German décision, on the other hand, the historical reference seems to be of 
substantive importance, not bccausc abortion was an issue during the Nazi 
period, but bccausc abortion seems to rccall the almost total disregard of in­
nocent human life during that historical period. The Constitution was devel­
oped as a reaction against that experience, and should, therefore, in the view 
of the Court, be interpreted so as to give the largest possible scope to the 
protection of human life. Abortion thus seems to stand as a symbol for 
'innocent human life’ which, given this historical experience, should be pro­
tected at all stages of development. Although it is questionable whether 
abortion should be presented in this historical context, this emotional factor 
seems to have played a role in the Court’s reasoning. It is interesting to note 
in this respect that in the Italian case it was not the prohibition but the lib­
eralization of abortion that was seen as a reaction against Fascism.
Another explanation of the different outcomes of the American and the 
German décisions is provided by the social ideologies prevalent in the two 
countries, as reflected in the abortion decisions. The American Supreme 
Court emphasizes the right to liberty of the individual in the sense of free­
dom from government interference. In German jurisprudence, on the other 
hand, the individual as part of society is central, a principle founded on the 
Sozialstaat-cfouse in the Constitution. This difference is very clear in the 
abortion issue. The American Supreme Court stresses the woman’s and the 
doctor’s right to liberty in the sense of autonomy in the abortion decision. 
The state is not allowed to interfere in this decision, and consequently does 
not have to make financial contributions toward the effectuation of this 
right. In the German decision, on the other hand, the emphasis is on the so­
cial role of the woman, and on the moral education of society. Abortion is 
not seen as a private matter but a public affair, thus reflecting the communi­
tarian values as opposed lo the libertarian values proclaimed by the 
American Supreme Court.
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One reason for the German C ourt’s intervention might have been that the 
abortion reform rcccived such a marginal majority in Parliament. It did not 
even have the absolute majority of all Deputies, and thus could not be con­
sidered to represent the popular will.
The abortion decisions reaffirm the vagueness of constitutional provisions 
and the importance of the constitutional judge for giving substance to the 
values embodied in the Constitution. As has already been pointed out, the 
respective constitutional courts could have come to quite different solutions 
on the basis of the wording of the relevant fundamental rights.
It is easy to assume that the political background of the judges determines 
to some extent controversial decisions such as abortion rulings. This theory 
has been disproved, however, both by the jurisprudence of the constitutional 
courts in general and by the abortion decisions in particular. The jurispru­
dence of the American and the German Courts -  the two most intervention­
ist Courts -  has shown that judges do not merely act as political agents. If 
political background had played a role in abortion decisions, the four Nixon 
appointees on the Supreme Court would have voted against the Roe opin­
ion. Although political factors might have played a role for individual 




The dilemma of abortion is often described in terms of a counterbalance be­
tween the right to life of the fetus and the pregnant woman’s right to self-de­
termination. This study has treated the abortion issue from this fundamental- 
rights perspective. Through a comparative analysis o f the constitutional ad­
judication of abortion in five countries belonging to the Western liberal- 
democratic tradition (United States, W est Germ any, France, Italy and 
Austria), an attempt has been made to evaluate the soundness of the various 
constitutional arguments used by constitutional courts and legislators, and, 
finally, to formulate a possible constitutional solution to the abortion issue.
Our first observation concerns the relevance of the constitutional argu­
ments presently used in the debate on abortion within the historical context 
o f abortion legislation. The religious, social, political and medical reasons 
which led to the abortion restrictions existing up to the beginning of the 
1970s, and the ones which subsequently resulted in a liberalization o f abor­
tion legislation, certainly show that not only the concern with the funda­
mental right to life o f the fetus and with the fundamental right to self-deter­
mination of the pregnant woman have played a role in this historical pro­
cess. Although the protection of unborn life was one o f  the reasons for pro­
hibiting abortion in the 19th century, certain ideas on sexual morality, 
voiced in particular by the Catholic Church, and the medical risks involved 
in the performing of abortions also played an important role in the develop­
ments leading up to restrictive abortion legislation. In the same way, the 
abortion reforms passed in the 1970s were not only a response to the 
women’s call for self-determination and personal autonomy. The call for free 
choice in matters of procreation and parental responsibility, on the one hand, 
and for a division of sexual activity and procreation on the other hand, led to 
a demand for freedom of abortion as a complement to existing methods of 
contraception. This demand was not only voiced by women as individuals, 
but also by couples and by society as a whole. The advances in medical 
technology made the widcscale practice of safe abortions possible, and some
members of the medical profession bccame interested in a liberalization of 
the abortion laws. Furthermore, government concerns with overpopulation 
did not directly further the abortion cause, but certainly resulted in the pro­
motion o f  birth control in general. The opposition to the existing abortion 
restrictions was thus based on a new vision of the family and child rearing, 
on a new sexual morality, and on a new concept of women’s role in society. 
The opposition grew as abortion became safer, and governments were in­
creasingly concerned with the problem of overpopulation. The demand for 
self-determination of the women’s movements with respect to abortion has 
therefore to be viewed in the wider context of these social and medical devel­
opments.
The theoretical discussion of the fundamental values at the basis o f the 
abortion decision has shown the impossibility of coming up with sound 
moral arguments in defence of a certain type (liberal, moderate or conserva­
tive) o f abortion regulation. The dilemma lies in the difficulty of defining 
the beginning of human life, i.e. the point in fetal development at which the 
unborn can be considered human beings and should therefore be given the 
same rights as bom persons. Any position on the right to life of the fetus, 
from conservative to liberal, seems to result in contradictions. The discus­
sion of the pregnant wom an's claims in the abortion decision, on the other 
hand, not only highlights the difficulty of balancing the fetus* and the 
wom an’s claims, but clearly shows that concerns other than the protection 
o f human life, (in particular certain views on sexual morality), influence 
views on abortion. Both a principled and a compromise solution to the ques­
tion of abortion tum out to be problematic. A principled position, i.e. rec­
ognizing the right to life from the moment of conception, or recognizing the 
woman’s right to abortion throughout pregnancy, has consequences which 
are untenable given today’s social and moral values. A compromise solution 
might intuitively seem the most appropriate, but by its very nature lacks a 
sound theoretical basis. The conclusion seems to be that all of the solutions 
proposed to the abortion issue lack a solid conceptual basis.
Although the respective constitutional courts and legislators have offered 
different solutions to the abortion question, some taking a principled stand, 
others proposing a compromise solution, the dilemmas signalled at the theo­
retical level reappear in full strength. The United States Supreme Court and 
the German Federal Constitutional Court had a principled view on the fun­
damental rights to life and to self-determination, but could not avoid contra­
dictions in their arguments which undermined the principles they pro-
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claimcd. The Italian, French and Austrian courts expressed themselves more 
cautiously and refrained from taking a stand on the fundamental rights at 
stake.
Only the German Constitutional Court recognized the right to life of the 
fetus, as from the 14th day after conception. The other courts put less em­
phasis on the claim to life of the unborn by declaring it a duty, or an inter­
est, o f the the state to protect unborn life. The pregnant wom an's right to 
self-determination, on the other hand, was implicitly recognized by all courts 
except the German one. No court, however, mentioned explicitly the right to 
self-determination, and only the US Supreme Court declared the woman’s 
right to abortion.
The most striking aspect of these five constitutional rulings is that 
although the respective courts seem to take quite different stands on the fun­
damental rights to life and to self-determination, in actual fact their positions 
are much closer than the wording of their decisions seems to suggest. The 
German Federal Constitutional Court, although proclaiming the fetus’ right 
to life as from the 14th day after conception, implicitly allows for a viola­
tion of this right by recognizing an indications solution which includes
more than just a strictly medical indication for abortion. By allowing for a 
fetal, ethical, and particularly a social indication, the Court abandoned in re­
ality the position that the fetus has a right to life from an early stage in its 
development. The American Supreme Court, on the other hand, actually 
took a more moderate stand than the radical wording of its /?oi-ruling declar­
ing the woman’s fundamental right to abortion would imply. The Court’s 
statement that the states have an important interest in the protection of the 
potentiality of human life, which grows in substance during pregnancy and 
becomes compelling so as to prohibit abortion from the moment of viabil­
ity, indicates that the Court in fact adopts a developmental criterion of hu­
manness.
What can be concluded is that, although the respective courts emphasized 
different aspects of, and expressed divergent views on the fundamental rights 
to life and to self-determination, in the end they ail adopted a compromise 
solution. The German and American courts made a very serious attempt to 
take a principled stand, but could not avoid contradictions in their arguments 
which implied a more moderate stand than the ones declared. The outcome 
was very similar in the French and Italian court decisions. What this com­
parative analysis shows is that it seems impossible to defend either the posi­
tion that the unborn have the right to life from the moment o f conception or
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the position that the pregnant woman should have the right to decide on 
abortion throughout pregnancy. The findings o f chaptcr II, namely that there 
does not seem to be a sound way to define the right to life are therefore re­
confirmed by the constitutional practice. The tendency to find a compromise 
between the protection of the value of unborn life and the respect for the 
m other’s right to self-determination is a common trait of these constitu­
tional decisions.
Given the fact that it turns out to be impossible to define the right to life 
in a principled way, a compromise solution which avoids the question of the 
right to life still needs a sound legal and constitutional basis. This poses the 
question of the validity of the time-phase rule and of the indications solu­
tion, the legal answers given to the dilemma of abortion in these five coun­
tries.
The arguments used by the German Court for imposing an indications so­
lution were that this would further the aim of the protection of unborn life 
and would reduce the incidence of abortion. A major objection, however, 
against the indications solution (including a social indication) passed by the 
German legislator is that it gives the impression o f being an objective stan­
dard which in reality it is no t The content of the very vague standard of the 
social indication will depend on the personal views o f the individual doctor 
and on the ability of the pregnant woman to convince her doctor of the valid­
ity of her arguments. In contrast to the medical, fetal and ethical indications, 
which can be ascertained in quite an objective way by a doctor on the basis 
of his medical knowledge, the rightness or validity o f social justifications 
for abortion do not require medical expertise and cannot be checked in an ob­
jective way by one or even two doctors. This type o f indications solution 
will, therefore, result in a liberal or restrictive abortion practice depending on 
the attitude of the individual doctor. This creates an unfair situation in which 
women are able to obtain an abortion more or less easily depending on the 
particular circumstances and not on objective criteria. The indications solu­
tion thus seems to lack a sound constitutional basis in that it violates the 
fundamental principle of fairness and the fundamental right to equality, and 
because, as has already been pointed out, it does not guarantee the fetus’ 
right to life.
In this light the French and Italian approach seem to offer a better solu­
tion. The time-phase rule does not create the inequalities that the indications 
solution brings about: a woman is not judged on the basis of vague, subjec­
tive standards; the decision is left to her. The argument against the time-
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phase rule is that it does not guarantee even a minimal protection o f unborn 
life, a basic element of a compromise solution on abortion. A time-phase 
rule with dissuasion requirements, as adopted in France and ItjyyTseems to 
take away part of this objection. The procedure the pregnant woman has to 
go through is aimed at dissuading her or making her reflect on her decision. 
This gives a greater guarantee than the indications solution that she will take 
a responsible decision. Strengthening the sense of responsibility o f the 
pregnant woman through counselling is perhaps the most effective way of 
protecting unborn life and does not affect the woman’s right to equal protec­
tion by the law. This is not to say that the time-phase rule with dissuasion 
requirements is the only solution to the abortion issue. However, from a 
constitutional viewpoint it is the least objectionable o f  the legal options 
presently available.
The fundamental rights contingent on the right to abortion have created 
less problems for constitutional courts and legislators. There is also a greater 
consensus of opinion on these values.
The father o f the fetus was unanimously denied a role in the abortion de­
cision of his partner by all constitutional courts and legislators. The more 
delicate problem of the role of the parents in the decision o f their pregnant 
daughter of minority age was handled rather differently in the different coun­
tries under review. However, in no instance was the minor granted an uncon­
ditional right to decide on abortion.
A very striking feature of these five legislations and constitutional court 
decisions is the central and at the same time ambiguous role that has been 
assigned to the medical profession in the abortion procedure. The doctor’s 
right to professional freedom has been fully recognized in all the countries 
discussed. The difference between the American and European debates on the 
doctor’s freedom of profession is that in the US there has been greater em­
phasis on the doctor’s right to determine the abortion procedure, whereas in 
Europe the focus has been on his right to refuse abortion assistance. The 
reason for this distinction seems to be that in the US abortion has been 
treated to a large extent as a medical act and the abortion procedure has been 
left mostly in the hands of the medical profession. European courts and leg­
islators, on the other hand, have refused to treat abortion is this way. On the 
European continent the abortion procedure is closely defined by law, which 
often imposes penal sanctions, and doctors too are bound by these procedural 
rules. Abortion is therefore not treated on a par with other medical interven­
tions.
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The ambiguity of the European laws, with the exception o f  the Italian 
law, lies in the fact, however, that the medical profession is free to provide 
or refuse abortion assistance at its own discretion. Although the medical pro­
fession is bound by certain procedural rules, the doctor’s freedom of profes­
sion is guaranteed. It is on the basis o f this freedom that the medical profes­
sion may come to an independent decision on abortion. In the German situa­
tion the medical profession has been given the additional task of deciding on 
the soundness of a woman’s abortion request. In Austria, France, Italy and 
Germany the doctor also has a role in the counselling (and dissuading) of the 
pregnant woman before the intervention can take place. This means that doc­
tors not only perform abortions but also take part -  directly or indirectly -  
in the decision making process. This raises the question of whether doctors 
are the most suitable persons to decide or counsel on abortions requested for 
non-medical reasons.
The discussion on the woman’s right to subsidized abortion shows a clear 
divergence in outcome between Europe and the US. Public funding of abor­
tion has been generally accepted in Europe but has been clearly rejected in 
the US both by the Supreme Court and by the federal government. The limi­
tations on Medicaid funding of abortion in the US should, however, be seen 
in the context o f a generally different altitude towards public assistance to 
the needy. In Europe health care is considered a public concern, in the US, 
however, health insurance is mostly seen as a private matter. The reason 
why abortion is paid for out of public funds in most cases in Europe and not 
in the U.S. is to be found more in the European welfare-state ideology rather 
than in a particular divergence in views on the underlying principles of sub­
sidized abortion between the US and Europe.
The view that abortion should be funded because abortion and childbirth 
deserve the same treatment was rejected on both continents. A distinction 
has been made between voluntary and medically necessary abortions. The 
view that non-therapeutic abortions do not deserve the same treatment as 
other necessary medical acts was originally adopted by the French govern­
ment, and is now finding support in the German government. It is also im­
plicitly adhered to in Austria. Italy is the only European country where abor­
tions are funded like other medical interventions, but this fact can largely be 
explained by the existence of a national health service. In the US, after the 
passing of the Hyde Amendment and after a series of Supreme Court deci­
sions, the federal funding of abortion interventions is limited to ‘medically
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neccssary’ abortions in the narrow sense. The states also have the constitu­
tional right to apply the same restrictions to the state funding of abortions.
The second claim on which the right to subsidized abortion could be 
based, the idea of abortion as a welfare right, has been rejected by all five 
countries. All abortion rules have as an objective the reduction of the inci­
dence of abortion and regard abortion as a ‘last resort’. The promotion of 
contraception was an integral part of the Italian, French and German abortion 
law reforms. Instead of accepting abortion as a welfare right, the policy has 
been to improve the social circumstances in which women live so as to take 
away the difficulties connected with childbirth. The American rejection of 
abortion as a welfare right is implicit in the Supreme Court's view that the 
right to abortion does not include the financial access to that right.
In the space of two years five constitutional courts belonging to the same 
Western liberal-democratic tradition ruled on the abortion issue. The debate 
presented itself in very similar terms in these five countries. This study has 
attempted to come up with explanations for the divergences in the respective 
constitutional rulings on abortion within the context of the national legal 
orders. A first observation to be made is that -  except for the US Supreme 
Court -  the constitutional courts simply had to decide the abortion question 
presented to them;they had no choice. In the French, German and Austrian 
case, the recourse to the constitutional court served as a political instrument 
of the defeated opposition in Parliament to block the liberalization of abor­
tion. The two decisions by the Italian Constitutional Court were responses 
to political demands for an abortion reform and for the repeal of the abortion 
reform respectively. The US Supreme Court was the only court which had 
the discretionary power to refuse to rule on the abortion question, although 
in fact the question might have been deemed ‘ripe’ for judicial review.
The outcome of the decisions in terms of the language used and the re­
spect shown for the legislation under review seems to fit into the respective 
jurisprudential traditions, which are characterized by different degrees of judi­
cial self-restraint and activism. The outcome seems also to have been influ­
enced by the type of legislation under review, and by its ‘representativeness 
o f the popular will’. This is particularly the case in Germany and Italy.
Irrespective o f the impact they had on the legislation under review, the 
American and German constitutional rulings were the most dissimilar. These 
differences could be explained by ihe different social philosophies prevailing 
in the jurisprudence of the respective courts, and by the constitutional and 
legal history of the respective abortion provisions. In spite o f the fact that
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The ambiguity of the European laws, with the exception of the Italian 
law, lies in the fact, however, that the medical profession is free 10 provide 
or refuse abortion assistance at its own discretion. Although the medical pro­
fession is bound by certain procedural rules, the doctor’s freedom of profes­
sion is guaranteed. It is on the basis o f this freedom that the medical profes­
sion may come to an independent decision on abortion. In the German situa­
tion the medical profession has been given the additional task of deciding on 
the soundness of a woman’s abortion request. In Austria, France, Italy and 
Germany the doctor also has a role in the counselling (and dissuading) of the 
pregnant woman before the intervention can take place. This means that doc­
tors not only perform abortions but also take part -  directly or indirectly -  
in the decision making process. This raises the question of whether doctors 
are the most suitable persons to decide or counsel on abortions requested for 
non-medical reasons.
The discussion on the woman’s right to subsidized abortion shows a clear 
divergence in outcome between Europe and the US. Public funding of abor­
tion has been generally accepted in Europe but has been clearly rejected in 
the US both by the Supreme Court and by the federal government. The limi­
tations on Medicaid funding of abortion in the US should, however, be seen 
in the context o f  a generally different attitude towards public assistance to 
the needy. In Europe health care is considered a public concern, in the US, 
however, health insurance is mostly seen as a private matter. The reason 
why abortion is paid for out o f public funds in most cases in Europe and not 
in the U.S. is to be found more in the European welfare-state ideology rather 
than in a particular divergence in views on the underlying principles of sub­
sidized abortion between the US and Europe.
The view that abortion should be funded because abortion and childbirth 
deserve the same treatment was rejected on both continents. A distinction 
has been made between voluntary and medically necessary abortions. The 
view that non-therapeutic abortions do not deserve the same treatment as 
other necessary medical acts was originally adopted by the French govern­
ment, and is now finding support in the German government. It is also im­
plicitly adhered to in Austria. Italy is the only European country where abor­
tions are funded like other medical interventions, but this fact can largely be 
explained by the existence of a national health service. In the US, after the 
passing of the Hyde Amendment and after a series of Supreme Court deci­
sions, the federal funding of abortion interventions is limited to ‘medically
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necessary’ abortions in the narrow sense. The states also have the constitu­
tional right to apply the same restrictions to the state funding of abortions.
The second claim on which the right to subsidized abortion could be 
based, the idea of abortion as a welfare right, has been rejected by all five 
countries. All abortion rules have as an objective the reduction of the inci­
dence of abortion and regard abortion as a ‘last resort*. The promotion of 
contraccpiion was an integral part of the Italian, French and German abortion 
law reforms. Instead of accepting abortion as a welfare right, the policy has 
been to improve the social circumstances in which women live so as to lake 
away the difficulties connected with childbirth. The American rejection of 
abortion as a welfare right is implicit in the Supreme Court’s view that the 
right to abortion does not include the financial access to that right.
In the space of two years five constitutional courts belonging to the same 
Western libcral-democralic tradition ruled on the abortion issue. The debate 
presented itself in very similar terms in these five countries. This study has 
attempted to come up with explanations for the divergences in the respective 
constitutional rulings on abortion within the context of the national legal 
orders. A first observation to be made is that -  except for the US Supreme 
Court -  the constitutional courts simply had to decide the abortion question 
presented to them;they had no choice. In the French, German and Austrian 
case, the recourse to the constitutional court served as a political instrument 
of the defeated opposition in Parliament to block the liberalization of abor­
tion. The two decisions by the Italian Constitutional Court were responses 
to political demands for an abortion reform and for the repeal o f the abortion 
reform respectively. The US Supreme Court was the only court which had 
the discretionary power to refuse to rule on the abortion question, although 
in fact the question might have been deemed ‘ripe’ for judicial review.
The outcome of the decisions in terms of the language used and the re­
spect shown for the legislation under review seems to fit into the respective 
jurisprudential traditions, which are characterized by different degrees of judi­
cial self-restraint and activism. The outcome seems also to have been influ­
enced by the type of legislation under review, and by its ‘representativeness 
o f the popular will’. This is particularly the case in Germany and Italy.
Irrespective o f the impact they had on the legislation under review, the 
American and German constitutional rulings were the most dissimilar. These 
differences could be explained by the different social philosophies prevailing 
in the jurisprudence o f the respective courts, and by the constitutional and 
legal history of the respective abortion provisions. In spite of the fact that
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legal and constitutional history have few contributions to make to such a 
‘new’ problem as abortion, the Second World War experience seems to have 
conditioned the German court’s position on abortion. The symbolic meaning 
o f abortion as the killing of ‘innocent human life’ recalled the total disregard 
o f human life during that period.
Finally, the constitutional decisions on abortion once again show that 
neither the wording of the constitutional norms nor the political background 
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